Performance Anxiety: The Nature of Performance Management in the NHS under New Labour by Vijayan, S
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Performance Anxiety: 
The nature of performance management in the NHS under New Labour 
 
 
Shana Vijayan 
 
 
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of Science and Technology Studies 
University College London 
 
1 
Declaration 
I, Shana Vijayan, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where 
information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in 
the thesis.  
2 
Abstract  
This thesis explores both the proliferation and prominence of ‘performance’ in the NHS, 
focusing on the New Labour years from 1997-2010.  The research’s main objective was to 
understand how performance policy impacts the work-place experience: to understand the 
nature of work undertaken by performance managers, the tools used and the effect of these 
techniques. The secondary objective was to understand the goals of performance 
management. 
 
The introduction and rise of performance saw a change in expert authority. A new set of 
professionals had arrived in the NHS: regulators, auditors and performance managers.  
This thesis looks at the performance managers’ body of expertise, drawing upon several 
forms of qualitative research. The primary research tool used was institutional 
ethnography, which included focused interviews, a case study and experiences and notes 
gathered during a period based as a participant in NHS organisations.    
 
Documentary analysis carried out in the first phase of this thesis revealed that the principal 
rhetoric employed by politicians concerned the function of performance management in 
reducing risk and harm to patients.  However, further research based on interviews and 
ethnography suggests that performance was experienced as a process of rationalisation and 
stigma, with risk rarely mentioned in the same way as in policy documents.  In particular, 
various aspects of rationalisation, including measuring, quantifying and tabularisation, 
were deployed, these processes being a means for state surveillance.  Performance, it will 
be argued, was part of the bureaucratic machine by which efficiency and effectiveness 
were judged in areas where the state previously had little knowledge or information.   
 
The research draws heavily on approaches in Science and Technology Studies to consider 
‘performance’ and audit as a form of socio-technological intervention as well the 
Sociology of Health to inform issues of organisational and work-based stigma.   
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“Reputation is an idle and most false imposition: oft got without merit, and lost without deserving” 
“Othello,” Act 2, Scene 3 
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Preface 
My interest in audit systems stems from working in NHS performance management 
between 2000 and 2010.  I am interested in how the NHS is held to account and the means 
and methods of accountability.    
 
My career in the NHS began within Patient Information at a hospital Trust, where I 
worked on Chapter 10 of the newly published NHS Plan.  I ensured patients had access to 
clear and accurate information on all aspects of their care. This is one of the key 
documents I look at in more detail as part of my research. While New Labour were elected 
in 1997, the NHS Plan was not published until 2000, yet that intervening period of 
consultation and consolidation resulted in much of the foundation to NHS reform and set 
some long-term goals. 
 
I moved from working in a hospital Trust to become the Senior Information Analyst in a 
Shared Services in 2002.  A Shared Service organisation provided a number of services to 
local Trusts; it stemmed from the strategy of local centralization of ancillary services, 
usually IT, HR and Finance.  While managing a team of analysts, who provided 
information for a cluster of PCTs, I became aware of the problems concerning information 
gathering to which national government seemed oblivious.  Standard information requests 
by the Department of Health were difficult to deliver: numerous gatekeepers restricted 
access to information, different NHS databases held variations of the same data, and 
finally there was the time lag as data was cleaned.    
 
My last role before beginning my research was as Head of Performance and Information 
for a Primary Care Trust.  From 2004 to 2007 I monitored performance within the PCT 
using the newly established Annual Health Check Framework set out by the health 
regulator. The position I was in led me to consider certain issues, e.g. the direction of the 
NHS, the objectives of performance and how information was processed.  However, no 
real reflection was possible while I worked in an organisation requiring answers 
immediately.  I rarely got the chance to comment on these issues while at work; research 
seemed a meaningful way of developing my thoughts.   
 
I moved from the PCT to a Strategic Health Authority in 2007 to lead on performance 
management for a geographical group of PCTs and hospital Trusts. Throughout this period 
10 
I continued my research with the consent of my employer. The emphasis here was to 
ensure sustainable solutions for improvement against national targets while holding 
organisations to account in these areas.  Once again I found myself focusing on the 
purpose of performance: what it seeks to achieve both at a local and a regional level.  
Others in the SHA felt similarly. Their thoughts are considered in greater depth in the case 
study central to this research.   
 
By 2009 I had taken on a position at the Department of Health in policy and performance. 
I now had the opportunity to watch the internal workings of government, to see how 
health policy was formulated and the tension between the political rhetoric of local 
responsibility versus national state accountability.  During this time New Labour left 
office to be replaced by the Conservative-Liberal Coalition government in 2010. A decade 
had passed where I saw performance management dominate the NHS.  This thesis is a 
reflection on that time.               
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Chapter 1  
Introduction  
“When a bedpan falls to the floor in Tredegar Hospital, its sound should echo in 
the Palace of Westminster.”1 Aneurin Bevan, MP, Minister of Health 1945-51 
 
This thesis explores the proliferation of performance management in the National Health 
Service (NHS) with particular focus on the years from 1997-2010 under the Labour 
Government.  My interest in this issue stemmed from working in the NHS from 2000 to 
2010, a period which saw the rise of a defined performance culture. Deleting   
 
The main objective of the thesis is to assess how performance management policy impacts 
the work-place experience; to understand the nature of work undertaken by performance 
managers, the tools used, and the effect these techniques have.  The secondary objective is 
to understand the goals of performance management. This research set out to find why 
performance management was pivotal to New Labour’s governance of the NHS and to 
understand the impact and unintended consequences the introduction of these systems had 
on the NHS, its patients and the wider public.  The rhetoric employed by politicians 
focused on reducing risk; my research suggests that performance was equally about 
rationalisation.  The introduction of performance saw a change in expert authority; a new 
set of professionals had arrived in the NHS: regulators, auditors and performance 
managers.  This thesis examines the performance managers’ body of expertise - unpacking 
the repertoires which served to legitimise their authority within the NHS.     
 
                                                 
1
 Nairne, P., (1984) pp33–51 
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It is important to understand NHS performance management because there may be a 
difference between political rhetoric and how a policy works in practice. Government’s 
vision and aim can be distorted; daily performance management in the NHS may not 
necessarily be what was articulated and intended originally.  This performance 
management culture is replicated in other parts of the public sector.  I use as key research 
questions those posed by Jeremy Dent and Mahmoud Ezzamel in relation to accounting, 
with the latter substituted by performance management. The questions then are as follows: 
“1) how does accounting fit in the totality of an organisation’s activities? How do such 
observed abuses in accounting interact with other organisational mechanism? 2) What 
forces shape the accounting functions in organisations? Why do accounting practices 
evolve over time?  Such questions should, perhaps, be addressed before deriving 
normative accounting propositions.”2  The substitution of performance management for 
accounting is non-contentious; performance management is already formally considered a 
subset of accounting. With its propensity for monitoring, providing external scrutiny and 
internal control, it is a form of auditing.   
 
I aim to contribute to broad debates in STS on how knowledge is created and used, both 
internally by the NHS and externally by the wider public.  I sought to understand how 
technologies and conceptual tools used in performance management originate and the 
manner in which these are diffused throughout the NHS. The benefits and deficiencies are 
considered in order to understand how these technologies are shaping and skewing our 
view of the NHS. Technologies are immensely powerful; their application and advantages, 
however, cannot be separated from their detrimental effects on people’s lives and labour. 
Therefore, assessing how performance technologies alter the way in which staff work was 
an important aspect in my research. I concentrate on how performance management’s 
focus, under New Labour, on measuring certain aspects of healthcare, presented a distinct 
view of the NHS which had a wider audience than those immediately concerned with 
health policy.   
 
Performance management, through the technologies it utilises, is like a kaleidoscope.  It 
attempts to view an array of what would otherwise appear as haphazard data and produce 
a coherent meaningful picture to the observer.  It looks to shed light on areas that appear 
unknowable, magnifying and multiplying facets of the system.  The viewer has the 
impression that what is seen are facts speaking for themselves, untouched, unrefined and 
                                                 
2
Dent, J., and Ezzamel, M., (1995) p39 
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unadulterated. The formation of facts lies in a heavily enriched process of translations and 
transformations and yet they appear distinct entities, separate to all that has gone before.  
What is seen is only that which is allowed to be displayed, the authorised account.  
Performance managers therefore are not only actors, but witnesses to the birth of these 
facts and providers of the literary technology for the official narrative; indeed they are 
actors in the laboratory where facts are produced.
3
  The tools at a performance manager’s 
disposal that aid the production of these facts are actants, Latour’s term to describe non-
human actors within a process.
4
  Actants are as necessary to the production of facts as the 
actors, the performance managers themselves.   
 
Performance tries to emulate science, in both its practice and culture; in so doing, like 
science, it has its own community, its own rules and standards of behaviour.
5
 The New 
Labour government prided itself in how performance management underpinned the health 
service. Applying methodologies in a scientific manner, that is, in an unbiased, rigorous 
fashion, was a sign of progress and transparency.
6
 This research considers the credibility 
of such an assertion and whether it is justifiable.  The intention is to look critically at how 
performance as an activity produces figures, data and evidence, how this frames 
perceptions of an organisation, and what it actually means to be a successful or a failing 
Trust. I consider how translated information is appraised and evaluated and what these 
assessments and judgements mean to organisations.  I look at what the idea of uniformity 
and standardisation, a one-size-fits-all approach to healthcare, has on those that work in it 
and how regulation enables the State to gather information on otherwise opaque parts of 
the NHS.  I seek to understand the process of classification and the role performance 
managers play as gatekeepers of knowledge as well as their role in producing evidence 
cultures
7
, epistemic cultures
8
 and epistemological cultures
9
.   
 
The concept of performance as originally implemented in the 1980s by Thatcher was one 
that increased efficiency, economy and effectiveness in delivering healthcare
10
.  How then 
did political rhetoric move to seeing it primarily as a form of risk analysis and monitoring? 
If performance is to be about studying risk then it becomes necessary to examine the 
                                                 
3
 Latour, B., and Woolgar S., (1986) 
4
 Latour., B., (1987) 
5
 Barnes, B., Bloor, D., and Henry, J., (1996) 
6
 McDonnell, O., Lohan, M., Hyde, A., & Porter, S., (2009) p170 
7
 Collins, H., (2004) 
8
 Knorr Cetina, K., (1999) 
9
 Fox Keller, E., (2002) 
10
 Klein, R., (1995) p139 
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impact of measuring the degree and effectiveness of risk avoidance measures, as well as 
the methodological challenges created by implementing such a system.  I look at why 
organisations appear to grow more fragile rather than resilient to risk, an outcome that 
conflicts with the New Labour Government’s aim of proliferating performance 
management throughout the entire NHS.  The research shows that risk appears to 
accumulate steadily rather than always diminishing or dispersing throughout systems.  I 
examine how the habit of work practices is inculcated into NHS Trusts and how staff 
incorporate rules without due reflection to wider consequences in striving to be a high-
achieving organisation.  Two types of organisations, a Primary Care Trust (PCT) and a 
Strategic Health Authority (SHA) were my base as an ethnographer and the location of 
majority of this research.  Both types of organisations will be described in more detail in 
Chapter Two.   
 
In Britain, when New Labour took office in 1997, no systematic research of NHS 
performance management existed.  The only research that had been undertaken was in the 
United States, and its main focus was on relationship between patients and clinicians as 
insurance companies were keen to make experiences more cost-efficient.
11
  This was of 
limited value as the approach to healthcare in Britain is very different, based on general 
taxation rather than private health insurance,
12
 with patients being seen by general 
practitioners (GPs) in the first instance rather than specialists.  This work deals with issues 
of modernity, trust, professionalism, accountability and regulation, all of which underpin 
the performance management agenda of the NHS.  At the start of the work for this thesis, 
there was no specific analysis of NHS performance management under the Labour 
government.  This research was an attempt to fill that void.    
 
The next chapter considers the formation of the NHS. Explaining to an outsider all aspects 
of performance in the NHS is often difficult.  It is necessary to explain the healthcare 
system in Britain from its inception, considering the ideological forces and historical 
context that shaped its conception but also led to its reform. This chapter looks at the roots 
of the performance culture and how it came to exist.  It also gives a brief account of the 
current structure and the different levels of care within the NHS.  This chapter will argue 
that performance management and the rhetoric employed prior to 1997, particularly under 
the Thatcher and Major governments, were about increasing productivity and providing 
greater value for money.  The Conservative governments’ concern was how to get the best 
                                                 
11
 Martinez, J., (2001) p10 
12
 Scambler, G., ed. (2001) p198 
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return from the NHS on taxpayers’ money.  Following New Labour’s success in the 1997 
election, there was a shift in government rhetoric as to the purpose and deployment of 
performance management.  This thesis considers how and why this change took place and 
attempts to elucidate the reason why this different narrative was employed.  Chapter Two, 
therefore, gives a general overview of the NHS, including its structure at the time of 
undertaking the research, providing a description of Primary Care Trusts, Strategic Health 
Authorities and the role of the Department of Health.  
 
Chapter Three gives an overview of the theoretical framework upon which this thesis 
rests.  It draws upon literature in Science and Technology Studies as well as the Sociology 
of Health, which has informed and driven the research.  It begins with a discussion of 
authors whose work was relevant as they discussed significant themes and issues that were 
central to the research, whether or not they have explicitly spoken about the NHS.  Having 
worked in the NHS for over a decade in roles relating to performance, my expertise 
allowed me to see clear links between their work and specific issues that arose in mine.  
Performance management is a tool of bureaucracy, therefore this chapter discusses the 
different effects of bureaucracy as expounded by Weber, Marx, Foucault and Arendt, and 
more recently co-opted and further developed by Bauman, Ritzer and Scott with regard to 
rationalisation. These writers provide details on the impact of bureaucracy on the 
individual, the organisation and the interplay with the state. This provides both context 
and a basis against which the research I conducted within the NHS could be set.  
Additionally, this chapter considers notions of risk as presented by Douglas, Beck and 
Giddens, and how this impacts relationships of trust and accountability within a risk 
society. Power’s work on audit combines ideas of rationalisation and accountability and 
this is studied in detail and will be central to my thesis.  Finally, an examination of 
language as a form of work as well as in relation to stigma and work in healthcare is 
considered.  Initially this research was based solely on a science and technology studies 
framework, but, as it developed, the need became apparent to draw also upon the 
sociology of health to bring greater understanding to the research findings.  The purpose 
here is to understand more precisely remarks made by participants in the research 
interviews while giving further meaning to the ethnographic observations made.         
 
Chapter Four sets out the methods, detailing the research aims and reasons for the 
approach chosen.  It details how ethics approval was sought and granted and how several 
forms of qualitative research were considered, before finally deciding upon in-depth 
interviews, observations taken as an institutional ethnographer, and the use of the ‘18 
17 
weeks policy’ as a case study, as the most appropriate tools for this research. The key 
policy documents studied were ‘The New NHS: Modern, Dependable,’ ‘The NHS Plan: A 
plan for investment, a plan for reform’ and ‘Shifting the Balance of Power: Securing 
delivery.’   
 
Chapter Five focuses on how the risk narrative was employed by New Labour when 
talking to NHS staff, patients and the wider public. The implication of political rhetoric 
was that a greater understanding of risk through increased performance management 
would simultaneously lead to a change in staff behaviour and a safer environment for 
patients and public. Documentary analysis suggests New Labour saw performance 
management as a tool for reducing harm.  This chapter considers how effective 
performance has been in reducing perceived risks.  Through studying the daily work of 
performance managers I assess if this is the case, whether there is a correlation between 
the normative and descriptive accounts and whether the rhetoric holds substance.  
Evidence from interviews and the ethnographic research shows, contrary to government 
rhetoric, that risk rarely features in the workplace and is not a principal part of 
performance culture.    
 
This chapter looks at the introduction of performance managers into the NHS, studying all 
aspects of the work undertaken; tools and technologies used; the impact of such features 
as of star ratings and league tables in order to strengthen accountability though choice and 
consumer deliberation; the increase in the volume of data placed in the public arena and 
the publication of Trust information aimed to inform patients’ decision-making.  Access to 
performance-related figures of NHS organisations was intended to encourage competition 
between Trusts, thus driving up the overall quality in healthcare, while enabling the public 
to assess the performance of the service provided and holding that service to account 
locally.  This part of the thesis examines the evidence and shows the impact this has had 
on actual performance.   
 
Within Chapter Five the nature of ‘planning’ is also examined as it contributes 
significantly to a performance manager’s work.  High levels of planning undertaken by the 
NHS attempt to prevent a crisis but more often merely postpone the inevitable, there 
having been little change to the fundamental causes of the original problem. Planning, 
together with the implementation of greater levels of processes, procedures and protocols, 
is an attempt to increase local organisational accountability and I examine in detail what 
this means in practice for both staff and the wider NHS.       
18 
Finally, this chapter examines how, attempting to decrease risk, organisations seek to 
control variables and to limit internal influences and perceived external threats.  However, 
when reviewing events, it becomes apparent that there is a generalised increase in risk-
taking behaviour in order to fend off the oncoming crisis. Parties recognise the onset of a 
possible catastrophe and take measures to prevent such a situation. Innocent mistakes 
made once and with no immediate negative repercussions may be intentionally reproduced 
at a later date to enhance the organisation’s stated performance. These actions by their 
nature are outside the normal and accepted range of practices and therefore increase the 
magnitude of the eventual crisis. This chapter raises the question: if risk-minimising 
technologies have the opposite effect, why did the government continue to employ them? 
An attempt to answer this question, more fully and in greater detail, is provided in the next 
chapter.      
 
Chapter Six looks the nature of performance as both work and as a technology, 
particularly at various aspects of rationalisation, including measuring, quantifying, 
tabularisation and the use of these processes as state surveillance. It recognises how 
practices, procedures and protocols develop and how standards are set, later to be relaxed 
before being removed or disregarded.  The credibility of data collection processes is 
examined and the impact of centralised systems and greater homogenisation is 
investigated. Performance managers calculate and compensate for discrepancies in data as 
well as providing analysis in order to create generalisations. The effect of such 
generalisations on real risk reduction is evaluated. The issue of rationalisation creating 
systematic risks, as standardization of indicators can lead to structures that exacerbate risk, 
is considered. Risks not dealt with appropriately can snowball; small risks build 
cumulatively, gaining both momentum and magnitude, resulting in significant effects on 
an organisation’s ability to provide care safely. This chapter shows that, while risks are 
considered in abstraction, managers are sometimes unaware of the real and significant 
underlying problems; this leads to performance management systems that are overly 
optimistic in their view of an organisation’s outlook.  Performance managers may prefer 
to set or upgrade an indicator in order to avoid imposing penalties or sanctions on a 
department or organisation for an otherwise failing standard, particularly if they believe 
that those penalties will make no difference to the situation and have no positive impact on 
performance. 
 
Furthermore this chapter considers the value and appropriateness of ratings and the 
pressure NHS Trusts face in complying and conforming with government directives which 
19 
in some instances may not deliver any benefits to patient care.  As organisations work as 
autonomous units, self-interest and competition come to the fore. However, this can be 
self-defeating as departments vie for resources at the expense of others, to the detriment of 
the overall NHS system as well as at a cost to patient safety. This chapter focuses on how 
performance is part of the bureaucratic machine by which efficiency and effectiveness are 
judged in areas where the state previously had little information. It explains how 
performance has become synonymous with rationalisation in the minds of those working 
in this area.   
 
Chapter Seven examines stigma as an expression and effect of rationalisation on 
individuals in an organisation.  The findings detail staff experience of group and 
professional stigma.  Discussion centres on the role and characteristics of stigma in 
relation to organisational change within NHS Trusts, policy implementation and the 
language of performance.  This chapter considers the importance placed on staff 
involvement in consultation processes in contrast to the actual weight given to the views 
expressed, and how attitudes towards performance as a tool alter as managers become 
increasingly unconvinced of the value of seemingly arbitrary changes.  Where outcomes 
seem predetermined, the value of the consultative approach is challenged and staff 
question the contrived conditions under which their responses are evaluated and the 
contribution their work makes to ensuring a sustainable health service. This chapter also 
seeks to shed light on the terminology, language and characteristics specific to 
performance.  As in industry and the public sector, certain words are used and their 
meanings taken for granted in the NHS.  These words, used every day embody specific 
history, concepts and ideologies.  This chapter explains exclusive language of 
performance to those who do not share the same cultural context.  Dealing solely with 
specific words is inadequate; simplifying the language by replacing jargon only leads to 
misunderstandings.  The language of the NHS is a currency by which ideas and values are 
transmitted, shared and embedded.  There was nothing simple about its deployment or 
proliferation.  Elucidating and clarifying performance language brought analytical distance 
and perspective and was pivotal to the research.  
 
The eighth and last chapter looks back on the central claims made in this research. I look 
at what has been revealed about the way in which New Labour operated in government, 
what it adds to our knowledge in terms of establishing the process by which performance 
management was embedded into the NHS and how it came to be the lens through which 
NHS productivity was viewed and understood. While decentralised government was 
20 
advocated publicly by New Labour,
13
 within public services this was far from the case.  
Performance culture allowed a command and control approach to be retained in the NHS 
and power to be reasserted from the centre; it was New Labour’s attempt to bring order 
and focus to areas previously hidden from the State.  However, after thirteen years, New 
Labour’s time in office ended in May 2010; therefore, this chapter also considers the 
future for both the NHS and performance management given the proposed reconfiguration 
under the coalition government.   
 
Finally, “Performance Anxiety,” the title of this thesis, is drawn from Power’s claim that 
the "audit society is the anxious society". Its meaning is threefold.  Firstly, it ties together 
the initial political rhetoric of risk, where performance management was New Labour’s 
response to the highly publicised failings in the NHS, a way to mitigate further crises.  
Secondly, it recognises the anxiety of the state: New Labour’s need for control and 
oversight of all aspects of NHS functions. Thirdly, it acknowledges the stigma related to 
performance management work. These three themes are discussed in greater detail in the 
coming chapters of this thesis. 
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Chapter 2 
 
The History of NHS 
Performance Management 
 
2.1 Formation of the NHS  
This chapter provides a general account of the NHS’s formation, looking at the forces, 
both ideological and political, that were central to its creation.  Key points in its history 
are identified to provide the background and context to more current reforms.  This 
chapter also details how performance was established in the NHS, having been adopted 
from industry. It sets out how successive governments have advanced the benefits of 
performance until now it is firmly embedded within the culture.  This chapter gives an 
outline of the structure; the different levels of care provided in the NHS as well as the 
different tiers i.e. Primary Care Trusts, Strategic Health Authorities and the Department of 
Health.  Initial performance management was concerned about increasing productivity and 
providing taxpayers with greater value for money. This was particularly the case for 
Conservative governments, with the focus on financial and economic metrics; however, 
New Labour changed the rhetoric, purpose and deployment of performance management. 
The purpose of this chapter then is to offer a historical perspective which highlights this 
context and frames this new way of seeing in order to understand this transformation.             
 
Created on 5
th
 July 1948 by Clement Atlee’s Labour government, the National Health 
Service (NHS) aimed to provide everyone with free healthcare.  Its founding principle was 
that care would be provided based on the individual’s need of treatment and not on the 
individual’s ability to pay.14  The emerging view was that healthcare was a right of all 
citizens; nothing as fundamental as the provision of healthcare should be left to altruism, 
whether from established charities or bestowed erratically by the wealthy and 
philanthropic.  At the beginning there was much conflict along party political lines. The 
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medical professions, politicians and planners all appeared to hold entrenched and 
polarizing positions, views were stagnant and there was little room for negotiation.
15
 The 
British Medical Association was vocal in raising concerns that their clinical authority 
would be undermined and they would be inadequately remunerated.
16
 However, there was 
a bipartisan agreement amongst the main political parties that the existing services were in 
disarray and that voluntary hospitals were facing increasing financial difficulties.  This, 
together with the medical profession’s view that change was necessary, prompted efforts 
by the state to intervene in the provision of healthcare services.   
 
After the end of the World War II, in 1945, a sense of optimism and solidarity fed the idea 
of a new, prosperous Britain.  The NHS hoped to educate its citizens in maintaining 
healthy lifestyles that would enhance the physical and mental wellbeing of the nation.  
Heath promotion and illness prevention were central to the newly founded NHS.  The 
NHS would also provide diagnostic services, followed up by the appropriate treatment and 
long-term care for patients with chronic illness and disability.  The State’s focus was not 
just on individual health but on public health; the NHS was concerned with creating a 
strong and healthy nation.  “The NHS was recognised as a remarkable experiment in 
healthcare …and to outsiders an outstanding example of ‘socialised medicine’ in the 
western world.”17 The NHS was revolutionary, with underlying principles that were 
different to all that came before.  Treatment was free at the point of delivery; it was 
universal - everyone was eligible and entitled to NHS care irrespective of status; it was 
financed in its entirety through central taxation. The final point was crucial in gaining 
wider public support because it meant the wealthier contributed more than the poor. Other 
welfare schemes were different in that that they were predominantly insurance schemes.  
   
The NHS would care for its citizens from the ‘Cradle to the Grave’ and be funded 
exclusively through taxation via national insurance contributions made by all those who 
were eligible to work.  The NHS would come under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of 
State for Health, a senior cabinet post, via the Department of Health, formerly the 
Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS). The NHS was part of a wider welfare 
state, which sought to offer security not only in health care but also in education, 
employment and social security.  Though aspects of the welfare state had existed prior to 
this, “The Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Social Insurance and Allied 
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Services” produced by William Beveridge made an urgent and compelling case for a more 
structured and complete welfare state.
18
  In identifying the giant social evils of squalor, 
ignorance, want, idleness and disease, his report necessitated the idea of the welfare state.  
While Beveridge was not alone in raising these injustices, his eloquence gained him wide 
support, channelled the voice of the public and ensured that these concerns could not be 
casually cast aside.
19
     
     
The NHS became a popular and valued institution with those who remembered a time 
before its existence.  However, the golden age of social expenditure in the developed 
world, considered to be between 1960 and 1975, was ending and thus the problems the 
NHS faced were exacerbated and obvious.
20
  By the mid 1970s, there was a tightening of 
government spending on public services, due in part to the oil crisis.  This saw the Labour 
government of the day in conflict with trade unions, a section of the electorate on whose 
support they had previously relied.
21
  During the Winter of Discontent, over half of the 
NHS staff took part in some form of strike action leading to a total of 1.4 million days 
lost. To date this is the “greatest episode of industrial unrest in the history of the health 
service.”22  There was a sense of militancy amongst staff in the NHS which had been 
absent in the previous decades, due partly to the monopoly-like status the NHS held for 
health service workers. There was conflict within the medical profession as different types 
of doctors sought to differentiate themselves through their professional bodies (e.g. Royal 
Colleges) in order to improve their pay and conditions.
23
  Other staff groups with the NHS 
followed the medical profession and unionised in order to strengthen their voice. This 
friction between unions and government was further exacerbated by the change in 
government from Labour to Conservative in 1979.  The 1979 Conservative manifesto 
proposed cutting bureaucracy and decentralising the service and the eventual change in 
government brought about a corresponding change in economic policy.  There was a shift 
to privatisation, lighter taxation and a further tightening of public spending, the result of 
which was a restriction in the finances of the NHS.  There was greater caution in how 
budgets were spent and the working environment became more overtly aware of the fiscal 
pressures placed upon the system. The government expected a greater degree of restraint; 
the years of milk and honey were over for the NHS.  
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2.2 The NHS under the Conservatives; the formative performance years   
The collapse in the consensus that had previously existed over both funding and the 
structure of the NHS was replaced with ideas of ‘New Public Management’.  Britain, like 
many other liberal nations, has a strong welfare state, unlike the welfare state of neo-
corporatist Scandinavian countries however, Britain’s welfare state does not co-exist 
easily with the market.  The New Public Management refers to Margaret Thatcher’s 1980s 
economic ideology, later picked up by New Labour, of replicating the private sector’s 
administrative practice including the introduction of market forces, cost control 
mechanisms, financial transparency and increased accountability, into the welfare state.  
During this period central government instituted a series of measures to reduce public 
spending based on the three Es: Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness.  The principles of 
good housekeeping were applied to the State and its institutions. The distribution and 
accessibility of information had become mainstream and, as such, performance indicators 
(PIs) were introduced in 1983 to measure progress, their aim to raise productivity.  PI 
comparisons allowed policy makers within the Department of Health to see at a new level 
of detail all parts of the NHS.
24
  Within the public health sector, changes incorporating this 
philosophy were most clearly seen in the management of Health Authorities.    
 
However, while changes were made to individual policies to drive competition and 
efficiency, this was not done in any comprehensive way by the early Thatcher 
government. While Bevan had introduced one single piece of legislation, which had a 
huge impact, the Thatcher legacy to the NHS would be made from a series of reforms 
whose cumulative effect was comparable to Bevan’s vision.25  ‘New Public Management’ 
had its own language and 1984 saw the rebranding of “efficiency saving” to “cost 
improvement.” Sir Derek Rayner, the then Chief Executive of Marks and Spencer’s, had 
been brought in from the private sector to examine the NHS.  His findings led to the 
introduction of a competition within the tendering and procurement process in non-clinical 
fields such as domestic services, and the selling of NHS assets, including hospital 
accommodation, as well as the use of performance indicators. Following Rayner’s report 
there was the new and additional expectation that Health Authorities should be in a 
position to generate their own income.  Health Authorities achieved this through a number 
of schemes including treating private patients. Rayner’s suggestions are important not 
only because they introduced competition to the NHS but because they created a culture 
where measuring different types of activity became the norm. That this was done in 
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relation to billing processes and finance makes it no less significant to the history of 
performance.       
 
Before 1991, Health Authorities had responsibility for distributing resources to local 
services as well as managing those services.  During the early 1990s, this changed, and 
Health Authorities became responsible for assessing the needs of the local population and 
contracting with public or private sector providers to meet those needs.  Service providers, 
hospital and community health units, became responsible for managing the provision of 
services.  Purchasers could choose from a number of providers and were no longer 
restricted to their local provider.  This new system, it was hoped, would bring market 
forces into the public sphere, encouraging a more competitive and cost-effective service.  
Publicly, the Department of Health referred to this process as allowing the money to 
follow patients, increasing the available choice of service providers to patients. These 
reforms led to a redefinition of notions of consumers and to a greater degree public 
services.   
 
Here, it is necessary to define the public and private sectors, because, as shown, there was 
a significant rise in the role the private sector played in public services.  The public sector 
refers to services and the delivery of those services which are funded by the state purse, 
whether at a local or national level.  Traditionally the private sector is independent of the 
state; it is self-funding through its ability to generate profit.  As mentioned, privatisation 
was a central part of Conservative thinking.  The private sector and the NHS were 
expected to compete for business; the Government wanted a level playing field on 
contracts awarded to the public sector.  The purpose of this approach was not only to 
break the monopoly the NHS had on tenders but to drive the cost of services down.  If its 
secondary purpose was to reduce the power of unions within the public sector workforce, 
then this policy was a success.  Privatisation inevitably led to the introduction of 
temporary contracts for staff and thus greater use of casual staff.  This ‘flexible workforce’ 
was positively encouraged by government, though Local Health Authorities continued to 
be sceptical about their use, as the standard of quality delivered by companies outside the 
NHS was thought to be inferior.        
 
The Griffiths Report (1983) was produced by Roy Griffiths, the then Chairman of 
Sainsbury’s, at the behest of Norman Fowler, MP, Secretary of State for Social Services 
(1981-87).  The finding of the report spoke of ‘institutional stagnation’ where health 
authorities ‘were being swamped with directives without being given direction’ and where 
26 
introducing change was extremely difficult with ‘decision making through a consensus 
approach leading to long delays in the management process.’26 His two central criticisms 
of the NHS were: 1) it did not make efficient use of its resources and 2) it was not patient-
orientated.  There was a basic change in philosophy, which saw the wants of the 
consumer, i.e. the patient, pushed to the fore; the producer, i.e. the medical establishment, 
was no longer the sole driver of the NHS.  In addressing these issues, Griffiths called for 
the introduction of a proactive approach to management where appropriate leadership both 
motivated staff and encouraged a mindset that sought out new areas of cost 
improvement.
27
 Prominence was given to good leadership, and at each level an individual 
was identified who had the necessary authority and accountability for planning and 
implementing decisions.  The relationship between the NHS administration and Whitehall 
was too tight, with the NHS often suffering because of Whitehall interference.  Griffiths’ 
belief was that consensus management should be set aside in favour of general 
management.
28
 However, doctors liked the status quo, as it conferred upon them greater 
authority, while nurses liked consensus management as it enabled them to transfer into 
management with its greater status.
29
  Conservatives hoped general management would 
break the professional monopoly on authority that clinicians held and give managers an 
equal footing when it came to decision-making.
30
   
 
General management was intended by the Thatcher government to call upon the brightest 
and the best from business to work alongside NHS staff.  However, as contracts were for 
fixed periods and based on performance-related pay, these terms were less attractive to 
those already working in industry, so few were prepared to leave.
31
  Instead, general 
management roles were filled by senior administrators already working in the NHS.  This 
was not the original intention, and it left open general management to the accusation that 
the change was merely superficial.
32
  Griffiths called for great flexibility between teams, 
clinicians and managers, with consultants encouraged now to become involved with 
financial and budgetary decisions. Griffiths gave several actions for making this happen 
but stressed that there was no time to waste in reflecting on what had been said. 
Government should make the changes and make them immediately because of the poor 
state of the NHS.  The Conservative government approved the business-like approach that 
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the Griffiths report favoured.  Little time was given for reflection
33
 before managers at all 
levels of the organisation were introduced. This had the effect of creating a group of 
people who were receptive to change, and open to ideas about developing the internal 
market within the NHS.  
 
By the late 1980s, there was a large gap between the income received by the government 
and the money required to meet patients’ needs.34  The activity of individual doctors and 
their departments was scrutinised by auditors, trying to stem escalating costs and the 
obvious tension between increasing demand and finite resources.  This prompted trials in 
clinical budgeting, necessitating a drive for robust data and information which are crucial 
to implementing performance management systems.  Outside the NHS, there was an 
explosion in audit culture; within the NHS this led to the introduction of basic 
performance indicators and here began the rise of performance culture.
35
 The strain on the 
NHS required national intervention and, as such, Thatcher made a £101 million cash 
injection into the system and instigated the Review in 1987 to assess the future of the NHS 
and avert both an immediate and future crisis. The BMA and other medical bodies were 
excluded from the Review, which was made up of a small select number of ministers and 
civil servants.  However, while the Review committee was meeting, the bodies excluded 
from the process were publishing their thoughts on the subject.
36
  While it was not a 
consultative process, the Review was not working in a vacuum unaware of the views of 
those working in the NHS or those who had a vested interest in the outcome.   
 
The conclusion of the Review was more mundane than people had expected.  Having 
looked at other developed countries’ models of healthcare, there was a recognition that no 
funding system was without flaws, and there was neither the impetus nor enthusiasm for 
change.  While the Thatcher government had advanced private health insurance, the 
uptake by the public remained relatively low. It was acknowledged that the system of 
taxation in place would continue to fund the NHS.  With this in mind, the spotlight 
returned to how to deliver services efficiently.         
 
It was during the Thatcher government that the split between social services and 
healthcare was made: the Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) ceased to 
exist.  One of the original initiatives of the newly-formed Department of Health was to 
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ensure that there were stronger lines of accountability for doctors, which brought the NHS 
into line with other public services.  1987 saw the publication of the paper “Promoting 
Better Health”37 which drew on the World Health Organisation’s principles for the 
developing world.  Its focus was on primary healthcare, where General Practitioners were 
the first line of defence; prevention was better than cure and, importantly for 
Conservatives, less costly.  However, many of the measures implemented under this 
altruistic banner were solely cost saving-measures with little to do with preventive 
medicine, such as the elimination of dental check-ups and eye tests.
38
 Within the White 
Paper “Working for Patients”,39 the performance of doctors was under scrutiny and non-
clinical managers had for the first time an influence in clinical management decisions. 
Thus, the managers had both authority and power which was significant in terms of 
establishing the performance culture.  However, it was a two-way process: doctors were 
expected to participate in wider management issues.  At the heart of the document, 
“Working for Patients,” was the separation between purchasers and providers, and the 
introduction of the internal market.  District Health Authorities would now buy the more 
costly services, while routine services would be bought by GP Fundholders.  In both cases, 
the services purchased were on behalf of the patients and reflected the needs of the local 
population.   By contrast, the providers, such as hospitals, would offer services in order to 
raise income.  Hospitals were vying for business and the competitiveness of their 
individual contacts would affect the organisation’s overall financial position.  During this 
period, hospitals were encouraged to work towards attaining Trust status.  This new 
arrangement conferred greater autonomy; it increased self-governance, and freedom in the 
management of both finances and service setting.  However, because of the scale of the 
reorganisation, these changes were phased in and dependent on local circumstances rather 
than national timetables.     
 
The changes that were driven through by Thatcher were structural in nature whereas the 
reforms undertaken by her successor, John Major, were more patient-orientated. Quality 
within the NHS was now the primary focus.  The Major years in government, though short 
in comparison to Thatcher’s time in office, nevertheless saw the initiation of some key 
pieces of work.  Firstly, the establishment of the Patient’s Charter40, which detailed what 
patients should expect from the NHS, as well as their rights and responsibilities.  It was in 
the Patient’s Charter that a maximum time was first set around waiting times, in so doing 
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highlighting the NHS’ obligations to the patient.  Moreover, by 1994 the Patient’s Charter 
was used as the basis for performance measures.
41
  Secondly, patients for the first time 
would be asked their views in the Patient’s Survey. The survey drove home the idea of 
customer satisfaction; the NHS was to model itself on private business, which was 
continually assessing its customers’ needs and expectations in order to drive up both 
quality and service.     
 
Later New Labour would continue championing the concept of patient surveys; its reasons 
for doing so were twofold.  It made the NHS more democratic and drove up quality within 
the system.  “Through measuring the way in which patients and carers view the quality of 
the treatment and care that they receive, ensuring the NHS is sensitive to individual 
needs,”42 the NHS would become more patient-focused.  In this respect New Labour saw 
an equivocation between patient and customer and thus drives to improve performance 
would be the same as in industry.  John Major had overseen the establishment of the 
Patient’s Charter, a forerunner to the idea of the patient as a consumer43.  Hence, where 
business employed customer satisfaction surveys, the NHS would implement patient 
experience surveys as a way of delivering greater efficiency in areas of particular concern 
to patients.  The publication of the results from these surveys together with star ratings 
shifted discussions about performance from the lofty echelons of the DH firmly into the 
public arena.
44
  This was New Labour’s way of fostering policies that would take the NHS 
into the 21
st
 century, proactively bringing about a patient-centred NHS.              
 
The final years of the Major government were also a time to embed the policies of the 
previous administration.  However, by then it became apparent that the creation of the 
internal market had costs of its own, costs far higher than had been expected. In pre-
electoral campaigning, “Labour claimed that the internal market had added £1.5billion in 
total to management costs.”45 More importantly, the management costs were higher than 
those of the previous system primarily due to the expertise needed to implement contracts, 
which led to accusations of sleaze within health service management.  John Major, trying 
to deal with these accusations, ordered a root and branch review of management costs, the 
outcome of which was a more streamlined management structure and contracts lasting for 
longer periods in order to mitigate the initial high cost in administration.       
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2.3 The NHS under New Labour; performance becomes modernisation   
To understand the importance of the NHS to the New Labour government of 1997 it is 
necessary to understand the US politics of the same period.
46
  The idea of an agreement by 
the State and its people, a ‘Social Contract’47 was taken up by the US Republican Party.  
‘Contract with America’48 was a document that listed the actions that would follow if 
Republicans held a majority in the US Congress.  One of its creators and most vocal 
proponents was Newt Gingrich, who oversaw the change from a Democratic to a 
Republican Congress; he was also one of Bill Clinton’s staunchest critics.  Clinton had 
turned to the “Third Way” in order to deal with the rise of the Right and challenge Newt 
Gingrich’s influence as Speaker.49  However, it was not before New Labour recognised 
the power and effectiveness of the ‘Contract with America’ as a rhetorical bomb, a 
weapon that a party in opposition could not fail to ignore or employ irrespective of its 
Republican roots.  Labour had already taken up the politics of the ‘Third Way,’50 where 
the State’s role is to bring about greater social justice and provide opportunities for wealth 
creation.
51
  Its magpie-like tendencies continued with it taking and transforming the 
‘Contract with America’ into a series of manifesto pledges for its 1997 election campaign.  
At the heart of these pledges was a commitment to the NHS. 
 
Tony Blair’s foreword to the first substantial document on the NHS was broken down into 
six paragraphs with the word ‘modern’ appearing in the title “The new NHS: modern and 
dependable” 52 as well as in the fourth paragraph.  The word “modernisation” appeared in 
first sentence of the first paragraph “Creating the NHS was the greatest act of 
modernisation ever achieved by a Labour government”53 and later again in the third 
paragraph.  In 2007 people were talking ideas of the legacy of Blair’s time in office, but he 
himself from the very start had been aware of the lasting effects of his premiership.  His 
was a global outlook; he recognised and related the image of nation, self identity and 
freedom to that of the NHS.  “For people of my father’s generation, the creation of the 
NHS in 1948 was a seminal event….the NHS was an extraordinary act of 
emancipation;”54 and again, “The National Health Service (NHS) is one of our country’s 
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proudest achievements and an essential strand in the fabric of our nation.”55  Early on he 
spoke of a “time to reflect on the huge achievements of the NHS.  But in a changing world 
no organisation, however great, can stand still.”56  
 
Blair’s vision was of an NHS that was the “envy of the world” and the final sentence in 
this first NHS document was that “we can create an NHS that is truly a beacon to the 
world”57.  This sentiment was first voiced by John Winthrop when talking about the 
formation of New England as example to the world - “For we must consider that we shall 
be as a city upon a hill. The eyes of all people are upon us,”58 and later by Ronald Reagan.  
“I’ve thought a bit of the ‘shining city upon a hill.’…. I've spoken of the shining city all 
my political life…. And she’s still a beacon, still a magnet for all who must have freedom, 
for all the pilgrims from all the lost places who are hurtling through the darkness, toward 
home.”59 Much has been said of Blair’s fondness for Clinton’s style and rhetoric on both 
rights and responsibilities and globalization
60
 and yet it is Reagan’s words that flow from 
his pen; it is Gordon Brown who is considered the Puritan and yet, with notions of saving, 
reforming and renewal,
61
 it is Blair’s evangelical zeal towards the NHS that shimmers on 
the page.  The US President has several roles including Commander in Chief; he also has 
several latent roles including ‘Mourner in Chief’ and ‘Chaplain to the Country’.  These 
last two roles are not ones we associate with a British Prime Minister but Tony Blair in 
fact played both these parts
62
 and has used the corresponding religious rhetoric in non-
conventional ways, as seen with its use in framing NHS policy.        
 
In its 1997 party manifesto, Blair spoke of New Labour’s vision for the future. “New 
Labour is a party of ideas and ideals but not of outdated ideology. What counts is what 
works. The objectives are radical. This means we will be modern….This is our contract 
with the people.”63 Blair in previous years had sought to alter the electorate’s perception 
that Labour was outdated and irrelevant to 1990s politics.
64
  It was in Blackpool at the 
1994 Labour Party conference that ‘New Labour’ was conceived; by 1997 new and 
modern would go hand in hand.  Thus, the manifesto was used to present the party as both 
                                                 
55
 Department of Health (2004) Foreword 
56
 Department of Health (1997) Foreword 
57
 Department of Health (1997) Foreword 
58
 John Winthrop “A model of Christian charity” 
59
 Ronald Reagan Farewell Address to the Nation, Oval Office, January 11, 1989.  
http://www.reaganfoundation.org/reagan/speeches/farewell.asp  
60
 Fairclough, N., (2000)  
61
 Labour Party (1997) manifesto 
62
 The death of Diana, Princess of Wales, 7th July 2005 (7/7) London bombings 
63
 Labour Party (1997) manifesto 
64
 Giddens, A., (1988) p155 
32 
modern and modernising in its approach to the NHS.  And while in early performance 
rhetoric the actual word ‘performance’ was not mentioned by Blair, the focus was instead 
on delivering dependable and high quality care, combining efficiency and quality and 
maintaining uniformly high standards, words which were the precursor to performance 
language.  However, by the time of the publication of The NHS Plan in 2000, the NHS 
itself was to become an example of modernisation.  Implementation of ‘performance’ was 
part of this process.  Performance management heralded a new approach for Labour; it 
was supposed to run through organisations and counter Conservative claims that Labour 
governments would run 1970s-style top-down management.   
 
One of the central electoral concerns that Tony Blair sought to address was access to 
treatment.
65
  Under successive Conservative governments resources had been steadily 
squeezed
66
, the three Es - Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness - led to ever-increasing 
financial rationing with its severe impact on services
67
.  The length of time that patients 
waited to be treated was frequently reported in the tabloid press, waiting times and their 
by-product lists were seen as failing patients; these personal stories resonated with the 
wider public. Though emergencies were dealt, with the experience in A&E, as patients 
readily testified, was often difficult and time-consuming, with people expected to wait 
hours before receiving simple treatment.  Moreover, routine operations involved very long 
waits.  Patients who should have been treated in their local community were admitted to 
hospital in the hope that they would be seen more speedily by the service. The 
consequence was “bed blocking,”68 a situation in which patients were in hospital although 
this was not an appropriate or suitable place for them and which burdened hospital 
services and further increased waiting times. Reducing waiting times and increasing 
access would be a key measure by which New Labour success would be measured.
69
 By 
the time Labour took office in 1997, the public saw the NHS as fragmented with huge 
variation across the service.  Performance was seen as a way of pushing efficiency while 
providing national standards.   
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‘The New NHS: Modern, Dependable’70 set out Labour’s initial vision for the NHS in 
terms of accountability, funding and organisation.  Due to the high costs, the 
commissioning function previously carried out by GP Fundholders would now be done by 
Primary Care Groups (PCGs).  Moreover, the arrangement of GP Fundholding was seen to 
promote and promulgate disparities and hence health service inequalities within the 
system.  In the new structure, PCGs were accountable to Health Authorities and the 
provider/purchaser split remained.  It was during this period that Private Finance 
Initiatives (PFIs) were introduced to fund hospitals. PFIs, like performance, were another 
example of modernisation by which New Labour sought to take the best practices of 
private industry and apply them to the NHS.  The advantages of PFI hospitals were that 
they could be established with little delay because initial capital was not an issue, the 
funding did not appear on the NHS accounts, and new hospitals were supposedly better 
than old and existing hospitals.
71
  Unfortunately, PFIs were considered inefficient in the 
long run with the financial burden falling on the NHS; the public remained sceptical about 
the use of the private sector within the NHS.  Moreover, to New Labour critics this 
appeared a mishmash of philosophies, lacking adherence to a single ideology or method.  
Yet this was the application of New Labour’s ‘Third Way’ philosophy to healthcare, a 
combination of old-style Labour command-and-control approach and Conservative ideas 
on the internal market.
72
 New Labour sought to “bridge the gap between centralised 
control and market mechanism through the ‘Third Way,’ which was a variety of 
mechanisms used according to the circumstances.”73 The ‘Third Way’ approach enabled 
New Labour to introduce competition into the NHS, stating  that “ideological boundaries 
or institutional barriers should not stand in the way of better care of NHS patients.”74  
Labour supporters felt the “lack of a coherent shopping list is no bad thing: it enables 
tactical flexibility and lets Government govern as circumstances change.  The Tories in 
1979 had a vague sense of wanting to extend the free market, but the precise mechanism -
privatisation- had not even been invented yet.  Labour will make progress in the same 
way: guided by values, but capable of innovation. The lack of a firm code of beliefs 
amongst Labour’s modernisers is a result of the lack of serious opposition.”75 In short, 
without a fixed set of dos and don’ts, a rigid set of ideals to conform to, New Labour were 
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able to incorporate many new ways of working that would have otherwise been 
disregarded.
76
    
 
‘The NHS Plan’ was published in July 2000 and was both an action plan and a statement 
of intent for the next 10 years.  Within it was the ‘Concordat,’ a promise to keep key 
services within the NHS, while strengthening the relationship between public and private 
sectors. Thus PFIs were not separate entities but rather very much part of the wider NHS 
family, and the plan made clear New Labour’s intent that the private provision of 
healthcare would increase.
77
  The NHS Plan set out measures to put patients and people at 
the heart of the health service.  The plan promised shorter waiting times for hospital and 
doctor appointments; more power and information for patients; more hospitals and beds; a 
greater number of doctors and nurses; tougher standards for NHS organizations and 
incentives to reward elite organizations; improved care for older people and cleaner wards 
providing better food and facilities in hospitals.  These promises, like the earlier election 
pledges, were to become the national healthcare priorities and form part of a social 
contract between the State and the public.  The document ‘Shifting the Balance of Power’ 
followed a year later and detailed how changes presented in the NHS plan would be 
carried out: putting patients at the heart of services; giving them greater choice of where 
they are treated; making it more convenient to access care.  The transformation of 
healthcare would be centred on Primary Care Trusts.  PCTs, it was believed, would be 
best placed to assess the needs of the local population and prioritise recourses. However 
the key move in this document was not, as the title implies, about shifting the power from 
NHS organizations to the patient, but rather to shift power from secondary care to primary 
care. This was significant because, alongside this shift in power, the government increased 
control and monitoring in primary care, an area where previously little had existed.  
Performance management was the mechanism by which this was achieved.        
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The diagram below illustrates the structure of the NHS as proposed in the 2001 
publication, ‘Shifting the Balance of Power’.   What is striking and significant about 
this diagram is how at the top the Department of Health and the Modernisation 
Agency sit parallel to each other, influencing all the NHS organisations which fall 
beneath it. The Modernisation Agency was crucial not only to establishing but also to 
embedding performance culture throughout the NHS.  
 
An overview of NHS structure as proposed in 2001 
 
 
An overview of the NHS structure and bodies  
A brief outline of the tiers of care within the NHS is provided, necessary in understanding 
how the NHS is constructed and where my research was located.  I describe the key 
functions, duties and responsibilities of the Department of Health, Health Authorities and 
Strategic Health Authorities, Primary Care and Secondary Care.  
 
The above diagram illustrates the normative relationship between the Department of 
Health (DH) and the NHS that is part of the wider civil service. Its position is to negotiate 
and secure funds from the Treasury and to maintain and improve the standard of service 
within the NHS.  Its role is to help set and implement government policy on health and 
social care. This diagram helps to illustrate the tripartite nature of the NHS a feature that 
has for the most part remained unchanged from its original inception in 1948 to the 
present day. The tripartite system was at first considered inferior to a single administrative 
system because it was expected to produce unequal, incompatible, fragmented services. 
36 
To alleviate this fear, promises were given that there would be high and active levels of 
intervention from the Minister of Health.
78
  However, irrespective of intervention by the 
Minister over the years, there have been continuous accusations of a postcode lottery with 
regard to services. While each organisation is directly accountable to the public it serves, 
the Department of Health has overall responsibility for the NHS.  It is worthwhile making 
the distinction here between the Department of Health which is a part of the civil service 
and the NHS which lies outside its jurisdiction.   All national health directives come from 
DH policy documents, and, while parts of it may be locally interpreted by communities 
and provider organizations, most have little scope to deviate from nationally formulated 
policy.  The DH works closely with the Strategic Health Authorities, the Care Quality 
Commission and the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE).  Beside the DH, 
the Modernization Agency ran from April 2001 to July 2005.  Its role was to direct and 
drive change throughout the NHS.  The NHS as an organisation was considered by 
government to be hesitant to change, holding back on reform, and the Modernisation 
Agency was there to ensure ‘things happened’.79  The Modernisation Agency, like the 
1997 Labour government, was interested in modern approaches and could not be seen to 
allow old ways and traditional practices to continue.  However the lifespan of the 
organisation was relatively short.  It set up performance initiatives which were 
implemented by Strategic Health Authorities.    
 
Health Authorities/Strategic Health Authorities.  Health Authorities were the 
forerunners to Strategic Health Authorities; their role was to lead the planning and 
development of local services. Health Authorities’ final accountability lay with ministers 
who had authority to curb their powers.
80
  Strategic Health Authorities were formed in 
April 2002. Originally there were 28, but mergers reduced the number to ten in England.  
The new, larger Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs) were set up to develop strategies for 
the NHS, and to make sure their local NHS organisations were performing well. The new 
health authorities were responsible for developing plans for improving health services in 
their local area; making sure local health services were of a high quality and performing 
well; increasing the capacity of local health services to provide more services and ensure 
that national priorities, for example, programmes for improving cancer services, were 
integrated into local health service plans.  A key link between the Department of Health 
and the NHS, they managed the NHS locally.  
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Primary Care is the first tier of care that an individual experiences in the local area. 
Primary care includes appointments with the family doctor (GP), dentist, optician, 
pharmacist or family planning clinic.  In this level of primary care, NHS Walk-in Centres 
and NHS Direct are also recent additions to the service.  The financial resources for the 
patients seen in primary care are funded by distinct organisations referred to as Primary 
Care Trusts.  Doctors/(General Practioners) GPs are independent businesses; the 
patients they see are funded through Primary Care Trusts.  The formation of the NHS saw 
not only access to medical treatment universalised, but also the funding of GPs through 
the NHS rather than directly through their patients.  Members of the public who 
previously were denied treatment because of their inadequate incomes could now freely 
access a GP, and those doctors who worked in the deprived boroughs did not have to rely 
on charities to supplement their income.  As part of the modern NHS, GPs are usually the 
first port of call for members of the public if they feel unwell.  They now provide local 
non-specialist advice and care working primarily in practices.  These practices are getting 
bigger as they increase their provision of services.  
 
Secondary care refers to hospital treatment which is available if a health problem cannot 
be resolved through primary care, or there is an emergency. This is done through a referral 
made by a GP who arranges treatment at a NHS hospital which provide acute and 
specialist services.  Hospitals are managed by NHS Trusts, known as Acute Trusts or 
Foundation Trusts, which ensure that hospitals provide high quality healthcare and money 
is spent efficiently. Strategy for the development of hospital so that services improve is 
also decided by the Trust. Treatment at a hospital is free to British and EU citizens.  Some 
hospitals were created in conjunction with universities and received some funds from their 
corresponding institutions.  Other hospitals focused on specific diseases or types of 
patients, for example, “specialist services as diverse as rehabilitation, fractures, plastic 
surgery, neurology and psychiatry. The need for emergency action to introduce these 
services was itself a reflection of the backwardness of facilities for specialist treatment.”81  
The introduction of the NHS and its pledge of universal coverage made the funding of 
healthcare for the first time a state responsibility.  
 
Huge public expectations were originally encouraged in order to ensure that the public 
used the newly-created service. This is no longer a concern. The NHS is a mammoth 
beast; it not only devours cash but also generates new demands at increasing costs. The 
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country has an increasing elderly population with associated healthcare requirements; 
there is a rise in complex cases and general demand on the NHS is growing and yet 
resources are finite.  Unfortunately, the cost of new technological and medical 
developments has outpaced any significant savings the NHS could generate.  This has left 
the current NHS serving a public where there is a mismatch between high expectations of 
speed and quality of care and that which the NHS can effectively deliver.  Thus, the 
primary function of managerial roles in organisations has been to prioritise these 
conflicting demands while attempting to meet the needs of patients, staff and the public.  
The tensions first voiced in the early years by Bevan were repeated at the 60
th
 anniversary 
of the NHS: “We shall never have all we need…Expectations will always exceed capacity. 
The service must always be changing, growing and improving - it must always appear 
inadequate.” As early as the 1950s it has been apparent that a financial treadmill had been 
created, and that politicians attempting to raise funds could not meet the public’s concept 
of adequacy.  Originally conceived by Bevan to meet the needs of the nation’s health, the 
NHS has evolved into an institutional device for rationing resources.
82
  Consequently, the 
tensions of the early years endure; the question that needed answering then of ‘how best to 
organise and manage the NHS?’ remains as relevant a question today.  Performance 
management as introduced by New Labour was seen as possible answer to this, in that it 
could contribute to producing public services that are more effective by improving 
productivity, introducing independent scrutiny and inspection and strengthening 
accountability.    
   
2.4 Reform of the NHS 
In contrast to the first half of this chapter which provided a short chronological history of 
the NHS as well as an organisational overview, this section looks at a number of 
significant reforms and ideas that facilitated the eventual proliferation of performance 
management under New Labour.  The second half of this chapter focuses on the changing 
roles of trust and autonomy in the medical profession, the inadequacies of past regulatory 
bodies; an examination of New Public Management with regard to how the demarcation 
between managerial and professional work impacts on decision making; and the rising 
prominence given to governance and public accountability.
83
  No single one of these 
reforms led to the development of the distinctive New Labour performance culture but, as 
a collective, they laid the foundations for its application and its initial wholesale 
acceptance.  
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2.5 The role of trust: the medical profession and the NHS    
It was George Bernard Shaw who wrote “They (professions) are all conspiracies against 
the laity; and I do not suggest that the medical conspiracy is either better or worse than the 
military conspiracy, the legal conspiracy, the sacerdotal conspiracy, the pedagogic 
conspiracy, the royal and aristocratic conspiracy, the literary and artistic conspiracy, and 
the innumerable industrial, commercial, and financial conspiracies, from the trade unions 
to the great exchanges, which make up the huge conflict which we call society. But it is 
less suspected.”84 This lack of appropriate scepticism is not new; Shaw was writing in 
1909.  Nevertheless, blind faith towards the medical profession
85
 has led to an ever-
increasing number of scandals to hit the NHS.   
 
The first scandal to hit the NHS under New Labour was at Alder Hey, Liverpool, 1998.  
Here the public learnt that Professor van Velzen had stripped the organs of babies who had 
died in the hospital between 1988-1996 without parental knowledge or consent.  He also 
encouraged staff to falsify records and statistics.  By 1999 the then Health Secretary 
initiated a review, which was published in March 2000, referring to the hospital and the 
university’s failure to supervise and performance manage the new unit86.The second 
scandal was the at Bristol Royal Infirmary concerning the deaths of 29 babies between 
1984 and 1995.  During the inquiry, which began in 1998, the public discovered that 
parents of children undergoing complex heart surgery had been told that the procedures 
carried no risk, only to find this was not the case.  The media was awash with reports of 
"old boys’" culture among doctors, and patients being kept in the dark about their 
treatment.  The third scandal to rock the NHS was the Shipman case.  Harold Shipman, a 
GP, was found guilty of 15 counts of murder on 31st January 2000; however, it is likely 
that he murdered 236 patients over a period of 24 years between 1974 and 1998.  When 
sentencing him, judge Justice Forbes stated, “You took advantage of and grossly abused 
their trust.  You were, after all, each victim’s doctor. I have little doubt that each of your 
victims smiled and thanked you as they submitted to your deadly ministrations.”87 
 
The three scandals raised two recurrent questions to the Blair government: “How could 
this happen?” and “How could such happenings go unnoticed for so long?”  In the 
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inquiries that followed, attempts were made to answer these questions.  The key findings 
in the Bristol Royal Infirmary Report were: “There were no standards for evaluating 
performance….imbalance of power, with too much control in the hands of too few 
individuals. Patients should be able to gain access to information about the relative 
performance of a hospital …For the future there must be effective systems within 
hospitals to ensure that clinical performance is monitored.”88  All three reports made 
similar statements and yet clinicians remained resistant to change, viewing the scandals as 
caused by the psychotic nature of individuals rather than failures of the system. However 
the Blair government, through the Department of Health, advocated the culture of 
performance to the public as means of avoiding such scandals and nullifying risks.  
  
2.6 Autonomy within the medical profession  
Occupations that are now considered professions, including doctors and surgeons, gained 
their status during the nineteenth century.  Professional status was conferred on 
individuals by the gaining of a particular qualification.  Here, qualification served two 
purposes: firstly, it established that those undertaking and completing specific exams had 
acquired a precise body of knowledge; secondly, a process by which through the 
curriculum entry to the occupation could be monitored and controlled.   The Medical Act 
of 1858 led to the formation of what was to become the General Medical Council (GMC), 
requiring all medics to register with the council and giving itself control of their training.  
The Act created a unified profession; a lack of registration formed a clear divide, helping 
to foster professional exclusivity (similar to that of a gentlemen’s club) and solidarity 
between members.   
 
This professional status acted as means of restricting the numbers, thereby enabling its 
members to command high salaries.  Even today in England there are only 2.2 doctors to 
1000 of population, one of the lowest rates in the E.U.  The profession operated as a 
lobbying network discreetly pushing its members’ agenda in the political sphere. 
However, even from the early 1920s, there had been calls for general management to exist 
within the NHS, separate from the professional doctors and surgeons.   These calls were 
dismissed, as they were perceived as a threat to professional control and autonomy.  Here 
a distinction between what Elliot Freidson refers to as medical dominance and medical 
autonomy aids understanding of the status of clinicians in the NHS. “By dominance, he 
referred to the ability of physicians to direct and control other health care workers. By 
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autonomy, he referred to the ability of physicians to exercise control the organisation in 
terms of its own work.”89 Thus, while the medical professions remain dominant, their 
autonomy, since the inception of the NHS, has gradually declined.
90
    
 
The medical profession is not a single entity; there are numerous Royal Colleges to which 
doctors are affiliated.  Like all professional bodies they protect their members’ interests, 
and operate under a middle class ethos of collegiality rather than the working class notions 
of competition.  Professor Carol Black, President of the Royal College of Physicians, said 
of her organisation “It was previously organised as a gentlemen’s club, though significant 
changes have taken place in the last four years”91 What is surprising in this comment is the 
time factor.  That an organisation such as the Royal College of Physicians exists as a 
gentlemen’s club well into the 21st century illustrates how far behind the medical 
profession is in terms of accountability and regulation.   
 
Moran speaks of the demise of club government starting in the 1970s leading to the rise of 
a new British regulatory state.
92
  Government had previously been based on the 
‘gentleman’s club’, a time of minimal accountability.93  The language was that of the 
British ruling class, the elite.  “The most obvious link is the connection of imperialism to 
social welfare reform, but empire provided much more: images of hierarchy to reinforce 
the domestic cultures of subjection; a stock of symbolic capital for governing elites; and a 
public language in which to express the country’s providential destiny.”94  However, the 
following decades after the Second World War saw the images of empire, imperialism and 
the Commonwealth left behind as Globalisation and Europeanisation were seized upon as 
the new regulatory framework. The move away from club government was a 
constitutional revolution where the boundary between public and private shifted, moving a 
large number of previously public industries into private enterprises.  But within the 
Health Service the change was slower as these old images were again imported, this time 
through the doctors and nurses recruited from Commonwealth countries.  These new 
recruits reinforced and strengthened crumbling elites, fortifying old systems that in other 
areas of the public sector were fast disappearing.   
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Medical institutions like the Royal College of Physicians remained impervious to these 
reforms.  There is now a strategic plan within the Royal College of Physicians that looks 
to champion the values of medical practice, improve the standards of clinical practice, 
support education and training and promote patient-centred care.  It sets out the values that 
doctors remain committed to: integrity, compassion, altruism, continuous improvement, 
excellence, partnership (NHS reforms will not be effective without politicians working 
with both doctors and managers) and finally, the essentially science-based nature of the 
work (no matter how much the softer skills are promoted e.g. communication). 
Nevertheless, the medical profession within the NHS has been slow to change its 
practices.   
 
Roy Griffiths in his 1983 NHS Management Enquiry Paper
95
 proposed that care and 
money should follow patients, as patients want a service which is local to them, ideally 
being treated at home or at their local GP practice.  However, it was not until 2005 under 
the New Labour government with ‘Creating a Patient Led NHS: Delivery of the NHS 
Improvement Plan,’ that we see this idea, originally articulated under Thatcher, beginning 
to be adopted.  Previously doctors opposed it and, without professional engagement and 
support, it was impossible to implement many of the Griffiths reforms.  The medical 
profession via the Royal Colleges had the ability to resist change, public demands, and 
government reforms.  This may have served its interests in the past but I doubt that this 
approach will be as effective in the future, as the assumption that ‘Doctor knows best’ is 
being challenged.   “Doctors under 30 are 3.5 times as likely (as those over the age of 30) 
to think of medicine as ‘a job like any other’”96.  This being so, it is possible that the 
coming generation of doctors will recognise, like other professions, that autonomy and 
accountability (assurance) can be complementary and counterpoised rather than opposing.     
 
2.7 The New Public Management 
By the 1980s, several bodies such as the British Medical Association as well as the 1983 
Griffiths Report were endorsing managerialisation of the NHS.  This gave such calls both 
weight and legitimacy, matching the political Conservative thinking of the day, which was 
that the public sector had to be brought under control as the system appeared to provide no 
natural restraint.  Public sector organizations were inefficient because they existed outside 
the market; therefore, it was necessary to introduce market-promoting competition to drive 
out complacency. New Public Management was an attempt to mitigate these inefficiencies 
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through the establishment of a general management function which would “provide 
leadership, introduce a continual search for change and cost improvement, motivate staff 
and develop a more dynamic management approach.”97   
 
The New Public Management had huge impact not just on provision of services within the 
NHS but also on its organisational structure, in particular the necessary role management 
had to play in dismantling established, over-centralised, bureaucracy.  
 
Models of Accountability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The diagram above shows the NHS’s move away from a Bureaucratic model style of 
management to the New Public Management model.
98
  These management changes which 
began in 1983 had profound consequences, one of which altered the decision making 
process, while the autonomy of medical and nursing professionals as well as their 
representative bodies would be curtailed.    
 
During this period the widely held assumption by cabinet politicians was that managers 
and professionals fell into two distinct groups, and similarly the work they undertook was 
also separate.  Managers create and maintain bureaucracies, applying rules and concerning 
themselves with the minutiae of regulations ensuring that these are upheld; their 
knowledge increases as their experience of bureaucracies’ intricacies deepens.  This world 
view is one where managers’ power and authority resides in their position in the wider 
organizational hierarchy and their ability to network, play the system, and be aware of the 
political manoeuvrings of all agents within their organization.  Therefore, it is one which 
they look to maintain and are resistant to change, in particular change that involves 
structural reorganisation as it undermines their authority and is a threat to the status quo.  
Managers are thought of as conformist, self-interested and career-motivated.  Compare 
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this then to assumptions made about professionals.  These creative, altruistic individuals 
are dedicated to offering expert services and advice.  Their motivation lies in their ethical 
commitment to their expertise, or at least to their profession as a way of securing status 
and privilege and, most importantly, the power and authority derived from the specialist 
knowledge they hold is not confined to a specific organisation.  They are seen as being 
more independent, championing those that they serve.  The table below illustrates clearly 
the common distinctions made between managers and professionals. However, “we must 
be cautious about the assumptions of an inherent and inevitable contraction between 
bureaucratic authority and professional autonomy.”99      
 
Ideal type contradictions: managerial/ professional 
100
 
 Managerialism  Professionalism 
Sources of legitimacy  Hierarchical authority  Expertise 
Goals/objectives Efficiency/ profit 
maximization  
Effectiveness/ technical 
competence  
Mode of control  Rules/compliance Trust / dependency  
Clients Corporate  Individuals 
Reference group Bureaucratic superiors  Professional peers 
Regulation Hierarchical  Collegial/ self regulation 
 
In the later chapter on stigma I will illustrate how these ideal types have been absorbed 
into the culture of the NHS and how language has been appropriated by performance 
management as means of both reinforcing and undermining these contradictions.  From 
inside the NHS, the first step towards managerialisation was greeted with caution but there 
was an inherent belief that good and appropriate management would deliver real change.  
Medical and nursing professionals within the NHS had always been expected to carry out 
managerial tasks; to an extent this was one way in which they have furthered their careers 
and moved up the professional ladder.  However, the idea of a new exclusive managerial 
layer was not seen as a threat but rather an opportunity.  The new managers, it was hoped, 
would help lighten the workload of clinicians; there was a sense of compromise, a belief 
that collaborative working between the two groups would benefit medical professionals 
allowing them to learn new skills/ techniques within their field as well as spending more 
time with patients.   
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2.8 Management as a new type of work         
The public and central Thatcher government both censured public services, including the 
NHS, for being inflexible, unwieldy organizations unresponsive to the public needs.  Only 
those who worked for these establishments appeared to receive any benefit.  In discussions 
of managerialisation from the 1980s, it is apparent that participants made a clear 
distinction between old and new management. Old managers were characterized as 
bureaucratic pen-pushers, conformist and dogmatic in their approach.  In contrast, new 
managers were seen as innovative, creative and empowering to organizations and crucially 
as ‘policy entrepreneurs’.  The health sector reforms had the intended effect of making all 
staff entrepreneurs.  This proved to be a far more effective form of control than is possible 
with explicit and open conflict, (as seen with disputes amongst teaching unions).  The 
entrepreneurial spirit was a Thatcherite ideal as one might expect from a greengrocer’s 
daughter who had risen to become Prime Minister.   
 
Throughout the scandals of the 1990s, the medical establishment continued to sustain high 
levels of respect from the public, higher than most professions, possibly because their job 
as a service has at its core the value of human life.  By comparison, other professions deal 
with the material or seemingly mundane.  In spite of this, doubts were beginning to be 
raised as to the role the medical establishment played in keeping its failings out of the 
public arena. “One of the major sources of inefficiency in the NHS is that the medical 
profession is not only exceptionally powerful but also internally divided, so that the 
provision of medical services is often decided by a power struggle between groupings 
whose representations hide their pursuit of vested interests behind what the outsider called 
‘a mumbo jumbo about clinical acceptability.”101   
 
The medical profession maintains a privileged position; it retains its professional 
autonomy, that is, it has a degree of autonomy seen by few other professions, and it 
preserves professional dominance through controlling the activities of other healthcare 
staff.
102
  The birth of the NHS saw a bargain with the medical profession: it would retain 
its power and status; in exchange the State would gain a comprehensive health care 
system.
103
 The medical profession’s influence has barely waned in the decades that have 
followed.  Its influence also extends to public opinion and it can bring to bear tremendous 
pressure on government to the extent that the government could not afford to ignore it.  
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The government recognised that it was necessary to make a distinction between respect 
and authority if the NHS as a larger organisation was to maintain credibility and influence. 
It is against this background that the government published the NHS Plan in July 2000.    
 
The NHS Plan was in many ways a radical document.  It stated that the NHS had failed to 
keep pace with change in society and must modernise to meet public expectations, 
reshaping itself from patients’ perspectives.  The government set the NHS 5 challenges: 
partnership, performance, profession and workforce, patient care and prevention.
104
  That 
performance should be on the agenda at all was surprising; that it should be so high up the 
agenda was shocking.  This idea of performance was new to the NHS; it was one where, 
data, information and knowledge were freely available to both patients and the public.  
Moreover, the information was there for them to ascertain the performance of clinicians, 
Trusts and the NHS as a whole.  The perception was that the medical establishment, the 
wider NHS and the government, were no longer authorities whose expertise could go 
unquestioned.  No longer was information solely for internal NHS purposes.  The public 
had been deemed fit to judge.  They had ceased to play the child/pupil in a parent/child, 
pupil/teacher relationship.        
 
2.9 Notions of Governance 
The NHS does not have shareholders, in the way other businesses do.  However, 
stakeholders, those with a vested interest (often patient groups), and government on behalf 
of taxpayers, have demanded that the NHS as an organisation provides more 
accountability and transparency.  Measuring the effectiveness of an HR Department, for 
example, does not fall into traditional financial reporting.  Nevertheless, there is a need to 
track its performance and actively measure the performance of such departments, in order 
to justify initiatives and provide confidence to the public.  There is also a need to monitor 
and measure clinical outcomes in terms of quality and levels against set standards.   
 
Traditionally, within PCTs, issues of quality (defined by Lord Ara Darzi, “as clinically 
effective, personal and safe”105) have organisationally fallen under ‘Governance’, which is 
separate from performance, with the Chief Executive having lead responsibility.  
Governance is another area that has been pushed up the political agenda. New Labour 
sought a shift in culture which saw the replacement of anachronistic systems of 
governance based on trust and tacit agreements by modern modes of regulation which 
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included include standard setting and audit. “In light of the Shipman Inquiry, we will 
strengthen clinical governance in the NHS to ensure that professional activity is fully 
accountable to patients, their families and the wider public.”106  Effective clinical 
governance refers to “a system through which NHS organisations are accountable for 
continuously improving the quality of their services and safeguarding high standards of 
care by creating an environment in which excellence in clinical care will flourish.”107 
From 1997, clinical governance was central to modernisation within the NHS.
108
  This 
concept is now embedded in all services across the Trusts to support continual quality 
improvement in new and existing services.  For example in the PCT where I carried out 
my ethnographic research, an Integrated Governance Committee was set up to deliver the 
‘National Standards Local Action’, which was a key planning framework from the 
Department of Health.   
 
The document ‘National Standards Local Action,’ set out seven domains including: safety, 
clinical and cost effectiveness, governance, patient focus, accessible and responsive care, 
care environment and amenities and public health.  In each of these domains a range of 
quality standards must be achieved.  Each PCT is assessed on the degree to which they 
have met these core standards: fully met, almost met, partly met and not met.  The rating 
achieved directly affects the overall rating gained by each Trust.  The introduction of 
National Standards Local Action had huge implications for performance, as it changed the 
performance management role.  On an organisational chart, performance sat under 
finance, because of its historical roots with cost savings.  However, with numerous targets 
looking at the quality of care patients receive, for example the introduction of counting the 
number of MRSA cases, there were discussions to move performance to the Quality and 
Governance directorate. Nevertheless, there is a difference between ‘measuring and 
monitoring’ and governing: governing implies a form of intervention.  Performance 
management then ceases to be exclusively about efficiency, economy, and effectiveness; it 
is also about public accountability.         
  
2.10 Performance management: a tool for increased accountability?   
Performance management, New Labour hoped, would create a culture of openness where 
scientific research could flourish, where best practice would be celebrated and areas of 
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concern highlighted.
109
  How successful it has been is part of this discussion.  The public 
are increasingly sceptical about those working in NHS management and accuse politicians 
of hiding behind numbers.  Current public opinion is that the NHS has become target-
driven
110
, with management creating a tick-box culture and where clinicians are prevented 
from doing real work through endless bureaucracy. This contrasts with health economists’ 
view of the NHS as singularly inefficient, and therefore irrational, organization unduly 
weighted in favour of the medical provision at the expense of administrative services.
111
 
The following quotation is from a health economist in 1989, referring to Nigel Crisp, then 
the Chairman of a local health authority who became the head of the NHS from 2000 to 
2006
112. “The NHS is grossly under-administrated.  The government proudly says they 
only spend 4% on administration….there is no routine information that a firm would 
normally use in managing an enterprise.  The chairman of the local heath authority is a 
guy from Rowntree Mackintosh.  He is absolutely appalled.  He is used to knowing the 
price of a bag of Smarties and all that sort of thing. He rolls into this place; he has never 
done anything in the health service before, and is absolutely amazed that nobody knows 
anything.  They have not got any cost data; they have not got much activity data; the 
planning is in its infancy”.113 This illustrates how the man who would become Chief 
Executive of the NHS under New Labour, having previously worked in private industry, 
expected to have figures at his fingertips on all types of activity and felt at a loss in the 
NHS during the 1980s where this was scarce.  He addressed this concern; his leadership of 
the NHS would be one where performance provided the State with data and the public 
with greater information.        
 
Progress was made under New Labour in augmenting the NHS workforce, including a 
proliferation of professional managers who were appointed to fill the gaps in information 
and knowledge.  Nonetheless, John Reid, MP, Secretary for Health (2003-2005) still 
sounded defensive when talking about non-clinical staff:  “The ‘snapshot’ census figures 
exploded the myth that everyone working in NHS was a bureaucrat, with 84 per cent of 
NHS staff directly involved in patient care and managers only making up three percent of 
the workforce.”114  The Labour manifesto went further, making a commitment to cut NHS 
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management and administrative costs by 2.5%: “By strengthening accountability and 
cutting bureaucracy we shall ensure that new investment is not squandered.  We are 
decreasing the numbers of staff in the Department of Health by a third and are halving the 
number of quangos - freeing up £500 million for frontline staff.”115  The government was 
defensive owing to the low opinion held by NHS staff and the public of published 
information.  Those working within the NHS are suspicious of statistics, having some idea 
of how they are formulated and being aware that the data does not always provide an 
accurate reflection of NHS life.  As Michael Power points out, “The audit society is a 
society that endangers itself because it invests too heavily in the shallow rituals of 
verification at the expense of other forms of organisational intelligence.”116 In addition, the 
public has grown cynical as figures are constantly thrown about to bolster the government 
position.  
 
The Labour government was proud of its financial investment in the NHS, particularly as 
most of that investment has gone on clinical staff, something that appeals to the public.  
“Spending on the NHS has more than doubled (from 1997) to £69 billion. The NHS now 
has 79,000 more nurses and over 27,000 more doctors.”117  Public perception was that 
services such as the NHS were safe under Labour in part because of their manifesto 
pledge: “We promised to revive the NHS; we have.  In our third term we will make the 
NHS safe for a generation.”118 The sweeping success in the 1997 election was partly based 
on its strong support of public services particularly the NHS, but how accurate is this 
assessment?  Is this a misguided belief based on historical tradition that is no longer valid?  
The last decade has seen the NHS under increasing pressure to function more efficiently, 
provide better services and operate in an economically sustainable manner, while ensuring 
any changes implemented do not detrimentally affect the overall clinical quality of care.  
Growing regulatory demands and stakeholder expectations add further financial pressure.   
 
2.11 The role of regulatory bodies vs. performance management as a 
regulatory instrument 
Regulation has been a feature of the state for far longer in the US than in Britain.  In the 
US, the regulatory state was embedded in its structure in three phases: 1) the progressive 
economy 2) the New Deal and 3) social regulation in the 1960s, far earlier than anything 
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similar in Britain.
119
  Firstly, the progressive economy is ‘neutral state,’ that is it is 
sympathetic to business but guided by legal impartiality, for example the Food and Drugs 
Administration and Federal Reserve Board.  Secondly, The New Deal’s purpose was to 
create an environment where competition could flourish, redressing market failures, 
particularly its failure to police entry ensuring fraudsters are excluded and guaranteeing 
honest and fair trade.  Thirdly, the 1960s social regulation created agencies that were not 
specific to one industry but encompassed the whole economy, e.g. Environmental 
Protection Agency.
120
  The introduction of these policies results in US risk assessment and 
management, which is both comprehensive and rigorous.  This is further aided by the 
litigious US culture; it is an environment that promotes public discussion of an adversarial 
nature.
121
  The continuous internal questioning generates a system that is genuinely more 
robust.    
 
The regulatory state in Europe has three key functions: redistribution, stabilization and 
regulation.
122
  However, its corresponding public bodies (e.g. HCC, NICE) in Britain have 
been unable to prevent or deal effectively with the repercussions of highly publicised 
crises.  It is worth noting that funding towards regulatory bodies is neither continued nor 
sustained.  The HCC and the National Audit Commission have, year on year, received less 
funding irrespective of increased calls by the public for independent regulators to have 
more power and authority.  The regulatory state’s focus is on risk because of a heightened 
awareness in the public consciousness.
123
  Risk has not increased, but public knowledge of 
its existence has.  This awareness is based on increased discussion within the media - 
discussion that leads to a demand for action against possibly dire consequences.  In an 
open society, traditional elites hold insufficient influence over the issues within risk 
debates and the agendas set are beyond their control.  “Regulation is the response to the 
new instinctive reaction that ‘something ought to be done about it.’”124  Panics, scares, 
alerts are not necessarily rational responses to the real risk posed, but rather a way in 
which government can demonstrate to the public that it is acting on their concerns.  This 
change in response is more acutely felt in Britain because of the nature of government and 
the previous form of rule, which still makes its presence felt.      
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In 19th century Britain, professional status had an element of social closure, particular 
features of which were the opposite of what is necessary to a regulatory state: openness, 
lack of secrecy and co-operation.  These features persist to the current day and are not 
seen to the same degree within the American system.  The proliferation of public panics 
within Britain is a possible symptom of the demise of club government
125
, the shift from 
oligarchy to pluralist democracy, but that risk management often employs 
remanagerialisation as a technique to deal with these crises illustrates how crumbling old 
elites attempt to reassert their control.
126
  Management appropriate professional clinicians 
such as doctors, making it more difficult for other doctors to challenge decisions made, as 
they would find themselves questioning the judgment of colleagues with the same 
knowledge and expertise.  This explains why managers would seek to employ doctors in 
management positions but not why doctors would chose such a role.  The answer lies in 
the fact that doctors are able to re-claim their lost authority and autonomy and re-assert 
their own agendas, their own morality.  The importance of this is that professionals and 
public often express competing values with reference to accountability.  Therefore, the 
history of performance management in the NHS is a story not just about monitoring, 
auditing and regulation; it is the story of how old medical elites have responded to and 
dealt with its introduction 
 
Two major political upheavals have affected the British government and its wider 
institutions: firstly, Britain’s entry into the European Union in 1973 and, secondly, the 
constitutional reforms made by the 1997 Labour government.  These upheavals saw the 
two connected phases of stagnation and hyper-innovation, which were produced by a 
crisis in the governing order.  The crisis came about because of the continued failures of 
economic policy but more importantly, yet less publicised, because of the failures of the 
system of rule.  The degree to which these two failures are intertwined goes some way to 
explaining the force of the cultural change.  The economic policy crisis occurred during 
the mid-1970s whereas the institutional crisis, which saw a clash between professional 
self-regulation and club government, occurred between the 1970s and 1990s.  It was the 
regulatory state which triumphed: it was “immensely superior.”127 The regulatory state 
“by any of the standards by which we might expect to judge economic government in 
liberal democracy - accountability, transparency, plurality of representation -” 128 appeared 
modern and open.  Club government and self-regulation had come to be seen as 
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ineffective and inadequate, and, by the time New Labour assumed government, this 
perception allowed them to introduce new forms of regulation with relative ease.  Within 
the health service an independent regulator for the NHS was established under the 1999 
Health Act.  It was initially known as Commission for Health Improvement (CHI) and 
came into being in 2001. This body would take on many names and guises, going on to 
become known as the Healthcare Commission (HCC) while its legal title was the 
Commission for Healthcare Audit and Inspection (CHAI) (2004-2009). The addition of 
the words ‘audit’ and ‘inspection’ were significant, as they highlighted the new 
mechanisms and techniques of regulation New Labour sought to apply to the NHS; they 
are discussed further when looking at the work of Michael Power in the following chapter. 
The most recent incarnation of the health regulator is as Care Quality Commission (CQC) 
(2009- present). 
 
During the 1980s, Thatcher’s ideas - Efficiency, Economy, and Effectiveness - led to the 
creation of performance management and the mass production of performance indicators 
(PIs).
129
 Performance indicators have been and continue to be a fundamental component in 
US healthcare; this is primarily because it is an insurance-based system. Information has 
been central to its working since its conception.  Information has inevitably led to 
comparative judgements and the costing of every aspect of care has become an intrinsic 
part of that process.  Earlier in this chapter the principles on which the NHS was formed 
were adduced, the most pertinent being that universal healthcare should be free at the 
point of delivery. Taxation is the basis for the funding the NHS; therefore ensuring value 
for money and minimum waste is the government’s responsibility, not that of private 
health insurance companies. It has been shown how the NHS changed through New Public 
Management under the Conservatives; we see there the precursor to performance 
management that would be further advanced under New Labour. The complete trust in the 
medical profession and the NHS which prevailed at its inception has declined; reforms to 
renew the NHS have to a degree curtailed the autonomy of the medical profession.  There 
has been a transformation in the nature of work, as well as new types of work being 
undertaken by the NHS, including the introduction of clinical governance and the use of 
performance management as a means of strengthening public accountability.  However, 
only after the election success of New Labour in 1997 was performance management 
pushed to the top of both the NHS and political agendas. Professionals in a true 
representative democracy undertake well-defined tasks within strictly defined objectives, 
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as is often demanded of employees within private industry.  However, this was impossible 
to impose as the NHS still had significant areas of self- regulation.  Nevertheless, the 
change in how the NHS was managed has been inevitable because of the parallel change 
in culture described earlier.  Furthermore, the scandals of the 1990s provided Tony Blair 
with further justification for pushing this new performance strategy. While New Labour 
oversaw the introduction of regulatory bodies into healthcare, this happened 
simultaneously alongside the proliferation of performance as a regulatory instrument. The 
imperatives and drivers that saw performance become associated with ideas of 
modernisation and progress meant that it became central to New Labour’s system of rule 
and style of management.  This will be demonstrated in the following chapters.   
54 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Theoretical Background   
 
3.1 Overview 
The previous chapter provided an overview of the NHS, the forces that led to its creation 
as well as key reforms under successive governments which pushed performance to the 
centre of management culture within the NHS. This is relevant to my discussion if a real 
understanding of how the NHS is now run is to be gained; it will provide context to the 
current changes and prevent me from falling into the trap of thinking I necessarily know 
better; “gaining some historical perspective should be sobering and enlightening 
experience.  Such experience should turn us away from ‘quick fix strategies based solely 
upon an interpretation of current conditions.”130  I provided a brief history of the NHS in 
the previous chapters.  In this chapter I build on this by discussing authors whose work 
was relevant to my research, though they may not have directly or explicitly spoken about 
the NHS.  Here my expertise and experience in the NHS will provide the reader with clear 
links between their work and mine, how their thoughts on specific issues has informed my 
research.  This background knowledge, this orienting theory, helps me recognise which 
particular phenomena are important and where I should focus the attention of my study.   
 
3.2 Bureaucratic regimes and their effects  
The NHS is a vast bureaucracy and performance management has become central to the 
operation of this bureaucracy (see Chapter Two) so it is necessary to understand the nature 
of bureaucracy itself.  Bureaucratic organization is, according to Weber, what defines 
modernity and pervades the modern era. As a form of administration, it surpasses all that 
came before it.  It is technically superior when compared with other forms of organisation 
in its “precision, despatch, clarity, familiarity with documents, continuity, discretion, 
uniformity, rigid subordination, savings in friction and in material and person costs.”131 Its 
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success is marked by its ability to generate large-scale results, while losses are avoided or 
at least minimized.  Rationalisation is the process of achieving more for less effort. 132  As 
will be evidenced throughout my research, this idea of rationalisation had huge appeal for 
both governments and senior management in the NHS.   
 
Modernity sees the rise of rationalization in all aspects of society. This includes the 
political, administrative, and economic arenas.  Thus, the bedrock to the rational State is 
the rationalisation of procedure.
133
  One aspect of rationalisation is quantification. “The 
spread of quantification also corresponds to a reconfiguration of expert knowledge and 
stimulates projects of professionalization.”134 Quantification counts and measures all 
variables. The statistician Karl Pearson exemplifies the idea that quantification can be 
applied to all aspects of life, including government and administration, providing rigour 
and a reasoned approach which had previously been missing in these areas. 
135
  Both the 
economy and technology are wheels in the engine of bureaucratisation.  The rational State 
sees bureaucratic conditions take hold: organisations are large scale, there is a strict 
hierarchy and order in place, and rules govern actions, with decisions based on a rational 
set of principles.  In this respect, a bureaucracy can be defined as a centrally-coordinated 
system where administration is rationalised. Within this, individuals work on specific 
structured areas gaining a specific expertise.  Qualifications, rather than fulfilling a set 
criteria, are what lead to an appointment.
136
  This bureaucratic coordination of the actions 
of large numbers of people has become the dominant structural feature of modern forms of 
organization.    
 
However, bureaucracy as a system is not without its drawbacks.  The aspects of it that 
make it successful, such as its size and scale, may also make it cumbersome.  It can 
become a vast monolith.  Those who work within it are small cogs in a large machine and 
outsiders who encounter bureaucracies can feel as if they are on a production line 
conveyor belt.  The by-product of bureaucratization is the overwhelming sense of 
depersonalization, it “dehumanises itself…the exclusion from the conduct of official 
business …of purely personal sentiment (and instead is) manned by the expert, who is all 
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the more indifferent in human terms, and so all the more completely objective.”137 
Rationalisation and bureaucratisation are linked; as one increases so too does the other.  
Weber argues that the more embedded the bureaucracy, the greater the level of 
depersonalisation.   
 
Weber's views are not dissimilar to Marx’s notion of alienation and the way in which this 
manifests itself through the process of commodification.  Within Marxist literature, much 
has been written about the idea of commodification, the notion that monetary value can be 
allocated to a thing or process, previously not considered in such terms, which can 
therefore now be traded in a market economy.  The good life, such as an individual’s 
health, is one such area which now has a fiscal value attached to it.  There is calculability 
to decision-making; illnesses are coded and costed and outcomes are measured not only in 
clinical terms but also on a financial basis.  What cannot be measured, qualities such as 
compassion, caring and kindness, by their absence cease to be important.  This lack of 
clear visibility in a list of performance indicators means these values are no longer viewed 
as an immediate priority.  Marx recognised as equally important several other aspects of 
commodification, which is worth noting.  Commodification leads to an abstraction, a 
generalisation in order to produce a product which holds universal appeal.  The societal 
bonds that go to its creation are no longer clearly apparent.
138
  The labour undertaken as 
part of commodification leads to the loss of ownership and accountability as relationships 
become more impersonal and take on a corporate identity.  The NHS which has become 
the purveyor of services illustrates this, and also displays the corresponding shift to 
performance management business process where seeking patient/consumer satisfaction is 
paramount. 
 
Marx and Weber recognize that depersonalised work is a tyranny in itself.  The constant 
need for increased effectiveness and efficiency can be damaging not only to the individual 
but also to the society it seeks to further.  Contrary to expectations, increasing 
rationalisation and the bureaucratisation of all aspects of life ceases to be a civilising 
force.  My findings support this theory and are elucidated in the chapter on Stigma.  This 
provides evidence that, contrary to intuition and mainstream viewpoint, on-going 
rationalisation of structures within organisations was not always the most appropriate way 
of running effective organisations.  Rationalisation can be counterproductive as networks 
of relationships become narrower, insular, inflexible and sometimes collapse.  Work in 
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modern society is becoming depersonalised as more recent studies focusing on the 
changing nature of work undertaken by professionals have shown.  
 
Foucault, while not dealing with the idea of bureaucracy directly, covers many of its 
aspects in his book ‘Discipline and Punish’.139  It details the shift from death through 
torture to the establishment of prisons.  Foucault does not favour one over the other.  
Rather his work shatters the myth that prisons are a means of deterrent.  Prisons act as a 
form of both punishment and control and seeks to re-establish the law as sacrosanct.  
Discipline is “a type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of 
instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a ‘physics’ or an 
‘anatomy’ of power, a technology.”140  Within prisons, a strict regime of discipline is 
imposed.  Moreover, the panoptican approach of control and surveillance is an intrinsic 
part of modern management. As he states, “our society is one not of spectacle but of 
surveillance….We are neither in the amphitheatre, nor on the stage, but in the panoptic 
machine, invested by its effects of power, which we bring to ourselves since we are a part 
of its mechanism.”141  Foucault widened the context of his work by applying the 
regulatory regimes of disciplinary power seen in prisons to schools, factories and 
hospitals.  The prison, its structure, management and use of technologies is metaphor for 
how modern society is run.  At the same time that hierarchical power has declined, local 
systemic power has increased.   
 
When discussing the medical profession,
142
 Foucault’s focus is on the clinic and what he 
refers to as the clinical gaze.  Observation is the essence of the clinical gaze; it is a form of 
surveillance. It is silent, gestureless and uninterrupting, seeking out the essential as it 
records and totalises before reaching an impartial objective judgement.
143
 As Foucault 
argues, “the clinical gaze has the paradoxical ability to hear a language as soon as it 
perceives a spectacle”,144 meaning that every symptom is considered a potential sign, a 
diagnostic.
145
  The establishment of ‘clinics’ or hospitals advanced a new type of medical 
approach, one based around clinical systematic observation by doctors who were the 
experts and controlling agency.  It saw them undertake physical examinations of docile 
and passive patients.  This new way of knowing, clinical expertise, was only possible 
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because of new technologies, tools, instruments and altered spaces.  It aided and 
characterised this type of behaviour and saw persons become categorised to suit the 
emerging professions within medicine.  Doctors compartmentalised disorders, experts 
diagnosed diseases and in so doing the body was disaggregated.
146
  The ‘clinic’, hospital, 
engenders a new type of individual, ‘the active patient’.  This is a person who understands 
and acknowledges the value of self-assessing and self-observing techniques.  Moreover, 
this is the norm; as such, they monitor their body and lifestyle for signs and symptoms of 
abnormality without real conscious thought. Good health is no longer a personal affair but 
a societal duty.  Individuals are not concerned with the salvation of their soul; this has 
been superseded by wellbeing.  Health has greater status now than ever before.  Therefore 
a responsible citizen is one who recognises the need to safeguard, control and care for 
one’s health.147  Medicalisation of everyday life sees individual citizens complying with 
minimal outside intervention.  This system of self-surveillance is internalised such that 
individuals become their own overseer.  Originally discussed with reference to the 
disciplinary power and with regard to prisoners, the panoptican is now reproduced in a 
medical setting.   
 
More recent interpretations of rationalisation and surveillance have been put forward by 
Scott and Ritzer.  Scott in his book “Seeing like a State” describes different examples of 
rationalisation such as a forest in Germany and cities in India and Brazil.  The book is 
concerned with efforts made to ‘read’ both nature and society.  Statecraft is the process by 
which the state imposes a system of simplification of structure, in order to make 
circumstances and situations more legible.
148
 In so doing administrations and bureaucratic 
processes mistakenly assume a map is not just a representation of a landscape but the 
terrain itself,
149
 that is, holding as real only that which has been codified and counted.  
Parameters are created through the process of rationalising and standardising; anything 
which falls outside this is considered valueless.  Scott begins “Seeing Like a State” with 
the example of German ‘scientific’ forestry as applied in the 18th and 19th Centuries.  
Scientific forestry established ordered and regimented planting systems, usually a single 
crop of Norway Spruce or Scotch pine.  Other elements of the forest were considered 
worthless.  Profit was the bottom-line and balance sheets make appropriate record of this.  
Monetary value assigned to commodity was reflected in the language defining what was 
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of worth and what was worthless.  Hence valuable trees were regarded as ‘timber’ in 
contrast to ‘underbrush’; crops fought against weeds and pests.150  At first easy money was 
to be had by the forest owners, as the more valuable trees were harvested.
151
  The focus on 
one commodity allowed codification, measurement and rigorous discipline that would 
have otherwise been impossible.  However, over time the lack of biodiversity, the 
narrowing species and the loss of little understood symbiotic relationships, were an 
ecological catastrophe and had a huge negative impact on the overall productivity of the 
forest.  All trees were the same age and same species and experienced weather threats such 
as severe snow or storms in a similar fashion.  This was an environmental disaster as trees 
fell down like bowling pins.  While the removal of underbrush simplified the working life 
of foresters, the disappearance of the forest floor weakened the overall forest.  Moreover, 
particular pests and predators thrived in the newly created monocultures and reached 
epidemic proportions.  Huge amounts were then spent on insecticides, fungicides and 
fertilisers in an attempt to make up for these failings.  This whole process culminated in 
the death of the forest.  Germans refer to this as Waldsterben.
152
 My case study of the 
health policy initiative “18 weeks” introduced by New Labour makes similar claims, of 
simplification and streamlining. This will be evidenced in the chapter on rationalisation, 
particularly in the section on tabularisation.       
 
Scott goes on to examine what he refers to as ‘high modernism,’ an example of which is 
the utopian planned cities.  Here large scale schemes of development placed value on 
rational design, social order and human improvement.  Science and technology were 
employed to impose the state’s vision of a well-run and efficient city.  This ideology is 
illustrated by the architectural work of Le Corbusier.  Primarily, Le Corbusier saw the city 
as a workshop for production, a place where human needs were met in order for the city to 
be at its most productive.
153
  One example cited by Scott is Le Corbusier’s design of 
Chandigarh.  Chandigarh, the new capital of Punjab, was a city built from scratch, a 
planned city organised into separate sectors through the use of wide open spaces.  The 
buildings within sectors were uniform with little variation.  Order was considered a 
precondition to efficiency; therefore there was a greater use of geometric lines, grids and a 
simplification of structures.  Vast squares were created for public space; however the sheer 
scale and size made it both impersonal and disorientating to individuals.  The crossings 
and corners, meeting places where people gathered previously were not incorporated into 
                                                 
150
 Scott, J. C., (1998) p14 
151
 Scott, J. C., (1998) p19  
152
 Scott, J. C., (1998) p20 
153
 Scott, J. C., (1998) p115 
60 
this new planned vision.
154
  Older cities that had adapted and grown with their residents 
were often labyrinth-like, in which side streets and roads converged to create mini-mazes.  
This contrasts with the new simplified planned cities which were organised, streamlined 
and highly rigid.            
 
Both examples of “seeing like a state” share a vision of central control where change is 
imposed from above; it is bureaucratic by nature, seeking to standardise objects, processes 
and procedures.  Central control creates a culture through which to rule, regulate and 
manage effectively from afar.  It is an administrative world view and therefore it is not 
surprising that planned cities such as Chandigarh are administrative capitals.  These are 
places where administrators reside and hence their city reinforces their vision of the 
future.
155
  To an inhabitant or insider it is easy to understand and navigate oneself through 
the traditional system, but to an outsider, taking the perspective of high modernism things 
appear chaotic, disorganised and therefore dysfunctional.  As Theodore Porter in his book 
“Trust in Numbers” states: “to measure for public purposes is rarely so simple as to apply 
a meter stick casually to an object….Adequate measurement clearly means disciplining 
people as well as standardising instruments and processes.”156  Similarly, Scott uses these 
examples to illustrate how the loss of local knowledge can be devaluing and the 
assumption that the external perspective is correct is often invalid.   
 
Modelling, simplification and generalizing are only conceptual tools.  Ecological and 
societal relations are infinitely more complex to model accurately.  More often than not 
planners, managers and bureaucrats make no attempt to understand the local conditions, 
instead working on the premise that they know better.  The practical implicit knowledge 
gained through experience is disregarded.  Scott refers to this as metis.  Metis is a type of 
knowledge that is of the moment, temporarily defined, highly spatial.  It is learnt 
knowledge which is local to its conditions and context.  It is not explicit and therefore 
difficult to write or prove in line with positivistic imperial science.
157
  Modernists question 
the existence and value of such knowledge. However to ignore it leads ultimately to the 
failure of these new regimes.  The reductionist vision of society engenders docile minds as 
people who were once autonomous are now reliant on the expert’s advice.  Weber noted 
the modern state is a bureaucratic state run on principles of instrumental rationality. 
Within a bureaucracy, statistics and measures are a key technology of power. The state 
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“sees” society through numbers and statistics with decisions and interventions being made 
accordingly; this process is one which remakes society.   
 
Zygmunt Bauman also discusses the effects of rationalisation and bureaucracy.  His work 
is important to my research as it illustrates how bureaucracy diminishes personal 
responsibility and increases the risk of behaviour that would otherwise be considered 
unacceptable. His work sheds light on how the Holocaust happened, how individuals were 
co-opted into committing mass atrocities.  His argument is that rather than an aberration of 
modernity, the Holocaust is a symptom and a product of modernity.  The Holocaust, he 
contends, could not have happened without the infrastructure and technological mindset 
that is a central feature of modernity - rational, planned, scientifically informed, expert, 
efficiently managed and co-ordinated.
158
  Bauman claims the Holocaust “could merely 
have uncovered another face of the same modern society whose other, more familiar, face 
we so admire. And that the two faces are perfectly, comfortably attached to the same body. 
What we perhaps fear the most is that each of the two faces can no more exist without the 
other than can two sides of a coin.”159  According to Bauman, characteristics of 
bureaucracy such as the apparatus of the state, governing organisations, the constant drive 
towards progress, the elevation of scientific method with its focus on rational thinking and 
personal detachment are all aspects of modernity which made the Holocaust so effective 
as a killing machine.  As Bauman states “though engaged in mass murder on a gigantic 
scale, this vast bureaucratic apparatus showed concern for correct bureaucratic procedure, 
for the niceties of precise definition, for the minutiae of bureaucratic regulation, and the 
compliance with the law.”160   
 
Professionalism, effective administration and comprehensive documentation were central 
elements to the Holocaust.  While most individuals would shun the use of brutality and not 
condone the killing of individuals, the State can sanction its citizens to use violence.  It 
has the authority to call upon its citizens who may feel compelled to do so where they 
consider their values to be threatened.  The State legitimises killing; individuals are free 
from guilt in the belief that their actions are obligatory and necessary.
161
 The aversion the 
individuals have to violence is set aside. They are prepared to be complicit in behaviour 
that they would otherwise consider abhorrent.  Individuals are able to abdicate the 
consequences of their actions as responsibility lies with the next person in the chain of 
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command.  It is this obsession with bureaucracy, where citizens are obliged to obey and 
there is pressure on individuals to conform and comply, which creates a moral 
detachment.  Bauman looks at how the death penalty is implemented.  Individuals talk 
about taking a professional approach to their job and the team in which they work.  
Bauman notes “all those people partake in the act of killing but no one is (or, rather, needs 
to feel) a killer. At no point is there but one trigger to be pulled by one finger.”162 What 
becomes apparent is the team effort enables all those in the team to say with a clear 
conscience they did not do it.  Moreover, the division of labour further aids the sense of 
mental detachment as individuals are concerned only with their part in specific processes, 
happy to remain unaware of others’ precise functions.  This distancing allows personal 
morality to be suspended with greater ease than if individuals had to scrutinise the 
behaviour of all participants and their impact on those participants. “Responsibility as 
Hannah Arendt observed is floating. And a floating responsibility is nobody’s 
responsibility.”163   
        
For Bauman the nation-state’s role is pivotal in forming the conditions that led to the 
Holocaust.  The state has a monopoly on force and in the Holocaust we see its most brutal 
application. While modernity is considered a civilising force, it also created a place where 
the only acceptable form of violence is that employed by the state.  Citizens are less likely 
to challenge or confront the authority of state organisations such as the police and armed 
forces.  As Bauman states, “somewhere in the wings physical violence is stored - in 
quantities that put it effectively out of the control of ordinary members of society and 
endow it with irresistible power to suppress unauthorised outbursts of violence.”164  The 
bureaucratic machine ensured processes were carried out with scientific but lethal 
precision.  State funding of scientists meant the government had a close cooperative 
relationship, “a government who stretches its helpful hand and offers just that can count 
on the scientists’ gratitude and co-operation.”165  The Third Reich exercised a modern 
rational approach in exterminating those considered racially impure, and in executing the 
final solution they showed deadly efficiency.  This detachment of emotion and conscience 
is still a fundamental part of organised, sanctioned and legitimate State violence.  The 
State “far from calling for mobilisation of individuals’ moral code or any other 
convictions, demand on the contrary their suspension, obliteration and irrelevance.”166 
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While it is impossible to say categorically that the Holocaust would not have occurred 
without modernity, Bauman clearly illustrates how the power within hierarchical 
bureaucratic organisations engenders a moral abdication where individuals no longer feel 
culpable for dubious practices.   
 
Scott’s idea of surveillance is not a direct interpretation of Foucault but rather an 
adaptation which sees surveillance as part of State work.  Governmentality is the term 
used by Foucault to describe the subtle creeping in the governing modes of thought; there 
is no master plan, no grand design, no conscious overarching scheme by the state. He 
differentiates between power as domination and that between individuals
167
.  All actors 
have varying degrees of power which increase and decrease dependent on the 
circumstances, and while power relations can be hierarchical they are not fixed.  Examples 
given by Scott demonstrate that rationalisation is in the interests of those who hold power.  
Where the State lacks knowledge and capacity to understand specific local conditions it 
generates new rationalising systems; Statecraft is where the role of the state is as the all-
seeing eye.  The rationalising processes introduced involve measures that compare and 
contrast, include and exclude, as well as differentiate and homogenise all actors and 
actants.  For Foucault these are all aspects of normalisation.  Scott’s examples note the 
trend is towards bureaucratic rigid planning, imposed practices and centralised inflexible 
systems. Thus practical local knowledge, which is valuable for its detail and expertise, is 
replaced and context is lost.  This makes decision making at ground level ineffective, 
cumbersome and difficult.  The introduction of rationalisation processes often involve 
claims to efficiency. In fact the new systems decrease overall efficiency but increase State 
intervention, surveillance and, more importantly, power.       
 
In his book, the McDonaldisation of Society
168
, Ritzer gives a critique of rationalisation in 
modern society. McDonaldisation is the term Ritzer uses to describe how any process can 
be broken down in to its component parts and rationalised on the basis of efficiency.
169
  
This new process can be further broken down and rationalised again. Hence an ongoing 
process of rationalisation, which lends itself to Weber’s belief that it is ubiquitous and 
unconquerable.
170
  This is a wholly rational, logical development as all variables are now 
controlled and all elements can now be costed and accounted for.  This sense of 
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calculability, that is a reduction to numbers,
171
 a quantifying of all elements and 
predictability, creating a culture of uniformity
172
 is paramount to the rationalisation 
process
173
; measured outcomes are a fundamental performance management tool.  Both 
calculability and predictability promote speed and routine repetitive work.  Ritzer coined 
the term McDonaldisation, after the fast food chain McDonalds, a company skilled at 
adopting and deploying these work practices.  However, these modes of behaviour have 
crept into all aspects of society including healthcare, with widespread cumulative effects.  
It creates a culture where speed, efficiency, and replicability have predominance over all 
other factors.  While this may be superficially gratifying, it is neither life enhancing nor 
emotionally sustaining.  Creativity, passion and human relationships are sidelined in the 
quest for ever greater standardisation and conformity.  The McDonaldization theory 
combines ideas of rationalisation expounded by Weber and Scott while recognising how 
this impacts the individual in the workplace.  The chapter on stigma picks up on how 
performance as a type of work has imposed standardisation on the NHS and how this 
affects the actions and activities of staff, particularly in decreasing the autonomy of 
performance managers.             
 
McDonaldization also sees the consumer take on the role of the worker; consumers carry 
out tasks previously done by paid members of staff.  Thus, the consumer is an unpaid 
employee.  Within healthcare this can be seen in patients not only having rights but also 
responsibilities.  These responsibilities involve undertaking small administrative tasks and 
simple care practices, such as booking further appointments and taking prescribed 
medicines.  Another aspect of McDonaldization on the workforce is a general deskilling, 
which Weber describes in relation to bureaucracy.  Within healthcare, there is a greater 
reliance on medical technologies.  The role of doctors increasingly becomes that of a 
‘dispatcher,’ referring patients to technical machines and specialists.174  In so doing their 
understanding of their work lessens; so too does their control and autonomy.  The 
fragmentation of complex skilled work into a series of simpler focused tasks means that 
staff can be easily replaced, as training is no longer cumbersome or costly. The use of 
casual, short term, contract labour for permanently temporary work is an effective strategy 
for corporate rationalisation. While this may reduce wage costs and overheads, and 
promote greater flexibility, this is not its true purpose.  The value in the new pattern of 
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work is the workforce now carries the burden of risk.
175
  Expertise and knowledge are no 
longer valued; performance is judged solely on the completion of a specified job. Another 
aspect of rationalisation and facet of deskilling is deprofessionalisationism.  This is the 
loss of cultural authority, prestige and trust once enjoyed by a particular profession.   This 
may be due to general social change, e.g. decrease in deference, an increase in the number 
of professional women both inside and outside the NHS, as well as an increase in 
information.  There is now a wealth of available information on any given topic, easily 
accessible through the internet or various other forms of media.  Over the last decade, the 
public has seen a huge increase in access as well as an increase in the mass of information 
available.  Professional clinicians therefore now argue that they provide expertise, in that 
they can differentiate between good and bad information.  They may no longer have a 
monopoly on knowledge; they argue instead that they have a monopoly on expertise.   
 
The Proletarianisation thesis expounded by Oppenheimer
176
 is the idea that professional 
labour is dependent on employment in bureaucracies.  However, this dependency brings 
with it a loss of independence, subjection to rules and greater scrutiny, and increased 
management as in any other group.  Critics have said this theory lacked specificity in 
process and consequence, stating that it was unable to show why the subjection of 
professionals to the same rules as other working groups was detrimental to their 
profession.  Within the NHS, state regulation led to a formalisation of existing structures, 
explicit monitoring, an emphasis on procedures and quality assurance, with the 
expectation that all patients should receive a certain standard of care.  All of this 
supposedly leads to a loss of professional independence and personal freedom.
177
  But 
while both theories can be applied to clinical staff in the NHS, it is important to remember 
the primary focus of self-regulation is the autonomy placed on the self, whether that self 
takes the form of a market, a firm, or a profession.  So while successive governments have 
encroached specifically on professional self-regulation, they have been careful to ensure 
that healthcare professionals believe that they have far more to gain than lose from the 
changes proposed.  
 
3.3 The rise of the Public sphere  
Public involvement was key to the Labour government’s reforms in the NHS which means 
it is necessary to understand how the ‘public’ is being constructed and what role for the 
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public is evolving within performance management.  Habermas charts the rise of public 
discourse with the emergence and establishment of the middle class.  He divides society 
into two spheres, the public and the private; both are constantly changing and developing 
in this highly complex relationship.  The influence and rise of democracy corresponds to 
changes within both these spheres.  Habermas states that the bourgeoisie, the middle class, 
grew through expansion in trade and industry.  Their power was further strengthened 
through the use of literature, letters and the press.  This voice was then asserted through 
the public sphere, a sphere where the middle class were particularly comfortable having 
helped in its creation, to become a significant challenge to state power.  This ties in with 
Moran’s conception of club government.  It demonstrates that the middle class use 
aristocratic norms, emulating the aristocracy, creating connections through businesses.  
Democracy, independence and rational debate are central to the middle class’ success and 
are necessary conditions for discussions to take place within the public sphere.   
 
Debates and discussion of public policy give rise to a ‘bourgeoisie public sphere’, which 
consists of forums such as debating clubs, salons, coffee houses, newspapers and books.  
Moreover, ‘public’ is no longer a place, but rather a state in which discussion can occur 
freely, e.g. the press.  The private reading culture becomes the medium of public 
expression.  Therefore, the rise of the public sphere is linked to the rise of rational public 
interaction and the middle class.  Public houses are those that are accessible to all; public 
buildings are those working on behalf of the public; public representation acts as an 
authority for the greater public and, crucially, public opinion is the function of the people 
to act as critical judge, providing checks on the public representations made. The 
bourgeoisie opposes aristocratic titles and privileges and rides against the ‘publicity of 
representation’, the visible ritualised representations of feudal structures.  “While the early 
institutions of the bourgeoisie public sphere originally were closely bound up with the 
aristocratic society as it became disassociated from the court, the ‘great’ public that 
formed in the theatres, museums and concerts was bourgeoisie in its social origin.”   
However, in today’s society there is no single public sphere; rather there are many 
including counter-publics, competing publics, and alternative public spheres.  Habermas 
refers to this as the marketisation of public discourse. 
 
According to Habermas, the public sphere declined during the 19th century and atrophied 
during the 20th.  He looks to the Enlightenment period for the ideal conception of public.  
Here discussion in the public sphere is not connected directly to action.  Habermas sets out 
a moral philosophical framework where we are free and autonomous, and assumes the 
67 
ideal speech situation.  This view holds reason and rationality as a liberating force; it is 
what binds humanity together, as it is a characteristic we all share.  This contrasts with 
Foucault’s position, where he argues that reason becomes a dominating force.   
 
3.4 Historical examples of the State as a social engineer   
Throughout this thesis I argue that the State has a transforming vision; in pushing forward 
ideas of progress it irrevocably alters society.  As already described, the process of 
measuring, the creation of records and the formation of lists are an intrinsic aspect of 
statecraft providing an approximation of reality.  Planning the corresponding by-product 
of measuring allows the state to see: it is a form of surveillance. It allows State officials to 
gain knowledge of a section of society that was previously hidden.  The state works from a 
premise that if it is possible to reshape nature it must be equally possible to reshape 
society. This can be seen on numerous occasions where the state has attempted to break 
from the past, from fixed traditions and old conventions.  Extreme examples include 
Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge with the introduction of year zero and Apartheid in 
South Africa.  Bauman states that it took an efficient bureaucratic society to implement the 
Nazis’ Final Solution.178  In exterminating the Jews, German society was perversely 
celebrating its efforts as civilising force; the organisational machine and workforce that 
enabled such an accomplishment was a salutation to modernity.  Such systems are 
complex, sophisticated and simultaneously deceptively simple, severe forms of social 
engineering.  These regimes establish and develop intricate forms of classification and 
engage in a process of rationalisation as expounded by Weber.  There are less extreme 
examples of rationalisation which allow the State to see.  I argue, using both theories of 
Scott and Ritzer, that policies driven through in the NHS were such processes.                      
 
Ritzer articulated his belief that society is undergoing ‘McDonaldisation’.  By this he 
meant that four main qualities are being subscribed to by various organisations 
irrespective of their place in society.  These four dimensions are efficiency, quantification 
and calculability, predictability and control.  This was exemplified by the American 
businessman and restaurateur  Ray Kroc when he “talked about uniformity, about a 
standardized menu, one size portions, same prices, same quality in every store”  in relation 
to his McDonalds empire.  Ritzer’s work develops Weber’s theory of formal rationality; 
this is the idea that people exist within a structured world where rules and regulation 
inform and to some degree coerce their thinking, choices and actions.  The bureaucratic 
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machine that lies at the heart of modern organisations pushes the individual into certain 
positions on the basis of supposed rationality.  Ritzer states that, “profit-making medical 
organisations are not the only ones pushing medicine in the direction of greater 
calculability; all medical bureaucracies are moving in that direction.”   
 
3.5 Understanding various approaches to risk 
An overview of the literature on risk will be provided because, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, high profile crises allowed New Labour to validate the need for 
performance in the NHS.  Notions of risk have changed considerably.  Appearing first in 
the Middle Ages in relation to maritime insurance, it meant the possibility of objective 
danger, the threat of a natural event, an act of God or an incident where blame could not 
be apportioned. This notion of risk negates the idea of human fault; as culpability is not an 
issue, censure or chastisement is inappropriate.  With the rise of modernity, 
industrialisation and the establishment of public institutions in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, notions of risk change.
179
  Risk became defined in terms of 
probabilities and statistics, as it continues to the present day where risk is concerned with 
calculating contingences and uncertainties. Unlike the earlier conception of risk, outcomes 
can be altered and/or influenced by human behaviour.  Risk is synonymous with 
uncertainty as such is viewed as the same. While risk can be either good or bad, personal 
experience tends to equate it with bad.  Risk moves to being fact and fact in turn moves to 
being absolute truth; nonetheless these are merely calculations provided by experts.
180
  All 
risk analysis is context bound
181
 and the evaluation of risk is very much dependent on the 
present; there is a temporal dimension
182
 which is essential when attempting to understand 
and calculate risk.   
 
Deborah Lupton gives one of the most comprehensive introductions and critiques of the 
three major theoretical approaches to risk: Cultural/Symbolic perspective as presented by 
Mary Douglas; the Risk Society/Reflexive Modernization perspective put forward by 
Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens, and ideas of Governmentality which emerged from the 
work of Michel Foucault.  (Each will be looked at in more detail.) Lupton makes clear the 
distinction between the three perspectives, noting that all three approaches to risk 
recognise politicisation of the topic and how ideas of risk pervade both modern life and 
society.  Lupton studied the relationship between risk and subjectivity.  For her individuals 
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deal with risk differently in different forums; how they deal with risk in the public arena is 
different to their experience of risk in their personal life.  How risk is constructed depends 
on context and circumstances of individuals on daily basis, where the everyday experience 
is essential in understanding risk.  Previous analysis focused on the presentation of risk 
within the public forum, but neglected to understand how risk is dealt with in everyday 
life.  Lupton focuses on the personal attempts to address this deficiency. 
 
3.6 The work and function of risk  
The cultural anthropologist Mary Douglas argues risk is a culturally constructed concept, 
reliant on and framed by knowledge of wider belief systems and moral positions.  In 
“Purity and Danger,” Douglas attempted to understand the process by which something is 
labelled risky or dangerous.  Things that did not fit easily into traditional classification 
systems were often regarded as impure.  By crossing boundaries, or lying on a 
categorization border, things were considered polluted and hence dangers and threats as 
they defied the rules.  These things, meaningless in themselves, are symbols, 
representations of cultural beliefs which can only be understood in the context of the 
communities in which they originate.  Douglas concludes that danger acts as a trigger in 
creating social boundaries between individuals, groups and communities.  “Danger is 
defined to protect the public… a common danger gives them (society) a handle to 
manipulation, the threat of a community–wide pollution is a weapon for mutual coercion.  
Who can resist using it who cares for the community?”183 Danger provides a demarcation 
criterion for distinguishing between them and us.  Risk is employed to construct notions of 
blame that serve to distance particular threats and blame.  This is done by negatively 
associating specific characteristics with the other, and blame and perceived wrongdoing 
invariably influence ideas of justice and its enforcement.   
 
Douglas gives a traditional description of risk: “risk is the probability of an event 
combined with the magnitude of the losses and gains it will entail,”184 and she also 
provides a fuller description of risk.  Perception and ideas of risk enable values to be 
produced and maintained. If culture is to be considered a set of values, then risk to that 
culture is that which endangers its values.  Notions of risk are understood, reinforced and 
perpetuated through those cultural values. For Douglas the politicisation of certain risks 
serves a particular function. She believes it is impossible to reduce risk to the individual 
level, and that real understanding of the role of risk in society is lost.  In this respect she 
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follows in the academic tradition of Émile Durkheim.  According to Douglas “the idea of 
society is a powerful image. It is potent in its own right to control or stir men to action.  
This image has form; it has external boundaries, margins, internal structure. Its outlines 
contain power to reward conformity and repulse attack.”185  Hence it is the defence of 
society and its attack on perceived risk that inevitably strengthens group identity, increases 
group cohesion and provides a sense of solidarity at times of decreasing social security 
and rising uncertainty.      
 
3.7 Professional life in the Risk Society 
Ulrich Beck elevated the concept of ‘risk society’186 in the developmental period of 
modernity.  To understand the risk society it is necessary to give a description of risk of 
which there are numerous definitions.  For Beck risks are “uncontrollable scientific, 
technical, or social developments which were started long before their side-effects or long 
term consequences were known.”187  Risk is concerned with potential catastrophe rather 
than its actual occurrence.  “The concept of risk thus characterizes a peculiar intermediate 
state between security and destruction, where perception of threatening risks determines 
thought and action.”188  A normative account of risk is one which involves probabilities, 
likelihoods and chances of specific events occurring.  Where calculations lead to a loss, 
measures are sought to nullify the risk.  This process is known as risk management.
189
  A 
risky occurrence is one where the chances of it happening are high and the losses are 
equally high.  There are various regulatory bodies and departments within organisations 
whose primary concern is understanding and assessing risk.  They introduce systems to 
lessen the chance of the event occurring and/or the consequences of the event itself.  
Society’s concern with minimising and preventing these hazards is referred to by Beck as 
the Risk Society.  This is the anxiety, response and manifestation to the hazards and 
threats faced by individuals.  In an effort to diminish these perceived risks, different 
approaches and methodologies for risk assessment exist in which a combination of 
evaluatory tools, techniques and technologies are used.  Yet questions remain as to how 
effective these methods are in dealing with risk.  
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With the collapse of the banking system, the value and effectiveness of financial risk 
systems is being scrutinised.  Professionals in this area have been challenged to explain 
how risky events were allowed to happen based on the knowledge already available.  
Another profession which relies on risk systems to inform its decision-making, and is now 
under enquiry, is social care
190
.  Practices in this area have come to the public’s attention 
after high profile cases such as that of Victoria Climbie
191
 and ‘Baby P’ hit the media.  
Social workers are under enormous pressure to explain how such huge failures in care, i.e. 
the abuse and death of two children could happen.  Local knowledge needs to be acted 
upon, rather than ignored.  These tragedies occurred irrespective of the audit and 
inspection systems in place in order to make practice transparent.
192
  Eileen Monroe 
argues that social work has become a risk assessment exercise at the expense of the child’s 
needs and social justice.  
 
Beck considers our preoccupation with identifying risk in every aspect of daily life.  Risks 
are man-made and self-inflicted, caused by the very technologies that make society 
modern. They are side effects or by-products to technology.  Risk has now moved on to a 
global scale.  Once risks were perceived as localised or limited in nature; now new risks 
such as terrorism and climate change are globally encompassing threats.  These risks are 
unmanageable but democratic, that is, there is no hierarchy as to who is affected.  There is 
an increased reflexivity within society.  Due to greater education, media coverage and 
scepticism, individuals no longer accept authority. Society is in a state of permanent high 
alert as disaster is always imminent.  The crisis which society awaits creates a sense of 
constant tension, anxiety and impending doom.  The doubt and uncertainty felt by society 
means that all risks are susceptible to being politicised.  While for Foucault and Scott the 
sense of watchfulness is part of the state surveillance, for Beck this is another aspect of 
anticipation.  This tension experienced prior to a catastrophe, this state of flux, is 
essentially the marker of the risk society.  However, others counter that the rise of the risk 
society is due to a blame and compensation culture and risk features highly when 
politicians seek justification for their policies.  “Command and control” policies, where 
accountability is both constantly sought and imposed, becomes an essential element of 
statework.
193
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3.8 Trust within the Risk society  
Discussion of risk happens within the private and public spheres.  However, in the Risk 
Society the public sphere is consumed by perceived threats and possible risks. “The 
discourse of risk begins where trust in our security and belief in progress end.”194  It is 
clear the clash between security and danger or even trust and risk is not as unambiguous as 
it would first appear.  These traditional divides can no longer be called upon in 
discussions; a consequence of modernity is that these distinct areas have collapsed.  To 
talk about one as if it is in conflict with the other is nonsensical; today’s society sees 
persons entering situations where security and danger, trust and risk are two sides of the 
same coin and nowhere is this more apparent than in healthcare relations.  The word of the 
health professional is not a guarantee; at best, they present patients and public with the 
most reliable information and evidence to date.  However, their expertise, like much of 
science, is uncertain.  This is because, as new evidence arises, so do the prevailing views 
and understandings.  Antony Giddens states, “Many people, as it were, make a “bargain 
with modernity” in terms of the trust they rest in symbolic tokens and expert systems.  The 
nature of the bargain is governed by specific admixtures of deference and scepticism, 
comfort and fear.”195  This implies that the degree of trust an outsider places in abstract 
systems is dependent on their experience at access points, i.e. the moment in which 
interaction can occur between a lay and expert person.  Access points within any sector of 
industry are often places of great tension because of the conflict between public and 
professional knowledge.   
 
According to Giddens, interaction with abstract systems leads to a basic understanding of 
the system itself, but interaction with the NHS predominantly occurs when an individual 
has a health concern which means it is a time when they are vulnerable and personal fears 
are magnified.  “We may end up claiming not to trust and yet, for practical purposes place 
trust in the very sources we claim not to trust.”196  A distinction must be made between the 
patient’s and public’s stated and revealed trust; that is the response given when asked and 
what their actions actually tell us.  It is necessary to differentiate between the motivation 
to trust and the competency of the individual in whom trust is being placed.  Earle and 
Cretkovich argue that trust placement is irrational.
197
  This may frequently be because the 
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necessary scepticism, understanding of risks, potential failures and other possible 
outcomes, obligatory in modern life, are relinquished as a lack of trust in the medical 
expertise provided proves too emotionally draining.    
 
To understand the rise of risk awareness in the NHS it is necessary to understand how 
relationships exist and work and the role trust plays within those relationships.  Trust has 
many facets: as an emotion, a social contract and its relationship with rationality. It can be 
characterised as an alternative means of control, or a form of dependency that is the 
acceptance and reliance on another. Trust is bound up in feelings of expectations and safe 
dependency.  It is a feeling of confidence in another’s future actions and also confidence 
concerning one’s own judgement.   
 
Competence and Caring in relation to building trust.
198
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Trust 
 
Distrust 
 
 
 
Respect 
 
 
 
Trust can be placed in the absence of pertinent knowledge or as a bridge between the 
present and future events as it anticipates outcomes.  Trust can be unintentionally 
transitive: an example of transitivity is if A trusts B, and B trusts C, then A will trust C.  
Trust is contextual as well as conditional.  Trust is based on expectations and not fixed 
calculations; nonetheless it still appears rational to trust trust.   
 
3.9 Accountability and Trust 
There have been dramatic changes occurring within public sector bodies in terms of 
internal accountability; the nature of traditional relationships between patients and doctors 
has also evolved.  Debates within society changed focus due to a shift from the 
manufacturing of material goods to a focus on information. This marked a move from 
modernity to a transition society, one based around information and consumer culture.  
This was also reflected in the patient-doctor relationship where patients insisted on more 
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detailed information about their treatment.  Previously science, of which medicine and 
those involved in its practice are part, made certain claims to knowledge, authority and 
power. This privileged position is no longer assured.  “Challenge to authority, including 
the authority of science should be expected in a healthy democracy,”199  Patients now 
expect to be kept fully informed.
200
  This loss of assurance is due to a plurality of 
heterogeneous claims in modern society as well as a decrease in personal relations and a 
simultaneous increase in abstract systems and regimes.  This sees a move from individual 
accountability, to faith, a form of trust in disembedding mechanisms
201
 relying on expert 
knowledge and trust placed in the entirety of the NHS rather than solely on the local 
family doctor.   
 
According to Giddens, how patients experience trust can now be divided into ‘event types’ 
of two sorts: firstly, as interpersonal, an individual doctor; secondly, role-based which 
incorporates doctors.  Modern society provides order and a sense of security, possibly 
falsely, by organizing the world in which we live.  It does this through the use of expert 
systems,
202
  that is through individuals who hold technical or specialist expertise, e.g. NHS 
professionals.  Expert systems eliminate social relations from narrow precise situations, a 
characteristic that is shared with disembedding mechanisms.  They provide instead a 
guarantee in the expertise offered irrespective of when or where, thereby encouraging 
confidence in the system.  “Trust is therefore involved in a fundamental way with the 
institutions of modernity. Trust here is vested, not in individuals, but in abstract 
capacities.”203  Giddens refers to the ‘time-space distinction’ as one way in which the 
system is maintained; trust is placed in the whole system rather a select individual.  Within 
the NHS, trust is placed in the system to deliver good efficient care.  Trust in the 
organisation is essentially about effectiveness and legitimacy which differs from 
individual trust relations.  Thus, public trust is closely linked to public satisfaction towards 
the NHS and the particular personality traits of clinicians are supposedly immaterial.             
 
Trust relations are changing throughout society and within the NHS
204
; policy initiatives 
have been introduced to increase levels of trusts in different trust relationships: trust and 
performance management, trust and patient care, trust and participation in disease 
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management.
205
  Under Sir Ian Kennedy, Chairman of the Healthcare Commission, the 
publication of patient survival rates of individual consultants has been introduced.  In so 
doing this illustrates the shift to operationalise trust relations of which performance 
management is a significant part.   
 
Forms of Trust Relations    
Old     New 
Embodied       Informed 
Peer  Earned 
Status Performance 
 
3.10 Audit as form of accountability and a tool for risk management  
Michael Power argues that “The Audit Society” is based on the political desire for greater 
accountability and control. Power sees audit as central in the functioning of modern 
society, as audit acts in the absence of trust, both in the public and private sectors. 
Employees become auditees and make auditability a central characteristic of their work. In 
the public sector, there is a greater emphasis on internal control systems with the 
performance of individuals and organizations assessed through an official and auditable 
process. There are financial audits, environmental audits, value for money audits, 
management audits, quality audits, forensic audits, data audits, intellectual property audits, 
medical audits and many others besides.
206
 These audits are an attempt at “restoring 
credibility”.207  Power argues audits do not deliver greater accountability, as the assurance 
provided is superficial and largely ineffective. There may be adverse repercussions from 
trusting such systems.  
 
Power gives a historical account of audit culture showing how it arose from financial audit 
compensating for the intrinsic mistrust at the heart of the relationship between investors 
and managers.
208
 The audit society “trusts auditors before operatives”209 and so the audit 
framework grew to foster the full functioning of financial markets.  As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, financial audit was exported to the public sector via new public 
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210
 which Power states saw “the diffusion and generalization of the financial 
accountability model, particularly in the public sector.”211  Public sector organisations in 
theory were devolved from central control but in practice government still required 
mechanisms for management; it is in this vacuum audit flourished.  It was deployed to 
resolve the disparity of these two incongruous ideals acting as “the shadow of hierarchy 
which saves the appearance of central control.”212 Thus, audit is a “political 
technology”213 acting on behalf of a centre unprepared to relinquish power and control, in 
this case the state, within the public sector. This description of audit is one that makes 
organisations within the public sector auditable rather than genuinely accountable. Audit 
as a technology replaced other methods of accountability including both inspection and 
quality control
214
 because it “has a special versatility in which submission to audit 
establishes legitimacy regardless of the operational substance of audit”.215  
 
Power identifies a gap in expectations but this is not considered detrimental to audit, rather 
a political resource. The public assumes audit will provide assurance yet it is ineffectual in 
its delivery.
216
 Instead, there is an appearance of high levels of assurance which 
legitimates regulatory programmes and bodies.
217
  The public are aware something is 
askew, the consequence being “the audit society is the anxious society”218  
Commissioning further audits is the only recourse that the public can take. “The ‘fact of 
audit’ reduces anxiety, or more positively, produces comfort.”219   The public’s only “hope 
for control in the face of increasing evidence of its absence
220
 is pretending audit improves 
the situation, but it deludes itself with ease as “audit success or failure is never a public 
fact.”221 Whether audit has failed or succeeded remains ambiguous to the public.  
Moreover, discussion about audit practices is prohibited - “criteria of success are 
withdrawn from public discourse.”222 Thus audit failures remain hidden due to “durability 
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as a ‘political rationality’”223; the public is forced to accept audit because it is professed to 
be a better technology. 
 
Audit generates rules and procedures with which auditees have to comply.  Moreover, 
audit over the years has moved away from inspection, towards systems audit, “whereby it 
is the auditee’s own system for self-monitoring that is subject to inspection, rather than the 
real-time practices of the auditee.”224  Power claims that, with the arrival of audit, self-
monitoring systems such as inspection were discarded,
225
 yet this is misleading. Power 
himself recognises that audit thrives on paradoxes, stating audit is a process, “in which 
newly perceived difficulties and dangers can be ritually purified and reconciled to existing 
managerial and economic practice.”226 The auditor is likened to a priest, undertaking 
rituals of purification and reconciliation within religious ceremonies. The auditor as priest 
engenders a sense of security to managers, giving them ease and comfort against new 
threats and possible dangers. This is one of the most important roles audit performs.  The 
sense of authority it promotes, its ability to transcend failure and its adaptability make 
audit pervasive. The notion that there may be fewer audits becomes unthinkable; the audit 
society no longer envisages organisations or individuals left to their own devices.
227
 
Power’s summation of audit culture is that “we are all auditees now.”228 
    
3.11 Language as work  
Later in my research I illustrate how New Labour’s political rhetoric is given meaning 
through those who work in the NHS.  New Labour talks about ideas of open government 
and appeals to traditional notions of public involvement in decision-making but is 
effective in controlling public discussions; accusations of spin have been rife.  The 
literature (documents) produced are promotional, resembling forms of propaganda.  The 
NHS Plan, discussed in Chapter Two, is not a document for dialogue but a statement of 
intent.  As Foucault states, “multifunctionality of language in texts can be used to 
operationalise theoretical claims about the socially constructed properties of discourse and 
texts.”229 Language produces a shift in ideology and changes and controls public 
perception.  Yet, lack of real discussion hinders public understanding of the scientific 
process. The public are unable to assess evidence and judge risk appropriately, democratic 
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decision-making regarding prioritisation and rationing is impossible, and there is nothing 
on the broader issue of the future direction of the NHS.  However, criticism of the 
language used by New Labour is difficult to make; it is not merely a campaign for ‘plain 
English’.  People within the NHS took the language and made it their own; performance 
managers, as described in the chapter on stigma, have their own vocabulary.  They give 
meaning to the political rhetoric so that it has depth and substance.  It is an example of 
administration as work, staff putting language to work.  Conventionally culture, of which 
language is a part, sits within the superstructure along with non-economic institutions.  
This is unlike ‘work’ which as a form of productive labour is positioned within the base.  
Traditional approaches assume that productive work involves the manufacturing of 
objects.  State work in contrast is immaterial labour.  However, I argue that it is no less a 
form of productive work.   
 
Talk is how people create values and within institutions, such as the NHS and 
performance management, helps formulate these values in individual organisations.  
Habermas calls this ‘communicative action’, that is talk or interaction which creates 
relations and consensus and provides understanding and meaning.
230
  He asks us to move 
towards “the paradigm of mutual understanding between subjects capable of speech and 
action.”231  This differs from strategic action which is focused on achieving success, on its 
practicalities and realities. Theodore Adorno claimed that instrumental rationality or 
strategic action was the most efficient way of achieving a goal, and when comparing both 
instrumental and communicative action, instrumental rationality is conventionally thought 
superior to communicative action.  However, it is not so straightforward; performance 
management draws on the strengths of both forms of rationality and their application 
within the NHS can be seen at different points.  Communicative action is about the 
process, not just the product.  Previously considered the sphere of politicians or 
performing artists whose work requires an audience, communicative action as a type of 
labour is both immeasurable and measurable.  It cannot be broken down into set units, yet 
time acts as the overarching unit of measurement.  It challenges the idea that talk is cheap.  
It is the recognition that values evolve, and therefore the process is as important as the end 
result.  As Virno states, “enunciation is simultaneously means and end, instrument and 
final product.
232
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In a bureaucracy, language helps create an organization. In fact bureaucracies are 
networks of action of which the NHS in an exemplar.  Latour advocates a move away 
from the narrow concept of the laboratory and a recognition that social constructions are 
created in a variety of settings.
233
 I would argue that the NHS acts as a laboratory for 
performance managers, a place where social constructs are created, fashioned and 
sometimes renegotiated; it is a place of co-production where facts emerge.
234
  Latour 
showed how the transformation of statements into facts is done through the use of 
technological devices and human devices. These technological devices can take a variety 
of forms: diagrams, dashboards and documents.  Science depersonalizes, that is, it makes 
the author anonymous in order to provide a greater sense of truth.  To confer objectivity 
on processes other spheres of work seek to emulate, imitate and replicate this idealized 
version of the scientific method. Latour states: “processes operate to remove the social and 
historical circumstances on which the construction of a fact depends.”235  Moreover, the 
history of a fact has by definition lost all historical reference.
236
  The importance of facts is 
their ability to provide credibility to accounts, driving forward and making acceptance of 
new political and policy agendas more likely.  Latour examined the process of 
systemisation, how gathered facts become irrefutable and how facts act as a rhetorical 
tool, an instrument of both negotiation and persuasion.   
 
3.12 The language of illness, its role in healthcare  
Marx, Weber, and Ritzer all understood that by its nature bureaucracy, rationalisation and 
surveillance lead to dehumanising relationships.  Certain patterns of behaviour are 
considered normal, and while, for Foucault, dominant cultural notions and labels are mere 
by-products generated through a system of order within society, they are nevertheless 
important.  This is not an area of research I had expected to discuss.  However, while 
undertaking research into the nature of performance management what became 
immediately apparent was the acutely-felt effect of rationalisation on individuals.  Hence 
it is a central aspect in understanding how the State operates at a distance.  Erving 
Goffman’s work on stigma has provided concepts on both individual and group identity 
which I have drawn upon to better understand my findings; these are set out at length in 
the chapter on stigma.   
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In his book “Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity,” Goffman describes 
how society judges what is normal and who is ascribed as falling behind this imaginary 
line.  Stigma then consists of the mechanisms used by individuals and groups to cope with 
their realities.  Stigma according to Goffman is “an attribute that is deeply discrediting 
within a particular social interaction.”237  Stigma originates when individuals are deemed 
deficient when compared to the norm.  A stigmatized person is one who is “reduced in our 
minds from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one.”238  Stigma leads to a 
devaluation and constriction of personal identity and a sense of being different and 
discriminated against, based purely on a particular attribute. Highly stigmatised 
individuals are those whose illness is self-inflicted or self-induced, where there is no clear 
treatment suggesting that the condition is permanent, where society has an inadequate 
grasp of the disease and where the symptoms cannot be effectively concealed.  Stigma can 
arise as a response to an individual’s own fears and this is no less real. Moreover, 
Goffman puts forward the concept of frontstage and backstage, drawing from the theatre, 
to describe the acting of a role.
239
  A stigmatised person or group does this in order to meet 
the expectations of an audience.   
 
Goffman divided stigma into three further categories: physical deformities, character 
faults and tribal stigma. My focus is on the last, “stigma that can be transmitted through 
lineages and equally contaminate all members of the family.”240  Here, stigma touches 
more than the single individual concerned.  Stigma indirectly affects a wider group of 
people. “The individual’s real group, then, is the aggregate of persons who are likely to 
suffer the same deprivations as he suffers because of having the same stigma; his real 
“group,” in fact, is the category which can serve as his discrediting.”241  This Goffman 
refers to as in-group alignment, individuals who share his interests and yet can at anytime 
be revealed as a fraud.  Another way in which a non-stigmatised person can be linked to a 
stigmatised person is through a “wise person”.  This is someone who is aware of the 
concealing actions of those who are stigmatized.  Wise persons are sympathetic to the 
stigmatised “and who find themselves accorded a measure of acceptance, a measure of 
courtesy membership in the clan.  Wise persons are marginal men before whom the 
individual with a fault need feel no shame nor exert self-control, knowing that in spite of 
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his failing he will be seen as an ordinary other.”242  A wise person is connected through 
family, kinship groups, or other kinds of social structure. Stigma can arise for a number of 
reasons, but what it does is to place the individual into a new or different peer group.  
Here the social rules must be re-learnt; the rules of engagement are re-drawn and it 
becomes increasingly difficult to associate with friends, colleagues and those outside the 
stigmatised group.  
 
Goffman used the concept of stigma to describe people’s attitudes to illness but I have 
broadened its scope to understand the effect of homogenisation in work as well as of 
organisational change on individuals in the PCT and SHA.  Goffman’s writings on stigma 
are an instrument which helps shed light on coping mechanisms, strategies and the role of 
rationalisation on human relationships in the NHS. Goffman himself cautioned against the 
over-extending of his concept of stigma. However, my motive for using his concept and 
applying it to the discourse in the NHS on organisational change and policy 
implementation is that the concept of stigma is so pertinent that it seems unnecessary to 
reinvent the wheel.   
 
Illness can be considered a form of deviance; moreover I will suggest it is not just 
individuals that become ill but organisations that take on aspects of deviant behaviour.  
Until the work of Talcott Parsons, deviance had primarily been associated with criminal 
activity.  However, Parsons widened its use applying deviance to illness.  He provided a 
Functionalist notion of the sick role.  “According to Parsons, the sick role consists of two 
rights and two obligations. The rights are that sick people are exempted 1) from 
performing their normal social roles and 2) from responsibility for their own state.  Sick 
people are at the same time obligated 3) to want to get well as soon as possible and 4) to 
consult and co-operate with medical experts whenever the severity of their condition 
warrants it.”      
 
Metaphor is a major cognitive mechanism by which the mind establishes connections. It 
allows individuals to move between meanings, as the ambiguity in the language allows 
inferences to be made.
243
 Good metaphors affect parts of the mind that other cognitive 
mechanisms cannot reach; moreover they influence other minds and establish social 
connections providing significance and meaning to an individual’s world view.  Metaphor 
functions not only at the cognitive level but also serves a social purpose.  It “sees the 
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social function of metaphorical talk presupposing and reinforcing ‘intimacy’ between 
speaker and hearer.”244 Susan Sontag presents a comprehensive study of how metaphors 
are applied to illness.  She focuses on this aspect of language because a metaphor 
crystallises and gives grounding to a complex idea which would otherwise remain out of 
reach to the masses.  A metaphor takes an abstract idea and provides a framework for 
general understanding.  Within “Illness as Metaphor” and “AIDS and its Metaphors,” 
Sontag illustrates how the description around specific illnesses became mainstream.  Her 
work looked at the narratives surrounding TB, syphilis, cancer and AIDS.  She tries to 
understand the myths, imagery and representations of illness. France in the 1870s saw 
modern bacteriology come into being, with which emerged the germ theory of disease.  It 
developed during a time of Prussian militarization which would culminate, in the invasion 
of France.  The germ theory grew in a cultural context where germs were considered to 
have both motivation and harmful intent.  This way of seeing illness become predominant 
and as such three military metaphors have been engaged in the discourse surrounding 
cancer: the disease as the enemy, invasive, foreign and deadly; the body likened to a 
battlefield, and the sufferer seen as the hero, valiantly fighting a fatal disease. “Military 
metaphors contribute to the stigmatizing of certain illness and, by extension of those who 
are ill.”245  Originally, AIDS and cancer shared similar language as AIDS was thought to 
be a ‘gay cancer’.  However, as knowledge of AIDS grew, it drew upon other imagery of 
its time; it focused primarily on surveillance metaphors.  Performance managers drew 
used military and surveillance language, in part as a defence mechanism, and my findings 
are elucidated in the chapter on stigma.    
 
In her book “Illness as Metaphor,”246 Susan Sontag looks at the language surrounding 
illness, in particular the words used in both text and dialogue by doctors and the wider 
public.  Her particular focus is how metaphors are applied and the images they seek to 
convey.  In using metaphors to describe illness, illness ceases to be just a biological 
deterioration; instead, it takes on wider meaning.  Illness becomes a way of explaining 
society’s tribulations, disorders and malfunctions247. Sontag gives the example of how 
AIDS was seen as a punishment for supposedly morally deviant behaviour.  There is a 
moral undertone in the language employed to describe those who are diagnosed with 
particular illnesses.  Certain illnesses are defined by the negative characteristics of the 
associated ‘risk groups’.  Yet, these risk groups are little more than bureaucratic 
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subdivisions of the total affected by disease.  Moral judgements are made about people 
with specific illnesses.
248
  For example to have TB was once considered a positive 
characteristic, while syphilis-induced dementia was thought to inspire creativity.  In 
contrast, those affected by cancer and AIDS find negative imagery associated with their 
illnesses.  Dominant representations of illness generate counter-representations, but both 
sets can be inaccurate in their depictions of the actual disease.  It is worth remembering 
that societal assumptions are not neutral, but value-laden.  This process creates a sense of 
separate identities and engenders feelings of shame and guilt in individuals.  Neither of 
these emotions are beneficial in understanding the illness, helpful in providing appropriate 
treatment or in eradicating the disease.  Sontag is not suggesting that we should do away 
with metaphors, but rather that metaphors should be used more appropriately and chosen 
by society with more care.  There should be an understanding and recognition of the 
potential harm wrought by the use of wrongly applied metaphors.  Metaphors are useful 
only when they help to describe a patient’s reality, not when they create a false one.  For 
my research Sontag’s work was relevant in illustrating how performance staff co-opted 
military and surveillance metaphors.              
 
3.13 Conclusion  
My thesis centres around literature on theories of rationalisation.  Rationalisation as 
explained by Weber forms the basis of bureaucracies which are, contrary to expectation, 
self-sustaining systems.  The NHS is a massive bureaucracy where rationalising is 
prevalent in various guises.  The government’s 18 weeks policy, I argue in later chapters, 
is a clear example of McDonaldisation within a public service.  It illustrates the growing 
desire for quantification and calculability into all aspects of life, including healthcare 
provision. Ritzer and Scott surmise that bureaucracies are created and perpetuated by 
methods of surveillance. Techniques of control and monitoring are numerous but 
observation is a core component to all.  The breakdown of trust relations, according to 
Foucault, necessitates a surveillance mentality.  For Foucault performance management 
would be a panoptic exercise of power, it is about making visible what is done within the 
NHS.  It is not necessary to choose one over the other, Foucault over Habermas; the two 
theories are not mutually exclusive.  Applying Habermas’ thought to performance 
management sheds light on issues of normativity within the NHS.  Performance 
management then is not just an exercise in power, but also about goals and value 
consensus.  Deliberation is required in a normative sense; consensus within the NHS may 
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be assumed, but all stable practices need to be justified to the wider public in order to 
appear legitimate.  Hence, performance management makes a latent argument about how 
things are done and what gives it legitimacy.  Public values, I argue, are represented and 
embedded in institutions like the NHS through performance. 
 
The later chapter on rationalisation will illustrate how different types of tools and 
techniques, including targets, were employed within the NHS so that central government 
knew compliance with its approach was all but guaranteed.  Its ideology had been 
incorporated and absorbed into local organisational culture.  As will be detailed later, 
though power filtered downwards, this did not increase individual autonomy or local 
decision-making. The deployment of punishment was not always necessary in the NHS as 
the threat of its use served to control organisations into compliance.  Failure led to 
punishment in the form of greater surveillance and an adherence to a greater number of 
targets to be achieved in shorter deadlines.  As detailed in the chapter on risk, the role of 
the performance manager is about organisational self-surveillance, about providing the 
eyes of the state within local NHS organisations without direct intervention. It is an 
example of the clinical gaze transferring from doctors to managers. This chapter also 
shows how success in the mandatory framework, the Balanced Scorecard, confers 
supposed autonomy on organisations, a supposed relaxing and lessening of state control.  
However, what happened was that success generated greater self surveillance, as 
organisations tightened their internal monitoring regimes thereby lessening individual 
autonomy.  Thus one form of surveillance was merely replaced by another. Expertise and 
authority are no longer a given; professionals and politicians are no longer exempt from 
questioning.  The voice of the establishment cannot be relied upon, society can offer no 
guarantee, no certainty and as such nothing is taken at face value.  Beck’s risk society is 
risk-averse; individuals go through life assessing the nature of conflicting risks.  Risky 
behaviour creates potential crises, political catastrophes and global disasters.  Giddens’ 
risk society produces an atmosphere where individuals are forced to place their trust in 
external actors; to trust what reason tells them is the untrustworthy.  This gives rise to a 
sense of apprehension and impending doom which permeates thinking.   
 
The rationale for providing a brief outline of literature on risk is that it was this account 
which was used by New Labour to justify the need for performance in the NHS.  As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the performance manager’s role was established and 
developed in response to Shipman, Alder Hey and Bristol.  It was against this background 
that the narrative from the New Labour government was formulated.  Quantifying, 
85 
measuring and monitoring, it was argued, would mitigate potential risk.  However, as will 
be illustrated in the chapter on risk, the increase in data, facts and information has not 
resulted in a decrease in risk.  The then government sought to measure the previously 
unmeasurable on the premise that patients and public would be safer and the quality of 
service they received would be better.  Performance was a command and control culture 
that sought continuous assurance that everything had been assessed to be ‘satisfactory’.  It 
was a response to the need to be seen to be taking immediate action against potential 
dangers, a process by which conformity, consistency and standardisation were valued, 
though this in itself led to a loss of genuine local insight, thereby maintaining and 
increasing the very risk it sought to diminish.  It was an illusion; it provided a false sense 
of security to senior management that risks had been averted. 
 
Understanding the nature of risk is an industry in itself as poor risk communication can 
turn the threat of risk into a reality.  However, the increase in bureaucratic measures 
further decreases accountability and trust. The introduction of markets in healthcare, 
where none had previously existed, is transforming the relationship between clinicians, 
patients and technologies and, in some cases, this can be detrimental to patient care.  For 
example, accusations have been made against the nursing staff that bureaucracy and a box-
ticking culture has replaced care and compassion both on NHS wards and in the 
profession. The doctor and journalist Max Pemberton: typifies this view, “The type of 
hands-on nursing that involves caring for patients day to day on the ward has been 
undermined and stripped of value and respect…..The pressure to hit targets means it is all 
too easy for the needs of patients to be lost, obscured amid piles of paperwork and the 
need to appease managers.”249  As discussed by Moran and Power in the previous chapter, 
(Reform in the NHS), surveillance techniques fulfil a need to show that action is being 
taken, but these measures are merely procedure.  The real examples given by Scott provide 
detail on how measuring, quantifying and monitoring are all aspects of rationalisation. 
They highlight how the State sees, how it attempts to rid areas from metis; I will 
demonstrate how this reductionist endeavour is replicated in NHS organisations.  The 
demand for greater efficiency from the public and the drive for increased productivity by 
the government meant that nationally there was a move to standardise levels of care 
through the services delivered by the NHS; this had a transforming effect on work.  The 
essence of performance in both Primary Care Trusts and Strategic Health Authorities was 
enforcing both the introduction and adherence to protocols, processes and procedures; this 
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changed the very fabric of the NHS, fundamentally altering its culture, structure and 
priorities forever. This standardisation provided no real verification or accountability; 
individuals were simply going through the motions of compliance.
250
  Any issue can “be 
problematized by a diverse and heterogeneous group of consultants, politicians, managers, 
experts and commentators of varying kind, who pronounce on the deficiencies of existing 
ways of making things and call for new ways to be invented.”251   
 
The introduction of monitoring measures is due to a sense of necessity; there is an 
imperative to change because of a supposed problem.  “All uncertainty about legitimacy 
of the values of the constants may be divided into two categories: 1) random error and 2) 
systematic error, which correspond to the modern distinction made between ‘precision’ 
and accuracy to their true value.”252 Regulatory regimes are concerned primarily with the 
latter.  Preference goes to measures that are quantifiable, replicable and standardised.  
‘Scientific’ models and practices are imitated in order to present a professional and 
objective approach.
253
 Yet this does not lessen the risk; instead it provides a false sense of 
security.  There is a tension between development of trust and empowerment and in this 
respect regulation.  The need to measure and monitor can be counterproductive; audit 
mechanisms can be self-defeating as they may maintain or increase levels of personal trust 
while also decreasing levels of trust in the organisation.  New forms of trust relations are 
emerging in the NHS which appears to have different aspects from other welfare and 
public sector services, as shown by the public perception of differences between risk and 
uncertainty and trust and trustworthiness.  Unfortunately these differences were not 
considered when introducing new performance management policies and systems.  This 
means that from their inception they are already programmed to fail, as they do not fully 
reflect the users’ needs and expectations.  Moreover intervention and monitoring systems 
are concerned with old risks and with preventing the reoccurrence of past crises. They 
offer no value in assessing new challenges or potential problems.  Only now, with the 
colossal failure of the financial regulatory regime, are these systems and those like it being 
reconsidered in terms of their application and effectiveness.  
 
The notion articulated by both Bauman and Arendt
254
, that bureaucracy promotes moral 
detachment from labour, in that responsibility no longer rests with a single individual was 
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given further credence by the serious shortcomings in care seen within the NHS. While of 
course not directly comparing the Holocaust to NHS mismanagement, it is clear that 
organisations have continued to be struck by severe and systematic failings which have led 
to needless suffering for patients and avoidable deaths.  The bureaucracy, discussed 
further in the chapter on risk, has added to, not reduced or eliminated, the likelihood of 
such incidents occurring.  Performance management, the preventative tool identified as 
necessary to averting episodes such as those seen at Bristol and Alder Hey, has in fact 
allowed such incidents to persist.  The chapter on risk provides supporting evidence from 
my ethnographic research of how performance regimes, whether through the use of 
frameworks, dashboards or scorecards, has made answerability more difficult to assign.  
Where all the facts were visible to everyone, there was a corresponding widening in the 
distribution of responsibility.  Everyone was now responsible to ensure success and stop 
unsafe events from happening, but this sharing led to a dilution of accountability; contrary 
to perception, responsibility ceased to be everyone’s concern; it became no one’s.  The 
chapter on sigma illustrates how this effect was compounded by the breakdown in 
community and the disenfranchisement brought upon staff by on-going organisational 
change, where roles were made redundant and jobs were shifting.  I will argue that 
performance managers took on this frontstage/backstage role to meet the expectations of 
those outside performance management, including other NHS staff and the public. 
Stigmatised groups use and apply concealing behaviours, which enable them to pass off in 
wider society; this includes development of their own terminology, language and forum in 
which to communicate freely amongst themselves.   
  
While bureaucracy is a form of work, other forms of work also exist.  Habermas and 
Latour contend that language is a form of work: when studying labour it is necessary to 
understand both what is done and what is communicated.  The nature of bureaucracies 
means that rationalisation affects not only physical labour, systems and processes but also 
human relationships and interactions between colleagues.  How staff talk, discuss and 
frame their work is as important as the artefacts and end products of their work.  If 
opposition parties dismiss the language of New Labour they invariably dismiss the work 
of the NHS; this they do at their peril.
255
  People orientate themselves through language, 
and this is clearly evident in the NHS.  It also helps in understanding how the nature of 
work has altered (the move from productive material work to immaterial work, i.e. 
emotional labour which is central to bureaucracy).  Giddens has been quick to dismiss 
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suggestions by Luhamnn that power or language is on par with money as disembedding 
mechanisms.  Yet, when an institution as large and influential as the NHS provides 
meaning to political rhetoric, the government of the day unexpectedly has a language 
which holds enormous currency with the wider public.  The fact that the language of New 
Labour has become the language of institutions and performance management is the 
clearest example of this phenomenon.   
 
Stigma as defined by Goffman is discussed with reference to the changing quality of these 
work-related relationships and Sontag’s study of how the metaphor of illness is deployed 
to articulate wider problems in society is also considered. So, while the sick role lacks 
permanency, it can be applied to anyone and appropriated by anyone irrespective of their 
status or position.  Doctors judge and apply universal criteria to individuals deemed sick; 
there is an objective set of definitions in assessing who is sick, the extent of their illness 
and what types of illness they are suffering from.
256
 The doctor acts as the ‘gatekeeper’, 
separating the sick from the healthy, the genuine sufferers from the fraudulent.  The 
doctor’s role in this sense has many of the characteristics of an auditor.  By widening this 
definition to the macro-level of organisations it becomes apparent that the Healthcare 
Commission plays a similar role.  It decides which NHS organisations are healthy and 
which are failing; it has demarcation criteria in the form of targets and assessments.  The 
role of the doctor differs from the HCC in relation to the remedial solutions it offers.  
While doctors in the majority of cases provide some sort of advice to patients and possibly 
the greatest advice to the most sick, the same is not true of the HCC.  Organisations which 
they define as failing, ‘unfit for purpose,’ receive no direct advice on a way forward.  
Individuals suffering from specific symptoms often feel reassured by having their illness 
accurately diagnosed.  The diagnosis is thought of as the first step to recovery; in 
diagnosing the illness, there are several possible paths of treatment.  An organisation, 
being defined as under par, does not share this sense of relief: diagnosis confers no 
immediate solution.    
 
The work of both Goffman and Sontag illustrate the complex role illness plays in society, 
how prevalent attitudes not only shape but limit our understanding.  Sontag’s examination 
of how military and surveillance metaphors have become ubiquitous in narratives on 
disease is central in highlighting that no part of life is exempt from rationalisation. In the 
chapter on stigma I elaborate on this theme providing ‘18 weeks’ vocabulary as a case 
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study.  Within my research, the focus of my interest was both the military and surveillance 
metaphors and how these have once again been co-opted by performance staff.  I will 
show what purposes they now serve, bearing in mind that the focus is no longer on a 
biological disease.               
 
 “Large modern capitalist enterprises are themselves in most cases unrivalled models of 
strict bureaucratic organisation. Their commercial relationships are completely dependent 
on increasing precision, reliability and above all speed of operation.”257 The NHS, even as 
a public sector organisation, in this sense is no different; if anything the focus on these 
qualities has become more apparent as the NHS has grown and developed.  Aneurin 
Bevan, the founder of the NHS, foresaw the pressures that would face the NHS when he 
said, “We shall never have all we need.  Expectations will always exceed capacity.” From 
the inception of the NHS, this rhetoric served as a predictor to rationalisation and gave 
impetus and credence to change.  There is an assumption that ongoing rationalisation will 
bring about radical change in how work is undertaken and yet there is little change in the 
concepts, categories and nature of work.
258
  Nevertheless, rationalisation is happening at 
several levels throughout the NHS: in the organisational structure, and on material and 
immaterial work.  The original panopticon transformed the way people acted, but more 
significantly changed the way they thought.  One example would be the establishment of a 
performance manager position within a PCT by a new Chief Executive, where previously 
there had been none.  By having someone dealing solely with performance issues in the 
organisation, the Chief Exec subtly challenges the way people think; he challenges their 
idea of what is important and visibly consolidates his priorities.  He also reasserts his 
authority by demonstrating that traditional organisational structures are no longer secure.  
Power operates within organisations and face-to-face relations.  Foucault refers to this as 
micro power; hence, performance management is primarily about micro power relations.  
My thesis recognises that the facts in the NHS are co-constructed, socially engineered 
artefacts and that the role that performance management has within the NHS can be 
compared to a laboratory, in that laboratories sort, process, abstract and rationalize 
information.  My thesis draws upon the wide range of existing literature on the various 
aspects of rationalisation and applies work already done to newer aspects of healthcare, in 
particular performance management.  Previously people have focused on rationalisation in 
a clinical setting and on medical treatments.  Rationalisation in the NHS is not new, but 
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the extent, pace and means by which this is happening, through performance management, 
is largely unstudied. My thesis goes some way to rectifying this.   
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Chapter 4 
Methods  
4.1 Introduction and overview to methods 
The choice of my methodological approach is informed by my main objectives which are 
to understand how performance management policy impacts the workplace experience and 
to understand what is it that performance management seeks to achieve.  This chapter will 
describe the rationale behind the final methods chosen.  It gives an outline of the methods 
employed within this research, which are working as an institutional ethnographer in NHS 
organisations, using the New Labour health policy ‘18 weeks’ as a case study, the use of 
in-depth interviews and discourse analysis of major Department of Health documents.  I 
give the reasons for choosing an ethnographic approach.  I detail how the method was 
chosen, a qualitative method that would provide legitimacy, reliability and sufficient 
reflexivity within the research.  The thesis is based on Institutional Ethnography of 
performance management in the NHS.  It is based on the premise, that at the beginning of 
this research, there was no clear understanding of what performance management work 
entailed.  The focus of the research is to understand the role of performance management 
within the NHS, through the work of those involved in its creation and sustenance: 
primarily performance managers and those whose work comes into direct contact with 
performance managers and the current performance agenda. The research is undertaken 
with an understanding that performance management in the NHS has evolved since its 
introduction into the NHS, and moreover that recent politics in the form of the last Labour 
government elevated and enlarged its role in the NHS further.   
 
New Labour placed an emphasis on being a modern party; one way in which it sought to 
achieve this modern approach in the NHS was to place an emphasis on science and 
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scientific practices. Medicine and other sciences had always been at the heart of 
healthcare, but NHS management was now encouraged to base its decisions on evidence, 
taking a more scientific approach to decision making. Glancing back at history, the debate 
between Hobbes and Boyle illustrates how modern scientific knowledge came to be 
considered as objective, demarcating it from other forms of knowledge
259
.  However, this 
division between science and sociocultural factors is, according to Bruno Latour, artificial, 
as the boundaries are constantly shifting and far from fixed.
260
 Only by stripping away 
specific aspects of knowledge, though a process of purification and transformation can this 
reified knowledge exist.
261
  For Latour, we should not stand in awe of the stated results, 
rather we should seek out ways of understanding the production process behind this 
knowledge, to go inside the laboratory and see how scientific facts are created.  In a 
similar fashion, performance management can be considered a laboratory for the 
production of facts.  These facts however are not confined to the NHS: they also permeate 
politics, fashioning ideas of self and national identity.  As illustrated in the previous 
chapter, in the section on language as work, science laboratories are not the sole areas 
where the purification and transformation of knowledge occurs.  Laboratories take on 
many different guises; performance management in the NHS is one such guise.  One 
aspect of performance management is how the requirement of measurement aids the 
metamorphosis of data into facts.  Data appears from its chrysalis as facts, just as the 
caterpillar emerges from its cocoon as a butterfly. The whole process remains hidden and 
out of sight. The nature of performance management work is to act both as a catalyst and a 
veil to this process.  My role as a researcher is to understand what goes on behind the veil. 
  
My primary research tool was institutional ethnography, which includes focused 
interviews, a case study and my experiences and notes gathered during a period based as a 
participant in NHS organisations. The interviews were with those whose work comes into 
contact with performance management and a case study of the implementation of the ‘18 
weeks’ policy, which was a New Labour initiative to reduce waiting times and ensure 
treatment commenced within 18 weeks.  In addition, principal documents that inform the 
research are Department of Health publications that address performance managers 
directly, such as ‘The New NHS; Modern Dependable.’262  The methodology was chosen 
primarily because of its ability to capture the reality of those who work within 
performance management in the NHS.  It allows the voices of those who are working 
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within there to speak for themselves about what their roles entail, their purpose and 
function. The research format allows me to gain access to the individual voice, the 
personal experience, inner thoughts and feelings which would otherwise remain hidden.
263
  
However, quotations are neither data nor statistically representative.  They provided a way 
of representing certain behaviours based on my experiences as an ethnographer where I 
act as the sociological technique.  What this generates is a process whereby individual 
voices layer together to provide a more complete and complex picture of working life.  
This compiled and analysed research allows the distinct voices to speak collectively with a 
compound and cumulative effect. Furthermore, “ethnography is valuable to healthcare 
because it can be used to rethink current policies and working practices.”264 
 
I took a standard approach to reviewing and analysing my experiences, that is: 1) 
following orienting theory and methodological strategy to theoretical conclusions, 2) case 
analysis asking questions and challenging given answers and 3) learning theory through 
action.  Though aspects of methodology were centred on a single organization, I hoped by 
combining several qualitative methods to provide a more complete picture of performance 
management.  My aim in applying this methodology was to produce a comprehensive 
appraisal of institutional discourse, social institutions and social formations. 
 
4.2 Rationale for Chosen Method 
I decided to focus on qualitative types of research methods as I believed it would give me 
a fuller understanding of the issues in performance management.  While quantitative 
research is concerned with the numbers generated, using statistics to interrogate the data, 
the primary concern of qualitative research, interpreting social realities, which was more 
pertinent to me.
265
  Furthermore, those who work in performance management are very 
adept at using and providing numbers.  As a researcher, I recognised that, had I chosen the 
quantitative approach, participants would be constantly trying to influence the outcome of 
the research by manipulating answers and possibly figures as well as attempting to 
second-guess my motives.  My research therefore focused on institutional ethnographic 
methods: analysis of primary documents and interviews with participant observation 
providing wider background knowledge.  There is no clearly defined ethnographic 
method; rather ethnography covers a wide range of investigative tools, of which I utilised 
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several.
266
 While the advantage of ethnography is its ability to produce rich, deep, holistic 
data, the disadvantage is that it is time-consuming and hugely labour intensive.
267
  
Moreover, “infiltrating a culture requires trust and intimacy and these take time to 
develop.”268 It may appear unhelpful that there is no directive or specified approach in 
how ethnographic research should be undertaken, but this would be a misjudgement.  
Rather, this open format allowed me, the researcher, to choose the most appropriate design 
method.  
 
I chose institutional ethnography over autoethnography as I was looking to gain an insight 
into how others, working in the field of performance management, experience it.  
Autoethnography is a self-reflexive approach to research. It aims to explain through, 
personal experience and systematic analysis, wider cultural phenomena.
269
 In contrast to 
institutional ethnography, the researcher’s subjective experience, rather than the 
experiences of others, is the focus.  The approach overturns traditional, well-established, 
ways of conducting research and representing others.  Instead, research is seen as a 
political, socially-just and socially-conscious act.
270
 Researchers employing this 
methodology use aspects of autobiography and ethnography to describe and write an 
autoethnographic account. Autoethnography incorporates personal narratives in the form 
of prose, poetry and performances to comment on wider societal realities and reveal 
hidden truths,
271
  thus being is seen as both process and product. While autoethnography 
has its merits, I opted for institutional ethnography as the basis of my research; I wanted a 
wider picture of performance management than my own experience of it.  
 
Institutional Ethnography (IE) is focused on discovering ‘how it happens’, exploring 
people’s relations with others inside an institution.  IE has a strong tradition in healthcare 
research, i.e. doctors, hospitals, pharmacies, community clinics.
272, 273
  Ethnographic 
methods have been employed in public sector research, and studies in certain aspects of 
clinical healthcare have been studied in detail.
274
  These methods have also been used in 
research into business management.  However, having undertaken a literature review, I 
found that research using ethnographic methods in non-clinical areas of healthcare such as 
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management and particularly performance management was non-existent.  The reason for 
this may be because, within British healthcare, the key players have always been 
considered to be the patient and the clinician, and as such it is their opinions and their 
world view which have been sought.   
 
IE combines theory with a practical workplace method, which is why it was an ideal tool 
for me.  It unmasks the relations of ruling elites that shape and form everyday life.  Its 
history is based on professionals concerned with forces shaping their work, and activists 
looking to understand the institutions they confront and seek to change, giving a voice to 
the silent majority.
275
  The methods employed in IE include interviewing, ‘talking with 
people,’ which can take the form of field observation or informal and planned interviews.  
The purpose of IE is to look at seemingly ordinary conversations or everyday events to 
reveal deeper truths, to discover and shed light on the practices of everyday life.
276
  People 
talk about their work using the language of the institution.  There was an institutional 
language within the NHS and one I argue particular to Performance Management.  The 
following quotation illustrates how IE is central to enabling the researcher to understand 
the values of the world in which they are located both working and observing.
277
  “IE is 
interested in text mediated discourse that frames issues, establishes terms, concepts, and in 
various ways serves as resources that people draw into the everyday work processes.”278  
 
4.3 My role as an institutional ethnographer 
Throughout the NHS during the late 1990s, Trusts were creating Performance posts and 
many newly appointed Chief Executives introduced the post of Head of Performance and 
Information.  It was in this role that I worked for six months as an institutional 
ethnographer in a Primary Care Trust. The function and responsibilities of a PCT were 
described in Chapter Two. In this section, in an effort to retain the organisation’s 
anonymity, I will keep description to a minimum.  I will say is that it was a medium-sized 
PCT, employing approximately four hundred staff, over half of whom were based in 
management. The headquarters of the PCT was where the majority of my fieldwork was 
undertaken.  This piece of research was encouraged by the PCT as it touched on some of 
the organisation’s core values, principally those of openness and innovation.  As a three 
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star Trust for two consecutive years, it appeared that in terms of performance management 
the organisation was ahead of the game.  However, with the move away from the ‘star’ 
system to the four point scale for annual performance ratings, in order to stay at the top, 
the PCT was looking for new ways of improving its service while meeting the 
expectations of its staff, patients and local population.       
                                                                                              
The position of Head of Performance and Information for a PCT had important strategic 
and operational responsibilities in a defined service area whilst making a significant 
contribution to the Trust’s modernisation agenda.  I was asked to lead projects both 
internal to the Trust and on a collaborative basis.  The senior management aspect of my 
role was to provide strategic and management leadership, direction and support of 
directorate services, ensuring that teams and departments provide a high quality service to 
the patients and staff of the Trust.  Heads of Performance and Information were supposed 
to become the physical representation of the public; the role was to hold Trusts to account 
on behalf of the public.  However, as a Head of Performance and Information, I had many 
lines of accountability within the PCT: to the Chief Executive, Director of Finance, the 
Strategic Health Authority, Department of Health and MPs, with the least importance 
given to the public.  Heads of Performance provided an internal layer of scrutiny, keeping 
the promise “Management will be held to account for performance levels.”279  I 
contributed significantly to the development, determination and implementation of 
appropriate policies and strategies relative to their services.  I also had the opportunity to 
influence the development of strategies, policies and operational procedures of the Trust.  
This role, as described in greater detail in Chapter Two, was about putting New Labour’s 
idea of performance at the heart of an organisation as articulated in the NHS plan; it was 
about making it a part of the NHS culture, moving away from centralised government and 
top down management and, most importantly, about reaffirming the change from Labour 
to New Labour as described previously in Chapter Two. 
 
The job’s purpose was: to ensure that the PCT achieves local and national performance 
targets and that all relevant parties receive performance management information; to work 
with the PCT’s public relations and advise/assist the Chief Executive on internal trust-
wide communications; to modernise services to achieve the best services for patients, 
working closely with the Director of Modernisation.  The remit of the role saw me 
develop the Performance Management framework for Directorates and Departments 
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across the Trust, including Implementation of Balanced Scorecard.  The Head of 
Performance and Information was expected to contribute to the corporate agenda, leading 
on Trust-wide issues as agreed with the Director of Modernisation and Director of Public 
Health and managing project work arising.  In this position I was expected to work in 
collaboration with internal and external stakeholders, in order to achieve improvements 
across organisations.   This is set out more clearly in the table below.     
 
Key Working Relationships for Heads of Performance  
Internal (within the Trust) 
Chief Executive 
Trust Executive Directors: 
 Director of Modernisation 
 Director Finance & Performance 
 Director of Public Health  
 Director Nursing & Community Services 
 (Head) Director of HR & Governance 
Professional Executive Committee (PEC) members  
- Assistant Directors of Operations 
- Assistant Directors of Finance 
- Head of Analysis 
- Head of Systems Delivery and Integration 
- Head of Patient Administration 
- Head of Service Planning & Commissioning 
- Service Improvement Managers 
- Head of Clinical Governance 
- Head of Risk 
External (Outside the Trust) 
- Department of 
Health  
- Strategic Health 
Authority 
- Primary Care Trusts 
- Local Authorities 
- (Modernisation 
Agency) 
- Third party 
System/Information 
Providers (BSS) 
- Information 
Colleagues in other 
Trusts 
 
 
As the Head of Performance and Information I worked with the Director of Finance and 
Performance to oversee the operational, day to day management of Trust Performance 
Management Framework.  The role required me to maximise the use of financial resources 
and ensure all staff were involved and able to contribute to their full potential within a 
supportive environment, with a focus on service delivery.  This aspect of the job follows 
Margaret Thatcher’s three E principles, those of Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness 
(as described in Chapter Two).  The role was not just to provide strong leadership for 
setting direction and delivering excellent service results but to act as a role model for all 
departmental staff, providing a positive ‘can do’ approach.  I was expected to participate 
in the trust modernisation agenda required by the chief executive or Director of 
Modernisation leading specific projects as appropriate. As Head of Performance and 
Information my role was to actively support executive directors in the exercise of their 
roles or responsibilities, to bring the necessary ‘clout’ to the performance agenda when 
this was required.  I was expected to participate in projects and programmes of work 
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across the trust as required by the chief executive.  This style of working was actively 
encouraged and promoted by Chief Executives as their jobs, through star ratings - a 
performance rating mechanism - were at stake if the organisations they led were assessed 
as failing.
280
   
 
I held two roles simultaneously: as an employed member of staff, I was the Head of 
Performance and Information, and by my own choice I was an institutional ethnographer, 
a researcher. Reflexivity required me to operate on multiple levels, recognising as a 
researcher I was intimately involved in both the process and product of the research 
project.
281
 Therefore, having a critical reflexive awareness, understanding the role I played 
as researcher within the research project was paramount.  In the role of an ethnographer I 
“learn to speak the language that I wish to interpret.”282 As an ethnographer some basic 
questions were redundant as these were answered by my day to day observations.  The 
interviews gave me the opportunity to check whether the assumptions and inferences were 
accurate and to clarify areas of ambiguity.  Part of triangulating my research included 
keeping field notes and reflective diaries during the research period.  This provided a 
medium in which I commented on significant events that occurred as well as jotting down 
informal remarks and my immediate reactions to what I heard.  It was not practical to 
record every conversation because of the sheer volume of recordings, transcriptions and 
analysis that would be created.  Moreover, some would no doubt be mundane conversation 
irrelevant to the focus of my research.  Writing my reflections on a more ad hoc basis 
allowed a judgement to be made at the time as to what was significant and what was not.   
Habermas’ concept of Verstehen283/ understanding was helpful here in explaining what I 
was attempting to achieve: seeking to recognise the link between one’s own life 
experience and the tradition to which one belongs, and the sphere of communication 
between different individuals, groups and traditions.
284
 Thus a reflexive diary acted as aid 
in providing context to the other parts of my research, particularly in-depth interviews.  
The process gave me greater confidence that my attention was focused on what was 
relevant.  As an institutional ethnographer both what I observed in the interview setting 
and outside it was as important as what was actually said.  By noting the reflections made 
by myself and participants in real time, I gained a deeper understanding of performance 
management as it was experienced and was clear about the issues faced by participants.  
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Actions do often speak louder than words.  Gestures and actions informed my knowledge 
of who held genuine influence and the informal and formal hierarchies that existed within 
the organization.  In terms of accountability, the organisational chart structure was of 
limited use, especially in the PCT, which, along with other PCTs in the country, 
underwent a merger.  The merger began during 2006 and took place while I was located in 
the PCT.  Observation did not provide me with the answers as to the ‘whys’ of certain 
behaviours but it acted as a prompt to new themes I had not previously considered.  Whyte 
said, “Social scientists may assume that people in organizations we study do not have any 
theories to guide them.  In fact people cannot make sense of the world around them and 
act in any coherent way without some theory.  The problem is that practitioners seldom 
explicitly articulate local theory.  They do not tell us, ‘I will do X because the ABC theory 
tells me to do so’. We have to discover the nature of the local theory from observing what 
people do and getting them to explain their actions and beliefs.”285 One of the early 
triggers to my research was noticing how clinical and managerial professionals often 
interpret and make sense of vague public health commitments proposed by the 
government.    
 
4.4 The use of in-depth focused interviews  
I also carried out a total of seventeen semi-structured interviews with individuals working 
in performance management or having direct links to performance outcomes.
286
  One of 
the reasons for choosing this approach was because my working knowledge of what is 
involved in NHS performance helped me in asking specific, pertinent and direct questions.   
Questions were posed around themes, which included trust, leadership, regulation, 
performance management and NHS development.  This followed Whyte’s methodology 
where conversation is centred on themes and questions are intentionally open to allow the 
respondent to frame their understandings and world views.
287
  
 
Schedule of Interview Questions: 
1. Could you tell me about your role in the PCT? 
 
2. How does that link in with performance management? 
 
3. What does performance mean to you? 
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4. What do you think it means to the public or patients?  
 
5. How well do you think performance management works?  
(What day to day problems, if any, do you experience while doing your job?) 
 
6. What has changed in your role over the last (10?) years?  
 
7. How have information requirements changed?  
 
8. What is it like working for the NHS?  
 
9. Talk me through the reorganisation.  
(What has that been like for you?) 
 
10. What makes an effective organisation?  
 
According to Malinowsky, “it is impossible for outsiders who come from a dramatically 
different culture to participate fully in the lives of people they study.”288 This statement 
has enormous truth to it.  This impression has been reinforced through my working 
knowledge of NHS.  Staff often view outside research consultants with scepticism for 
several reasons: they have no real understanding of health service provision; their main 
concern is to increase productivity but they rarely take into account the lack of real market 
forces; successful management structures from within industry seldom transfer effectively 
to the public sector; the knowledge that their jobs or those of their colleagues could be at 
risk.  When I employed this approach, I did not face the accusation of being an outsider or 
someone ‘who doesn’t really know what is going on.’ I had other issues to deal with.      
 
One of the initial problems I anticipated in being a participant was that others would see 
me as part of the organisation and possibly part of the problem, and thus be unwilling to 
talk freely.  However, I noticed early on that PCT staff took on board with apparent ease 
the fact that I had two roles: that of an institutional ethnographer and the other, as member 
of the organisation.  Since the start of this project, staff to whom I otherwise would not 
have spoken shared their experience of performance with me.  They seized the opportunity 
to voice their opinions, finding this in some ways cathartic.  In the NHS this was a period, 
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2006-7, of great uncertainty: there were organisational mergers occurring (currently there 
are 303 PCTs; in the future approximately only a hundred will exist
289
), large-scale 
redundancies were being made and management posts, including my own, were most at 
risk as Trusts struggled financially.  This feeling of uncertainty that individuals experience 
is a theme which I address, particularly as this feeling was intensified and brought to the 
fore by the threat of redundancy.  My dual role as participant and researcher was an asset 
rather than a problem as my professional background enabled me to recognise where to 
probe more deeply.    
 
4.5 Sampling and data collection  
The interviews took place with those who were involved in performance management.  
They included: information analysts, public health data specialists, performance managers, 
service heads and commissioning managers.  It was a one-off interview for each of the 
interviewees, with the intention that each interview last a maximum of one hour. 
However, when a couple of interviews went over this limit I allowed the interviewees to 
continue as they were providing valuable data.  The order of the interviews depended 
largely on the availability of the individuals as the interviews took place around their work 
schedule.  I had no wish for a more formal process, as I did not want those being 
interviewed to feel that there was a hierarchy in the process, or that greater weight was 
given to certain opinions.  Ashmore et al scrutinised the practices and discourse of health 
economists to understand how they rationalised NHS policy and decision making, doing 
this through interviews and focusing on key reforms. I picked up where Ashmore et al left 
off but, rather than focusing on health economists, my attention was on the NHS 
workforce.  Those who are openly sceptical about performance agendas were also 
interviewed, for example Public Health Managers.  Their contribution was useful in terms 
of giving an insider outsider perspective; that is, someone who works within the NHS but 
is not directly involved with performance management.  The differences, similarities and 
points of contention they raised in contrast to the other interviewees highlighted deeper 
issues.  I conducted semi structured interviews around themes, e.g. trust, leadership, 
regulation, performance and NHS development, rather than a closed questionnaire.  This I 
felt would be more productive as it allowed me to pick up on any new point that needed 
further clarification, rather than having to write down a series of questions.
290
 Without the 
constraints of a formal questionnaire, staff were less likely to give a normative account of 
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what occurs within the organisation.
291
  This format was less regimented and left the 
interviewee free to give a fuller response.  
 
I tape-recorded all the interviews I conducted.  This way I could actively listen, ensuring 
my personal views were not directly or indirectly expressed, concentrating on what was 
said and checking to make sure the interviewee was clear about what s/he had stated.  I 
guarded against needless interruptions which would break the interviewee’s train of 
thought.  This approach meant that I did not need to worry about taking detailed notes 
during the interview.  Nor was I relying solely on my memory, as my focus in the write up 
was on what I considered important at the time.  It was only after all the interviews were 
complete that a real assessment of what was valuable was made. When writing up I used 
the subjects’ description to explain their specific experience, while my own perspective 
provided clarification and a general summation of the situation.   
 
4.6 Coding and Interpretation   
With regard to the indexing and evaluating data produced from the interviews, I 
considered using the Atlas tool to link themes, events and individuals, though I had 
concerns about research that has an over-reliance on the use of this tool, as analysis could 
easily slip into a coding exercise and little else.
292
  In the end I kept software use to a basic 
minimum, using a series of themed tabs which I cross-referenced in an Excel spreadsheet. 
This provided me with a modern version of index/file cards which were both mobile and 
easily accessible to me during the working day. The aim of my analysis was to provide 
some structure and coherence to the mass of information gathered.  While it was important 
to have a clear methodology, it was equally important that my data did not swamp the 
research and that real analysis took place.  On this issue I was very firm.  This resolution 
stems from working in the NHS and realising that it holds huge amounts of data in various 
forms and locations, but does not have the resources to understand or use the data it holds.  
Whyte states that “it is useful to think in terms of two issues: breadth versus depth and 
description versus analysis.”293 Finding the appropriate balance was essential for me, but it 
is the last word of each two phrases which will prove valuable, as the NHS rarely has the 
resources to undertake this type of non-clinical, non-patient focused study.   
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4.7 Using the 18 weeks policy as a case study   
4.7.1 Introduction to 18 weeks initiative  
A case study was undertaken of ‘18 weeks.’ This was a term used within the NHS, 
shorthand for referring to the time taken from GP referral to hospital treatment.  Eighteen 
weeks was the maximum time allowed; it acted as a standard against which other aspects 
of the patient’s treatment were measured. More importantly ‘18 weeks’ was a New Labour 
manifesto pledge.   The phrase was first used in 2004 by the Department of Health in the 
document The NHS Improvement Plan where a commitment was made that all patients 
would be seen in this timeframe by December 2008.  During 2008, as the deadline 
approached, ‘18 weeks’ had regained prominence in the NHS so that its delivery had 
become the central aspect of performance managers’ work.     
 
Case studies are an excellent way of gaining understanding of complex issues and 
strengthening what may already be known through previous research. Case studies focus 
on providing detailed contextual analysis of events, situations, conditions and 
relationships.
294
  However, the criticisms of case studies are that owing to their scale they 
cannot establish reliability nor can generalisations be made of findings.
295
 Nevertheless, 
researchers continue to employ this approach as phenomena can be studied in its entirety 
within a real life, natural, context.
296
  The aim of this case study was to understand how 
the introduction of a government target 1) changed the way in which old processes were 
viewed and 2) allowed us to see the way in which the target created a new way of seeing.  
The research centred on how the actors, in this case performance managers, 
conceptualised the ‘18 weeks’ policy; how it operated both as an epistemology and a 
technology.  The focus of this research was specific to one policy and was done within the 
constraints of NHS.  However, the results would be of wider benefit, illustrating how a 
small change in policy by the State can completely alter a world view for organisations 
and thus for the wider population.     
 
4.7.2 Political background and detail to the ‘18 weeks’ policy 
In this section I provide the political background and the detail of the ‘18 weeks’ policy in 
order to illustrate why it became a priority for the Strategic Health Authority SHA.   
Details of the role of an SHA were described in Chapter Two; it was here that the case 
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study was located and where I was based.  This background also helps to set the context to 
my research questions.  
   
‘The NHS Improvement Plan’ published in June 2004 introduced the Government’s 
ambition that “by 2008 no-one will wait longer than 18 weeks from GP referral to hospital 
treatment.”297 The reason for this figure was that previously the average length of time 
from GP referral to hospital treatment was 18 months. The move to 18 weeks was seen by 
New Labour as a memorable way of highlighting progress within the NHS to the wider 
public.  Its success was seen as being as much of an achievement of the NHS as of the 
Labour government.  The 18 weeks pathway strategy appeared as a central reform in 
modernizing the NHS, and in this respect was part of the “civilising mission,” dragging 
the NHS infrastructure into the 21st century.  As Scott states, “The builders of the modern 
nation state do not merely describe, observe and map, they strive to shape a people and 
landscape that will fit their techniques of observations.”298  Nowhere was this more clearly 
demonstrated within healthcare than in the 18 weeks pathway.  I wanted to understand 
what it meant to be a patient going through processes of transformation, reclassification 
and rationalisation.     
 
The 18 week pathway focused on delivery of an efficient, effective and safe patient 
journey from initial GP consultation and referral to the start of treatment and included the 
previously hidden waits within diagnostics and patient follow-up.  The scope of the target 
included waits for GP referrals, consultant-led services including consultant-to-consultant 
referrals, A&E and Walk-in Centre referrals and any therapies that form part of the 
patient’s treatment in secondary care.  PCTs were held to be fully accountable for the 
achievement of the 18 week Referral to Treatment (RTT) pathway for all patients.  They 
assumed responsibility, in line with the NHS Contract, for the performance of any 
providers and ensured that the commissioning of any activity delivered achievement of the 
target for each patient.  RTT times were assessed using clock start and stop times; a fuller 
description of what this entails is given in the later chapter on stigma under the section ‘A 
dictionary of terms’.  The PCT was required to identify and capture this information from 
all providers along the pathway ensuring performance was managed.  All patient pathways 
needed to be identified, analysed, redesigned where necessary and then measured.  This 
required significant engagement from clinicians and management across the whole of the 
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SHA, both within each organisation and across those organisations that shared 
responsibility for delivery of the end-to-end patient journey. 
 
Key targets and milestones had been identified by the Department of Health to enable 
organisations to manage the changes in working practice.  PCTs failing to achieve the 
targets at the December 2008 deadline were to be penalised according to the degree of 
failure.  It was therefore imperative that actions were taken to ensure achievement of the 
target and the SHA had established a programme of work to support and help manage the 
delivery of the changes required across the health economy.  This programme built on the 
structure and focus areas identified in the National Implementation Programme i.e.: 
Engagement (clinicians, management and patients), Communications, Policy and System 
Reform; Planning and Strategy; Measurement; Performance Management; Navigation 
(Monitoring, knowledge sharing); Service Transformation and Commissioning; Intensive 
Support. 
 
The LDP and contracting process for 2007/08 were concluded and plans put in place by all 
PCTs and Trusts to achieve the following requirements as set out in the Operating 
Framework by March 2008: 
 85% of pathways where patients are admitted for hospital, and 90% of pathways 
not ending in admission, are completed within 18 weeks  
 Stage of Treatment milestones of a maximum of 5 weeks for a first outpatient 
appointment, 6 weeks for diagnostic test and a maximum of 11 weeks for elective 
inpatient treatment are achieved 
The SHA where I undertook the case study managed approximately 25 NHS 
organisations, including PCTs, hospital Trusts, ambulance Trusts and mental health 
Trusts. It was one of ten SHAs that were established across England whose role was to 
regulate commissioning and the delivery of healthcare across the region. My role in the 
SHA was to performance manage local organisations against government targets including 
18 weeks, and this gave me both the opportunity and direct access to see how a single 
target was implemented. Within the SHA which was to be my focus, most organisations 
were using Stage of Treatment milestones of a maximum of four weeks for outpatients 
and diagnostics and ten weeks for inpatients for their capacity plans in order to ensure 
delivery of the 85% and 90% targets.  These plans had been reviewed against national and 
local capacity assumptions and local demand management plans. Monitoring was 
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continued on a weekly and monthly basis with the use of dashboards, which gave a visual 
representation of performance.   
 
The SHA had committed itself to achieving the 18 week target, from referral to first 
definitive treatment, nine months ahead of the December 2008 deadline and within the 
SHA this project was referred to as ‘Further Faster’. The scope of the programme covered 
the SHA and its associated PCTs. Achieving the target ahead of the national schedule was 
accomplished through two mechanisms: firstly, provision of additional resources to reduce 
the existing backlog, and, secondly, provision of support to PCTs to redesign and 
implement sustainable improvements to patient pathways which ensured that waiting 
times remained below 18 weeks in the long term.  
 
Work to redesign and improve patient pathways across the SHA was coordinated through 
the “End Waiting, Change Lives - Transforming Care” Programme, a joint initiative 
between the SHA and the PCTs
299
.  The main goal of the Programme was to equip 
personnel within PCTs with the service improvement skills and motivation to 
continuously improve patient pathways (in terms of waiting times, overall patient 
experience and quality, efficiency and staff morale). 
In attempting to attain the overall target, mini-milestones had been identified by the SHA 
in order to assess progress.   
 
By End Dec 2008: 
• 100% of all patients treated within 18 weeks but likely to include tolerances to 
take into account patient-initiated delays and clinical exceptions i.e. 10% 
admitted and 5% non-admitted. This was later confirmed in the Operating 
Framework. 
• Good results from patient’s feedback survey. 
• The SHA Shadow Early Achiever 
• By December 2007: 
• 90% of admitted – in 4 specialities for patients in a particular county from a 
specific hospital.  
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• 95% of non-admitted – in 4 specialities for patients in a particular county 
from a specific hospital  
The SHA Accelerated Delivery (Further, Faster…) 
By March 2008: 
• 90% of admitted 
• 95% of non-admitted 
In recent times, the SHA and the organisations which reported to it have found themselves 
responding to the criticism that they are “hitting the target but missing the point” and, as 
Scott puts it, there was “a strong incentive to prefer precise and standardizable measures to 
highly accurate ones.”300  In response to this argument they tried to identify what good 
looked like.  This was an attempt to show that not only was the target achieved but that the 
original spirit in which the target was set was also being adhered to. The list below sets 
out what achieving the target in a good and appropriate manner would look like:   
 
• RTT admitted and non-admitted achievement of 90% and 95% but coverage 
needed to be at 90% level 
• Zero unknown clock starts 
• No patients waiting over 20 weeks for in-patients 
• No patients waiting over 11 weeks for out-patients 
• No patients waiting over 6 weeks for diagnostics 
• Incomplete – Reduction in length of wait month on month 
• Patient Tracking List (PTL) – ability TO report last week’s RTT activity, 
completeness of data, low or zero unknown clock starts. The total number of 
patients waiting on the PTL was reduced; the stock of patients who had 
breached 18 weeks and were still awaiting treatment was reducing. The 
number of patients passing breach date each week reduced to a level which 
was consistent with the tolerance.  
• Good results from patient surveys 
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The list illustrates Ritzer’s claim that “The performance of the incumbents of positions 
within bureaucracies is reduced to a series of quantifiable tasks”301, such that volume 
becomes the main measure of success rather as on an assembly line.  To counteract this 
within the SHA the project around ‘18 weeks’ was to be completed and considered 
successful when all project activities had been undertaken and an agreed methodology for 
pathway redesign were available to all PCTs.  PCTs and hospital Trusts were expected to 
redesign efficient, patient centred care pathways for agreed high priority conditions that 
consistently delivered minimal patient waiting times.  PCTs had redesigned and 
implemented agreed pathways over the nine month period.  A Knowledge Management 
infrastructure was in place to ensure PCTs were able to share the outputs of interventions 
across the SHA, to consist of both electronic document search-and-retrieval tools and 
formal networking mechanisms.  Embedded skills and experience in the application of the 
agreed Lean Thinking
302
 methodology, such that individuals were comfortable that they 
could replicate the work completed with little or no external support, could be measured 
and reported by the PCTs. 
 
The main objectives for the Further Faster programme were fourfold:  
 
1. Support and monitor the development of redesigned care pathways in PCTs and 
Trusts across Strategic Health Authority to ensure that achievement of the target of 
18 weeks from referral to treatment was sustainable; 
2. Ensure effective programme and project management structures, disciplines and 
resources were in place to deliver the changes required; 
3. Support effective communications, involvement and engagement activity across 
the SHA to ensure clinical and patient representatives were supportive and active 
in delivering new patient pathways; 
4. Ensure PCTs and Trusts took appropriate steps to develop a workforce with the 
right skills and behaviour to change ways of working for the benefit of patients and 
healthcare colleagues. 
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It was hoped the 'Further Faster’ programme would ensure that, for the participating PCTs, 
their chosen pathways became efficient and effective and were designed, implemented and 
utilised by clinicians and commissioners, and shared across organisations where 
appropriate and safe to do so.  It would also help to develop experienced and skilled Lean 
practitioners within the programme, and provide a shared repository of knowledge for 
subsequent use by the PCTs and the SHA. The primary benefits to the stakeholders would 
be realised from achievement on each of the re-engineered pathways.  The SHA and PCTs 
intended to achieve the 18 week RTT trajectories for their selected pathways in a 
sustainable way that contributed to financial balance and high quality patient care, thereby 
avoiding financial penalties for non-achievement.  Patients would receive treatment 
quickly, in the most appropriate setting, potentially leading to better clinical outcomes. 
Patients and carers would be highly satisfied with the services provided, enhancing the 
reputation of high quality service providers. Following development and implementation 
of new pathways, patients would have equal access to services (based on clinical need). 
There would be high levels of staff satisfaction through structured learning and the 
knowledge that patient care was of a high standard.  Cooperation and partnership working 
across the social and health care sector would lead to joined-up, effective patient care 
planning.  Moreover PCTs were equipped to continue Lean pathway development for the 
future. 
 
The ‘Further Faster’ programme of work was focused on the measurements supporting 
Scott’s theory.  According to Scott the five principal characteristics of state simplifications 
are utilitarian facts, written documentary evidence, static facts, aggregate facts and 
standardised facts
303
. The measurements around the patient pathway were poor at first but 
become more detailed, with the introduction of tables, charts and registers.  Patients took 
on qualities similar to inanimate items and therefore were disposed to being organised.  It 
was then possible to measure and standardise parts of the patient journey within the health 
system. The employment of tables leads to systemisation, a focus and precision previously 
unseen.  While local knowledge and local standards were at best informed approximations 
of what happens to a patient, the introduction of the 18 weeks pathway had deconstructed 
this experience only to rebuild it.    The patient undergoes quantification, a process similar 
to Weber’s rationalisation which strips away the local context, removing any situation-
specific knowledge and historical account.  “Particular customs of measurements were 
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thus situationally, temporarily and geographically bound”304 with many of these 
measurements dependent on the skills of the individuals and the interest groups to which 
they belonged.    The insight into a wider history that they provided was disregarded in the 
rush to quantify that which was under scrutiny, in this case the individual’s treatment 
pathway.     
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, in Theoretical Background, Scott calls upon the 
example of forestry in the 19
th 
century and notes that it was seen primarily in economic 
terms and discussed in terms of revenue.  The language used is similar to that employed 
by an accountant,  that of “minimum diversity” “balance sheet” “sustain yield.”305 The 
discussion was based on utilitarianism in relation to the state: nothing outside revenue 
production  has value and is therefore of no interest.  In this context the forest is 
considered principally in fiscal terms. The language reclassifies the world into a world of 
the valuable - in this case crops and livestock, and the other, the worthless, which are 
weeds, pests, predators and vermin.  This is relevant to the case study as the 18 weeks 
programme had seen new language come into being, new ways of defining the patient’s 
experience unbeknownst to the individuals themselves. The research questions I posed 
tried to uncover and understand this process.    
 
4.7.3 Research Questions 
Within performance management, judgements are instinctive and formed both rapidly and 
frequently on the basis of group norms which are rarely queried.
306
 Practitioners and 
managers must invoke a range of rationalities to justify, explain, excuse or exonerate their 
actions.
307
  There is a sensemaking process occurring.
308
  Those working within the 18 
weeks project would have learnt in a relatively short space of time to reason in an 
institutional context.  18 weeks was an artificially constructed reality; Habermas would 
refer to the ‘lifeworld’ of the patient being intrinsically altered.  It was a lifeworld that had 
become simulated and codified in order to undergo measurement.  I wanted to understand 
the technical heuristics that lead to this conformity, standardization and homogenisation of 
pathways, because the final measured product had more reality and meaning in the eyes of 
the State.   
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My empirical research focused on asking actors ‘18 weeks’ work the following questions: 
1. How has the notion of 18 weeks come about?  
What historical context do those working with the 18 weeks give to the policy? How 
does this frame their understanding of how the policy came into being?  Does setting 
‘18 weeks’ into a wider framework of health policy help in their delivery of the target?     
2. How had the idea of the 18 week pathway been constructed within the NHS and 
SHA? 
How has the 18 weeks policy become a pathway? How do the dashboards work as 
visual representations of the 18 weeks pathway? In what way is this similar to the 
wider national debate on achieving the ‘18 weeks’ target and how is this different 
locally at the SHA level?    
3. How are these constructions prioritised? 
Which measurements are given priority? How do performance managers choose 
between priorities? How does this process work?   
4. What post ad hoc reasoning do individuals give to normalise their actions, in 
particular to emergent errors or miscalculations? 
What rhetoric do individuals use to justify their actions? How are performance 
managers rationalising their behaviours?  
5. How was the 18 week construction relevant to the public?  
Do performance managers think the public know what 18 weeks is? What is the 
purpose, the goal of 18 weeks? 
 
4.7.4 Sources and Methods behind ‘18 weeks’ case study 
The intention then was to gain a real understanding of the 18 weeks policy, as a specific 
example of performance management, how the patient pathway had been redefined and in 
particular the ‘Further Faster’ project being undertaken by SHA.  Frederick W. Taylor 
(1856-1915), the founder of scientific management, devised methods to improve industrial 
efficiency through maximizing the organisational working structures and environment. 
“Taylor believed that the most important part of the work world was not the workers, or 
even the managers but rather organisations that must be constructed to plan, oversee and 
control their work……it was the task of management to study the knowledge and skills of 
workers and to tabulate that knowledge and skill to laws, rules and even mathematical 
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formulas.”309 This could be a clear description of the role of the SHA, and particularly its 
part in the implementation of the 18 weeks policy.  I had originally thought to do a vertical 
study, taking a single record and following its journey through the system, looking at one 
patient’s experiences of the NHS. However, the time constraints, together with not 
knowing when the patient journey would end, made this option less feasible.  
 
I was nevertheless ideally placed to get a thorough understanding of how the patient had 
been reclassified though a horizontal study; the focus was on one layer of the organisation, 
in this case the work and perceptions of performance mangers at the SHA.  Unlike a PCT 
where only one performance manager exists, in a SHA there are a number of performance 
managers.  The SHA consists of several regional areas, each one with its own 
corresponding performance manager. I undertook interviews with all eight performance 
managers in the SHA, with each interview lasting between sixty and ninety minutes.  This 
was the organisation that implemented and gave grounding to the Department of Health’s 
vision.  As such its focus was on the rules and regulations that lead to the standardisation 
of measurements.  It managed a number of organisations, so by talking to those involved 
in this target I gained a clear picture of the challenges each organisation faced and the 
strategies they employed to deal with difficulties arising from these new ways of 
measuring.  
 
Scott states that “control co-ordinating schemes do work effectively under conditions 
where the talk environment is known and unchanging, where it can be treated as a closed 
system.  The more static, standardised and uniform a population or social space is, the 
more legible it is, and the more amenable it is to techniques of state officials.”310  
However, this was contrary to the current position of the NHS; the last ten years had seen 
it in constant flux.  I was curious to know whether high levels of dissatisfaction felt by the 
staff had affected its ability to implement such schemes efficiently and if there was a sense 
of ambivalence to the inevitable changes which the actors faced.  Bauman
311
 argued that it 
would be reasonable to expect rational workers, confronted by lack of transparency and 
clarity in modern bureaucracies, to adopt a position of ambivalence.  I assumed that the 
language used throughout the interviews would be indicative of interviewees’ wider 
feelings about work satisfaction and as such would not be directly questioning on this 
subject.       
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My research questions arose from simple preparatory work as an ethnographer in this area 
and were developed in each of the interviews.  The ethnographic work consisted of my 
involvement in monthly performance meetings to monitor progress made by PCTs on 18 
weeks over a period of six months at the start of 2008, attendance at six 18 weeks 
workshops led by the SHA for PCTs and Trusts, as well as regular reviews of the 
information published by the DH on its national ‘18 weeks’ website.  During this time I 
also kept extensive informal notes of team meetings, conversations and phrases of interest 
I heard.    
 
The research for the case study was primarily in the form of qualitative interviews with 
eight performance managers.  Each interview was taped and lasted approximately 45 
minutes. The only recordings taken were those of the interviews; there were no other 
media recordings as I felt this would have been overly intrusive.
312
  I chose to undertake 
qualitative interviews because this allowed me as the interviewer and ethnographer to 
understand what others in similar situations to mine were thinking and feeling.
313
 The 
feedback contained dense description; it gives the opportunity to the researcher to see how 
individuals are making sense of their worlds, while giving them the opportunity to 
describe their experiences freely in their own language.
314
  Following the interviews with 
participants, transcriptions were made and analysed alongside my field notes. The 
analysis, coding and interpretation were undertaken in the same manner as the earlier 
interviews, within the framework that helped me to derive greater meaning and 
understanding of what I had observed.   
 
4.8 Discourse Analysis of Department of Health policy documents 
I initially considered employing critical discourse analysis (CDA), but instead chose to use 
the broader approach of discourse analysis (DA). DA was applied to my research in two 
ways; firstly to focus on key Department of Health documents that shaped performance 
management and secondly to influence and inform my ethnographic research.  
 
Discourse happens at several levels including political and institutional.  Institutions like 
the NHS hold immense power by providing social cohesion.  This latent power becomes 
apparent in how it disseminates information, engages in discussions with the public and 
conducts dialogue with its staff.  DA focuses on language, not on its linguistic nature, but 
                                                 
312
 Blaxter, L., Hughes, C., Tight, M., (2008) p172 
313
 Denscombe, M., (2010) p180 
314
 Denscombe, M., (2010) p173  
114 
rather on both written and spoken discourse while critical discourse analysis provides a ‘3-
dimensional picture’ through 1) the analysis of language texts 2) the analysis of discourse 
practices and 3) the analysis of discursive events
315
.  What DA and CDA have in common 
is that they are both methodological approaches that highlight the relationship between 
language, ideology and power, as well as the relationship between discourse and 
sociocultural change.  Language can not only define the discourse but also set the political 
agenda. The documents I focused on provided a history and helped set the context.  A 
brief analysis of documents provided an insight into political discourse while interviews 
provided an insight into institutional discourse.  There was of course an overlap between 
the two spheres and employing DA on both primary documents and interviews highlighted 
where this occurred.  
 
In contrast to discourse analysis, CDA necessitates text being broken down in terms of 
argumentation, rhetorical figures, lexical styles, storytelling, structural emphasis, credible 
writers and expert quotation.  When studying the text, genres that are usually considered 
are communicative acts and social meaning, participant positions and roles, speech acts, 
macro semantics (topic), superstructures (text schemata)
316
.  Within text and talk both 
local meaning and coherence should be uncovered, including levels of specificity and 
degree of completeness, perspective, implicitness
317
.  I did not apply this level of detail to 
my analysis, but, while conducting textual analysis, I was alert to the different levels at 
which text works, that is both the structure of the text on the page and how that text relates 
to an organisation such as PCT as well as, more widely, to an institution like the NHS.  I 
restricted the scope of the research, excluding media texts as their inclusion would have 
limited the time spent on analysing the data from the interviews.   
 
NHS staff have a significant shared knowledge base which has its own language codes 
and abbreviations.  There is also the knowledge of principles and norms of language use, 
knowledge of situations as well as knowledge of the wider world.
318
  I incorporated and 
applied three of Fairclough’s definitions - subject, client and public -319 to both the PCT 
and the NHS.  I used the term ‘subject’ to refer to individuals in the institution, 
institutional roles and identities.  ‘Client’ is used in relation to outsiders and in an NHS 
context this was the patient.  The concept of ‘public’ refers to the larger audience to which 
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institutions such as the NHS address their communication.  Institutional ethnographers 
often suppress personal information, identifying speakers instead by location in the 
institutional work process, for example nurse, client, teacher, administrator.  This is 
something I replicated in my research to maintain a degree of separateness.    
 
I utilised the same methodology as Norman Fairclough (2000), in that I was not 
exhaustive in my use of published NHS documents, concentrating rather on those with a 
key impact on shaping performance management. As Fairclough states “CDA should 
focus its attention upon discourse data within the history of the present.”320  Therefore, I 
focused on the period from 1997, when Tony Blair’s New Labour took office.  There were 
a great number of documents written by numerous agencies within government, but, I 
directed my research to high level policy documents published by the Department of 
Health, because these address both the public and NHS staff, as well as stating the primary 
audience is ‘professionals’.  Furthermore, in major policy documents, there is usually a 
foreword by the Prime Minister and a preface by the Secretary of State for Health.  The 
documents under study were as follows:  
 
 The New NHS: Modern, Dependable (1997),  
 The NHS Plan: A plan for investment, a plan for reform (2000),  
 Shifting the Balance of Power: Securing delivery (2001),  
 Delivering the NHS Plan: next steps on investment, next steps on reform (2002),  
 NHS Improvement Plan: Putting people at the heart of public services (2004),  
 Creating a Patient Led NHS: Delivering the NHS Improvement Plan (2005),  
 Our health, our care, our say: a new direction for community services (2006).   
 
By focusing on the text within these documents I am acknowledging that text had a greater 
meaning than that which was on the page.  Policy text has several levels of meaning: 1) its 
intended political meaning and the meaning ascribed to it, 2) management level, how text 
is handled and employed, 3) day to day interaction, the way in which text is put into action 
by staff.  Looking at the texts in this manner helped inform and frame my ethnographic 
observations as all three levels contribute to explaining how people give language 
meaning.  
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4.9 Summary of Ethical considerations   
I concentrated on qualitative research methods in order to gain a fuller understanding of 
the issues in performance management. There were, however, ethical considerations that 
came with choosing this approach.  As with any type of observational work, institutional 
ethnography requires more than an element of self-awareness as in effect you are an 
embedded participant-observer. Observation is not a passive act as selection and 
interpretation occur in mind of the researcher.
321
 I was aware of the problem of 
imposition, that I could pollute my research with my own beliefs and values, possibly 
skewing the findings. I recognised early on, when considering the methodology for this 
study, that while undertaking interviews with NHS staff I would be supplementing, 
authenticating and validating what I heard with my own experiences. This being the case, 
it seemed that for me to write off my own experiences would be a waste of the valuable 
knowledge I had gained over years in the NHS.  I believed and still do, that it was better to 
take those experiences and analyse them in the same way as those that had been 
interviewed and observed. This process allowed me to reflect on all observations and 
experiences in their totality while also providing me with a sense of detachment.      
 
My role as institutional ethnographer was fundamental to my research. The reason why it 
proved to be invaluable is summed up nicely by the researcher and sociologist William 
Foote Whyte: “As I sat and listened, I learned answers to questions that I would not even 
have the sense to ask if I had been getting my information solely on an interview basis.”322 
However, one of the problems of being a participant was that others would see me as part 
of the organisation and possibly part of the problem, and as such might be unwilling to 
talk freely.  I had worried that keeping the diary might act as a distraction, making those 
with whom I worked cautious in their behaviour.  However this was not the case.  My 
work colleagues with were aware of my reasons for keeping notes. This practice was taken 
as the norm and my behaviours were accepted by participants and those around me.  
Moreover, I noticed that staff took on board with apparent ease the fact that I had two 
roles: that of an institutional ethnographer as well as a member of the organisation.  Since 
starting this project, I found staff, whom otherwise I would not have spoken to, sharing 
their experience of performance with me.  They seized the opportunity to voice their 
opinion and some reported that they found the interview process cathartic.   
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As an institutional ethnographer I involved myself in everyday work situations taking on 
board all that I encountered, trying to make sense of the routine interactions. The period 
during which I undertook my research was one of great uncertainty for the NHS: there 
were organisational mergers occurring (of the 303 PCTs, in the future only approximately 
a hundred would still exist), large-scale redundancies were being made; the people most at 
risk were management, including myself, as Trusts struggled to break even financially.  
This feeling of uncertainty that individuals experienced was a theme I address, particularly 
as it was intensified and foregrounded by current circumstances.  As both a participant and 
researcher I inhabited two worlds, seeing this as an asset rather than a problem.  It could 
be said that as an insider I was biased, or that my views would unconsciously corrupt what 
I heard
323
.  However, as the interviewer I had a professional background to assess what 
was valuable, what to disregard and more importantly what issues needed further 
discussion.  There were minor difficulties, but being part of the organization gave me 
opportunities and access which made this method worthwhile.   
 
4.9.1 Gaining informed consent 
Informed consent was gained from those who chose to participate in my research. On 
being selected, individuals were given a participant information sheet.
324
  The final 
participant information sheet was comprehensive and covered the following areas:  
 what the research was about, why it is being conducted and its importance, 
 the purpose of the study and how the results would be shared;  
 what was expected of them if they agreed to participate and much time they would 
be committing to;  
 participants could expect anonymity and confidentiality: 
 they had the option not to participate, that their involvement was voluntary;  
 if they agreed to participate could withdraw at any time without any penalty or 
effect our professional relationship.  
 
However, rather than simply giving participants information sheets before the start of each 
interview, I checked to see that they fully understood what they were taking part in, 
addressing any questions or concerns they had, and going over issues of anonymity and 
confidentiality
325
 before asking them to sign the consent form. It was made clear that the 
identities of participants would be concealed, names excluded and locations where 
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identities could be inferred removed from the published research. I reiterated that 
confidentiality would be maintained and made clear the raw data would be protected and 
access to it restricted. The consent document 
326
 covered both being interviewed and being 
observed; participants could opt into either or both parts of the research. All participants 
opted into both parts of the study.        
 
4.10 Applying for and achieving ethics approval 
Ethics approval was granted finally on the third application.  My initial application was 
denied because there were concerns about the political nature of my research. The ethics 
committee felt that participants might say something that would later be harmful to their 
careers. They were also concerned about the impact that undertaking such research could 
have on my own career.  This concern was alleviated by ensuring that the anonymity of 
both NHS organisations and the participants would be maintained at all times, and by 
producing a more explanatory consent form, detailing what would be required of 
participants.       
 
The second rejection was because there was no clear understanding of institutional 
ethnography by the ethics committee. Providing a historical context, explaining how the 
methodology has been adopted from the discipline of social anthropology helped me over 
this hurdle.  Silverman quotes Agar when defining ethnography as “the social research 
style that emphasises encountering alien worlds and making sense of them… called 
ethnography, or ‘folk description’. Ethnographers set out to show how social action in one 
world makes sense from the point of view of another.”327  However, providing an example 
of an ethnographic study within a medical setting that had recently gained approval 
ensured success on the third application.    
 
I was supported by my employers, both the PCT and the SHA, to undertake this research. 
Both organisations were keen to encourage research into this area and wanted to show the 
day-to-day life within performance management.  Their expectation was that I shared my 
findings with the organizations.  I thought this was appropriate and envisaged no problems 
as they did not push an agenda or require certain results.  I used the (ASR-2) applied 
social research approach; I was fully in charge of the process, including methodology 
design, and though I was officially accountable to my organization, I was largely 
independent in what I did.  The only area in which this freedom was curtailed was in 
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respect to my job.  My research must not negatively affect my day-to-day ability to do the 
work: deadlines were not to be missed and meetings where my input was necessary had to 
be attended.   
 
In this research there are multiple voices.  Performance culture is reflected in the voices of 
the participants and my own as the institutional ethnographer; a picture emerges 
individually and collectively of performance management work under New Labour. 
Though there was no obligation to my colleagues, I felt it was my responsibility to 
represent their views accurately and fairly.  This was not just an issue about conducting 
good and useful research but also about being able to face myself and those with whom I 
worked with confidence. 
  
120 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
Risk: Solely State Rhetoric   
      
5.1 The introduction of Performance to eliminate risk  
Performance management, as discussed in Chapter Two, had been in place under 
Thatcher’s and Major’s Conservative governments; however, it was developed more fully 
in the early years of Tony Blair’s first term in office.  Several high profile scandals had hit 
the NHS and the rhetoric around the introduction of performance management was one 
way of preventing incidents such as organ removal at Alder Hey Hospital, the large 
number of baby deaths seen at Bristol Royal Infirmary and the hundreds of murders 
carried out by Harold Shipman. The perceived sense of the New Labour government was 
that the NHS was facing increased risk from a number of fronts that threatened to 
overwhelm the image of an effective and trustworthy health service. A more 
comprehensive and robust performance management framework as will be detailed, they 
believed, would eliminate the threat of further occurrences which put patient care at risk.   
 
“Technology is fundamentally a system of knowledge, but a knowledge that is readily 
comprehensible in one setting may be great mystery in another. Making a new kind of 
knowledge both understandable and useful often requires the services of a translator- a 
person capable of functioning in both settings so that information can be transferred from 
one to another.”328  The introduction of the position of Head of Performance and 
Information into the NHS workforce was in effect to provide a translator who could move 
between disparate areas of healthcare. The holders of this role were the visible 
representation of increased accountability for the NHS, not to the public, as they rarely 
came in contact with them, their job more behind the scenes, but to the NHS employees. 
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This role, the responsibilities it held and its ineffective relationship to reducing risk, will 
be discussed in this chapter in more detail.        
 
Performance management had a number of tools at its disposal to decrease risk: the 
Balanced Scorecard (BSC) which connects a company's current activities to its long-term 
goals and is a means of priority setting; Star Ratings, a classification system assessing how 
successful an organisation has been in achieving set targets; and increased planning, 
monitoring measures, collaborative working, audit reviews and maximising the use of 
information technology.  All these techniques were employed at the government’s behest 
and this chapter considers the overall effectiveness this had in reducing risk. I will argue 
that as a means of reducing risk these tools were inadequate. The performance tools and 
technologies employed were not the panacea for risk. New Labour tried to imbue 
performance management with powers it did not have, and saw this as the answer to all 
that ailed the NHS. These technologies were chosen above others because they were 
visible symbols to which New Labour could point in order to show that change was 
happening, progress was being made and, more importantly, that their approach to the 
health service was vastly different to that of their political predecessors.      
 
In this chapter I argue that those working in performance management do not choose the 
rhetoric of risk to give meaning to their work; rather this was the voice of the State, of the 
New Labour government. In order to demonstrate this, within this chapter a complete 
description of the work and activities undertaken by a performance manager, gained 
through my experience as an institutional ethnographer within a PCT, will be given.  It 
illustrates how Beck’s notion of the risk society has been interpreted by the NHS and how 
this has been applied at a local level.  Performance management draws on science not only 
to uncover and identify possible risks but also to provide solutions.  Yet new risks are 
continuously emerging within the NHS, and requiring immediate action in order to 
prevent the next oncoming crisis or catastrophe.  The predictive nature of science gave the 
NHS the opportunity to lessen potential risks and impending threats; performance 
management was considered to be the application of this knowledge to avoid further 
crises.  However, as will be demonstrated the same technology that provides solutions to 
emerging risks also adds to the burden of risk, as performance management does not 
always have the desired effect.  Instead, what appeared to happen was the opposite: where 
measures were introduced to lessen risk, problems increased.  The reason was two-fold. 
Firstly, attention given to a designated risk area strengthens individuals, departments and 
organisations so that failure cannot be allowed: success is the only option.  Hence the 
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likelihood of ‘gaming the system’ increases as staff feel under greater pressure to succeed.  
Secondly, in focusing attention on one area, other areas suffered through lack of financial 
and physical resource.   
 
5.2 Performance managers as risk minimisers  
My experience as an embedded performance manager within the PCT revealed that 
performance managers were supposed to be the eyes and ears of an organisation, or more 
specifically the eyes and ears of the Chief Executives, providing an omnipresence in their 
physical absence.  This style of working was actively encouraged and promoted by Chief 
Executives as it was their jobs, through Star Ratings - a performance-rating mechanism, 
that were at stake if the organisations they led were assessed failing.
329
   Previously, a 
Chief Executive was often the last person to know when a crisis was brewing in the 
organisation; the introduction of Heads of Performance was supposed to lessen this risk 
and thus make their long-term tenure more secure.  The role would provide greater 
security to individual Chief Execs and greater stability to the organisation, a win-win 
situation.               
 
One of the key functions of a performance manager was to maintain an in-depth 
understanding of the local and national performance indicators and targets that the Trust 
was expected to achieve and disseminate this information to relevant senior managers 
within the Trust, discussing ways of improving performance as necessary. This was done 
through a regular slot at Directors’ Brief.  This session was closed to all members of staff 
except the Directors, though other members of staff might be asked to present a briefing 
paper on a specific topic.  At these weekly sessions a quick progress report of the 
Balanced Scorecard, the specifics of which will be explained in the next section, was 
expected.  Though the NHS in recent decades has tried to move away from hierarchical 
forms of management, they continue to exist, a fact only apparent to staff in a PCT over a 
period of time.  I observed through being located in the headquarters that, though there 
were few levels of management within the PCT, there was nonetheless a clearly defined 
hierarchy; this one weekly meeting made visible who was making the decisions within the 
organisation.  It demarcated those who made the decisions and those who could influence 
the decision making process.  There was a divide between those in the loop and those 
outside it; being wise meant having access to privileged and often restricted information. 
Moreover, through attendance at these meetings I noted the maintenance of power 
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relations and attempts to legitimise old ways of working.  Over a period of months I 
noticed those not invited to Directors’ Brief complained to others similarly excluded about 
feeling disempowered because their voice was not heard.  Informal networks that share 
information exist between staff; these are equally important to the formal structures of 
bureaucracies, but such connections broke down during organizational restructuring 
within the PCT.  This will be discussed in greater detail in the chapter on stigma.            
 
5.3 The Balanced Scorecard: strategy into action 
The idea of the Balanced Scorecard was first put forward by two business academics 
Robert Kaplan and David Norton
330
 in the early 1990s as a way of measuring delivery.  
Their initial aim was to produce a more holistic and balanced view of a company’s 
performance.  The Balanced Scorecard was devised to enable anyone, but especially 
senior management, to know at a glance the performance status of their organisation.  It 
was a way of providing a marker, a signpost to which areas needed managerial attention 
and were likely to be classed high risk if no further action was taken.  Performance 
Indicators (PIs) had been employed from the mid-1980s as an internal control scheme for 
managers to assess the efficiency of their organisations.  This was somewhat different to 
the outcome-related performance indicators (ORPIs) which were incorporated into the 
Balanced Scorecard as they were about providing external accountability, increasing 
citizen awareness and public trust, providing evidence that the government was keeping its 
election pledges.
331
   
 
New Labour published ‘A First Class Service’332, a consultation document within a year 
of its first term in office.  It emphasized the need for a performance framework which 
would promote high quality standards and assess matters that were important to both 
patients and the public. As Frank Dobson, MP, Secretary for State for Health, wrote in its 
foreword, “A national Performance Framework will measure the things that really 
matter…All these measures will complement and reinforce each other to ensure that high 
quality care becomes the norm everywhere to patients.”333  Less than a year later “The 
NHS Performance Assessment Framework” (PAF)334 was published, as a response to the 
consultation. The NHS (PAF)
335
 introduced a new approach to assessing performance in 
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the NHS. It focused on six areas (Health improvement; Fair access; Effective delivery of 
appropriate health care; Efficiency; Patient/carer experience; and Health outcomes of NHS 
care). Alongside this was a set of High Level Performance Indicators (HLPIs) and Clinical 
Indicators (CIs) for both Health Authorities and NHS Trusts. This was the first full range 
of indicators on which national comparisons of NHS hospital Trusts’ overall performance 
could be made.  The PAF was based on the Balanced Scorecard and established a more 
comprehensive style of evaluating performance in the NHS. While the framework was 
originally aimed at health authorities, it was later developed to meet the requirements laid 
out in 'The NHS Plan’336 and as such applied to all NHS organisations.  
 
The Balanced Scorecard was supposed to create a framework for business planning, a tool 
to help organisations measure success and a method of involving all staff.  Blair was keen 
to introduce ideas that had been used in private industry.
337
  As explained in chapter two, 
it was part of the ‘New Labour’ philosophy where public services would learn from the 
private sector, as they were focused on delivery, on tailoring their product to the customer.  
Part of this customer focus is the idea of translating a corporate vision, a strategy, into 
action.  The strategy becomes a part of each individual job through the HR appraisal 
process and Personal Development Plans (PDP) and provides a strategic focus and 
alignment throughout the entire organisation from the Chief Executive, Board, directors, 
managers and the rest of the staff.  The diagram below shows the flow of information 
being two directional.  It is based on a democratic premise: all staff influence the targets 
by which they are measured.     
Translation of strategy into action 
 
The diagram illustrates Kaplan and Norton’s vision of translating strategy into action 
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The Balanced Scorecard as presented by Kaplan and Norton consists of four perspectives: 
financial, internal business processes, customer and learning and growth.  Its application 
as a strategic management tool provides a more comprehensive understanding of the 
direction an organisation is taking, than that of its predecessors. The Balanced Scorecard 
can be seen as example of what Giddens refers to as an expert system which operated at 
micro level.  An expert system is a type of disembedding mechanisms, this is “the ‘lifting 
out’ of social relations from local contexts of interaction and their restructuring across 
indefinite spans of time-space.”338 Hence, the Balanced Scorecard is an expert system 
because local knowledge previously held only by specific clinical staff now became 
accessible to a wider audience without the same professional expertise. The much 
publicised scandals to hit the NHS had led to a breakdown in trust between the public and 
professionals which the State believed could hinder both treatment and care.  The 
government sought to address this risk by removing trust from individuals by creating 
confidence in the whole system.  It believed this was a more effective method of ensuring 
greater transparency as it enforced a process of abstraction, stripping away the specifics, 
which unlike standard risk analysis was context bound.  The Balanced Scorecard was also 
supposed to act as a form of risk communication, as within minutes of staff seeing it they 
were able to ascertain poor performing, high risk, areas.  However, the Balanced 
Scorecard, as will be demonstrated in this chapter, was not always effective in this respect.  
What became apparent was the inadequacy of communicating risk unless it was followed 
through with appropriate action.  Risks must be confronted; to do otherwise was to 
increase the risk itself.   
 
The use of the Balanced Scorecard within the NHS consisted of key targets and indicators 
monitored by the Healthcare Commission.  The 2004-5 PCT Balanced Scorecard in the 
NHS was made up of 41 targets divided into four areas: 8 key target indicators, 12 targets 
on access to quality services, 11 targets on improving health and 10 targets on service 
provision.
339
 The weighting between areas highlights which area has supremacy, namely 
access to quality services.  This is because election pledges were centred on reducing 
waiting times e.g. cut NHS waiting lists by treating an extra 100000 patients, end waiting 
for cancer surgery,
340
 and cut maximum waiting times by the end of 2005 for outpatient 
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appointments from six to three months and inpatient from 18 to six, and end waiting times 
for cancer treatment.
341
   
 
In the early years of the Blair government, success was measured by the decreasing of the 
length of waiting times for outpatients and inpatient appointments, and the lessening of the 
huge volume of patients on waiting lists.  New Labour was keen to focus on the quality 
and success of treatments and move away from the 'Efficiency Index' employed by the 
Conservatives which counted the numbers of patient 'episodes,' believing this to serve as 
incentive for greater efficiency.
342
  And yet by 2005 the financial position of a PCT would 
be the key measure of whether a Trust was successful or not.  This outlook was articulated 
by the Director of Finance at regional SHA as follows: “The positive financial position is 
the successful expression of the status of the NHS. A surplus acts as buffer and we should 
not think in term of savings, instead refer to this as financial improvement.”343  Initially 
discussed in Chapter Three, this quantification seen in performance management was 
based upon two false premises held by those in government: firstly, that by assigning a 
number to an issue there is greater understanding, hence a lessening of financial risk; 
secondly, quantification leads to facts and facts are difficult to refute.  This erroneous 
sense of rationality in the process was a form of scientism and, while it provided a 
superficial reassurance to participants, was merely misplaced faith.  The consequences of 
overzealous quantification culminated in a financial crisis for the NHS during 2005-6
344
, 
where many Trusts saw budgets cut, services slashed and jobs axed.        
 
5.4 Star ratings: encouraging success, marking out failure 
A short history of the introduction of Star Ratings into the NHS to provide context now 
follows.  John Major’s Conservative Government instituted school League Tables in 
education through the 1998 Education Reform Act to foster a climate of competition and 
choice.  Schools were expected to publish key stages of educational outcomes, public 
examinations and truancy rates.  This would enable parents to be more fully informed in 
their decision-making on their choice of their children’s schools.  As parents were likely to 
choose good schools, these would flourish, while failing schools would fold.  Thus the 
role of the market would be to incentivise improvement.
345
  By 2001 New Labour had 
recognised its value and deployed a similar system in the NHS: Star Ratings.  So, in spite 
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of claims around the known negative aspects of educational league tables,
346
 the 
comparative quality that was inherent in the education system was replicated in Star 
Ratings.  Star Ratings were intended to recreate the sense of competition seen in education 
between health professionals and NHS organisations, thereby pushing up quality.  The 
achievement of all key target indicators was essential if PCTs were to achieve the highest 
rating of three stars.  Star Ratings were a retrospective assessment of performance over a 
financial year within a Trust; they were introduced to acute Trusts in 2001, and 2002 for 
Primary Care Trusts.  An independent regulator, the Healthcare Commission, assessed and 
evaluated the performance of each organisation and awarded an appropriate Star Rating.  
There were four levels of achievement, three stars, two, stars, one star and zero stars. 
347
  
Three stars was the highest level of attainment for any organisation; a Trust with zero stars 
was classified as failing.  
 
Like the Balanced Scorecard, Star Ratings could be constructed as another example of 
Giddens’ expert system.  However, unlike the Balanced Scorecard, as a type of 
disembedding mechanism it functioned at a macro rather than the micro level.  Its focus 
was to create a framework by which organisations could be judged nationally by the 
public.  Local context and attributes specific to single organisations were removed in order 
to allow the process to be managed and administered from afar, that is by an independent 
regulator.  In the case of the NHS the independent regulator was the Health Care 
Commission (later the Care Quality Commission).  The Star Ratings format presented the 
state with a high level perspective of performance, marking out both successful and failing 
organisations. The government said this process brought transparency to organisational 
performance enabling the public to judge how their local Trust was performing. However, 
like the educational league tables, this process was intended to introduce market forces 
such as choice and competition into the public arena.  In terms of risk, attention focused 
on failing organisations, as these were deemed high risk, but as will be shown this was a 
false premise: even the most successful organisations were partaking of high risk 
behaviour.  A high star rating was not a guarantee of high quality patient care or safety.    
  
The PCT where I was located, undertaking empirical research, scored one star in the first 
year, and then three stars in the following two years.  It is because of the poor performance 
shown by the PCT in 2001-2 that a performance manager was appointed.  In terms of the 
financial reward, the justification was that a person dedicated to the PCT achieving three 
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star status would be worth more to the PCT than their salary.  The level Trusts scored 
within Star Ratings was dependent on the results gained in the Balanced Scorecard and 
Key Targets.  A Balanced Scorecard existed for each of the different types of 
organisations in the NHS: acute, specialist, ambulance, mental health as well as PCTs.  It 
was supposed to present a rounded view of performance within an organisation.   
 
The briefing session of the Balanced Scorecard was in place to help the PCT understand 
what drives good performance, helping to anticipate possible future problems, enabling 
directors to take corrective action early and enabling me, the then Head of Performance, to 
centre staff activity on what really mattered.  There were however problems with this idea 
when applied to an organisation as large as the NHS.  I observed that when targets do not 
remain constant, individuals do not know what they are working towards.  Trusts have 
been vocal in their requests for full specifications of the Balanced Scorecard targets before 
the start of each financial year in order to know the criteria by which they are being 
assessed, claiming there was a lack of transparency in the process. However, this 
uncertainty was maintained on the principle that by countering predictability, playing the 
system was less effective, and thus the assessment more credible.
348
  As in many British 
companies, the NHS financial calendar year starts in April, and the performance of a PCT 
is on a twelve month period from one April to the next.  However, a Trust’s performance 
was not officially assessed until July, when the ‘Star Ratings’ were published by the HCC.  
Revisions to the Balanced Scorecard targets then occurred during late December, early 
January.  This delay of eight months left staff whose work had a direct impact on the 
success of a target playing ‘catch up.’ What was designed to increase participation in the 
formation of targets, failed magnificently.        
  
A performance manager had to ensure that all relevant members of staff and management 
were aware of the Trust’s targets and standards, to monitor and communicate progress 
against these to relevant personnel and assist in developing improvement programmes 
where required.  Therefore, communication was essential around the key targets within 
Balanced Scorecard. Through my ethnographic observations I saw the benefits of 
implementing a national Balanced Scorecard in that it brings clarity and a systematic 
approach when setting the priorities of an organisation.  It also brings greater awareness of 
performance because of the communication about targets.  However one of the key pitfalls 
in making the Balanced Scorecard effective is that there can be a lack of senior 
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management commitment so that the scorecards are not cascaded, not communicated 
throughout the organisation.  In an attempt to avoid both these pitfalls the use of simplistic 
‘smiley faces’ was introduced at the beginning of my time at the PCT as its performance 
manager.  However it agreed with the PCT management’s ethos of ensuring staff knew 
what was happening within their own organisation, making sure they felt a part of that 
organisation and conveying ideas of success and failure.  Senior management felt that in 
areas where performance was poor, there was a possibility that, if staff were made aware 
of this, they would find new ways to improve the situation.  Highlighting underperforming 
was not about blaming certain individuals; it was not a ‘name and shame campaign.’  My 
field notes during my time as an institutional ethnographer comment on how smiley faces 
created a more cooperative culture between staff; they promoted a sense of community 
and a sense of ownership of organisational targets as they were a talking point for staff 
from different work streams.  It engendered an atmosphere in which everyone felt they 
could contribute to the success of the PCT, to the ongoing good performance and to the 
improvement of underperforming areas. The technique of smiley faces was later discarded 
when the PCT merged; this approach to performance was considered unprofessional by 
the new organisation.  Field notes show morale suffered; staff became less aware of PCT 
priorities and organisational cohesion was adversely affected.  Staff engagement in 
performance would now be conducted through the formal channels of board papers. The 
effect of organisational change on staff will be discussed at greater length in the chapter 
on stigma.             
 
Monitoring and managing the Trust’s levels of achievement against local and national 
targets and disseminating relevant monitoring information to local PCTs and local 
Strategic Health Authorities was a core component of the performance manager’s role.  It 
was necessary to be aware of the Trust’s position against any of the targets at any time and 
to present on-going plans to keep the situation under control.  Moreover, it was essential to 
be well informed on national and local developments in associated services, ensuring 
implementation of best practice.  This is referred to as benchmarking and was one of the 
central components of performance management in the PCT.  There was a sense within 
big business that uncertainty, risk and complexity were fundamentals of a globalised 
economy, a recognition leading to the development of the benchmarking tool to provide 
the competitive advantage necessary to be the ‘best-in-class.’349 It was this motivation that 
New Labour sought to replicate.   
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Although theory behind benchmarking suggests it provides quality improvements in 
service which may lead to parallel financial savings, monetary gain was not the prime 
motivator for introducing it.  Benchmarking can be a driver of change, offering 
compelling evidence and justification for a new policy direction as it provides an outward-
looking perspective.
350
  However this was not the motivation for New Labour, rather it 
was all about showing ‘value for money’ as it introduced benchmarking at the start of its 
term in office: “Particular emphasis will be put on benchmarking and the sharing of good 
practice,”351 and again: “The requirement for benchmarking will encourage rigorous 
scrutiny of NHS Trusts’ costs and performance.”352  Performance managers were expected 
to look across the county or Strategic Health Authority and see how other Trusts were 
performing on targets within the Balanced Scorecard.  There are two significant aspects of 
benchmarking: firstly, measures are supposedly objective and therefore tracking progress 
on performance should be a transparent process; secondly, this process is a form of 
rationalisation as expounded by Weber, the idea of applying scientific approaches to 
aspects of society.  There was little value in benchmarking in 1997, when New Labour 
took office, as information available within the NHS was patchy and often incomplete.  
However, benchmarking has produced data that now holds credibility.  The consequence 
of the process of doing is that what is done now takes on real value.  Meaningless work 
has become meaningful; it has gained authority.                      
 
One example of close monitoring is of the ambulance targets which measure the time it 
takes for the ambulance to reach the patient after the initial call. The PCT commissioned 
the service from the Ambulance Trust; the performance manager worked with the 
Assistant Director of Commissioning to improve three targets: Category A calls meeting 
the eight minutes target, category A calls meeting the 19 minutes target and category B 
calls meeting the 19 minute target.  A category A is classified as urgent, that is responding 
to life-threatening emergencies, with category B calls less urgent than A.  Within my PCT 
where meeting the first of these three targets had been a near impossibility for the 
Ambulance Trust, performance meetings, as my field notes describe, were often heated 
affairs.  This is because the PCT, (unlike the neighbouring PCTs), covered a mainly rural 
area, and this, together with the fact that the main hospital was located within that PCT, 
meant that they always failed to reach this target.  On a national level the Ambulance 
Trust’s performance was measured not by PCT but rather by a patch basis, in this case X, 
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Y and Z PCTs.  As far as the Ambulance Trusts were concerned, if they achieved the 
patch targets, then they were performing well.   
 
The disparity between PCTs’ performances was not a high priority for the Ambulance 
Trust, but the PCT commissioning the service had a duty to provide the best possible 
service to its population.  Moreover, the local population was affluent and articulate, with 
high expectations that both the NHS and the PCT should at least hit the target, and its 
frustration was expressed in the local press.  The board agreed additional investment to 
improve time, but there was no significant improvement.  The PCT found it difficult to 
make the distinction between the PCT and the Ambulance Trust clear to the consciousness 
of the public, who viewed poor performance in this area as much a fault of the PCT as of 
the Ambulance Trust.  Field notes taken during board meetings show they saw no 
separation between the provider of service and the commissioner who was buying it.  The 
government policy of empowering local people failed in this case.  Comments made in the 
NHS Plan: “The patient’s voice does not sufficiently influence the provision of services.  
Local communities are poorly represented within NHS decision-making structures” are 
still relevant.  The Health Select Committee on Patient and Public Involvement, a 
committee established by Parliament to promote public involvement in health matters, 
states: “If NHS bodies are to involve the public effectively, they need to do so at an early 
stage and before any options are drawn up or decisions are made.”353  For the public to 
have any real understanding, the local community should have been involved in 
discussions with the Ambulance Trust from the beginning.  Seeing merely the 
consequences to decisions already taken made the public feel that lip service to the idea of 
public engagement was replacing genuine or real participation.           
 
The ambulance targets had been on the Balanced Scorecard since its introduction into the 
NHS.  This was significant because it shows that it had been a constant priority during this 
time.  In fact the ambulance target was seen as one of the Labour government’s successes. 
In 2000 only one Ambulance Trust was able to meet at least 75% of category A calls 
within eight minutes. This was then set as a target in 2002 and by 2005 four fifths of 
Ambulance Trusts were meeting the target.
354
  Nevertheless, there have been issues 
around reporting.  Since this target was introduced there have been accusations that those 
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who achieve the target have been ‘gaming.’355 Gaming is one of seven distorting effects 
produced by outcome related performance indicators. Others include “tunnel vision: 
concentration on areas included in the ORPIs (outcome related performance indicators), to 
the exclusion of other important areas; suboptimization: the pursuit by managers of their 
own narrow objectives, at the expense of strategic coordination; myopia: concentration on 
short term issues; convergence: an emphasis on not being exposed as an outlier on any 
ORPI, rather than a desire to be outstanding; ossification: a disinclination to experiment 
and misinterpretation: including creative accounting.”356  Gaming is explained by Bevan 
and Hood as playing the system in order to meet the target while failing to deliver the 
service.  Different ambulance services had different reporting structures in place which 
inevitably led to different start times.  While variations of thirty seconds may seem 
irrelevant on an 8 minute target, such variations make the difference between success and 
failure.  It was due to the variable start times that the idea of ‘call connect’ was 
implemented in 2007.  ‘Call connect’ refers to the clock starting from the moment the call 
connects to the ambulance service.  So, irrespective of whether the member of staff has all 
the necessary information from the caller at the beginning of the call, they must be ready 
to dispatch an ambulance.  This change in how times are measured was supposed to bring 
equity to the process of measuring and lessen areas of disparity between the ways used by 
Ambulance Trusts to measure the time it takes to reach patients.         
 
5.5 Planning: forecasting the future 
In this section I examine the proliferation of planning in the NHS as a means of reducing 
risk.  Politicians across the political spectrum like to propose a simplistic view of science 
when talking to the public. The rhetoric is of science’s ability to predict outcomes, thereby 
allowing the NHS to both foresee and foretell the future; New Labour in this respect was 
typical.  NHS organisations are seen to have the opportunity to lessen risk and avert 
disaster through planning, an important aspect of NHS work.  Planning was seen by the 
DH at that time as one way of providing greater security against potential or impending 
risks through the deployment of specific actions, thereby bringing risk to a level which is 
deemed acceptable.  However this relies on trust both in the initial assessment and in the 
subsequent actions.  As Giddens summarises, “The experience of security usually rests 
upon a balance of trust and acceptable risk.”357 Observations made while working in 
performance management have shown that NHS organisations place high value on the 
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planning process as evidenced by the recruitment of external management consultants.  As 
consultants are financially costly, their advice was given considerable credence by the 
principal personnel, including the Chief Executive and leadership team within the PCT.  
While embedded in the PCT I noted that staff were obliged to listen to guidance given and 
were told to act on it; resistance was not allowed.  Here is one such example of advice, 
taken from my fieldwork diary, listing what a plan within healthcare should contain: 1) it 
assesses needs and current services, 2) describes services and GAP analysis, 3) decides 
priorities, 4) includes risk management 5) provides strategic options
358
.  Yet how 
constructive were these plans?  It was necessary to prepare strategic and operational plans 
that support the achievement of short, medium and long-term objectives for the defined 
service area in order to deliver high quality services within available resources.  The 
physical form which this takes is in the construction of the Local Delivery Plan (LDP), a 
three year plan revised each year updating planned data with actual/real data.   
 
To a performance manager, taking the lead on negotiating local targets with the Strategic 
Health Authority and drawing up the LDP was central to the annual planning process.  
Parts of the LDP were then monitored on a quarterly basis in the form of the LDPr.  It also 
contained several measures by which the PCT was monitored, including targets measured 
by the Healthcare Commission as well as other targets that have been part of the LDPr for 
years and are only measured in this document.  Completing this form was a hugely time-
consuming process.  Shared Services (SS) provided data on its surrounding inpatient 
numbers.  However, other measures, where data was collected by individual members in 
the PCT, were collated by the performance manager.  Ideally, the same lines would have 
been requested by the DH each quarter, but this was not the case.  In my fieldwork notes a 
recurrent comment is “Much of today has been spent on the LDP and LDPr.”  Late 
January was one of the hectic times of the year because the updated LDP was required by 
the DH and SHA as well as the LDPr.  However I soon came to realize that no amount of 
preparation and organisation eased the process of completion of the LDP or increased its 
accuracy, but I did recognize that the requirement to submit plans was a latent form of 
surveillance.   
 
Blair pledged to “keep the planning and provision of healthcare separate, but put planning 
on a longer-term, decentralised and more co-operative basis. The key is to root out 
unnecessary administrative cost, and to spend money on the right things - frontline 
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care.”359  Yet this ideal approach to planning was a near impossibility as “Although almost 
everyone can make accurate short-range forecasts, no one can predict accurately beyond a 
few months ahead.  When it comes to foretelling the future, there are no true experts.”360  
This flies in the face of the initial political rhetoric concerning both science and planning. 
The manifest function of planning is to reduce risk, both perceived and real; the 
underlying function however in the PCTs is cultural reproduction.  Producing, updating 
and maintaining the LDP continues to be one of the most time consuming and inefficient 
aspects of performance management and yet it is the one ritual by which performance 
management is most readily identified with in the NHS.   Many different types of images, 
objects and beliefs can be transmitted as traditions.  This is in contrast to action which 
exists only in the moment.  It is the images of action that are transmitted and, to give them 
life they must be reenacted. 
361
   
 
By taking part in its creation and sustenance new staff become a part of old cultures, 
indoctrinated in old customs; keeping the ingrained tribal traditions of bureaucratic 
management alive. “Managers keep forgetting that is what they do, not what they plan, 
that explains their success.  They keep giving credit to the wrong thing namely the plan- 
and having made this error, they spend more time planning and less time acting.  They are 
astonished when more planning improves nothing.”362  Within a ten year period, from 
Blair coming to power in 1997 to the handover to Gordon Brown in 2007, there were 
seven main documents setting out the agenda of the NHS, four of which contained the 
word ‘plan’ in the title.  Thus what is seen in the NHS is a fetishism of planning, where 
the plan becomes reified.  The ritual of planning leads those working in the process to 
become disciplined in its structure and finally disciples of the plan itself.   This replicates 
notions that paradigm and exemplars, as first proposed by Kuhn
363
, both exist and infer 
advantage on staff in times of political upheaval; a necessity due to the constant change 
and reorganisation in the NHS. (This is discussed further in the chapter on organizational 
change in the PCT.)   
 
Being based within NHS organisations has allowed me to see firsthand how management 
within the NHS are often treated with disdain by clinical staff, who are sceptical about the 
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work they do.  General Management as it currently exists only came into the NHS after 
the publication of the 1983 Griffiths Report
364
 and yet there is still a pervasive idea that 
they add to the existing bureaucracy of the NHS, preventing clinical staff from doing their 
job.  Through my fieldwork the belief that managers do not know what they are talking 
about as they have no dealings with patients has been highlighted not so much by what is 
said by clinical staff but through the tone, untimely interjections and readiness to talk over 
management.  This can come across as dismissive.  By contrast, another significant latent 
function of the LDP is that it confers expertise on performance managers.   It provides 
them with detailed knowledge which is neither known to other non-clinical staff or 
management to the same extent.  They are the main authority and the main gatekeepers to 
this knowledge.  To those working in the field it provides security, and given the newness 
of the profession in comparison to both other professions in healthcare and managerial 
approaches, this monopoly is vital.  There are no set entry requirements for the role and no 
specific qualifications as a prerequisite to working in performance management.  Staff 
come from a variety of backgrounds including finance and IMT, many having fallen into 
performance management.  While the majority have degrees and years of experience, there 
remains a perception by those with a medical background that they are playing at 
management.  Such precise knowledge then lends itself to providing a powerbase within 
the organisation as well as offering a sense of stability; the size of the LDP acts as a 
boundary, a barrier, stopping the encroachment of other managerial departments into this 
area.  The role of planning in the NHS does not in itself lead to reducing risk; plans often 
repeat the mistakes of previous years as they deal with the same constraints, thus options 
and choices are narrow because specific variables cannot be negotiated   However, what 
planning does effectively, through its cyclical process, is to strengthen the position of 
performance as an ideal and embed it into an organisation.  
 
5.6 Do performance managers increase accountability? 
Monthly performance reports were produced and submitted to the PCT Board and the 
Professional Executive Committee (PEC), on behalf of the Director of Finance and 
Performance, in an effort to increase local accountability.  This exemplified New Labour’s 
ideas of openness between the public and public institutions.  It contrasted with popular 
notions of sleaze which in 1997 had tainted the Conservative Party and from which New 
Labour were keen to distance themselves.  Restoring trust was one of the central themes of 
election rhetoric; it was also an area with which Old Labour was comfortable, though 
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under a different banner, that of legitimation.
365
  Blair pledged to modernize not just 
government but the institutions of the state; in the NHS this was not solely about ending 
secrecy but also offering transparency rather than paternalistic management.   
 
Performance reports, moreover, provided external accountability, as Board meetings now 
included members of the public so these were taking place in the public forum. “In the 
new NHS, all NHS Trusts will be required to open their board meeting to the public…. 
Openness and public involvement will be key features of all parts of the new NHS.”366  
However during the reorganisation within the PCT there were fewer public Board 
meetings: other Board meetings were held but were closed to the public.  One of the 
principles to which Foundation Trust Hospitals were expected to adhere are Public Board 
meetings.  Even though they have greater freedom and independence from central 
government they are obliged to provide greater local accountability.  However, my time as 
an institutional ethnographer at the PCT showed that this was not the case; here too local 
Foundation Trust hospitals had fewer public meetings than before they had gained 
independent status.  It seems that transparency and accountability are not embedded in 
NHS culture and where, it is possible to move away from open management, organisations 
take this route.  Within the PCT it appeared that, when all was going well, the public could 
be involved, but when there was a crisis they were asked to leave.  Doctors in the past did 
not tell patients the severity of their illness, believing that the patients could not cope.  
This style of management is similar; it assumes that the public cannot deal with 
difficulties.      
 
However, while Board reports from performance managers are supposed to increase 
accountability there are often huge swathes of information that are unavailable due to a 
variety of reasons: only annual data is available, the PCT does not hold the information, 
only an approximate figure is known and this is not suitable for public consumption.  
Some of the available information originated from the quarterly LPDr as well as the 
monthly monitoring returns; where neither returns were suitable, the comment “data 
currently unavailable” appeared.  The role of performance manager requires that all 
national and local monitoring requirements are met to high quality standards, in 
accordance with DH and NHS guidance, making certain that all data submitted are valid, 
reliable and consistent. Furthermore, all data produced or used within the department must 
be managed in accordance with the Data Protection Act and relevant Trust policies and 
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procedures, and that statutory weekly, monthly and quarterly reporting requirements of the 
Department of Health against performance measures must be met. The reason for this was 
to ensure that no information showing the PCT in an unfavourable light left the PCT 
without acknowledgement from senior management.  Many of the reporting structures 
within the NHS fell into what Moran refers to as “shallow forms of verification.”  This 
was highlighted in one of the key Monthly Monitoring Returns (MMR), generally referred 
to as the ‘fasttrack’.  It gave a measure of the total number of inpatients, long waiters, 
outpatients, and CHD patients.  It also gave an overview of the referral method of these 
patients, for example GP referral.  The ‘fasttrack’ acted as a summary of more detailed 
reports which show waiting list activity.  The importance of this return was because it 
showed the number of ‘breaches’ for the PCT’s population in a month.  A ‘breach’ was 
the common term used to describe patients who have gone over the waiting targets.  
    
While board reports are about external accountability, other forms of reporting are about 
internal accountability.  Performance internal to the NHS is about monitoring.  One aspect 
of a performance manager’s role is to liaise with the lead commissioning PCT to provide 
prospective and retrospective information that allows the PCT to fulfil its obligations and 
monitor its performance against local and national targets. Where the PCT was the lead 
commissioner, the performance manager had to act as the Trust’s representative and point 
of contact for both the local Strategic Health Authority and the Department of Health for 
all performance management issues and provide information and answer queries as 
necessary.  A performance manager assisted and represented the Trust at monthly 
performance management meetings with Strategic Health Authority, explaining the 
Trust’s progress in achieving local and national targets and elucidating plans to improve 
performance.   
 
During my initial period spent as an institutional ethnographer within the PCT, I observed, 
that, as the PCT achieved three star status, this happened less frequently than in other 
Trusts.  Performance monitoring by the SHA happened less frequently because the 
assumption was made that a three star PCT knew how to manage their finances and 
resources effectively.  This relaxation of SHA performance monitoring happened to an 
even greater extent in Foundation Trusts(FT).  FT status only applies to hospitals which 
must already be three star Trusts, a fact that suggests they should already be high 
performing, self-monitoring organisations. When the PCT merged in 2006 with its two 
neighbouring PCTs to become a larger PCT as part of the ‘Patient-Led NHS,’ 
reconfiguration of financial performance fell dramatically.  The SHA, my fieldwork notes 
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reveal, then increased its monitoring of the PCT, with monthly meetings to review 
performance.  This was part of a process involving the decision that there should be “clear 
sanctions when performance and efficiency are not up to standard.”367 Where this was the 
case, Health Authorities were “able to withdraw freedoms.”368  
 
When New Labour came in to office they were able to introduce performance tables and 
Star Ratings fairly rapidly because there had been a number of high profile clinical 
failures.  The manifest and stated function of this was to improve, standardise and 
formalise the quality of care patients received.  Blair was successful in rapidly changing 
decades of clinical working by establishing regulation of the medical profession in the 
form of compulsory clinical audit and assessment.  That it was such a lengthy period, 
following the initial suggestion in the 1983 Griffiths report, to establish this level of 
scrutiny highlights the nature of the medical profession’s autonomy and its political 
clout.
369
  By effectively challenging the medical profession’s belief that it was the sole 
authority on patient safety, it was relatively easy to establish performance assessments and 
Star Ratings in PCTs.   
 
From the beginning, there were conflicts in the role that performance management would 
play; performance monitoring by an external organisation was used as a threat.  Strategic 
Health Authorities had taken on a Big Brother role, the implication being they imposed a 
level of scrutiny and surveillance that PCTs should fear.  As discussed in Chapter Three, 
Weber and Foucault saw surveillance and self-surveillance as increasing the effectiveness 
of organisations.  Within the SHA’s Big Brother role, surveillance acted to suppress 
internal criticism.  It was failing Trusts, the most vulnerable organisations within the NHS, 
that were monitored to such an extent that the right to reply, to defend their actions, was 
lost.   
 
In the past, there was a local structure, in the form of PCT, which had to abide by national 
targets.  This meant that most work concerned meeting national targets, and this created 
frustration.  From 2006 there was a chance for greater freedom.  PCTs at a minimum must 
meet national targets; however they were now in a position to set the local agenda.  Chris 
Ham spoke of the NHS moving towards high street retailer John Lewis in terms of its 
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structure
370
; John Lewis is an employee partnership and staff have a stake in the business 
and share its profits.  Moreover, this setup has enabled its staff to participate fully and 
engage in setting the direction of the company, ensuring its success.  However this 
metaphor of John Lewis and the NHS has been applied to a wider context including 
discussions over issues of quality.  The public do not want huge disparities between 
services which can lead to health inequalities, articulated in the media as the ‘Postcode 
lottery’371; rather they wish to see pervasive reliability in the NHS as you see in John 
Lewis.  They want to experience a level of quality which can be relied upon to deliver 
effective care.   
    
5.7 Fundamental flaws: when disaster strikes it is neither new nor unexpected  
There were fundamental flaws in the NHS in both processing and communicating 
information which a robust performance framework was introduced to eliminate.  
However, as seen when discussing the application of NHS planning, targets, a central part 
of the performance work, aggravated and enhanced risk-taking behaviour.  During my 
time as Head of Performance and Information, one of the local hospitals, from which the 
PCT commissioned services, was investigated by the HealthCare Commission; this was 
Stoke Mandeville Hospital, part of Bucks Hospitals Trust.  Thirty three patients were 
known to have died of Clostridium Difficile (C Diff.) though the figure might have been 
double that between 2003 and 2005.  This was nearly triple the expected number of cases.  
The HCC carried out an inquiry to assess what had taken place, including the events 
leading up to the deaths as well as subsequently.  The report in 2006 was damning; 
performance culture had come to be a threat, it was no longer securing the interests of 
patients; patient safety had become a secondary issue in the race to meet performance 
targets.
372
 The HCC noted that trust management failed to learn from the first outbreak of 
C Diff and implement their own identified changes to prevent further outbreaks.  Various 
staff at different levels in the organisation recognised the continued failings in the system 
and repeatedly reported this to senior management, who unfortunately ignored the 
warnings as their focus was on “having to make changes to services, provide new 
buildings, resolve serious financial pressures, achieve the Government’s targets”373 and 
C.Diff was the last priority on their list.   
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Being based within the PCT, I noted that there was a feeling that the findings said nothing 
new, and only served to echo the observations made by staff on numerous occasions.   Yet 
to assign blame to senior management fails to recognise a more fundamental flaw in the 
system.  The Government was not clear in discussions with Chief Executives that patient 
welfare supersedes all other priorities.  This seems obvious to clinical staff and to 
outsiders but senior management were under constant pressure to achieve other targets, for 
example the 4 hour maximum wait in Accident and Emergency; consequently the 
principle of patient safety seemingly obvious, appeared to become less so.  When more 
recent crises have hit the NHS it has been noted that “when managers do fall below 
expected standards they often do so in the context of a politicised environment in which 
honesty and transparency are sometimes actively discouraged.”374  It is also worth taking 
into consideration that NHS management until recently did not have a Hippocratic Oath or 
its modern day equivalent ‘duties of a doctor,’ whose first three points are “make the care 
of your patient your first concern, protect and promote the health of patients and the public 
and provide a good standard of practice and care.”375 It is only from 2002 that Code of 
Conduct for NHS managers
376
 was established.  This has sought to rebalance the public’s 
perception and reassure patients, as seen by the first principle: “to make the care and 
safety of patients my first concern and to act to protect them from risk.”377  However, my 
experience of working in the NHS has shown this is not yet the norm. There is still a sense 
amongst managers that this has only been taken on superficially and has not become 
embedded in working practices and culture. The reporting of the outbreaks of Clostridium 
Difficile at Stoke Mandeville was regrettably not the first time that the target culture had 
come under fire
378
 as a threat to improving the quality of care in the NHS.   
 
The aim of target setting was to focus attention and create competition between hospital 
providers by driving up overall quality.  The important word here is overall: what this 
meant in practice was that while some Trusts excelled, others fell below standard, as was 
the case at Stoke Mandeville Hospital.  This example illustrates the detrimental effects of 
fierce competition which were first voiced in relation to internal markets in the NHS - the 
fear that there would be stratification in quality of patient service, and that the equality of 
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care so valued in the NHS would be threatened.  By 2006 the Star Ratings system had 
become redundant; policy seemed to have gone a full circle.  However assessments, the 
results of which were made public knowledge, had not been fully abandoned.  Instead they 
covered a wider remit and took the form of an assurance framework.   
 
The case of Mid-Staffordshire is one example where this new method of assurance has not 
prevented poor levels of care. An initial independent inquiry published its findings in 
February 2010. It reported there were 400 unnecessary patient deaths between 2005 and 
2008 “due to the hospital being concerned primarily with targets and cost cutting.”379  
Andy Burnham, then Secretary of State for Health, stated: “this was ultimately a local 
failure.”380 However, the suspicion that this behaviour was widespread did not diminish 
and continued public outrage led the new Secretary of State for Health, Andrew Lansley 
MP, to announce a full public inquiry into the role of the commissioning, supervisory and 
regulatory bodies in the monitoring of Mid Staffordshire Foundation NHS Trust.
381
     
 
5.8 Seeking assurance or requiring reassurance  
As a performance manager I had to ensure that appropriate quality standards were 
achieved by the PCT and that all work I directed had the desired results within a defined 
budget.  With the Head of Risk and Head of Quality, I had to ensure a quality assurance 
system was in place for the development and delivery of services and maintain clinical 
governance frameworks to support the continued delivery of high quality services.  Two 
documents, the PCT Assurance Framework and PCT Declaration on quality standards, 
submitted to the Healthcare Commission, the then regulator, represented a contract 
between the public and the state.  Here the HCC judged compliance that systems were in 
place to ensure and provide evidence that the PCT could meet the core standards.  The 
PCT alongside its local partners had to provide a Declaration of how far they had 
complied with the standards.  
 
This was a more collaborative approach in comparison to the previous Star Rating 
process.  The HCC then corroborated, by cross-checking, the declaration with the results 
the trust had recently achieved.  Inspections were undertaken where the HCC had concerns 
about compliance. Random spot checks of PCTs also occurred to assess whether standards 
                                                 
379
 http://www.midstaffspublicinquiry.com/previous-independent-inquiry.    
380
 In response to the findings Andy Burnham addresses parliament. 24
th
 February 2010 
381
 On 9th June 2010 a public inquiry into the bodies responsible for monitoring Mid-Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust was set up.  Chaired by Robert Francis QC who conducted the initial inquiry, its findings 
are due to be published January 2013.  
142 
had been breached.  The role of the HCC from its original inception had changed with 
reference to performance assessments: by 2006 there was far greater cooperation between 
Trusts and the regulator.  While it remained the arbiter of ranking within the NHS, the 
HCC was more concerned about overall improvement than merely achievement against 
targets.  The performance manager’s role in this process was largely about ensuring the 
HCC received the declaration in line with its timetable as the PCT under the scoring 
system could be penalised for a late submission.  The declaration was ‘signed off’ by the 
PCT Board with the performance manager providing adequate data, information and 
evidence to support its submission.  I also acted as the PCT co-ordinator for Audit 
Commission on behalf of the Director of Finance.  As performance manager I was 
required to supply evidence on PCT performance in any given area.  My role in this 
context was not dissimilar to the role I played in bringing together the PCT’s HCC 
declaration.   
 
5.9 Collaborative working: covering all bases   
Blair’s government talked a great deal about joint working across different areas of 
government, “to get the NHS to work in partnership.  By breaking down organisation 
barriers and forging stronger links with Local Authorities.”382  The intention behind 
collaborative working is to close gaps between organisations and increase knowledge in 
areas where this was previously lacking.  In addition, this multidisciplinary approach 
would provide a deeper understanding of true risks faced by organisations.  However, the 
rhetoric and the practice were very different.  One of the central aspects of the 
performance manager’s role was to ensure the completion of DH or Healthcare 
Commission reviews.  In the late spring of 2006, the PCT was asked to undertake a 
Childhood Obesity Review.  This was the first obesity review and was requested by the 
DH; it acted as a baseline assessment of childhood obesity.  This arose from the Public 
Service Agreement (PSA) target on obesity and was the government’s first, high level 
response to the major health problem posed by the continuing rise in obesity.  The target 
of “halting the year on year rise of obesity among children aged under 11 by 2010 in the 
context of a broader strategy to tackle obesity in the population as a whole,” was 
challenging.  The target was jointly owned by the DH, the Department for Education and 
Skills (DfES) and the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) in 
acknowledgement that its delivery would depend upon a concerted, joined-up effort across 
government and at a local level.  Local data on childhood obesity was needed for the 
                                                 
382
 Department of Health (1997) section 2.4 
143 
following purposes: to inform local planning and targeting of local resources and 
interventions and to enable tracking of local progress against the PSA target on obesity 
and local performance management.  ‘Measuring Childhood Obesity: Guidance to Primary 
Care Trusts’ was issued by the DH on 11 January 2006 and further ‘Guidance to Primary 
Care Trusts’ on data handling from DH on 3 May 2006.  The review was to consist of 
PCTs measuring all primary school children in Reception Year (aged 4-5years) and all 
primary school children in year 6 (ages 10-11 years).    
 
Fieldwork notes taken during the meeting of the Information Monitoring and Definitions 
Group (IM&D group) at SHA highlights the issues surrounding measuring obesity and the 
sharp differences between the rhetoric of partnership working and the reality.  The 
hoarding of power within the Department of Health made a mockery of this ideal.  
Moreover, these internal conflicts between state departments were replayed at a local 
level.  The Minister had said that all children up to the age of 10 should have their Body 
Mass Index (BMI), a score for assessing if an individual is a healthy weight, recorded.  
How to achieve this was problematic; there were significant time constraints.  Anger was 
felt that PCTs had received complete guidance only at the beginning of May when pupils 
would break up for summer holidays from early July onwards.  Most child health 
requirements were done within the school system, i.e. through the Local Authority, thus 
PCTs could not understand why the same approach was not being taken for the childhood 
obesity review.  However, it was noted that GPs under the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework (QOF) were recording the BMI of all patients between 15 and 75.  Questions 
raised by individuals around the table included: “What happens to the recordings between 
the ages of 10-15?  Is this when you are allowed to be hugely obese? Why is there no 
screening programme for obesity the same way there is for cervical cancer?” I later posed 
this same question to a public health specialist within the PCT.  The response was that 
screening programmes, like those around cervical cancer, can take place only when there 
is a clear evidenced-based treatment path.  In the case of obesity such a path did not exist. 
There were conflicting theories about what was the best practice for treating childhood 
obesity; hence the purpose of DH’s obesity review was to inform local planning and target 
local resources rather than to identify and treat individual obese children.  This made me 
realise that public health input was vital and that lack of this wider knowledge hinders 
information gathering at all levels.  It was apparent that the recording of BMI was 
significant as it clearly underscored failings in the system.  Obesity was high on the health 
agenda; however there was no systematic process of collecting data.  Data collection 
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should already have been occurring but had not.  Moreover conflicting messages were 
voiced by various parties involved in child health.   
Much work was carried out between myself and the Public Health Obesity Specialist on 
behalf of the three PCTs.  In 2007 the work was being led by the Provider arm with little 
direct input from the public health directorate.  On completion of the 2006 review, and 
once the DH published their initial findings, a ‘suggested protocol for measuring 
childhood obesity’ was created.  In 2007 ‘Childhood Obesity: data quality’ was part of 
Healthcare Commission’s New National Targets. Therefore the work done in 2006 as part 
of the DH review, including measuring all children aged 5 (reception) was undertaken 
again in 2007, but this time did not affect the PCT’s overall yearly performance nor its 
national standing.    
A considerable amount of a performance manager’s time was spent on bringing together 
information for HCC’s in-depth reviews.  This was an assessment by the independent 
regulator.  The focus was on: 1) an aspect of the patient pathway such as a service or 
across organisation; a population group, e.g. children or a condition, e.g. diabetes; 2) a 
domain of the developmental standards; 3) leadership and organisational capacity.  One 
such review was the HCC improvement review in 2006 of Tobacco Control.  A member 
of the public health team was the lead co-ordinator, with advice required for the 
performance element of the review. Once again the work was carried out across the local 
health economy which comprised three PCTs, though each PCT was assessed 
independently.  The results of the improvement review for Tobacco Control were expected 
a few months after its completion.  The hope was that the PCT would achieve a 3.  There 
were 4 levels, from 1- 4, with 4 being the highest.  The PCT’s Public Health Specialist had 
spoken to the Thames Valley SHA representative who had told her that the majority of 
PCTs would fall into a level 2, that no-one in that year would achieve a level 4, and only 
exceptional PCTs would receive a level 3.  It was disheartening to hear this news as we 
believed that the PCT provided a better than average service.  Besides, it was a huge piece 
of ongoing work, for which effort to receive only a score of 2 seemed inadequate.       
 
5.10 Lack of feedback & follow up invalidates conducting lengthier reviews  
In the end, the PCT where I was conducting my empirical research and the neighbouring 
PCT scored a level 3, while another adjacent PCT achieved the highest score, a level 4.  
This illustrates the expectation that we would score lower than we actually achieved.  This 
was a great affirmation of all the work which had been done by both the Public Health 
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Directorate and the Smoking Cessation Service.  There was however an expectation that 
the three PCTs would receive feedback/actions on the completion of the review on which 
they would then be assessed at a later date.  Though the HCC referred to this process as 
review, like all its reviews it had the hallmarks of a large scale national audit which is why 
there was a presumption there would be specific feedback.  To an organization such as a 
PCT, there is little value in an audit without such a response.  The Healthcare Commission 
did not produce any such local action plan, which was disappointing for those who worked 
on this improvement review.  Good feedback, staff felt, would have provided clear 
direction on which areas need attention.  Instead, the Healthcare Commission produced 
the national document, “No Ifs, No Buts,”383 which PCTs were expected to work towards.  
This was a more generic response to all PCTs rather than the more specific actions hoped 
for.  Staff were more than aware of the gaps in the Smoking Cessation Service; had these 
been identified in a Healthcare Commission Review this would act as tangible evidence, 
to a wider audience, of where resources would need to be located.  For staff who were 
involved in the review, its remit was not only to assess the current standard of 
performance and to highlight the risks, but, more importantly, to provide actions and 
solutions in difficult areas.  All this was missing.  By calling it an improvement review 
rather than an audit, the HCC had managed to cut corners in terms of what was expected 
from them as a regulatory body.  As previously discussed in Chapter Three, the principles 
behind undertaking audits are the highlight and lessening of risk, providing clear lines of 
accountability to a public audience. While Power argues they are not always successful, 
what is clear here is that even these shallow processes of risk reduction are not used 
effectively. Moreover, this diminishes New Labour’s earlier claim, as set out in Chapter 
Two, that performance management’s purpose was to mitigate risk through increased 
accountability and effective regulation.         
 
5.11 Achievement of targets are dependent on organisational ownership   
New Labour prioritized action on tobacco control soon after coming into office
384
.  
Shortly after, a key target for PCT concerned smoking cessation; in Bucks PCT over 2000 
people had to stop smoking each year.  For the last three years, with tremendous effort, the 
PCT has exceeded this target.  2004 saw the government first propose a smoking ban in 
public places.
385
  The acting Public Health director and the Public Health director who was 
appointed in Jan 2005 lobbied for a smoking ban in the belief that it would encourage 
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people to give up smoking.  During this time I noted “Today Public Health team has been 
listening for news on the Smoking Ban as the vote is later tonight.   The MP for X appears 
to have changed his opinion and it seems he will be voting for a smoking ban.  Both 
Directors of Public Health (DPHs) are on annual leave (it is half term), so the rest of the 
public health team are unsure whether to send more information to the MP or whether this 
would be too much pressure, and hinder rather than help the case. …All of Public Health 
team were happy today, they won a smoking ban!”  Nevertheless, national debates take 
longer to permeate public NHS culture.  At a local level, during this same period the 
Public Health director was still fending off questions at Board meetings as to whether 
there was any value in Quit Smoking targets.  Quitting smoking has an immediate impact 
on the life chances of individuals.  Almost 1 in 4 deaths in people aged 35-64 in the South 
East are due to smoking. This represents a burden to the NHS as 44,000 people in the  
South East were  admitted to hospital with smoking-related illness in 2003/4, accounting 
for estimated costs to the NHS of £238 million.
386
 That there were questions around the 
value of the smoking target being asked raises the issue of how much understanding 
management had of NHS priorities.   There appeared to be no recognition of the financial 
risk and consequences faced by the NHS resulting from continued tobacco use.      
 
However, by late 2006, achieving the yearly, Quit Smoking target for 2006-2007 appeared 
a near impossibility for the PCT.  This was because of low prevalence rate and patient 
reports to their GPs of their intension to give up when the smoking ban came into place 
which was not until 1
st
 July 2007, namely the end of the financial year.  Compounding this 
problem, the scale of deficit needed to be overcome had been misjudged.  The forecast 
was based on upward trends in quarterly figures that failed to materialise.  I arranged a 
meeting with the Smoking Cessation Service relating to the performance monitoring of 
this target.  The central concern under discussion was that the delivery of the target 
required more than just the smoking cessation service.
387
  In contrast to the prevalent idea 
that the smoking cessation service alone could deliver this target, I understood that lasting 
success required the involvement of a wider number of people, including those from other 
directorates.  As performance manager, I experienced an acute sense of failure.  However, 
there was also a recognition this transient dip in morale could lead to a more widespread 
and damaging sense of underachievement amongst the team.  The greatest failure would 
not be missing the target; the real failure would be abandoning smokers merely because an 
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arbitrary quota now appeared beyond the PCT’s grasp.  A performance manager has to put 
aside feelings and focus all energy on rallying the team to forge ahead on a recovery 
strategy.  Some individuals around the table were resistant to this notion that the smoking 
target had anything to do with them; they required significant persuading.  The separation 
of the service level agreement (SLA) performance monitoring from the actual operational 
delivery of service to meet the target was introduced, as well as the interim measure of 
having an operational group to promote work already occurring and encourage the 
additional work that needed to be undertaken.   The smoking target crystallized my view 
that the delivery of a key target is dependent on more than just one group.  However 
specific targets are often seen as belonging to a particular directorate, who are responsible 
and accountable for its achievement.  In the case of the smoking target, this responsibility 
lay with public health.  Hence other directorates were not keen to get involved, 
particularly as their involvement was only sought when the target appears to be failing; 
staff had neither the desire nor wish to be associated with a failing target.       
 
One significant issue in increasing the number of quits was making sure referrals got into 
the service.  Success in an initiative such a smoking cessation requires constant dialogue 
with the public to bring to the fore their concerns and expectations.  Feedback from 
consultation with the public told me that they would value a more immediately accessible 
smoking cessation advisor.  To this end, a couple of smoking cessation advisors were 
permanently based in the PCT’s largest practices.  I encouraged the rest of the service to 
continue with this dialogic approach given the collaborative nature of this endeavour.   
Similarly, I recognised internal PCT communication was important, in orchestrating a 
drive to monopolise on the peak Quit Smoking periods of New Year and No Smoking 
Day.  Hence the PCT sought to establish a smoking service team, including a 
representative from communications, commissioning, primary care, public health and 
senior management support from the provider arm.  This type of open discussion forum 
and close monitoring aided not only the achievement of the immediate target and the 
strengthening of the service but also fortified the battle against tobacco domination.  As 
performance manager, my principal aim was to reduce the absolute number of smokers 
within the PCT population.  The intersection of this objective with the meeting of the 
target would be ideal, though a secondary outcome. However in this role there was an 
awareness that this approach was contrary to the purpose of my employment.  Focus 
should be on achieving targets, and if I failed to do this I was seen as having failed - a very 
short-term approach to healthcare.  As discussed in Chapter Two, New Labour introduced 
performance management in order to increase accountability thereby reducing the risk of 
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future crises within the NHS.  Yet what this example illustrates is that clear organisational 
ownership of targets is missing and because of this the associated risks remain in spite of 
New Labour’s emphasis on performance culture.         
 
Attendance at the monthly Adult Mental Health Performance meetings with the Mental 
Health Trust (BMHT) was useful as several of the PCT performance targets were 
discussed.  Information from this meeting was fed back into the board report; this included 
explanations for over-and under-performance, management action to address over-and 
under-performance, and ensuring information for statutory returns were as accurate as 
possible.  The PCT targets covered were: Commissioning of comprehensive child and 
adolescent mental health services; Commissioning of crisis resolution/home treatment 
services; Commissioning of early intervention in psychosis services, CPA 7-day follow-
up; assessment of older people’s mental health needs and services.  However “waiting 
times are not measured for mental health services and, unlike elective care, targets for 
reducing them are not in place…..overall the mental health system remains poorly focused 
and poorly coordinated.”388  Waiting times for mental health services were some of the 
longest; the lack of performance targets in this area reflects understanding that the 
achievement of any adequate performance would require sustained amounts of money and 
resources, which were not available.  Mental health was one area where the public, 
including lay groups, had a strong voice.  The expertise of the medical profession was not 
taken to be infallible and as a result there was a greater debate over what value targets 
have.
389
  In addition, the government appeared to have thought it better to have no targets 
in this area rather than to be seen as constantly failing against a specific target.  This 
served to prevent Mental Health Trusts being labelled a failing service and politicians 
having to deal with all the entailing baggage.  Psychiatry and other mental health services 
were often referred to as the ‘poor relations’ of the NHS; they did not share the prestige or 
the budgets of services such as oncology or cardiology.  Funding was always under 
constant threat.  This was also an area which the NHS commissions the service but does 
not solely provide it; it relied on both social services and the local councils.  This could be 
problematic as targets set in the NHS for PCTs were sometimes not targets for Local 
Authorities or Social Services.  What this meant in practice was that a target may not have 
been a high priority for other organisations and their staff, so the level of commitment a 
performance manager received varied.   
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5.12 Ineffective measuring creates a false sense of security 
Using two examples from my time spent as an institutional ethnographer within a PCT, I  
illustrated in the previous section how New Labour’s introduction of performance 
management to increase accountability as an approach to reducing risk had proved 
ineffective.  This section demonstrates how measuring, another key aspect of performance 
management, was applied by New Labour as a means of mitigating risk.  I argue that this 
too was ineffective; measures were not a clear and appropriate of reflection of health 
policy and data used was neither accurate nor robust.  This created a false sense of security 
as those not directly involved in the process were unaware of the limits of the information. 
The following is an example gained while located within the PCT as Head of Information 
and Performance.  
 
There were two measures around the target of infant health: breastfeeding initiation rates 
and smoking during pregnancy. This target was about reducing health inequalities and 
about providing the best start for newborns.  The information was provided to Share 
Services by individual Trusts; the PCT would then get this information from the two main 
hospitals in the area.   A huge amount of work was undertaken by a public health 
specialist over a period of two years on improving the data quality on the smoking target.  
The measure for breastfeeding initiation rates moved from initially being a public health 
issue to a data quality target.  The indirect outcome of the introduction of the measure was 
not to improve the breastfeeding initiation rates, (the original aim) rather the target’s focus 
became the measuring of data quality in this area.  The aim was to increase the number of 
women breastfeeding.  In contrast, the target’s construction led to a focus on ‘data 
completeness’ as the numerator measured the number of women breastfeeding at birth 
plus the number of women not breastfeeding at birth over a denominator of total number 
of pregnancies.  Therefore the aim was to have a figure of one, and deviation from this 
value was unacceptable to the SHA on the basis that it was illogical.  Women must either 
be breastfeeding or not and this figure cannot be higher the total number of births.  
However, systems did not cover all the data requirements hence the denominator was 
taken from Hospital Episode Statistics (HES), while the value that makes up the 
numerator is taken directly from midwives.  While the numerator and the denominator 
gave real and accurate values independently, the different data sources led to discrepancies 
in the end value.  Each quarter, after the submission of the LDPr on which this data was 
collected, this discrepancy between the numerator and denominator would be queried by 
the SHA on behalf of the DH.  Each quarter the performance manager was in the position 
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to alter this figure, so that the end value was the expected ‘one’.  As Porter states: “The 
Latin root of validity means ‘power’. Power must be exercised in a variety of ways to 
make measurements and tallies valid.”390  Here is a clear example of such power, where a 
performance manager’s role is to ensure such validity.   
  
This example highlights an unwritten ethos of ‘don’t ask, don’t tell,’ a combined process 
of concealment and unquestioned acceptance of how the figures were achieved and 
created.  Accomplishing the impossible had become the standard, the norm.  The 
normative aspect of performance management includes the aspiration of sharing good 
practice and ideals around benchmarking.  Yet the descriptive process of day to day work 
involves fudging and distorting figures.  A performance manager’s likelihood of partaking 
in dysfunctional behaviour increases when they sense that a control mechanism, in this 
case the adherence to a flawed measure, has been imposed against their will.
391
  There was 
a lack of true autonomy, of acting rather than being acted upon.  Instead a sense of 
heteronomy pervades where individuals feel subject to factors beyond their control. This 
was initially discussed in Chapter Three by Bauman in relation to bureaucracy and moral 
detachment. Here is clear example of displacement of responsibility; for how can an 
individual be responsible for something over which they hold no control?
392
  While an 
outsider might see behaviour as risky, the effect of repeating the action and therefore the 
risk means that it ceases to be considered so by those working in performance 
management.
393
  Contrary to New Labour’s desire for performance management to 
decrease risk, it in fact had the opposite effect.  Performance management was a kind of 
accounting of which there are two forms: firstly, accounting for an action, that is to 
provide accountability to a wider audience; secondly, providing an account, in this case a 
false one, in order to accomplish meeting a target, preventing SHA monitoring, and the 
sustaining of a good reputation.  The introduction of performance management aimed at 
lessening risk but because of false accounting this was not the case.  There was a process 
of normalising this deviance, a culture of turning a blind eye to the obvious, an unspoken 
understanding between those shaping the figures.
394
  This balanced scorecard 
target/indicator crystallised my view that one cannot turn a poor measure into a good one 
and this was acknowledged and understood from the beginning of New Labour’s time in 
office.  “Experience shows that the way in which performance is measured directly affects 
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how the NHS acts; the wrong measures produce the wrong results.”395 Ten years on, poor 
measures are still affecting the actions of staff.  The targets around infant health illustrate 
that it is possible to have a good policy, a stretching target, but also a poor measure, ill-
conceived and unconstructive.  The distinction between policy, targets and measures needs 
to be more clearly understood by those creating policy.  There is no point having idealistic 
policies in place if the measures do not accurately reflect what it is you seek to measure.     
 
5.13 The role of IT in reducing risk  
I have illustrated New Labour’s emphasis on measuring; this in turn led to information 
technology (IT), a means of enabling measuring to be done, enhancing its status within the 
NHS.  Moreover, as previously mentioned in Chapter Two, New Labour were keen to be 
considered modern and IT was one way of reflecting this progressive outlook.  
Information Management took on a significant role after 1997 as the NHS moved to 
implement the internal market.  This was contrary to early claims made by New Labour 
that their strategy was to move away from information technology in the NHS which 
focused on supporting the transaction processes of the internal market
396
.  Moreover, 
market reform policies to increase “plurality and diversity” 397 in healthcare provision 
meant private and voluntary providers had the opportunity to compete for NHS business. 
By 2008, this was up to as much as 15% of all NHS operations;
398
 it was considered 
essential by both Prime Ministers Blair and Brown in expanding overall capacity within 
the NHS, while enabling waiting times to be reduced for surgery, as well as providing an 
impetus for improved efficiency in NHS hospital trusts.  In addition, under schemes such 
as Practice-based Commissioning, the requirement for detailed information had become a 
necessity.  PCTs needed to be in a position where they could confidently state: ‘cost 
savings have been made.’ Without an accurate baseline no effective comparison could be 
made, and no confident statements asserted.  As Head of Information it was necessary to 
support the growth of an information culture within the Trust by assisting staff to 
understand and use the available information and evidence provided by the department to 
inform decision-making and the planning of current and future provision of care 
throughout the Trust - “Information is at the heart of everything we do in the NHS.”399 
There had been a slow recognition that within the NHS there is much data, but little 
information.  There may be several local data sources, in some cases over 40 different 
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ones,
400
 but there was no common glossary of terms, consistency or integrated approach.  
Moreover, the antiquated manual processes did not give visibility to all interested parties.  
There were often questions about the timeliness of data as well as issues of quality.  This 
lack of alignment between the data and strategy was raised in the Audit Commission 
Report “Aiming to improve: the principles of performance measurement.”401  New 
Labour, like Harold Wilson’s Labour, was once again quick to realise that though there 
had been rapid growth in information needs there had not however been a corresponding 
growth in the necessary IT infrastructure.
402
  People within the NHS developed ad hoc 
solutions to get the information they needed.  Prior to my undertaking this empirical 
research, there was a move to combine the roles of Head of Performance and Head of 
Information based on the belief that, without a good understanding of what and where the 
information came from, it was impossible to score well in performance frameworks.   
 
Local and national requirements drove the need for an effective performance monitoring 
system.  A flexible reporting capability was needed to bring together clinical, financial and 
resource information to provide good quality management information to the PCT 
managers and to produce regular reports for those who required them, including statutory 
returns.  Tools were required to enable the PCT to respond to performance data, changes 
in ways of working (e.g. for the provision of new service models) and to facilitate 
planning.  Locally, a tool was needed to enable anybody who had a need to access and 
manage data, including main Board executives, managers and clinicians, to make 
informed decisions and implement improvements or corrective action.  Timely, accurate 
and relevant information was required to enable staff to take appropriate action.  
Nationally there was a requirement to report performance and clinical governance details 
outside the local area, e.g. the DH.  A key imperative was the ability to justify the PCT’s 
performance for national ratings with sound data.  The NHS worked to replicate 
information management systems similar to those in the United States which were seen by 
the Department of Health as robust and effective.  However, this is because US medical 
care was funded by private healthcare insurance.  The competition between health 
providers means that they must have the most detailed information on costs.  This 
motivation did not exist in the NHS, nor had there until recently been multiple providers.  
Instead, what was seen in the NHS are characteristics of a prisoner’s dilemma in relation 
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to the scrutiny of data: the costs of scrutinizing data far exceed any benefit to an 
individual, although such scrutiny may benefit the wider community.
403
             
 
Within information management, the principal data sets used concerned elective access 
that is, planned appointments.  Examples of the most frequently used include waiting 
times and activity (both Inpatient and Outpatient), diagnostics, and 18week referral to 
treatment.  On the Public Health agenda, the key data sets were smoking cessation, 
coronary heart disease (CHD), obesity and genitourinary medicine (GUM) while, on the 
Patient Safety agenda, key data sets were around Healthcare associated infections (HCAIs) 
including Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) and Clostridium Difficile 
(C Diff.).  Finally, on commissioning, the key data set was around the LDP.  Data sets 
around ‘access’ (to primary and secondary care) changed in the way items were measured; 
this led  to different values but the motivation and meaning behind requiring this 
measurement remained the same.  Data sets within public health move up and down the 
national priorities.  For example, during the 1980s AIDS moved up the political agenda 
but slipped back during the 1990s.  Now in the new millennium it is back on the agenda 
through the GUM because of the increase in Sexually Transmitted Diseases, STDs.  In 
addition, some data sets such as those around MRSA have become more robust as 
people’s interest in HCAIs had risen, highlighting the risks society perceived it faced.  
Movement and change seen in the data sets used reflect public opinion; this is one of the 
few observable impacts of indirect democracy.  Individuals and groups have “stressed the 
importance of addressing the 'democratic deficit' by making NHS bodies in some way 
accountable to their local public.  The NHS has not been directly linked with local 
democracy since local councillors were removed from Health Authorities in the 1970s.”404  
 
There were several key tools used within Information Management.  The private company 
Dr Foster was a ‘real time’ monitoring and performance investigator.  Dr Foster was the 
most popular performance information provider in the public sphere.  Previously Dr Foster 
was an independent company, and many of its findings were published in the national 
press, e.g. The Times.  However, there had been more collaborative work between the 
DH, the NHS and Dr Foster.  Data from different sources often gave conflicting answers.  
By working with the most publicly recognised health information provider, the DH hoped 
this would provide some consistency within the public consciousness.  There had been 
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much work undertaken by private companies external to the NHS.  The use of 
consultancies had been one of the biggest outsourcing projects of the NHS though 
probably the least publicised.  2.9 million was spent on external consultants by the local 
SHA in 2006/7.  New Labour had encouraged the partnerships with private firms under 
the banner of modernisation; unfortunately these same firms had exploited both NHS 
managers’ and civil servants’ inexperience and incompetence to make excessive financial 
returns.
405
  While “experienced buyers create and benefit from competition, innovation 
and lower prices; inexperienced buyers reduce competition by handing the keys to the 
castle over to a few big operators.  Reduced competition means less innovation and higher 
prices.”406  This had been seen in the NHS, from when New Labour came into office in 
1997, when the big four consultancy companies, McKinsey, PWC, KPMG and Andersen 
Consulting had free rein over NHS contracts, though this was scaled back slightly under 
Gordon Brown’s premiership.407  This will be discussed further in sections on 
organisational change, an area where these companies had huge impact.           
 
Other information tools include Secondary Uses Services (SUS), previously the 
Nationwide Clearing Service (NWCS).  This held data sets on Practice based Referral 
(PbR), Practice based Commissioning (PbC) and the eighteen week patient pathway (18 
weeks).  Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) captured all patient-admitted data and Map 
Info showed the geographical map against an indicator/target.  The most compelling and 
frequently used indicator is Life Expectancy.  Within the PCT there was a difference of 
ten years between the most affluent and deprived areas.   In addition, the performance 
manager had responsibility for the introduction and application of the recently acquired 
performance management tool, Pbviews, into the PCT.  Pbviews was a performance 
monitoring tool, being fed by data on pre-agreed performance measures used by all 
organisations, to create a ‘common view’ and approach across the SHA.  Its presentational 
style utilises a dashboard effect, based on the traffic light red, amber, green, on measures 
such as finance, manpower and activity.  It took a complex area and reduced it to terms of 
risk.  However, my time spent as institutional ethnographer within the PCT allowed me to 
observe how the complexities within the Balanced Scorecard were lost until it became just 
a method of presenting data; just a piece of paper with traffic lights, just a compilation of 
national targets and summary of PCT performance.  All perspectives were lost when 
objectives, measures and targets become traffic lights.  This dashboard effect was 
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supposed to bring clarity, but this form of systemisation - over-simplifies situations and 
problems.  PbViews was hosted by a Shared IT Service.  However, I had to oversee the 
management of the information and knowledge bases held by the Trust (database 
maintenance), support Information Analysts both in the PCT and Shared Service around 
data quality-improvement programmes, as well as negotiate with software suppliers in 
association with the Head of IM&T, to ensure upgrades and revisions were consistent with 
the PCT’s needs.  The Strategic Health Authority procured licences to implement a 
version of PbViews (from Performancesoft) performance monitoring software at each 
NHS organisation across the patch.  There was an expectation that each PCT would have 
done this by 31
st
 December 2005.   
 
Both performance monitoring software and the Management Information Systems (MISs) 
they support act as a form of surveillance which, as first discussed in Chapter Three, is 
central to providing a sense of security, through possible risk reduction, and forming 
administrative structures and procedures.  The history of surveillance, however, can also 
be viewed as a history of information management, of bureaucracy.
408
  As information 
management has evolved and developed, so too have the tools at its disposal, now incluing 
MISs.  The PCT, where this empirical research was undertaken, had been working on the 
procurement of a full Management Information System (MIS) and had reached the final 
interview stage of the tendering process by the summer of 2005.  The possible 
introduction of a management information system was not without controversy; in the 
PCT it was seen as a highly politically-motivated decision.  This was because MISs often 
change the configuration of how information flows; the very nature of MISs alter the 
distribution of how, when and which staff receive data and in so doing the structure of 
power inevitably would be changed.  Within the PCT where I was located, and nationally 
within other NHSs organisations, MISs were recognised as having three principal 
functions, including bolstering the information processing facilities of an organisation, a 
surveillance mechanism for management to exert control, and a decision support 
system.
409
  All these functions to varying degrees were considered valuable to the PCT as 
an organisation; the utilization of MIS was seen as promoting greater efficiency and 
effectiveness.  However, with the publication of “Commissioning a Patient-Led NHS” in 
August, the decision was made to suspend procurement.  This was because no future new 
organisation would have wished to be tied to a significant financial commitment.  The 
performance manager spent much time with the PbViews training and meetings.  PbViews 
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was a piece of performance software which was introduced in my PCT. The idea behind it 
was that people within the organization could have access as to how the PCT was doing 
on any given target at any time.  Unfortunately, it was not the all-encompassing system the 
PCT originally intended to buy.  However, the SHA, without proper consultation, bought 
licenses for all the PCTs in its area.  The change in circumstances meant it would have 
been pointless to buy the MIS as the organization originally intended.  A lot of time had 
been wasted putting together business cases. This example illustrates clearly how a lack of 
appropriate staff consultation on significant projects within the NHS causes much 
resentment and frustration.  As one interviewee comments:  
 
PCT Governance Manager: “Nobody is ever held to account; within the IT 
there’s been so many examples of projects not being properly performance 
managed and huge losses and what happens?  Nothing really happens; I don’t 
know that they really learn a huge amount from it.  I guess, things have 
improved, I’m not being completely negative, but, we don’t run a very tight 
ship as an organisation really.  Also, it’s just the culture, most people on the 
shop floor who actually influence how resource is spent, don’t even know 
anything about performance management.”410 
 
Politicians of all political persuasions have recognized that public consultations are often 
fruitless exercises where policy has already been formed and politicians and public 
organisations are simply going through the motions of local engagement. The Health 
Select Committee, which consists of cross-party politicians, reported that, “Public trust 
has to be earned and is easily broken. In some places, consultations have been a sham, 
elsewhere NHS bodies have sought to evade their duty to consult entirely. The 
Department needs to take a lead and make it clear that such behaviour will not be 
condoned.”411  More importantly, internal decision making, which I was privy to witness 
in a variety of key meetings, left a lot to be desired and often it was about politics and 
upholding the conservative social order that exists within the NHS.  Yet this has not been 
recognised nationally.  Why should staff recognise the value of public participation when 
their own participation is not appreciated?  It is difficult to implement both policy and 
change when principal parties have been kept out of key decisions.  This then in turn 
affects their ability to implement improvements, developments and reform within their 
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own organisations as there is a culture of disenfranchisement.  Denying senior 
management the ability to influence key decisions leads to a basic lack of local 
engagement with key policies.  Where there was no sense of management ownership, of 
buy-in, on specific decisions, a wider lack of direction and a sense of aimlessness was 
generally felt by all staff.    
            
Blair’s rhetoric on technology and modernisation went hand-in-hand.412  The two themes 
were supposed to signify to the electorate New Labour’s modern approach to the NHS.  In 
a globalised world, the communications and information technology sector provide the 
bulk of work, overshadowing the traditional industries.  New Labour had been keen to 
devolve the post - industrial economy promoting partnerships with the private sector to 
innovate technologies.
413
  Nowhere had this been more apparent than in the significant 
amounts spent on the National Programme for Information Technology (NPfIT), now 
rebranded Connecting for Health.  It was overseen by Richard Granger (previously of the 
consulting company Deloitte) and should have delivered a range of new systems to the 
PCT between 2006-2007 e.g. New National Network (N3) connections to all NHS sites 
including GP Practices and branch surgeries, Care Records Service (CRS) functionality in 
Community Hospitals, Choose and Book (CAB), Picture Archiving Communication 
System (PACS), SUS etc. None of these projects have adhered to original timetables.  
Some of this work was managed and coordinated nationally and the rest more locally; the 
role of outside consultancies however is a constant.   
 
There were risks associated with any significant implementation of a new system.  In 
general, when trying to quantify levels of risk around NHS IT, ‘the more ambitious the 
solution, the higher the risk’ works as an accurate guiding principle.  It should be 
acknowledged that the ‘do nothing or little’ option often runs the risk of failure to meet 
other strategic policy imperatives or business objectives.
414
  As with all big IT projects 
within the public sector, when there were delays in implementation, costs escalated; in this 
case the financial burden was felt by the NHS.
415
  In late January (26/01/06) Heads of 
Information were informed of the delay in the launch of Secondary Uses Service (SUS) by 
the SHA.  Concerning SUS there were data quality problems and the roll out was once 
again delayed.  People were unsurprised to hear that the launch was to be postponed from 
                                                 
412
 Department of Health (2002a) Delivering 21st century IT support for the NHS: national strategic 
programme 
413
 Driver, S. & Martell, L., (1999) p42-44 
414
 Department of Health  (2002b) Securing our future health: taking a long-term view - the Wanless Report 
415
 Craig, D, Brooks, R., (2006) p183-197 
158 
1st April 2006, with no new date being issued.  As earlier mentioned, the NHS looks with 
envy to American Management Information Systems.  The reason private insurance is so 
keen to have credible information is because it makes a more accurate assessment of risk 
possible.  In a society such as United States, where the threat of litigation is higher, 
compensation claims financially more lucrative, viable private health insurance companies 
want to feel that they have covered all eventualities, thereby minimizing the risk they take 
on.  Nevertheless, during the 1980s the US public sector was exploited in a similar fashion 
to that which was currently seen in Britain; what prevented this continuing was the move 
from voluntary self-regulation to the introduction of 1996 Information Technology 
Reform Act.  However the Labour government shied away from introducing comparable 
legislation for fear of being seen as anti-business and therefore Old rather than New 
Labour.     
 
5.14 Conclusion 
Performance management was introduced to eliminate risk by increasing patient safety, 
preventing scandals the size of Alder Hey, Bristol Infirmary and Shipman but also the 
incidents that never made it to the mainstream press. Performance within the NHS, 
according to New Labour rhetoric, was implemented to address issues of risk 
management. However, as seen, the manner in which it was introduced left much to be 
desired; there have been many inconsistencies within its application and processes were 
rarely evaluated.  During the start of New Labour’s term in office, performance managers 
were appointed in Trusts throughout the NHS, their presence to draw attention to 
underperforming areas, their role to act as risk minimisers. At their disposal were tools 
such as the Balanced Scorecard, a high level strategic document which enabled the Board 
to identify areas of action.  Star Ratings were supposed to make organizations more 
publicly accountable; however as financial independence and rewards came with being a 
high rating Trust, playing the system and gaming increased to an extent where it became 
the norm.  
 
Annual planning cycles were designed to prevent problems from arising, yet the same 
problems occurred time and time again and the crises that happened were invariably 
expected. Performance managers did not significantly increase accountability; it was not 
assurance against standards that was being sought by the Department of Health and the 
health regulator but reassurance; their role was thus to reassure the organisation that 
everything was satisfactory. The value of collaborative working was often lost; engaging 
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with other departments and organisations was often mainly concerned with dividing 
responsibility and protecting oneself in areas that were already considered to be high risk 
and with a high likelihood of failing.  Conducts of audits and lengthier reviews were 
invalidated by a lack of genuine feedback and advice; a simple score was not conducive to 
sustainable improvement.  The setting of targets and creations of numerous standards were 
only attained if specific senior individuals were tasked with their responsibility.  To say it 
was the entire organisation’s responsibility was inadequate. What I evidenced in this 
chapter was this: where there is no ownership of a target, it merely becomes what Arendt 
terms a “floating responsibility.”  Moreover, achieving targets, being labelled a successful 
organisation could be deceiving, as all assessments were based on historic data.  
Furthermore assessments undertaken presented only an overview of an organisation,  often 
missing pockets of poor and even substandard practice.   
 
During this period the NHS did not have sufficiently robust information systems and 
hence measuring became a shallow form of verification, losing the trust of its staff. Their 
accounts informed wider debates, creating an atmosphere of public disbelief about the 
information produced.  Other types of organisational intelligence should have been used; 
moreover a review should have been undertaken into how effective the new performance 
system was in achieving its goal of reducing risk, thereby providing real scrutiny in the 
NHS. Ineffective measuring creates a false sense of security, but to focus all attention on 
implementing, upgrading and purchasing the latest IT systems as a means of reducing risk 
was to invest too much expectation in technology’s ability to solve deep seated problems. 
Newer technologies are only as good as the systems, staff and data they support. 
Nevertheless, to disinvest in IT was a false economy. A satisfactory compromise was 
required, one where staff’s accounts of areas in which they are experts are accepted and 
given credence and if necessary supported by quantitative information. This chapter has 
illustrated that was the opposite of what actually occurred.  Inaccurate numbers were given 
primacy, thereby increasing risk and decreasing the quality of care patients received.    
 
Risk reduction was the normative account the state used to introduce performance 
management; detailing the work of the performance manager, we see this role in fact was 
minor in relation to the goal of performance.  However, this narrative of risk successfully 
acted as the catalyst to bringing about a more compliant, less challenging, workforce and 
enabling the state to introduce performance management with minimal disruption and 
interference from public and staffing bodies.  Early government rhetoric about the 
proliferation of performance was centred on reducing risk; the evidence suggests that the 
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tools employed have not delivered the desired results. The NHS flounders from one crisis 
to the next.  Thus if performance’s sole purpose was to reduce risk, it should be 
considered a failure.  However, in the next chapter, I propose that performance has had 
another function, that of rationalisation, and here it has been most effective.   
 
This chapter has relied heavily on data gathered through my observations as an 
institutional ethnographer.  This provided a rich, complete and detailed account of work 
done within performance.  It did not give or lend support to personal narratives around 
risk.  Rather, the sole quotation used was from the in-depth interview with the governance 
manager who provided a narrative which made clear the link between performance and 
rationalisation, the with notion of risk left unspoken.  Being based within the PCT enabled 
me to see that individuals did not make sense of their world or their work through an 
understanding of risk.  Risk was the voice of the state, but not the rhetoric used by 
individuals or organisations to make sense of their work.  Its absence was telling.  What 
this chapter has illustrated is that risk was the elephant in the room.  All the apparatus at a 
performance manager’s disposal arose from a risk culture.  Risk management has a clear 
process: identify risk, put mitigating actions in place, understand what factors are outside 
an organisation’s control, and put contingency plans in place, reassess and review the risk, 
take action and plan as appropriate.  To understand risk it is necessary to look at the risk 
faced in its totality.  Those working in performance went through all these steps on the 
Trust’s behalf and yet it was not the choice of rationale for individuals in aiding them to 
describe, understand or explain their work.  Rationalisation as set out in the next chapter 
was what gave meaning to the performance agenda.     
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Chapter 6 
Rationalisation: Statecraft Work 
 
6.1 Organisational Rationalisation  
The move from Labour to New Labour was considered by some political commentators to 
be a marketing ploy and by others as providing a visible shift in the direction of the party 
from left to centre-right politics.  However, ‘Labour’ as a party name originally referred to 
work, as it has its roots in the trade union movement.  New Labour redefined how it saw 
work, shown clearly in the dropping of Clause Four
416
 prior to the 1997 election.  Within 
the NHS the effects of New Labour were seen in the new labour of performance 
management as described in detail in the previous chapter.  This distinction is important 
because as Marcuse stated: “Social change is a qualitative change if it establishes 
essentially different forms of human existence, with a new social division of labour, new 
modes of control over the productive process, a new morality, etc.”417  Thus, New Labour 
oversaw the shift from performance as an operator, a mechanism, to performance 
management which was not merely a transformative form of work in the NHS but also a 
process of organisational and hence social change.   
 
I will argue in this chapter that rationalisation in its many forms, as will be illustrated, 
permeated the NHS through performance management. Performance management was the 
vehicle for statecraft, previously described in Chapter Three, and performance managers 
the tools of the state. Performance managers, through their work and the process of 
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rationalization, enabled the state to see into areas over which they had had little or no 
control hitherto. The evidence presented here shows that, in the rush to meet targets, 
critical thinking regarding what Trusts were seeking to achieve was abandoned.  
Tabularisation allowed immediacy in judgements to be made, on a basis solely of weak 
quantified information, while evaluative decision-making processes were bypassed.  
Patient care slid down the list of Board priorities as the focus was on financial 
management. Organisational rationalisation brought with it structural reorganisation 
during which those staff, with sufficient seniority and authority to raise pertinent questions 
about the policies being followed, were made redundant or relocated.    
 
The idea of rationalisation can be applied to organisations, in the changing shape of the 
workforce as well as wider structure of the NHS.  Before taking office, Tony Blair spoke 
of “An NHS for the future: the NHS requires continuity as well as change, or the system 
cannot cope. There must be pilots to ensure that change works. And there must be 
flexibility, not rigid prescription, if innovation is to flourish. ….Our fundamental purpose 
is simple but hugely important: to restore the NHS as a public service working co-
operatively for patients, not a commercial business driven by competition.”418  And once 
Labour was in government he went on to say the following: “The government certainly 
does not want to see reorganisation for the sake of it…mergers arising from local 
decisions will be considered on their merits, on the basis of demonstrable benefits in 
health and healthcare, and saving in administration.”419 Yet the experiences of 
performance staff, as I will detail, indicate that this normative ideal has been very different 
in reality. 
 
Long serving staff, those who had been in the NHS for more than a couple of decades, 
described in both in the recorded interviews and informal conversations the cultural 
changes they have experienced in NHS.  As an organisation, the NHS has seen massive 
centralisation and a concentration of services in which the personalised approach has 
gradually been phased out as organisations favour greater efficiency.  All these are 
features of rationalisation and modernity as previously described by Weber. A PCT 
governance manager sums up the situations as follows:  
 
GM: The changes I have seen are from a very focused local service and, 
almost, not a personalised service, but a personal service, to a very large, and 
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what is fast becoming an impersonal service.  And that’s how certainly the 
members of the public that I know in my community, that’s how they see it.  
They now see the PCT as just a large, impersonal organisation, which is 
moving from its local roots.
420
 
 
Far from there being a steady state or a slowly evolving organization, change has been 
rapid, continuity has in many cases disappeared and any sense of stability within an 
organization is no more than a dream for those working in performance management.  In 
the words of one PCT commissioning manager: 
 
CM: Depends, depends at which point in time.  Now, we’re probably going to 
the right level across a region.  Where we had three PCTs, we’re now going to 
one PCT across a county.  That’s probably the right level to do it at.  Sooner or 
later somebody’ll have a great idea and put it back up to a health authority 
level, and we might not have PCTs; or somebody might have a bright idea and 
split us all up again into smaller PCTs because we’re not being responsive to 
our local needs.  
IV: Okay, so are you…?       
CM: We change too often. We change too frequently; we don’t allow change 
to embed.  It takes five years for organisational change to embed, and for 
cultures to embed within that.  What we end up doing is we do this in a cycle 
of two to three years, we rip everything apart.  All the systems that we’ve had 
in place, where they were just about to start having some benefit to the 
corporation, we then put everything in disarray.  We lose very good members 
of staff to the private sector or out of the NHS full stop, because they no 
longer want to work in healthcare.  We do it too quickly, too frequently.
421
  
        
The interviewee states that the effectiveness of rationalising a workforce is dependent on 
when it happens.  Three PCTs are merging to become one and he is part of this process of 
rationalisation.  He suggests that organisational change can always be justified, whether it 
is to create a smaller organisation or a larger organisation, and that there is a sense that 
change is cyclical.  However he goes on to say that change in the NHS happens too 
frequently, so that any positive impact felt by the implementation of that change is 
negated.  The process of change is not experienced in any organised fashion and the 
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disorder created leads to people leaving. For example this same theme was taken up by the 
PCT governance manager.         
 
GM: Most people work here because they fundamentally believe that it’s a 
good organisation to work within.  I think it’s just the number of changes that 
have been forced upon it.  Even though some of them are justified and things 
do need to change, there’s not enough time for systems to actually settle down 
and be implemented before they’re thrown up in the air again and there’s more 
change.  People get more sceptical, everyone knows there’s going to be 
change again within the next year; there’s no way the proposed structure will 
stay, it’s too unstable. 422  
   
Here the interviewee talks about organisational change being forced onto the PCT, a sense 
of things happening which are beyond its control, a sense of powerlessness against an 
outside force in a position to instigate this change.  As the changes become more frequent, 
staff become more cynical, as illustrated by a PCT risk manager.       
 
RM : It’s probably the most stressful environment I’ve ever worked in and I 
worked in the city, in finance, in a very wide term, in merchant banks, in 
insurance, in international finance.  And that’s public sector, international 
finance, and the NHS is very stressful in that things are constantly changing.  
And I wouldn’t say they’re evolving.  They are changing.  And I’ve forgotten 
the name of the woman now, she did a very good article, I think it was in 
Health Service Journal (HSJ), about investment threshold, in that healthcare 
organisations are never given sufficient opportunity to demonstrate that their 
improvement measures are effective because they’re never given enough time.  
I think it’s a four year parliamentary… the word escapes me, in that 
government is in power for a period of four years, but they never seem to give 
NHS organisations that period to implement measures which have been 
legislated upon or advised by government.  Because an election is 
approaching, the government will introduce certain measures and it doesn’t 
matter whether those measures contradict, ones that were introduced two or 
three years ago.  We will just turn the whole apple cart upside-down and see 
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what comes out.  And it doesn’t matter how many apples are bruised in the 
process.
423
  
 
Here the interviewee talks about the stress caused by the constant change in the NHS, the 
negative emotional impact rationalisation generates; this aspect of rationalisation was first 
introduced in Chapter Three.  He notes that this is far worse than any previous 
environment he has worked in.  He comments that the change is driven by the timetabling 
of elections, rather than any internal reason for change.  He also feels the need to 
corroborate his opinion, by mentioning an article published by the HSJ which presents a 
similar idea.  He uses the metaphor of the apple cart being tipped over, to describe a sense 
of chaos, of staff hurt and of no clear outcome.         
 
Continuous flux within the system and formations of new organizations mean that there is 
little trust between organisations existing within the system.  Reorganisations and constant 
movement of people has led to a lost history. Individuals described the loss of 
organisational memory.   
 
PM: I’m getting on a bit now.  I’ve seen things go around and come around 
many times. I see initiatives with new names that in substance have been 
around a few times, and because I’m getting old and grumpy, I find the jargon 
irritating. We don’t call things what they really are, we just create new 
descriptions for old things. And there’s very little memory in the NHS, there’s 
very little organisational memory of, well, hang on, we did that ten years ago – 
it didn’t work then; but we’re going to call it something else and do it again. 
What are we doing here folks?
424
  
 
The interviewee, someone with a long career in the NHS, states that much of the recent 
change he has seen before in previous incarnations; to him it is simply a case of 
rebranding old initiatives.  For him much of this constant change is due to the lack of what 
he refers to as organisational memory: the NHS repeats its mistakes, not learning from 
past failures. 
                
As all these quotations demonstrate, perpetual change is experienced, but this is not 
regarded as an evolving NHS nor is it necessarily regarded as progress by staff.  However, 
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the more things change, the more they stay the same.  There is a perception of running fast 
but standing still.   
 
PM: well, since 1987, I’ve probably forgotten how many restructurings of the 
NHS I’ve seen. Regardless of the number of restructurings, probably what 
makes it effective is that generally speaking, there is a common aim behind the 
treatment of patients. And I genuinely think that that is kept largely at the 
forefront of people’s minds. We all know that sometimes various targets that 
aren’t necessarily patient related can go up the rank of importance. But, 
because people generally work around the way the NHS is structured, it does 
ensure that certain outcomes, at least, come out of it. People tend to keep the 
outcomes in mind, even if sometimes it could be better. Obviously, having a 
change vote on average every three years means that by the time you’ve 
bedded in the last change, potentially there’s another one coming around 
which obviously, isn’t always particularly beneficial.425  
   
The interviewee experienced restructuring on several occasions; his belief is that the 
patient is at the heart of these reorganisations.  However, he goes on to say that there are 
times where reorganisations are not patient-orientated, that they do not work in the best 
interest of patients, and in these circumstances staff work around this difficulty. The 
interviewee discusses how reorganisations can coincide with political upheaval therefore 
any perceived potential benefit is lost. The interviewee is articulating his belief that 
politicians come from a consequentialist position. Reorganisations in themselves may be 
damaging but they are a means to an end, the end being a better NHS.         
 
In these interviews, the lexicon of everyday work experience includes feelings of 
nostalgia.  Nostalgia is a yearning, a longing, for the past, and yet there is hopefulness for 
the future.  People see the positive in previous times.  There is nostalgia for a world which 
was perceived as not changing, a world which was stable, and a world where individuals 
knew their roles. When others (politicians, new PCT staff) imply what has gone before is 
worthless, their response as illustrated by the above quotes is to essentially say, ‘no, what 
we did had value, it still has value’. They are reasserting their contribution to work as 
worthwhile. While individuals were nostalgic for the past there were often contradictions 
in staff opinions. As discussed in Chapter Two, the founding principle of the NHS was 
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that care would be provided on the basis of individual’s need for treatment and not on the 
individual’s ability to pay; some staff believed this ideal was being eroded. Interviewees 
reminisced over a lost golden age of the NHS, but nostalgia for these values did not 
prevent them discussing rights and rationing in the same breath.  
 
PM:  I’ve noticed that the politicians have stopped saying NHS and the 
National Health Service; they just talk about the health service now.  They 
don’t talk about brand NHS, there is erosion around independent, private and 
NHS, it’s just the health service… Everybody should be responsible for their 
own healthcare needs, and if that means a dual service between NHS and an 
insurance scheme, then that’s the way we should go. Germany’s got one of the 
best healthcare systems in the world; one of the most efficient healthcare 
systems in the world.  But I believe it’s fully insurance-based, whereas France 
has got a dual-part, of some of it’s state and some of it’s insurance-based. 
IV: Okay.  So, if Germany is one of the best in the world, and it’s fully 
insurance-provided, and that’s the most effective, or not, why not go straight 
down the insurance route? 
PM: Because I don’t think the public will allow you to.  The NHS has too 
many values to it.  It’s coming up for our 60th anniversary, so we’re not going 
to, all of a sudden, give up the core-values of the NHS, of being free at the 
point of entry.”426 
 
The performance manager has an open admiration for healthcare systems where 
individuals have to take out private health insurance and states that a fully insurance-based 
system is desirable.  However he reminisces about the loss of NHS values.  In his eyes, the 
variation within the NHS throughout the country means it is no longer truly a national 
service.  That private providers are at the core of NHS business means that neither is it any 
longer a public healthcare system.   
 
This inconsistency in thought is not unusual amongst NHS management. Performance 
managers are no different.  While based as an institutional ethnographer in the PCT and 
SHA, I was often privy to discussions on the NHS rationing of services.  Examples 
include treating only specific illnesses; state funding for secondary care but not primary, 
which would be funded privately; A&E being the only service that was free at the point of 
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treatment, all other services being paid for by health insurance.  This dichotomy, a belief 
in the founding principles of the NHS and rationing of services, is not new. When 
performance managers discuss this they refer to it as rationing, as this language is used by 
the media, and yet it is also the most obvious form of rationalisation.   
  
6.2 Measuring, quantifying & evidence 
As previously discussed in Chapter Three, modernity values both the rational and the 
scientific as well as placing a strong emphasis on the idea of progress.  Quantification is 
attractive when making claims about progress; they become more difficult to refute.  
Discussions about progress necessitate thinking about future states, what is achievable and 
what has been achieved.  In defining progress it becomes appropriate to have goals and 
aims.  Under New Labour, those working within public services have seen these goals and 
aims translated into targets.  Measuring is an intrinsic part of performance management.  It 
focuses not on the norm but on deviations; what is different, what is distinct, and captures 
the interest and attention of those doing the counting and later those making policy. 
Counting creates subdivision, which in turn generates further divisions.
427
  When applied 
to individuals, this becomes a process of categorisation.  However, categories are neither 
fixed nor static; new ones come into being and a history lies behind each category
428
.  The 
process of counting and classifying leads to an exponential increase in that which is 
measured.  NHS policy focuses on measuring through the work of performance managers.  
This has led to new realities, new ways of seeing and, more importantly, new ways of 
referring to patients
429
. This is articulated clearly by a performance manager working in 
the SHA.   
 
PM: To me performance management is about… it’s a technical exercise, it’s 
looking at trends, it’s looking at performance against trajectories and it’s 
about, if you like, flagging this up to the organisation, or in a critical way.  
Performance improvement is something, is more about site postings, about 
showing best practice, it’s supporting organisations and individuals who are 
perhaps most challenged and actually helping them.  It’s a lot more of a 
supportive role and that’s where with my improvement tools and techniques, I 
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can offer something that traditional performance managers would not be able 
to do.
430
  
 
The interviewee makes the distinction between performance management and 
performance improvement; clearly in his mind there is a difference between the two.  
According to him performance management is about ensuring organisations are in line 
with plans and following forecasted trajectories and projected plans. Performance 
improvement by contrast for the interviewee is encouraging excellence and aiding Trusts 
to improve their services.  There is a dual function, a clear division of roles in how he sees 
his work.  In contrast to the traditional role where the majority of time is spent holding 
organisations to account for their performance, the latter aspect that of performance 
improvement is more supportive and the focus of his discussion.  My work as an 
institutional ethnographer within the SHA shows that this is not an accurate reflection of 
the actual work.  The description gives an account of 40% of time being spent on 
traditional performance management and 60% of time on performance improvement. 
However, having observed performance managers, I know this not to be the case; the 
inverse is actually true.  This is significant because the majority of time spent by 
performance managers is on measuring and quantifying, key aspects of rationalisation, 
rather than risk mitigation. It would appear the interviewee has internalised New Labour’s 
rhetoric on risk and is keen to present this normative ideal.                      
 
In the previous chapter, I discussed how there was a fetishism of planning in an attempt to 
control risk factors. I stated how the Local Delivery Plan (LDP), a framework which 
details what services NHS Trusts will be providing for the financial year, was ineffective 
in both understanding variables and risk reduction.  The following is an extract taken from 
an interview with a PCT Primary Care Manager.  Every NHS organisation forecasted data 
at the beginning of the year and populated the LDP with actual information on a quarterly 
basis throughout the year.  He discusses the nature of his work in terms of measuring and 
monitoring, features of rationalisation, in relation to the LDP. 
 
PC: The thing that I would say about the whole LDP and other initiatives like 
that, is that it seems to me that the organisation never talks to each other in any 
great way.  One group say, want smoking statistics and obesity statistics, with 
their certain parameters.  Then it’s done again, inside the QOF [Quality and 
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Outcomes Framework], but to a different set of time periods and different 
parameters, it’s still a statistic, but nobody seems to want to mould together, to 
make the one target, that everyone can use.  We keep reinventing the wheel, 
that’s what I’m saying.   
IV: Is it a case of different people requesting information in different ways?  
PC: Yeah, different departments.  Just ask for it in different ways, yeah.  But it 
is being done in so many different ways.  There is similarity, but differences, 
so you can’t use it.431 
 
The interviewee discusses how the information required varies each quarter and that those 
monitoring the information use slightly different measures, thereby preventing 
information from being replicated. This is important as nationally the normative account 
of measuring is to compare like with like, in a systematic approach, letting the data speak 
for itself.  Yet the interviewee’s description of the process calls this version of events into 
account.  The situation he describes is an environment which appears to hinder this type of 
comparative assessment.   
 
Within Chapter Three, I gave an account of Ritzer’s theory of McDonaldization, the rise 
of uniformity and standardisation within the workplace. The following is a quotation from 
a PCT Risk Manager who appropriates this idea, by stating the need for greater integration 
in reporting. 
        
RM: I don’t find my job difficult; it would be easier if there was some 
uniformity of reporting.  Every body and I mean that in terms of every body, 
rather than people, requesting information, seems to request it in a different 
format.  If there was some uniformity of format in this reporting process, that 
would make life a lot easier for everybody concerned.
432
  
     
Here the interview notes how different organisations within the NHS all require the same 
information in a different format.  There is no set way of reporting this information.  He 
believes a greater degree of homogenisation would result in simpler working practices. 
This then is an example of the ideology of rationalisation, rather than the New Labour’s 
rhetoric of risk, giving meaning to work.     
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New Labour were keen to modernise the NHS; one such technique was to make its work 
evidence-based, so that approach and decision-making were more scientific and rigorous. 
Below a PCT Public Health manager discusses how successful this has been, what 
problems he has incurred in trying to search for basic information.  Emphasis has been 
marked by italics to the citation. To stress his frustration he repeats his words to reiterate 
his point, ensuring that I, the interviewer, understand the difficulty of the situation.    
             
PH: Increasingly, particularly over the last five, maybe four or five years, 
there’s been a much stronger push around ensuring that the work we do is 
evidence based, and sometimes that presents challenges because sometimes 
the evidence isn’t there, it’s not always click up, to be honest. One of the most 
frustrating things is that, and I only said this to X actually the other week, is 
that public health analysts are poor; we need, we’re really lacking in the PCT 
compared to other areas, and it’s been a constant battle for as long as I’ve 
worked out here really. There’s sometimes information that we need at our 
fingertips, and I find myself scrabbling around for information. Like for 
example, with the smoking recently, like we have now over the last years, 
we’ve established a lot of data through the QMAS (Quality Management and 
Analysis System) system, so we’ve got a lot of information on our patients 
regarding smoking status and people with long term conditions who are still 
smoking, but it’s like you have to scrabble your way to find the information, 
and nothing seems coordinated, and if ever I need public health analyst 
support for information, which has to be at my fingertips with the sort of work 
I do, it’s a bit of a battle. We’re really lacking in the PCT in that side of 
things.
433
  
 
The interviewee states how scientific and rigorous decision making promoted by New 
Labour was deficient by having limited access to appropriate data and information.  There 
are not enough analysts employed to support this evidence based way of working.  The 
interviewee notes how rather than the analysts it is he who has to pull together the 
necessary information.  Where the technical systems and the corresponding analysts are 
not in place, the others step in to create and piece together information.  Extracting the 
appropriate data is a skill, and where an individual does not have this skill things are very 
challenging.  
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One interviewee, a PCT Public Health Manager, used the example of breastfeeding to 
question the value of measuring. 
   
PH: For Performance Management per se, I sometimes worry that we are all 
running around counting things and, yes, that is a good measure of how well 
we are performing, but, sometimes, it is not a good measure, because, for 
example, with the breastfeeding one, lots of women initiate breastfeeding, and 
the definition of initiation is so brief in terms of the baby is put to the breast, 
and that is it, and from a Public Health perspective, it would be much more 
relevant to measure how long someone manages to breastfeed.  That has health 
impacts on the mother and the baby.  It also tells us a little bit more about the 
service we are providing, because if someone has been able to breastfeed in 
hospital, and has managed to establish it at home, and keep going for even two 
weeks, that tells you much more about the service they have had than someone 
who has just had the baby put to their breast in terms of ticking the box to 
show that is done.
434
   
 
While initially stating that measuring had some value in assessing the performance of a 
service he notes that some measures do not accurately reflect what the State is trying to 
measure.  Measuring is supposed to give an outsider a clear picture of progress; in this 
case it is clearly failing.  There is a sense for those working in performance that the NHS 
is measuring for the sake of measuring, that they are going through the motions to imitate 
a scientific process, when all the while the measure is ineffective.  This is but one example 
out of many, accumulated in my fieldwork, where an individual feels that what is being 
measured does not relate to good public health.  Therefore progress in this measure does 
not correspond to progress in healthcare.  There is no long term value to the work being 
done; it merely fulfils statutory information requirements.        
     
PH: There has probably sometimes not been enough input, because quite often 
these things feel like they come down from above.  You do not feel like you 
have much input into how they were created.  For example, on the obesity one, 
it probably is a good idea to know what level of obesity we have in our 
locality, but it is very unlikely to be that different from the national average.  It 
might be a bit lower.  And with that information, what can we do, because it is 
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quite a universal issue?  It is not like we can target a particular area, because 
there are a few children in every school who are overweight.  It’s not like there 
are all obese children in one school and we could make a big intervention.  
Even for that one, given the level of work required to collect the data, I am not 
entirely sure it is useful.  It may well be five years down the line when we 
have got more trend data, I wonder whether they could have done that on a 
sample size, rather than on a national programme.
435
    
 
The PCT Public Health manager is questioning the purpose of measuring and monitoring 
when no clear action can be taken.  Collecting information can seem like a pointless 
exercise if appropriate intervention does not follow shortly afterwards to those working in 
public health.  The interviewee uses the example of obesity where large scale data 
collection has little value, so no intervention can be taken even when children have been 
identified as obese.  The argument put forward is: if all you want to see are trends then 
carrying out a study on several small sample populations would be more appropriate.  
Measuring all the children adds little extra value and thus seems unjustifiable.               
 
In the following excerpt, a PCT Clinical Governance Manager talks of his experience 
working in another health economy and how this compares to the NHS.     
          
CG: I haven’t worked in the States; I don’t know whether it’s actually more 
effective, I just think they’ve always been sort of ahead of the game in 
defining what data can be collected. One of the weaknesses of the NHS is that 
we do have a lot of data, but it isn’t actually that useful; it is actually quite 
difficult to get the information so we haven’t routinely collected a lot of this 
data so therefore it’s quite hard to manage performance and see how we’ve 
sort of improved, I guess.
436
 
 
The interviewee mentions that there is a huge amount of data and information within the 
NHS but accessing this is extremely time-consuming, and that information which is 
available is of limited use. Assessing progress as part of the performance management is 
therefore difficult and can only produce judgements which are not based on either accurate 
or complete data.  The interviewee believes that the quality of US data and information 
collection is of a higher standard.  While this may be true, the reason for this is primarily 
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due to the US system being one of multiple private health insurance companies. 
Consequently, investment in information and technology which supports data gathering 
has been a priority since its inception.          
          
The effect of change on systems, organisations and individual work will be studied in 
greater detail in the following chapter, on stigma. However, I will provide a brief 
quotation from a PCT Public Health Manager to highlight how constant change can affect 
data capture.    
 
PH: I think it probably becomes less robust, because things change so 
frequently and because, sometimes, gathering the data is a difficult thing in the 
first place.  When people change, or when systems change, it takes a while to 
get the quality of the data up again.
437
       
       
The interviewee comments that information is no longer reliable because what is being 
collected changes frequently over a relatively short period. Hence it is difficult to make 
comparisons which in turn means that any fluctuations within similar data sets are missed.  
Good data quality is reliant on stable collecting systems.  It is worth remembering that 
within bureaucracies features of rationalisation include objectivity, quantification and 
reliability; under New Labour performance management’s role was to provide this to NHS 
organisations yet continuous change meant this was not always possible.     
 
Another PCT Public Health Manager gives an account of how data is gathered; he speaks 
of an accumulation of facts and figures which leads to nothing and nowhere.  This is 
contrary to the idea that data is collected in order to alter behaviour, whether this is of 
doctors or patients.    
           
PH: They used to do a Health Visitor audit which looked at the activity of 
Health Visitors, which did record duration of women breastfeeding.  I pulled 
out some of that data from a very clunky system and looked at it, but no-one 
else had.  They collected all this data for years and years and no-one had used 
it. That is where Performance Management gets a bad name, because it’s as if 
they do not want to fill in more forms because I never see the outcome of it.  
When we presented the Health Visitors with this duration data and said, this 
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many women are breastfeeding for six weeks, three months, or whatever, and 
these are the areas where they are not, down to specific GP practices, you 
could then target intervention.  This is good use of data collection, but if you 
are not using it, I worry about why we are collecting it.
438
 
 
The interviewee recognises that data collection occurs but information analysis often does 
not. The purpose of data collection is for it to impact treatment and better health outcomes. 
Where this is not happening, data collection appears a cumbersome and meaningless task, 
particularly to those in working in public health. There appears to be no justification for 
this kind of work. However, if we return to the work of Scott, (see Chapter Three) and his 
notion that the State requires data to provide eyes into previously unseen areas, then this 
offers an explanation to what is occurring. New Labour wanted to know about all areas of 
healthcare provision; this is about establishing power while maintaining the appearance of 
a decentralised government, about retaining control even at a distance. This then is not 
New Labour but rather the behaviour of Old Labour.         
 
Another PCT Public Health Manager states this:  
 
PH: (There is) far too much information to effectively manipulate the data,
439
  
A very short but pithy observation. The public health manager believes that the volume of 
the information available makes the issue of understanding the data difficult.  It brings to 
mind the adage “can’t see the wood from the trees.” With reference to bureaucratic 
regimes and their effects, the intended impact of rationalisation is to streamline processes 
through accurate information but in an organisation as large as the NHS the sheer volume 
of information generated means that rationalisation has the opposite effect. Excessive 
amounts of data were produced, without the necessary resources, manpower, skills and 
analysis to make sense of it.          
    
According to an SHA Performance Manager, what is lacking from performance culture is 
what Scott describes as metis, described in Chapter Three: knowledge gained through 
experience, learnt wisdom which is local to its conditions and context.  
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PM: We don’t have detailed knowledge, well; it’s more difficult to have it at 
this level, when you’re at a greater distance from the point of delivery. But we 
measure lots of things, and balancing the books is very important, achieving 
some of these national targets. Do we really look to see how our family of 
organisations are relating to their service users and their customers? Is there 
any kind of measure around that? It isn’t high on the agenda, and it’s one of 
those more quality things.
440
 
 
The interviewee states that generally SHA performance managers lack detailed knowledge 
of clinical practices.  There are a large number of targets; however, financial balance is the 
priority. Though standardisation allows for increased measuring and for a greater number 
of comparisons to be made, the interviewee believes the most crucial comparison is not 
considered.  This for him is the comparison between organisations as to how they relate to 
their users, which does not appear high on the agenda. This is an example of the effects of 
rationalisation.  Quantification was driven by the need for greater efficiency and economy 
but doing so resulted in the customer, that is the patient, being expunged, erased, 
forgotten. The process that remained was one which was depersonalised and anonymous.  
This is concerning because it creates a culture of what Hannah Arendt called floating 
responsibility, (see chapter three) where responsibility is no one’s, and risks, like those 
New Labour were seeking to avoid, increase.       
 
According to the PCT Elderly Care manager, the true purpose of measuring is to 
demonstrate that any comparisons made are done on an impartial basis. Yet impartiality, 
independence and objectivity come at a cost, that of ownership. A sense of responsibility 
for the quality of the work constructed is lost.    
 
EC: It stems from wanting to be able to be fair and be able to demonstrate and 
to be seen to be fair, and they want to be able to compare things, which is fine. 
But they just need to understand that if – well, it’s the garbage in garbage out, 
isn’t it – you try and collect data for the sake of collecting the data for a target, 
actually the people putting the data in, aren’t going to care and they’ll put 
anything in. They’re not meaning to cheat the system or anything like that, it’s 
just that unless you feed back to them what the data is, they don’t own the 
data, they have no interest in it and they’ll be careless with it and they won’t 
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make it accurate. Whereas, if you encourage them to use the data and see what 
it’s used for then they take more care to get it right.  It’s kind of an 
understanding that if you are setting targets and you have a performance 
framework, you’ve got to set it in a way that people will be interested in their 
own performance, and see it as a useful measure of their own performance. 
Because if they don’t, then it won’t be worth the paper it’s written on. And 
there are some things we’re asked to do by the DOH, and we just do it because 
we’re asked to.441 
 
The interviewee believes that the DH fails to understand that where staff feel no 
ownership of a target and see data collection merely as an arduous task, the information 
produced will invariably be of poor quality.  Staff do not seek to manipulate the data or 
deceive, but rather have no interest in the process.  Moreover, where data collection does 
not bring about appropriate change this disincentivises staff still further.  Staff need an 
emotional investment in the data they are collecting in order to guarantee accuracy; it must 
correspond to their own understanding of their work and inform what they do.  If this is 
not the case, the information collected is not only worthless but demoralises the 
workforce. This is detrimental as it is an alienating experience of work; staff undertake 
measurement merely for the sake of compliance.  There is a sense of imposition; 
performance management adds to the burden of work.   
 
Under New Labour measuring became a central part of performance management work.  
As shown, data collection, counting and categorisation were key activities that made up 
performance culture; being embedded in NHS organisations enabled me to witness the 
exponential increase in this form of rationalisation. The following section looks at how 
targets were formulated, how staff made sense of these new measures, realities and 
perhaps, most significantly, ways of seeing patients.  
 
6.3 Arbitrary nature of targets & measures 
Performance management endows a certain objectivity, rationality and credibility to how 
issues are seen; this is similar to the process and purpose of audit previously discussed in 
Chapter Three.  Information goes through many versions because there are constantly 
shifting requirements from outside bodies, e.g. the Department of Health or the Healthcare 
Commission.  Data is malleable at the hands of analysts, figures are added and deducted.  
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Performance managers confer meaning on data, often blurring boundaries between the 
known and the implied.  They act both as witness to the transformation, having seen the 
data in its raw state, and also as spokesperson.  Performance managers are representative 
of how the new should be viewed and discussed.  They act as reference points for other 
managerial staff.   
 
However, in the creation of new targets, performance managers themselves appear to be 
unaware of any rational reason as to why specific policies, targets and measures have been 
chosen.  From my fieldwork I observed that performance managers are often cynical about 
politicians’ motives, believing that their policies are ones that lead to high media visibility.  
While quantification and measurement frequently lead to a meticulous application of 
rules, this precision is often thought to be missing in the formation of the original policy.  
The rational, scientific and objective approach that is sought through measurement is not 
always apparent to performance managers in a policy’s inception and subsequent 
establishment.          
 
Below is a series of quotations from three SHA Performance Managers as they deliberate 
about the arbitrary nature of target setting, each speculating as to why this is so.  
 
PM: Politically there is a need to challenge the NHS and to challenge the 
status quo.  Five years ago it was not unusual to have three year waiting lists 
for hip replacements and that type of thing and anything that challenges and 
forces the service to improve, has to be good.  I mean 18 weeks is fairly 
arbitrary, I don’t think there’s any particular top level thinking as to, why 18 
as opposed to 16 or 23, but why not have 24?
442
  
 
The interviewee notes that while targets push organisations to stretch themselves, the end 
goals of many targets seem arbitrary in nature, as illustrated with the 18 weeks target. As 
discussed in Chapter Four, there is no rationale as to why the Department of Health chose 
to focus on 18 weeks.  Reducing waiting times was an election issue and weighs heavily in 
a positive public perception of the NHS.  However, as the interviewee points out, the 18 
weeks policy could have just as easily been 16 weeks, 23 weeks or even 24 weeks.  Policy 
setting in this respect appears completely arbitrary and irrational to performance 
managers, as there was no wider recognition of the government’s election pledge to 
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reduce waiting times from 18 months to 18 weeks, which, at the time, was a challenge to 
the status quo.                 
 
PM: 18 weeks, big political hot potato, to show the government up as looking 
and focusing on patient satisfaction, to make sure that their pathway through 
the NHS system, from first point of contact, going to see their doctor, right 
through to having whatever treatment they needed, and getting home, is as 
short as possible, and they pin that on 18 weeks. No idea why they pinned it 
on 18 weeks, as opposed to 15 weeks, or 20 weeks. 18 weeks is quite a catchy 
little number, isn’t it? It is just about that, patient pathways in all specialities, 
and making sure that it happens as quickly as possible, and that it’s the patient 
who is satisfied at each stage, which is why we have the stages of treatment 
and the milestones within it. There was some extra emphasis and investment 
put into it by tagging some areas as further faster, those that might qualify for 
going even quicker, and that’s what they called further faster. I didn’t know 
that for some time. There’s all the jargon that’s attached to it, RTT, I didn’t 
know that for goodness knows how long, and now I do. 
443
   
 
The interviewee notes that 18 weeks become a priority for government in order to 
demonstrate that they were addressing a public concern and increasing overall patient 
satisfaction in the NHS.  Once again the performance manager speculates about the 
arbitrary nature of 18 weeks target.   
            
GM: It’s probably political, I guess; waiting time was originally 18 months, it 
probably seemed a good idea. We’ll transform 18 months when we come into 
power to 18 weeks, as an absolute number. There is genuine commitment 
within the government to get waiting times down. There is evidence that two 
to three years ago, it was considered one of the public’s particular gripes about 
the NHS.
444
  
 
Here one of the few performance managers to recognise that 18 weeks was not an 
arbitrary target but rather was based on a wider political commitment.  The above is the 
sole comment to recognise that the 18 weeks policy was a political pledge whose mandate 
came directly from the electorate.  18 weeks was a response to public dissatisfaction with 
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long waiting times and as such was made a priority within the Labour Manifesto.  While it 
is true that the figure of 18 weeks is arbitrary, its implementation as national policy was 
not.  However, 18 weeks, unlike many measures, did not have this element of public 
accountability.  It is unsurprising for performance managers to assume the introduction 
and setting of 18 weeks was arbitrarily set.  As seen in the previous section, this sense of 
arbitrariness permeates all aspects of the target culture, including individual measures, 
setting of baselines, and definitions of success and failure.      
  
This section gives credence to Power’s comment that “measures of economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness may be arbitrary”445 and  illustrates what Foucault referred to as 
governmentality, elucidated in greater detail in Chapter Three; it is the creeping in of the 
governing modes of thought. There was no clear direction, no grand design, no master 
plan, and no conscious overarching scheme by the state. Nevertheless, what becomes 
apparent from this series of quotations is that while New Labour wanted simply to 
implement its manifesto pledge, reducing the time taken to receive treatment from 18 
months to 18 weeks, this implementation had a significant impact on how work was 
undertaken and how it was viewed.  Performance managers gave meaning to data; though 
not always successfully, they attempted to bring reason and a coherent rationale to 
political policies.  My observations as an institutional ethnographer within the SHA 
reinforced this position; performance management made a connection between the known 
and the implied. Performance managers acted as eyewitnesses to the transformation of 
data into information and spokespersons for the state. Performance managers were 
ambassadors, who determined how the data was viewed and discussed, and who took 
arbitrary targets and attempted to articulate a meaningful narrative. In so doing they were 
endeavouring to provide a common sense of purpose to all staff who did not have 
everyday exposure to the target.    
 
6.4 Tabularisation; its purpose and proliferation    
Tabularisation or the use of tables, charts & dashboards are hugely popular in performance 
management; application is widespread and not restricted to one specific area of 
healthcare.  As a technology, dashboards make possible assessments at regional and 
national levels as they rely on rigid units of measurement, rules, and fixed conventions.  
Dashboards remove local context and customs, histories are lost and traditional practices 
are stripped away for practical purposes.  Human activity is disordered; however through 
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the use of these technologies and a system of codification order is brought and imposed 
upon the chaos.  This process of streamlining, applied social engineering, allows the state 
to make comparisons that would otherwise be impossible.         
 
Dashboards are used in the delivery of 18 weeks (see pp274-277 Appendix E for examples 
of 18 weeks dashboards); they allow performance managers to convey over time a 
situation with minimal input.  The dashboards are actants.
446
  Performance managers 
themselves rarely use the dashboards because of what they omit. However, they are keen 
for others to engage with the dashboard.  The dashboard forces a reality onto that which it 
counts.  Individuals who look at the dashboard are compelled to talk in the terms defined 
by the dashboard.  It is not possible for two individuals to look at the dashboard and 
discuss what they see and understand without employing the vocabulary and concepts set 
out in the dashboard.  Generalisations are only feasible because of the standardised 
approach offered by the dashboard phenomena.    
 
The SHA performance manager explains the purpose of dashboards, in the following:    
 
PM: I don’t think there is much value in sharing this wider than the SHA, it 
doesn’t show trends particularly, it just shows a snapshot in time.  It really is 
for our internal purposes only, it allows us to quickly identify at an SHA level 
where the strengths and weaknesses are. 
447
   
 
Here the interviewee states that dashboards were primarily for internal purposes, within 
the SHA, providing an overview highlighting each organisation’s achievement.  However, 
it was the weekly routine for these dashboards to be sent to organisations.  At first glance 
it appears that the performance manager is challenging Scott’s idea of seeing like a state; 
but my observations as an institutional ethnographer enabled me to ascertain that SHA 
performance managers acted as surrogates for the State, their evaluations being equivalent 
to the government’s. So while the interviewee states dashboards were used for internal 
purposes this in no way negates Scott’s claim that rationalising technologies enabled the 
State to see.      
 
The quotation below shows a performance manager making sense of a dashboard (see 
Appendices) and wishing to share this understanding with his counterparts in other 
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organisations.  This is important because it illustrates how the interviewee carries out his 
role as a performance manager; the knowledge he holds on behalf of the SHA is 
disseminated through him to Trusts.    
  
PM: we routinely send these (dashboards) out, because I wasn’t aware of the 
executive members, so I had to make leads.  They were getting them and they 
were trying to run their organisations based on what we were sending them.  
The first thing I had to do is explain that we assumed that they were getting 
their own intelligence and certainly that it was not the expectation that 
executive dashboards
448
 would be used as an operational management tool.  
This is about giving the SHA an overview of performance across the patch; it 
is not really for individual organisations to start managing their 18 weeks.
449
 
 
What the above illustrates is how performance managers share their way of interpreting 
the dashboard, thus ensuring that their way of seeing things becomes the standard.   As the 
interviewee goes on to say that, within the organisations he was monitoring, nobody in the 
early stages knew or understood how to read the 18 weeks dashboards.  It is a clear 
example of a performance manager corroborating Scott’s explanation of rationalisation, 
the idea of state surveillance as described in Chapter Three.  The new dashboards aimed to 
standardise patients, procedures and processes, making them streamlined and highly rigid.  
Change was imposed by the SHA as New Labour’s intermediary in order to rule, regulate 
and manage from afar.  Although external NHS organisations, PCTs and hospitals did not 
understand what the dashboards were supposed to tell them, they nevertheless 
endeavoured to use them to help run their Trusts.  The interviewee then states that he had 
to inform staff the dashboards were not to be used in such a manner;  the SHA would 
expect Trusts to be using their own data and information for operational management.  
Though this example draws on the 18 weeks dashboard; it highlights the general confusion 
about the purpose of dashboards and who they were designed for.  My observations as a 
performance manager confirmed this; trusts often came to their own incorrect conclusions 
as to what they should be doing with the dashboard.  18 weeks dashboards were primarily 
a monitoring tool for internal purposes, but as they were used to measure the performance 
of organisations then organisations felt it was necessary to know what they were being 
measured by.  As such the dashboards were often distributed more widely than originally 
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anticipated by the SHA.  When Trusts received tabularised information, they had a sense 
they must do something with it.           
     
The following excerpt is from an interview with a SHA performance manager who states 
dashboards are unhelpful as information shown is not current, providing only a picture of 
the past. To question an organisation about past performance is ineffective; one of their 
first comments will be “that was then, we are no longer in that position”.   
 
PM: The reason I don’t pay particular emphasis to them (dashboards),450 I 
used to, is, firstly, because (Row) A it is monthly, and it’s November, and 
we’ve moved on.  (Row) C is monthly as well, and they talk to me about their 
data completeness, and where they’re at more recently, on the phone, so I 
don’t say to them, well, your thing is saying this, because they’ll say to me, 
well, that’s back in November.451  
 
The interviewee highlights the inadequacies of tabularised information because it is a 
snapshot in time.  As the performance manager points out, data will be out of date in 
comparison to what is actually happening in the hospital.  However this was an effective 
device as it necessitated the performance manager based in the PCT (primary care trust) to 
explain how they had moved on from the dashboard while still using the vocabulary 
employed by the dashboard.         
 
The following SHA manager provides a conflicting perspective to the above performance 
manager’s use of the dashboards. 
 
PM: I to use them to see movements in performance over a period of time, I 
look more importantly at the graphs on the back, to see which way the trend is 
moving over a period of time.
452
 
 
Unlike the previous interviewees he used the dashboards to identify trends.   However, 
this was because he ignored the front sheet page completely, focusing instead on the back 
which provides graphs.  What became clear through the interviews is that each 
performance manager had his/her own way of reading a dashboard.  This was unexpected 
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as one of the original aims of a dashboard was to limit the number of ways a particular set 
of circumstances is seen.  It appears that performance managers were, in certain aspects 
and behaviours of their work, finding the means to break away from this imposed 
conformity. Dashboards were supposed to have a rationalising effect, their purpose being 
to provide a single perspective, to prevent multiple ways of seeing events.  The dashboard 
was intended to take what would otherwise appear as chaotic data and produce a 
comprehensive picture to any viewer where facts could speak for themselves.  What this 
example illustrates is the way in which performance managers inverted this ideal by taking 
a more personalised approach, an individual narrative, while still utilising the dashboard. 
This then was not about streamlining and simplification but rather about attempting to 
retain the complexity of patients’ lives alongside the standardised information reports 
produced.      
        
Once again an SHA performance manager states how little the dashboards help inform 
organisations of their performance or their progress.   
 
PM: I think, someone that didn’t have an understanding or background knowledge 
of 18 weeks, it would be very difficult to explain these four particular pieces of 
paper to; like my husband, who has no knowledge of 18 weeks.  But I believe it 
helps inform me of what position my organisations are in the delivery of the 
programme.  I tend to relate more to the organisations, themselves, and what they 
tell me, as opposed to what, statistically, these charts tell me.   
IV: Why is that?   
PM: Because I need to understand what’s happening on the ground, operationally, 
with the organisations in the delivery of the programme.  Statistics don’t, 
necessarily, reflect what’s happening on the ground. 
IV: Do your conversations with your PCT give you a more operational view of 
what’s going on? 
PM: Give me a rounded view to be able to assess what the statistics are telling me 
and why and what lay behind what they’re telling me.453   
      
The dashboards did not reflect what was actually occurring; the interviewee was 
reasserting her belief that to gain a real understanding, it was necessary to talk to 
individuals working within the Trusts.     
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If these dashboards were routinely sent to organisations, but were of little or no use, then 
what was their purpose?  It would appear that performance managers were not using this 
tool for its intended purpose. Rather this technology allowed performance managers to 
weave an official narrative, an authorised account around how policy, in this case 18 
weeks, was being implemented and delivered.  Dashboards provide standardisation, a one-
size-fits-all approach to highly complex patient pathways.  Tabularisation was meant to be 
reductive by nature.  However, quantification does not mean that it is a more accurate 
reflection of a particular situation or set of circumstances.  Measuring does not 
automatically confer a greater knowledge about the phenomena under examination.   
  
Tabularisation was but one tool at a performance manager’s disposal.  Another was the 
use of the data dictionary as means of aiding measurement; like tabularisation, it too was 
supposed to be reductive.  The NHS Data Dictionary “provides a reference point for 
assured information standards to support health care activities within the NHS in England. 
It has been developed for everyone who is actively involved in the collection of data and 
the management of information in the NHS.”454  It is an information tool: the nature of 
language is precise and meanings fixed.  For example, search for  ‘Accident and 
Emergency Time Seen For Treatment’, and the following  is found  : “Accident and 
Emergency Time Seen For Treatment is the time, recorded using the 24 hour clock, that 
the PATIENT is seen by a health professional to diagnose the problem and arrange or start 
tests and start treatment as necessary.”455 A list of where this information was used is also 
given.  Initially created to provide NHS staff with a wider understanding of all aspects of a 
target, it was used predominantly to programme IT systems.   This is because the language 
is rigid and inflexible.  My time spent as an institutional ethnographer allowed me to 
observe that while a requirement to efficient tabularisation, it was ineffective in describing 
the realities which staff experience.  The data dictionary was but one example of staff 
working and operating in two minds.  The process of measuring has created an 
environment which does not correspond to what they know.  As it was impossible to avoid 
the impact of targets, standards and measures, staff alternated between vocabularies, 
seeing the world either in one way or in the other.  Performance managers however 
negotiated both worlds, not only sustaining but developing and promoting the language of 
tabularisation.         
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These examples demonstrate that performance management’s focus on measuring 
particular aspects of healthcare presented a distinct view of the NHS.   Performance 
management, through the technologies it employs, attempted to provide an authorised 
account that was consistent with New Labour ideology.  Tabularisation as a technology 
sought to make possible comparisons at regional and national levels; therefore it became 
necessary to apply rigid rules to ease the process of measuring. However, dashboards 
removed local context and provincial organisational practices were stripped away for 
practical purposes.  While human activity is chaotic with patient histories reflecting this, 
these tools enabled a system of codification to be imposed, allowing the State to make 
assessments that would otherwise have been impossible. These examples also show how 
in some instances SHA performance managers tried to reintroduce the complexity they 
saw in the NHS Trusts they were monitoring; they were opposing the rationalisation they 
helped both create and embed.           
 
The use of charts such as dashboards was to enable the SHA to assert control over the way 
in which a problem should be viewed.  Moreover through this regimented process, it 
allowed quantification and thus comparisons to be made which would otherwise have 
been impossible.  How relevant these comparisons were is questionable.  Trusts vary 
considerably in terms of population, economic deprivation and allocation of resources.  
All these factors and many more were excluded from the charts.  The 18 week dashboards 
simulated a false sense of uniformity; organisations became homogeneous as dashboards 
imposed a set of rules on behalf of performance managers and the State.             
 
6.5 The rationalisation paradox  
The use of charts and dashboards was common practice within performance management.  
As stated in Chapter Two, their application had become more widespread as the risk 
culture had become more prevalent in the NHS.  Charts allowed organisations to attempt 
to quantify all aspects of a pathway; this simplification was an administrative 
convenience, drawing attention to the risk areas.  While this was not always successful, 
the unintended consequence was to engender a workforce which was in some cases more 
risk averse but in others complacent about risk. Either way, this was not the culture that 
New Labour had intended to propagate when embedding performance management into 
the NHS.               
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In the following excerpt, a PCT Clinical Governance Manager comments that charts 
should not be relied upon to highlight risk.   
 
CG: There needs to be the balance, you need to be able to demonstrate they’re 
performing well.  If that’s then stable you can then allow people to take risks 
and be innovative, but they need to have that understanding that it’s okay; 
because they might try something and might fail and we can’t afford to try 
something and it fails, the system won’t allow for it, and unless you can show 
an incredible business case, for instance, no one’s interested.456  
     
The reason the interviewee was wary and cautious in the use of charts, dashboards and the 
like was because it could focus on the minutia and as such compound and magnify risk 
thereby preventing real innovation; innovation requires an element of risk which this 
process of rationalisation, tabularisation, discouraged.  Small negative movements shown 
on a dashboard without more detailed context were viewed as a threat to the overall 
delivery of the target and so were discouraged.  The interviewee stated that the system 
prevented failure; while not literally true, he corroborated the rhetoric New Labour 
promulgated, that of a risk-averse health service.  While this may on the surface appear to 
be an advantage, in the long term it proved detrimental.  As pointed out, any business case 
presented needs not to be credible, but incredible.         
 
A Public Health manager articulates his view that part of strong and effective leadership is 
being able to take risks, to represent the needs of your population.   
 
PH: Leadership is things like being able to take tough decisions, not always 
towing the line, risk taking, radical, inspirational, taking staff with you, being 
able to tackle the giants of the NHS – not being afraid to speak up for what 
locally is the issue, against the sort of bureaucratic giants like the Strategic 
Health Authority or the Department of Health, being able to put their head 
above the parapet, really, and a motivator.
457
  
 
The interviewee believed that Trusts see organisations such as the DH and the SHA as 
bureaucratic machines.  Good leadership, thus, is about being able to voice the local health 
priorities and organisational concerns to these bodies, irrespective of the political climate. 
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He also made the claim that leadership is about making risky decisions, thereby speaking 
clearly against the risk aversion element of New Labour’s vision for implementing a 
performance culture within the NHS.  Rationalisation encourages standardisation not only 
in protocols, processes and procedures but also in people and their behaviours as 
expounded in the McDonaldization thesis, explained in Chapter Three. However, this 
interviewee states the opposite; in order for a Trust to be successful it must have a leader 
whose actions are distinctive to the organisation he manages.          
 
In recent years many patient pathways had been redesigned by Trust staff, placing the 
patient at the heart of the process. Moreover, when engineering these pathways, attention 
was given to ensuring they were neither financially burdensome nor resource intensive.  
Long term sustainability was taken into account by hospital and PCT senior management 
teams before a new pathway was considered viable.  However, a change in the definition 
of a measure led to a corresponding change in monitoring and on occasion there was a 
decrease in attainment against the target.  Pathways were then altered in order to achieve 
the target, but in so doing sustainability was jeopardised. The clearest example of this was 
the Accident and Emergency target: 98% of people should be seen in four hours. This 
target was assessed by the health regulator on an annual basis, and, in the months towards 
the end of the financial year, the clinical pathway would be re-evaluated with both money 
and staff being allocated heavily in this area to ensure the target was met.  However, as the 
next fiscal year began, this additional investment which had enabled the target to be met 
invariably was removed, being too costly to sustain.                   
 
Rationalisation as seen by the use of charts can lead to greater risk. From observations as 
an institutional ethnographer I witnessed how staff become so familiar with seeing a 
negative position that it was no longer considered a concern, or a borderline position 
would be over-analysed. The paradox is that rationalisation seeks to minimise risk by 
quantifying all known factors.  It goes one step further in attempting to also quantify the 
unknowns.  What this leads to is a false sense of security because the unknowns, no matter 
what value is given to them, still remain indecipherable; furthermore there remains that 
risk that was so obscure it was never considered.  However, it is all too easy for 
organisations to comply. Even the most difficult organisation will eventually step into line 
as their colleagues adapt to the new ways of measuring.  This illustrates Power’s concern, 
as detailed in Chapter Three, that with greater rationalisation comes the introduction of 
auditing tools including both measuring and monitoring which do not however necessarily 
lead to a lessening of risk. Rather the shallow forms of verification, offered by these 
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technologies, make organisational accountability more difficult.  In addition, risky 
behaviour is more likely and examples of this will now be elucidated in the following 
section.        
      
6.6 Transparency and Gaming  
As set out in Chapter Three, one aspect of rationalisation is about providing transparency 
to processes, about ensuring all aspects are accounted for.   This is the idea of revealing 
that which had previously been hidden, allowing full knowledge about previously 
concealed ways of working, making public supposedly private matters.  In so doing, the 
performance management culture had become a dominant force within the NHS. One 
specific aspect of this culture, that of targets, has flourished more than others.  However, 
with new targets have come other behaviours that were not expected though were 
extremely predictable.  With the introduction of new targets and ways of measuring came 
a corresponding set of new actions.  Rationalisation was in part about simplifying complex 
processes; it was no surprise then that for a short period of time there were grey areas, 
which did not fit easily into narrow parameters, where suitable boxes had yet to be 
formed.  In these grey areas where boundaries are blurred or non-existent, organisations 
found the greatest scope to game.      
 
The subsequent account, by the PCT Clinical Governance Manager, sets out his belief that 
the issue is not the existence of targets but rather the targets’ focus.   
     
CG: I don’t know that it’s [targets are] not effective, I don’t think we 
necessarily always monitor the right things. The problem is that people game 
to provide the data that they need to provide, so a lot of it is about 
organisations and executive directors providing the information that they think 
the Strategic Health Authority or the Department of Health wants them to 
provide and altering the way they run their organisation to provide that 
information.  It isn’t an organic thing, it’s an imposed thing rather than an 
organic thing; to a certain extent, not all of it, but there’s a danger that it 
actually skews performance, not necessarily always in a helpful way.  I guess, 
some things will be really positive like, hopefully, reacting to infection rates 
for example if you’ve actually got proper data.458    
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The interviewee explains how Trusts try to pre-empt what the SHA and the DH will 
request, providing these bodies with information that does not necessarily reflect what is 
happening in the organisation. My observations as an institutional ethnographer within the 
PCT verified this: PCTs gave information that led to minimal intervention by the SHA and 
DH.  Sometimes, it is a case of “giving them what they want to hear, to get them off our 
backs.”  This idea of gaming, of playing the system in order to produce the best results for 
a Trust, certainly does not improve the service.               
 
In the following, a PCT Public Health Manager offers an explanation as to the difference 
between the reality experienced by staff and what is reported.   
 
PH: What is reported and what is reality are sometimes different across the 
board.  It is not always people trying to be creative, it is just that the systems 
do not count right, for example, on the breastfeeding one, they have changed 
the form that it is recorded on, and now it is on page twenty, not page one.  Is 
our data suddenly going to dive because people don’t get to page twenty of the 
patient record?  When it was on page one it was easy to tick and they 
remembered to tick it because it was there in black and white.  Will our 
breastfeeding rate suddenly dive because of the practical issue of where it is on 
the form?  It probably happens with quite a few things, unfortunately.
459
  
 
The interviewee notices that reporting does not reflect the world that staff encounter. This 
is not always due to manipulative practices but rather inadequacies or changes in data 
collection.  The example of breastfeeding was used to show how a small change in the 
form could lead to completion rates falling, resulting in an apparent dramatic drop in the 
actual number of mothers breastfeeding, though in reality, there was no change.  This is 
not gaming as no deliberate manipulation occurs; neither is it an example of falling 
performance. It is an illustration of the ineffective results of monitoring incomplete data, 
which leaves the State with inaccurate information thus no closer to understanding this 
area of healthcare.  
           
An SHA Performance Manager describes, in the following, what being an effective 
manager entails. It is an account that contradicts New Labour’s rhetoric that a performance 
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culture would increase transparency and accountability thereby decreasing risk and the 
likelihood of further scandals.       
 
PM: Until you’ve been there and done the operational role, so you understand 
the pressures that are on you and the ways to bypass some of those, some of 
the games and tricks you can do to hit targets, make it… I’m not sure how you 
can be an effective performance manager unless you have a background of 
delivery.
460
  
 
To be an effective manager you need to have worked in a hospital to understand the 
pressures faced by the staff and especially the operational staff.  That way you learn how 
individuals will play/work the system in their favour.  Being a good performance manager 
is often about thinking ahead, keeping one step ahead, knowing what short cuts, tricks, 
games Trusts are likely to carry out.  As the previous example shows, this is not always 
about outright deception.  Organisations are merely trying to place their Trusts in the best 
possible light as achieving targets can result in financial rewards, greater autonomy and 
independence, or simply a higher status amongst peers.          
 
With the introduction of a new policy and its corresponding target there is a higher chance 
of gaming, as seen with inpatient and outpatient waiting times.  The following is a 
description from a SHA Performance Manager as to how and why this occurs.   
       
PM: Originally there was a lot of gaming, there was a lot of loopholes in the 
way that you could classify patients. Was it an endoscopy?  Was it an 
outpatient procedure? Was it a day case? You know, if you want to increase 
your day case percentage, you call it a day case.  You know… and all 
providers talk to one another… and we soon found out the ways to kind of get 
through.  Almost the course of least resistance.  What could we do that would 
keep the government off our backs, but would deliver the health care, so the 
targets didn’t get in the way of what we were doing?  If you talked to a nurse 
and say, how has 18 weeks affected you, she wouldn’t know what 18 weeks 
was.  She might have noticed that there’s a lot more managers around with 
stopwatches, but fundamentally it hasn’t changed the way that she practises 
her profession.  In the past it was not heard of for patients to be asked to come 
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in on their birthdays for operations and normally they would turn that down, or 
at Christmas, that enabled us to suspend them or re-start their clock and that 
was quite a normal practice
461
.    
 
The interviewee notes certain procedures such as endoscopies may be moved from being 
an outpatient procedure or a day case procedure dependent on which percentage hospital 
management were most concerned about.   It is entirely rational for hospitals to choose the 
route which will provide them with the greatest gain with the least effort.  The interviewee 
continues by noting how often front line staff, such as nurses, do not know what the key 
policy initiatives are as their  work is unaffected, though they do notice an increased 
managerial presence for a limited time.  As part of the gaming culture, patients have been 
called to arrange an appointment on a birthday or at Christmas, as staff know that the 
majority of people will turn this date down.  This means that the organisation has offered 
an appointment and it was the patient’s choice to reject it.  The clock is then re-set to zero, 
and the patient’s waiting period begins again. Their period of waiting prior to the offering 
of an appointment is not held against the hospital. This is a clear example of gaming: 
managers are working within the rules but are not adhering to the spirit of the policy.  
Moreover, as previously detailed in Chapter Three, this gives credibility to Porter’s claim 
that measuring for public purposes is far from straightforward; for it to be effective, 
people as well as instruments and processes must be disciplined, controlled. 
 
6.7 Rationalisation and increased bureaucracy   
Rationalisation has led to a centralised administration, within organisations and within the 
structure of how healthcare is delivered.  Performance managers apparently provide the 
State with bird’s eye views of all organisations.  However though their function leads to 
increased rationalisation, performance managers themselves have become more 
prominent, leading to the charge that the NHS has become more bureaucratic.  
 
A Primary Care Manager who had previously worked in the Royal Air Force and who was 
therefore used to large scale organisations, comments that the NHS’ size puts it at a 
disadvantage, preventing it from being competitive in comparison to smaller health 
providers and failing to optimise its productivity.   
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PC: Well, having been in the Royal Air Force, which is a large organisation, 
any military service or large organisation, you understand the size of the whole 
thing.  It [the NHS] is a really huge organisation and sometimes it loses 
contact with each other because of its size.  Efficiency wise, it’s probably very 
difficult to be as efficient as it can be, because it’s just such a huge dinosaur 
sometimes.  Lumbering along, lots of smaller services can actually run circles 
around, but the wheels keep turning, but they’re getting older all the time and 
slower.
462
     
 
The size of the NHS precludes its knowing what is happening in all areas.  Despite 
economies of scale, he doubts how efficient such a huge organisation can be.  He likens 
the NHS to a dinosaur, because of its size and fast approaching extinction.  He talks of 
smaller services, meaning GPs, holding both the purse strings and the power to the wider 
NHS; yet, even these seem outdated and unable to serve patients’ needs.      
    
A PCT Clinical Governance Manager describes the improvement he has seen under New 
Labour in how key performance indicators (KPIs) are set. This then is recognition that the 
initial measures were often inappropriate.   
   
CG: The most evident thing in organisations is that we’ve been better at 
defining sort of key performance indicators and things that we want to 
achieve.  They’re very tightly defined, not compared to somewhere like the 
US where they’re very clear, you’ve got the Balance Scorecards and things 
like that, which are only snapshots, but at least they give people an overview 
of how an organisation’s performing.  We’ve got the annual health check 
which is performance management, but it’s fairly unwieldy. 463    
 
This means that performance management has improved at defining targets, though this is 
less effectively done than is achieved by indicators used to measure performance in the 
States.  However the use of Balanced Scorecard and the introduction of the Annual Health 
Check, initially discussed in Chapter Five in relation to  risk, though cumbersome, were a 
more appropriate and effective technology for performance management.    
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In the following, a PCT Risk Manager describes the bureaucratic burden: rationalising 
processes, introducing monitoring systems and increased measuring, which oblige staff to 
spend an increasing amount of time providing information for reporting structures.   
        
RM: Everybody wants to believe that they’re performing well and somehow 
good performance is being translated into monthly reports and quarterly 
reports.  But a lot of PCT staff see the constant performance reporting as 
burdensome in that there are performance reports to internal management, 
there are performance reports to the regional health authority, to the Strategic 
Health Authority, there are returns to the Department of Health. We could 
look at our working timetable and it would be a series of reports to one body 
or another, which is a good thing but we need to ensure that in completing 
these performance reports, in a standard format, we can translate that format 
through board meetings to the public and general information leaflets to the 
public. Some organisations have hammered that happy balance between 
reporting statistics and reporting reality to the public.
464
  
 
The interviewee lists four different bodies requiring reports on performance: internal 
management, regional health authority, SHA and DH, thus validating the NHS 
Confederation’s summary: “Strategic health authorities (SHAs) and the DH were 
responsible for more than 60 per cent of the data requests placed on NHS organisations, 
the reporting was on average required monthly, and the data returns took medium to high 
effort to collate. In addition, a large proportion (58 per cent) of the data collated could not 
be used for any internal purpose, nor was it seen as useful.”465 While it may be necessary 
to provide accounts, to these bodies, it matters more to relay performance to the wider 
public.  For the interviewee, it is about striving to achieve that balance between narrow 
statistics and conveying a meaningful reality to the public. The Risk Manager has 
recognised the contradictory effect of rationalisation. It aims to streamline and 
standardize; yet Trusts, being accountable to various organisations, must report to a 
variety of different bodies each with varying requirements and statuses in the regulatory 
hierarchy. This feeling of being overwhelmed by reporting was reiterated to me frequently 
while I was embedded as an institutional ethnographer in the PCT and SHA. Staff often 
communicated their frustration concerning a lack of coordination between bodies and the 
replication of information which did not directly benefit the individual NHS Trusts 
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collecting the data.  The predominant impression presented by performance culture on 
staff was that it merely added to the bureaucratic burden rather than increasing 
accountability.  
 
6.8 Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness   
The three Es, Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness first put forward by Thatcher, and 
previously discussed in Chapter Two, sums up the rationalisation ideal. During the 1980s, 
performance culture was focused on these areas to deliver a more cost effective healthcare 
service. Conversely, for New Labour performance management emerged from risk 
avoidance culture, but I argue that the values of economic rationalisation as illustrated 
were still dominant during Blair’s and Brown’s terms in office.     
 
In the extract below the Primary Care manager doubts that the public understand the costs 
of running the NHS.   
 
PM: The public don’t appreciate the cost of healthcare. All they see in terms of 
the NHS is either the headlines in the papers, saying we are so many million 
overspent, and the majority of the public would wonder how we got to be so 
many million overspent.  Or they look at their payslip, where they’re then 
being deducted a couple of hundred pounds a month.  What they then don’t 
realise is that a hip operation can cost between £5 000 and £10 000, depending 
on how severe it is and what else is needed for it. And all the other parts of a 
hospital around that, the MRI scanner and everything else, costs millions. 
They don’t have a full understanding of how much healthcare actually costs. 
But that one episode of care, outpatients, in-patients and then follow-up...
466
 
 
The interviewee knows the cost of healthcare is huge but believes the public does not 
realise the true cost.  Newspaper headlines recount millions of pounds of debt, while 
individuals, seeing how much money is deducted from their payslip, don’t understand how 
this can be the case.  He uses the example of a hip operation. It is not just the operation 
which costs; so do the appointments that follow it, the cost of the equipment and hospital 
running costs. The Primary Care manager is aware of units of cost which the process of 
rationalisation makes manifest, but the public do not consider the price of all parts of the 
treatment process.  This contrasts with Nigel Crisp, who before becoming Head of the 
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NHS, as stated in Chapter Two, noted that staff had no access to the financial value of 
activity. This then is a dramatic change: staff in NHS organisations under New Labour 
now know the financial costs and expect the public to value the NHS in these terms. The 
ideology of economic rationalisation has been absorbed by the NHS.  New Labour, while 
not making this their primary motivating ideology for proliferating a performance culture, 
did, nevertheless, instil these values, values that were formerly considered conservative 
dogma.                   
 
Next, a SHA Performance Manager discusses the introduction of the national GP contract 
and its negative impact on both performance and raising standards in the NHS. The 
contract was supposed to deliver higher productivity, but by explicitly stating what was 
expected of GPs for their salary, it had the opposite effect. Anything that had not been 
taken into account at the time of writing the contract had to be negotiated on an ad hoc 
basis at additional financial cost to the government. The uniformity of the contract for all 
GPs failed to take into account the difference in roles; consequently, the expected saving 
never materialised.     
 
GM: GPs generally do a pretty good job. The GP contract, though, was one of 
the worst negotiated things I’ve seen in the NHS in the last ten years. It was 
appallingly negotiated. To some extent, it doesn’t achieve its aim: that they get 
paid for their improvement in performance. The quality targets that GPs have 
to achieve, for their pay, are so low as to be almost meaningless. Despite the 
fact they probably had the biggest pay rise in any area of public sector, they’re 
arguing about doing two to three hours extra out of hours work. That’s very 
frustrating; all they’re doing is coming across as a sort of money-seeking 
group of individuals. Oh, it’s frustrating at times. But, that’s ignoring all the 
good things that happen, but it’s the sort of thing you tend to blow your top 
about, with fellows who’re working in the NHS. But you don’t sort of nag on 
about it to people outside of the NHS, where you end up finding yourself 
defending it.
467
  
 
When the GP contract was rationalised, it was supposed to be about greater economy and 
efficiency, getting more value for money for the public, and rewarding clinical 
effectiveness.  GPs were being performance-managed to deliver in the three areas on 
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which Thatcher had focused: economy, efficiency and effectiveness. However the 
standards were set extremely low, the targets were easily achievable and yet they were 
financially rewarded.  Accordingly, GPs were required to work extra hours outside their 
contract, but saw no reason why they should.  It appears that GPs are financially driven 
while the NHS is inadequate, despite the contract having been created by the DH, the 
State, not the NHS.  The interviewee comments on how this frustrates him and other 
colleagues, yet beyond the confines of the NHS he finds himself defending this poor 
contract. He seeks to defend the NHS, seeing it as under attack from outsiders, but in so 
doing must defend the actions of the State, that is the New Labour government.
468
  My 
fieldwork notes as an institutional ethnographer corroborate this position; performance 
managers frequently defend New Labour’s actions to those external to the NHS because 
they feel it is necessary to defend the NHS and its values. Financial rationalisation, the 
push for greater efficiency and economy mean performance management staff feel 
established values, such as free care at the point of delivery, are exposed and vulnerable to 
reform.     
 
A PCT Clinical Governance Manager gives an example of economic rationalisation; 
patients were seen in primary care settings (GP surgeries) rather than secondary care 
(hospitals) as an efficiency saving. 
           
CM: It was originally set up in a hurry and the idea was to try and save money 
by pulling patients out of the acute trust; and by being clear what the threshold 
for referral for GPs should be.  Performance management was set up around 
that process at the time, but given the current deficit in the PCT a turn around 
team is being put in place and so they have set up a number of cost 
improvement programmes/performance management initiatives and that sort 
of thing, so I am being performance-managed now more than before.
469
    
 
This case of rationalisation was not directly connected to performance management, but 
was part of a bigger national policy, as being seen in a GP practice or a community setting 
costs less than being treated in hospital. However as the PCT was in financial difficulty 
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there were many more performance management initiatives instigated to cut the deficit.  
Performance management here is very much about financial rationalisation.            
 
In the extract below, a SHA Performance Manager questions the notion that NHS Trusts 
should make a financial saving or a profit.  His concern is that, unlike in other industries, 
in healthcare money not spent is not a valuable saving but is detrimental to the treatment 
of patients.   
           
PM: Two years ago, in terms of financial performance, there was about £500 
million deficit, which sounds a big sum of money but is less than half a 
percent of total NHS funding. There was an awful lot of pressure put on the 
NHS to reduce those deficits, which was largely done last year. Now, all of a 
sudden, we are struggling to keep surpluses down. Because of political 
changes and that’s an example in terms of finance, but various things, in 
performance terms, go up and down the ladder.
470
     
    
The NHS was in £500 million in deficit, a sum which deceptively sounds like a large 
amount, though it is actually less than 0.5% of the total NHS budget.  Yet when the figure 
hit the media politicians came under huge pressure to improve performance in this area.  
Now the NHS is in surplus you could say performance has improved, but, while there is 
unspent money, people still wait for treatment. The interviewee indirectly refers to 
performance culture’s renewed focus on economic rationalisation, with Thatcher’s three 
Es taking prominence.  New Labour had reacted to the press coverage by bearing down 
heavily on the leadership in NHS Trusts, ensuring it focused on organisations’ financial 
positions.  Performance management was initially about the State retaining control from 
the centre through tools such as measures, indicators and targets, but towards the end of 
New Labour’s time in office this changed.  Through working in NHS for over a decade I 
was able to see the shift in approach. The government no longer worried about being 
thought of as Old Labour with regard to the State preserving power; its fear was that the 
image of Old Labour, unable to control finances, would return to haunt them.  The 
Department of Health was clear that being in the black mattered; organisations could not 
be in deficit and should at the very least strive to break even.           
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6.9 State surveillance 
Performance managers are tools in the state’s surveillance system, as discussed in Chapter 
Three.  Foucault would consider performance management a panoptic exercise of power.  
It attempts to make visible all that is done within the NHS, to transform the way people 
act, and more importantly the way they think.  Conformity becomes obligatory and 
monitoring produces a sense of false compliance.  The monitoring reports are explicit 
technologies, an exercise in State power.  However, performance managers themselves 
can be regarded as a similar technology.  Performance managers show that action is being 
taken in the here and now; the past in this respect is of no consequence.  Upon the 
introduction of a new policy, there will often be a corresponding target.  This is because it 
is difficult to propose intervention or suggest causal improvement without supporting 
evidence.  Monitoring offers reassurance to the government that it does control the 
situation and knows what its citizens are doing.   
 
As illustrated in the chapter on risk, monitoring is a continuous process.  That which has 
been identified to be measured will be observed at regular intervals. Subsequently a 
system of recoding will be put in place allowing for the counting and verification.  All 
stages will be repeated and replicated in part to bestow a scientific authenticity on the 
process and to ensure that staff remain vigilant.  Monitoring at first creates a 
hypersensitive environment, but over a long period apathy takes root.   Small changes in 
monitoring, the addition of new targets and measures, ensure that staff cannot become 
complacent and in this way the state reasserts both its authority and control.             
 
In the following extract, a PCT Clinical Governance manager sets out his belief that the 
culture of quality improvement is not ingrained in working practices within the NHS.   
 
CG: If there was a proper culture of quality improvement people would be 
empowered to change things at whatever level they worked at. They would be 
interested and have that mindset to look at things and change them or suggest 
things that could be changed on a daily basis. Balanced with performance 
management it might work better because people are more creative rather than 
feeling like they’re being monitored all the time. They kind of close down and 
perhaps aren’t as innovative as they could be.471    
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This interviewee feels that staff are not thinking on a daily basis how their service could 
be improved; this aspect of performance management is ignored. Instead, performance 
management imposes conformity, as staff feel their actions are being monitored and this 
stifles creativity and innovation.  Individuals, and organisations, are inhibited from 
considering new ways of working. Staff feel restricted in their behaviour and fear failing 
publicly. The sense of being watched curbs both thought and action.   
  
Next, a short passage from a SHA Performance Manager’s perspective on the effects of 
managing an organisation that has been labelled as failing. It corroborates Onora O’Neill’s 
comments to hospital staff that they labour under ‘Herculean micro-management’ which 
she believes is a symptom of the State’s failure to trust.472 
 
PM: The flipside is being micro-managed…. I’ve learnt to give everything 
time, and to expect things to be very cumbersome, very bureaucratic, very 
long-winded, and have lots of people involved.
473
  
 
Where an organisation is failing, not only is the organisation performance managed, but 
also the performance manager comes under inspection. This reassertion from the centre of 
discipline, as set out in Chapter Three, is a type of power.  Hyper-rationalisation comes 
into play, when a greater degree of scrutiny, monitoring and measuring occurs. 
Management control increases exponentially.  At this stage trust has broken down; all 
actions, meetings and conversations require evidence, all of which must be recorded.          
          
A  SHA manager elucidates the role he plays. According to him one of the central roles of 
a performance manager is about monitoring targets, having explanations for both good and 
bad performance.   
 
PM: It’s about key targets, knowing what your key targets are and monitoring 
them, looking for areas of low activity, or low performance, and getting action 
plans and assurances that they’re going to be improved. If they’re not, what it 
needs to make that improvement, does it need more money, does it need more 
staffing, and you can do that.
474
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Organisations, the interviewee states, are expected to provide details of where they are 
against trajectories, and their relationship to plans.  Where they are off course, the cause is 
sought and remedial action taken.  They must then provide an account of what is being 
done to rectify the situation.  Each step is monitored; an organisation is under the watchful 
supervision of a performance manager.              
 
In the following, the SHA performance manager reflects on whether his role adds value. 
The account he provides refers to conversations he has had with senior management.     
 
PM: What I do in performance, does it make a difference to organisations 
performing to what they should be, and I tested this. I said to a Chief Exec, 
because they are having trouble with their providers, and getting them to 
deliver on their targets. I said, what makes you deliver when it comes to 
getting the numbers ready, and having your data ready to tell me. He said it’s 
your phone calls, it’s the fact that you phone every week, it makes us look at 
things we’re supposed to have done, and that our performance is achieved, and 
that we’ve improved. He said, it’s not the only thing that makes us, but it 
keeps us on our toes.
475
  
 
The interviewee notes the Chief Executive of the organisation he performance managed, 
felt the constant monitoring and scrutiny kept the organisation ever vigilant, as they 
required changing and having appropriate answers to the questions they faced each week.   
Trusts could not be seen to falter in the responses given; this puts an element of doubt into 
a performance manager’s mind. He speculates if there is a real grip on the issue or whether 
organisations have just got better at providing suitable answers to stop the questioning. 
His unease reflects the fact that performance management under New Labour was 
supposed to be about risk mitigation but if organisations have merely become rather 
become more economic with the truth, altering their words, but not necessarily their 
behaviour, the risks remain or indeed accumulate. The State, for all its surveillance, still 
fails see what occurs in NHS organisations.   
 
A SHA Performance Manager states next that where organisations have deviated from 
their plan, performance managers expect an e-mail or telephone call explaining what has 
happened and what measures are being taken to revert to the original plan.  Successful 
                                                 
475
 Interview with a SHA Performance Manager, p10 
202 
organisations do not wait for the performance manager’s call, but will e-mail or call, in 
order to reassure the SHA performance manager.  This also enables Trusts to set the 
agenda and avert any further escalation, such as formal reporting or the involvement of an 
outside organisation. 
 
PM: I don’t expect to form an action plan, what I expect is an e-mail back, 
telling me what the assurances are to get it back on track, and they might have 
already done that, which often happens, because we’re a little bit late with our 
info, just a bit, on the monthly stuff. I get a mental health report every month 
and I also get an assurance report from the overall Trust, but timing is an issue 
in terms of how timely things are, but that’s always been an issue with 
reporting, since the year dot.
476
  
 
The interviewee is articulating his belief that good management is seen to be dealing with 
issue internally.  Poorly performing organisations however are less reactive, providing a 
response only when asked a question about unsatisfactory delivery.  The difference 
between successful organisations and mediocre ones is the provision of answers before the 
questions have been asked.  Successful organisations are aware of being monitored, of 
being observed; they can pre-empt and predict the minds of performance managers.      
 
Below, a SHA Performance Manager describes his role. What he expresses illustrates 
Foucault’s description of self-surveillance. Performance management is the eye of the 
state entering local NHS organisations without direct intervention. It is also an example of 
what Foucault referred to as the clinical gaze, (see Chapter Three), shifting from doctors to 
performance managers. 
          
PM: I know from working in Trusts myself, the general thought is the SHA is 
overseeing us, it’s looking to see what mistakes we’re making, always on our 
backs sort of thing. But you hope that isn’t how we’re seen; hopefully that 
isn’t how we act. We still have a role in overseeing targets and know how the 
government decisions are taken, it’s increasingly important, particularly with 
our relationship with the commissioners that we act in a way of enabling them 
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to do their work better. You need to work with them rather than just tell them 
what they should be doing.
477
  
 
The SHA performance manager notes how Trusts assume that the SHA is waiting for the 
organisations it monitors to make errors, to fail.  While he recognises that there is an 
overseeing role for the SHA, he hopes that this is no longer the case.  He sees his role 
within the SHA as being an enabler, providing support, using and sharing best practice.  
The role is not about dictating what should be done but working with organisations to 
improve the delivery of care. The performance manager’s clinical gaze is one that leads to 
a prescription, a course of treatment, a list of remedial actions for organisations. He 
describes how he encourages the Trusts he manages to monitor their own behaviour. Like 
the responsible citizen who recognises the need to care for one’s health, this is replicated 
within organisations; self-surveillance is internalised so that Trusts become their own 
overseer.   
 
The SHA Performance Manager provides an outline of his role, which he sees as aiding 
organisations to achieve the goals set out in the Annual Plan as well as keeping them on 
the “straight and narrow:”, he must rein in behaviour which would endanger their success, 
such as focusing solely on one service area and ensuring the achievement of national 
targets.  
    
PM: The SHA is there to support the PCTs, to help them achieve, to provide 
the services that their population needs, to provide possible additional finance 
that they may need. To try and keep them on the straight and narrow, but at the 
same time to try and teach them how to manage their own performance. 
Possibly there could come a time where they are self-sufficient in 
understanding where the directives are coming from, and to know what actions 
they need to take accordingly, without being accountable to the SHA. 
IV: You said, to keep them on the straight and narrow. What do you mean by 
that?  
PM: Not focusing on one target; they take the whole lot and get a balanced 
approach to them all. It’s easy to stick to an area that they know, and they’re 
confident in delivering. Whereas another target may possibly be set too high, 
and they’re thinking, oh no, we can’t achieve this, let’s not worry about it. It’s 
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trying to get them to take a broad approach rather than fail miserably over the 
whole areas, or to do really well in one area and not so well in lots of others.
478
  
The interviewee sees his role primarily as creating an environment where Trusts have a 
self-sufficient and sustainable performance management function, in order to diminish the 
SHA’s interventionist role.  Once again organisations are being encouraged to take on 
self-monitoring behaviours, which fits Foucault’s wider description of self-surveillance.  
Trusts should be in a position to understand the directives coming from external bodies 
such as the DH and Healthcare Commission and take appropriate action. Consequently, 
the State no longer needs to exert its power directly; self-surveillance automatically leads 
organisations to seek to comply.              
     
The following is a short description provided by an SHA Performance Manager; he 
discusses compliance and recognises it is often unnecessary to punish; the threat of 
increased external surveillance is regarded as punishment itself.   
    
PM: Performance means a mixture of behaviour, a mixture of actions and 
delivery on certain things and that’s good, as well as not so good.  It’s about 
understanding what behaviours mean and what out-turn, what’s delivered by 
their behaviours.
479
  
 
Performance management entails a mixture of behaviours, but primarily it is about 
knowing and understanding what are the consequences of certain actions and moreover 
what the wider impact will be if these actions go unchecked. This illustrates how 
rationalisation subtly affects performance managers’ behaviours. Their internalisation of 
government expectations corresponds with Foucault’s concept of governmentality, which 
is the process of entrenching governing modes of thought. Performance managers’ role in 
this respect is dual aspect: to provide surveillance, being the eyes of the state, in addition 
to acting as the conduit for state control at a distance.         
 
6.10 Conclusion  
Rationalisation in the NHS takes many forms, whether through organisational change, 
streamlining of work practices or the homogenisation of human activity. Organisational 
rationalisation occurred with greater frequency under New Labour than under previous 
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governments. This rapidly altered the work and the workforce of the NHS; as has 
demonstrated it became more bureaucratic.  Through the expansion in use and application 
of tables, charts and dashboards, health has become objectified and there is now a sense of 
shallow uniformity.  The use of key performance indicators (KPIs) to measure, quantify 
and evidence performance, across different organisations with local variation taken out of 
the equation, enabled the state to make like-for-like comparisons. The state now believes 
itself to be in a position to evaluate improvements, consider progress and judge failure.   
 
The introduction and proliferation of quantification as seen in the target culture has 
permeated all levels of the NHS. On a superficial level the purpose of performance 
measurement was to push forward improvements in future performance. However this 
chapter has evidenced how performance management was the vehicle for statecraft and 
performance managers the tools of the state. It gave the state information about the work 
being undertaken by the NHS.  Modernity has a love affair with all things scientific. It is 
no surprise that performance management values objectivity, detachment, quantification 
and replicability. Nevertheless, risk is associated with uncertainty and it is virtually 
impossible to perfectly quantify risks. The purpose of putting performance measurement 
systems in place was not only a way of tracking progress against targets but also a way of 
monitoring patients through the system. 
 
Rationalisation has been delivered through the use of performance management.  There 
was an on-going process of classification, regimentation and standardisation.  
Unfortunately, what rationalisation discourages is open scepticism and the notion of 
considering what is reasonable or plausible.  I think it is important to distinguish this from 
cynicism which is based around a lack of trust.  Moreover, it must be remembered that 
rationalisation, with its focus on risk, suppresses innovation and increases the incidence of 
gaming.  This weakens the NHS; sustainability is threatened, leading in the long term to 
less economy, efficiency and effectiveness.  This chapter has illustrated why I have deep 
reservations about the arbitrary nature of targets, particularly quantitative targets and the 
efforts organisations go to achieve them.  Trusts’ preoccupation with targets has led to a 
neglect of broader concerns and this had resulted in a deterioration in the quality of care 
patients receive; and at the extreme patient harm ensued.   
 
Performance against key targets was assessed in terms of whether the target had been 
achieved, to assess whether there was some degree or a significant amount of 
underachievement of the target.  The key targets which formed the basis of Star Rating 
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system had a definite reward and penalty schedule.  Hospital Trusts obtaining three stars 
for a consecutive number of years could apply for Foundation Status. FT conferred 
significant financial and managerial autonomy, an independence from regional and central 
government.  Therefore, the incentives to ensure the best possible outcome were very 
strong. Distortions arose as Trusts sought to maximise their results through a broad 
interpretation of the target. A fudging of figures might occur which showed them in a 
better position than in reality; this did not tally with either actual activity or patient 
experience. Consequently, while national comparisons were now possible, the issue of 
public transparency became more opaque and the public became more disenchanted with 
performance management.  
 
Performance management, contrary to New Labour rhetoric which focused on risk, had 
retained its original Conservative premise; it was a means of driving through the Thatcher 
principles of Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness, yet now the State had a far greater 
degree of control but from a distance. The impression given was of greater freedom for 
organisations but performance management introduced self-surveillance; self-monitoring 
became the norm within PCTs and SHAs.  While rationalisation increased state 
surveillance, it is mistaken to think that collecting more information, increasing the 
number of processes, protocols and procedures, and greater bureaucracy led to a 
corresponding decrease in risk.  Rationalisation as delivered by performance management 
under New Labour, made the NHS increasingly vulnerable to the unexpected. 
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Chapter 7 
Stigma: Stigmatised Staff, 
Stigmatising State 
 
The previous chapter looked at performance management as the vehicle by which the state 
implemented rationalisation, where performance managers were the tool by which 
rationalisation was driven through the NHS organisations.  This chapter looks at the 
effects of rationalisation on individuals and organisations within the NHS. Constant 
reorganisations brought unnecessary disruption to staff’s day to day work. A sense of 
displacement and dislocation added to the sense of stigma felt by those working within 
performance management.  The continuous change created a sense of turmoil, isolation 
and anxiety. Staff described a sense of disenfranchisement and disillusionment brought 
about by New Labour’s consultative approach, that continuously asked for feedback yet 
never seemed to take on board staff opinion.  Moreover, the lack of professional autonomy 
and the political sensitivities around the role forged a culture and language specific to 
performance both as a defence mechanism and coping strategy for staff. The language 
allowed a reappropriation of power, letting performance managers endow meaning that 
would otherwise have been missing to aspects of their work. This had been stripped away 
through performance tools and technologies, discussed in the Chapters Five and Six, 
which saw significance and meaning temporarily shelved as staff engaged with the 
products, e.g. charts, tables, dashboards and graphs. The language was a subculture where 
performance managers could talk freely and openly about their concerns about measures 
and targets which they did not want others party to because of the political ramifications 
for their organisations.    
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7.1 Defining stigma  
Throughout my ethnographic work, I sensed a stigma around the work of performance 
management, making individuals need to justify their work, a feeling intensified when 
individuals looked back to what they perceived as better times in the NHS.  As mentioned 
in Chapter Three, when using the word stigma I do so in the same sense as Erving 
Goffman, “an attribute that is deeply discrediting,”480 with particular focus on tribal 
stigma which as already stated is the “stigma that can be transmitted through lineages and 
equally contaminate all members of the family.”481  Goffman details the role of  being 
‘wise’; this is the idea of being in the loop, of knowing what is going on and within an 
organisation this comes through attendance at meetings, committees etc.  The ‘wise’ can 
also suffer stigma as “the individual who is related through the social structure to a 
stigmatised individual, a relationship that leads the wider society to treat both individuals 
in some respects as one….all are obligated to share the some of the discredit of the 
stigmatised person to whom they are all related…..the problems faced by the stigmatised 
persons spread out in waves, but of diminishing intensity….In general the tendency for a 
stigma to spread from the stigmatised individual to his close connexions provides a reason 
why such relations tend either to be avoided or be terminated, where existing.”482 
However, as stated in Chapter Three, the reason why, Goffman’s idea of stigma has been 
applied to discourse in the NHS on organisational change and policy implementation is 
because it would be totally unnecessary to create a new concept when one already exists 
which is both relevant and appropriate.   
 
The link between stigma and sickness is strong; as first discussed in Chapter Three, the 
NHS not only treats the symptoms of sickness in individuals but can also be seen as sick 
institution itself.  Targets were a means by which to assess the status, the health, of an 
organisation and whether it was failing; thus in a system said to be improving the 
proliferation of targets appears a contradiction.  Freidson
483
 originally suggested doctors in 
creating new illness inevitably created a demand for their expertise.  The same can be said 
of the HCC; its work has led to a proliferation of targets, as it attempts to assess the status 
of NHS organisations.  Moreover, the HCC previously labelled more organisations failing 
(now poor) than it offered corrective action.    
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Individuals in a Trust deemed failing saw themselves as failures as the work acted as a 
reflection on their life.  When talking about illness certain labels have an associated stigma 
which can create problems in itself: the person becomes defined primarily by their 
complaint, separate from the other ‘normal’ individuals.  An organisation said to be failing 
is associated with a similar stigma.  I will argue that PCT mergers within the NHS had a 
similar effect; this is because a Trust not able to carry on as a single entity must in some 
way be failing.   
 
The PCT I studied went from being a three star Trust to having to merge with two 
neighbouring larger PCTs, one of which had in 2005 received only one star.  The merger 
had a huge effect on PCT staff; as an organisation their morale and identity went into 
crisis.  The master status of the organisation was no longer a highflying ‘3 star Trust’ 
rather it was ‘failing PCT’.  Staff could not reconcile how quickly the change in status had 
happened; there was a feeling of incredulity.  My ethnographic work both in the PCT and 
Strategic Health Authority has led me to: 1) recognise that performance management is 
stigmatised and stigmatising and 2) understand to a greater degree the discourse of stigma 
in relation first to organisational change and secondly to policy implementation.  
 
7.2 The discourse of Stigma and Organisational Change   
The Foreword to ‘The NHS Improvement Plan: putting people at the heart of public 
services’484 was set out as 9 numbered points; there was no longer the standard use of 
paragraphs.  In Point 3 Blair stated the following: “a series of authoritative reports has 
found the NHS is firmly on the road to a full recovery.”485 Here the metaphor of illness is 
used in polemic fashion. As mentioned in Chapter Three, Susan Sontag states disease 
metaphors “are used to propose new critical standards of individual health, and to express 
a sense of dissatisfaction with society…..to judge society not as out of balance but as 
repressive.”486  Blair compares the NHS organisation to a body which is prone to illness.  I 
will illustrate how NHS staff use this metaphor in a similar fashion.  Sontag herself states 
“there is a tendency to call any situation which one disapproves of a disease.  Disease, 
which could be considered as much a part of nature as health, became the synonym of 
whatever was ‘unnatural.’”487  She refers to the nineteenth century, but this could equally 
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be applied to today
488
.  I restate that it is not I who chooses this metaphor, but staff and 
politicians.  Illness is used as a metaphor for change, but more importantly this change is 
seen in a negative light by staff in the NHS who feel stigmatised by that experience.  
However, “illness comes from imbalance.  Treatment is aimed at restoring the right 
balance – in political terms, the right hierarchy.  The prognosis is always, in principle, 
optimistic.  Society by definition never catches a fatal disease.”489   
 
7.3 Four aspects of stigma: time, conflict, communication & tribe/community 
I contend that there are four aspects of stigma experienced by individuals during 
organisational change expressed by interviewees and corroborated by my ethnographic 
observations: time, conflict, communication and tribe/community.  
 
1. Time 
As raised in Chapter Two, modernisation and progress have been major themes running 
through New Labour policies, as exemplified by ongoing changes driven through the 
NHS. Other parts of the public sector, including education, have also had to show a 
commitment to the notion of progress. The Nuffield Review focusing on the National 
Curriculum states: “‘Progression’ is used as though it is self-evidently clear, and yet 
whether a particular change counts as progress depends on the value attached to what is 
being progressed to.”490 However, NHS modernisation has no end goal; it is regarded by 
politicians as an evolving process.  Moreover, in a quest for ever-improving services, there 
is widespread organisational turbulence.  Blair wrote of the changes under way in the NHS 
that it was “a good start …(but)  not the time to falter.”491 This statement was reiterated on 
different occasions to both staff and the wider public.  It recognises the pressure and the 
anxiety felt by individuals and organisations while also sitting in a timescape.  This is 
important as it corroborates Foucault’s idea, discussed in Chapter Three, that organisations 
exert power by controlling time and space.  Within the PCT the change in locations, in 
geography, corresponded with an internal sense of shifting power structures.   
 
The following is an extract from an interview with a PCT Risk Manager describing how 
the organisation he was working for was spread over three sites, each of which should 
have had, but did not, a senior executive. He discussed the impact on staff morale.   
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RM: They’ve almost become like an invisible body.  The idea was to have at 
least one executive director in each of the three major locations.  We have one 
executive director based here in X and he’s here two days a week at most and I 
wouldn’t say that it’s a visible presence.  I heard a complaint, just last week, 
that our chief executive has become invisible.
492
      
         
The interviewee talks about the lack of physical visibility of senior management and how 
this is a source of grievance to the workforce.  My ethnographic observations also 
highlighted the fact that the lack of ‘seeing’ senior management made staff feel as if the 
organisation had ended prior to its official end date.  There was a sense that the senior 
executives believed the organisation had passed its sell-by date, moving from a stale 
stagnant organisation to one in decline and decaying.   Executives were invisible as they 
did not want to be seen hovering around a corpse.   
 
A PCT Public Health Manager explains how thinking and communication happen 
separately in each of the different buildings spread across different locations. 
   
PH: It is a function of Chinese whispers, in some respects, in that there are still 
three separate buildings.  Once we are all in one building, it will help, because 
at least the rumours are circulating in one building, not having to leap across 
the ether.
493
   
 
The interviewee illustrates the lack of a coherent voice speaking for one organisation.   
Rather competing voices vie for attention in the power vacuum that has been created by a 
loss of leadership.         
 
A SHA Performance Manager described how the building in which he worked was 
separated into three sections.  Even when an organisation was in one building there were 
separate sections or ‘wings’.  These wings created mental barriers, which were greater 
than the physical distance and space they occupied. 
 
PM: To a certain extent, but as you know, we’re divided into three wings. You 
can go day-to-day, unless you make the effort, either not meeting up with 
anybody in different wings, or seeing anybody from the different portfolios. 
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It’s very easy to drop them an email to ask the question, rather than get off 
your bottom and go and actually speak to people. Unless you’re really clear 
who that person is that you need to speak to, it’s a bit of a deterrent to you 
getting out of your chair to go and speak to people because you don’t want to 
look foolish, and go and ask the wrong person that question. We’re not very 
good at going to speak to people that we don’t know. People aren’t often in the 
office, so you drop them an email; you get a reply back. You might get your 
question answered but you still don’t know whom you’ve been working with, 
because you wouldn’t know that person face to face. There are a lot of people 
here who actually don’t work in the office very often because they’re based 
more out in the patches rather than the office. Perhaps an example of that is 
networks. We’re less likely to contact them, because we don’t know them, 
we’re not familiar with them. It goes back to my first point on communication. 
You always go to the person that you’re happy to talk to, and ask the silly 
questions, rather than go and ask that question to somebody you don’t know 
quite as well.
494
  
 
The interviewee articulates the anxiety felt by staff about the possibility of looking 
‘foolish’, of not knowing something, and the fear of this ignorance being viewed in 
foreign territory acts as a disincentive to move away from one’s own turf.  This was made 
more acute by the fact that many jobs are not based in one building. This affects staff in 
e.g. the Cancer Network, the Cardiac Network and others, who visit different NHS 
organisations ensuring that people are aware of good practice. Therefore, the rapport that 
usually comes from day to day interaction between staff was missing. The interviewee 
noted that these fragmented relationships lead to a reliance on e-mail and a move away 
from personal interaction.  During organisational change there was also a breakup of the 
informal networks that previously existed.   
 
Below, a PCT Governance Manager talks about how relationships during organisational 
change became reliant on formal structures, and while this provides ‘clear lines of 
accountability’, it created a structure that was more rigid were relationships are dependent 
on fixed roles.  During this time, less official interactions were undermined and devalued, 
while prominence was given to the relationships illustrated in the organisation chart.    
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GM: You have to have clear line management, clear accountability and you 
need to be able to be empowered to do whatever it is you need to do your job, 
and not be told: no, you can’t talk to that person or you can’t go to that 
meeting or whatever; it feels very hierarchical at the moment which I’m not 
used to.  You feel a bit as though you’re kind of being squashed down to just 
do your job at that level, and actually if you’re going to achieve change, which 
is what I’m supposed to be doing, you need to be able to influence people at 
all sorts of different levels.  You can’t necessarily do that as easily via other 
people when you don’t know what’s being said in exchanges that you’re not 
party to.
495
  
        
The Governance Manager expresses his frustration at how informal channels of 
communication are undervalued, how this was detrimental to carrying out his job as it did 
not allow for the need to be able to network to effect change in the NHS, that is, to both 
negotiate and influence parties that you are not responsible for or managed by.  Due 
recognition is not given to latent, underlying, less-prescribed working relationships which 
makes the organisation feel very hierarchal.  The interviewee speaks of not being party to 
conversations, leading to a knowledge gap and making future conversations with others 
more difficult. Drawing on Goffman’s concept of stigma, individuals are then deemed 
deficient when compared to the previous norm.             
        
The change in locations entrenched a formal sense of “them and us.”  Individuals use the 
concept of time in ‘talk’ conversation paradoxically, seeing their input in a temporary 
light, but the uncertainty of their future as ongoing.  For them there is no conflict in this 
relationship.  There was heavy use of the following phrases by the workforce: “We are 
stuck in limbo”, “Everyone has gone, there is no one left, there is only us”, “Time will 
tell”, “It is just a matter of time”, “There is no direction”.  It was apparent that staff felt 
trapped in an indeterminate state, experiencing a strong sense of isolation, not knowing 
what the future held and lacking any purpose.      
 
Staff experience what Durkheim 
496
 calls a state of anomie. It is time of organisational 
change where the rules are breaking down and structures are more rigid, leaving 
individuals with a sense of normlessness. The following excerpt illustrates the impact that 
the breakdown of formal structures had on individuals. Here, a PCT Public Health 
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Manager explains how organizational and personal work histories are lost; staff find 
themselves having to, as Beck puts it, ‘produce, stage, cobble together their own 
biographies.’497 
 
“To stop being used as a political football, to let things bed down, to let 
organisations settle down and have a period of real rest from the constant 
change. Not to be used as a political football, and from the financial and 
business point of view, there are lessons we need to learn from the private 
sector. I’m not saying I want the NHS to become a private sector led type of 
organisation, but in my experience, the way that the finances have been 
managed within the NHS is very, very poor. As somebody who’s grown up 
with relatives who’ve all owned their own businesses and I’ve come from that 
sort of background, it horrifies me, the way that the finances are managed. 
You would never do that if you were running your own business. It’s almost 
like a misuse of public sector monies, the way that things are not tightly reined 
in and not kept on top of, and if anything, from the finance and business point 
of view, we need to learn some lessons from the private sector in order to take 
the NHS forward into the future.”498 
 
This illustrates how the interviewee gives substance to Marx’s concept of alienation, a 
workers’ separation from their labour; this is clear to see when individuals speak of 
‘things’ happening to the organisation over which they have no control.  There was a 
disassociation from the decision making process and no sense of when this would return.  
“It seems possible for an individual to fail to live up to what we effectively demand of him 
and yet be relatively untouched by this failure; insulated by alienation.”499 Interviewees 
were in a state of flux, time constraints no longer bound their work and there was an 
indifference to deadlines.       
 
Staff were affected by lack of control, uncertainty and vulnerability.  Desiring security, 
individuals often vocalise their stress.  In the shift from a Conservative government to 
New Labour, health highlighted the differences between parties, with New Labour seen by 
the electorate as compassionate, in its belief in ideas of society and wider community.  
However, the day to day work experiences of staff show a NHS community breaking 
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down. This substantiates Power’s comment that “in pursuit of performance measurement, 
anxieties have been fuelled that threaten to destroy the commitment of individuals to their 
organisations to such an extent that this may undermine performance.”500 Staff feel 
powerless and think that nobody listens to them; this affects not just their work but their 
lives. Work becomes a job, a new attitude in the NHS, for previously individuals spoke of 
working for a common good, a common purpose, with patients as the primary priority. 
Sheila Slaughter and Larry Leslie
501
 made a similar comparison with academia.  The 
changing nature of universities, the introduction of both internal and global markets, has 
seen these institutions no longer orientated along the lines of the greater good.  The 
principles previously guiding academics were those of service and altruism towards 
society but this is no longer the case; rather, profit has become one of the key motivators.  
Furthermore, this change in attitudes of NHS staff links with the work carried out by 
Marmot on the health outcome of civil servants and loss of identity of former employees 
of the Longbridge Rover car plant.
502
  However, Marmot concluded that instability and 
insecurity by its nature can only be experienced briefly. Experienced over a long time, 
these factors become the norm, a part of everyday culture, and in this sense the feelings 
associated with stigma can become institutionalized.    
 
2. Conflict  
As already explained, one of the four aspects of stigma as defined by Goffman is conflict.  
The language used by NHS staff during organisational change is that of a person who has 
a severe illness, or a person engaged in battle.  As explained in Chapter Three, Sontag first 
detailed the relationship between illness and warfare, how doctors and the wider public 
employ this metaphor
503
.  There was a move from early Christian ideas of a specific 
illness being an appropriate punishment for certain behaviours and sins to illness being 
symptomatic of a failure of will.
504
  This way of thinking leads to cancer patients being 
victims, deserving of their illness and in part to blame for the illness.  Sontag notes how 
the vocabulary of cancer uses military terminology such as the invasiveness of cancer cells 
which colonise the body, breaching the bodies’ defences; treatment includes tumours 
being bombarded, cells being killed.
505
   The disease-warfare metaphor establishes ideas 
of enemy through the imagery of foreign bodies and alien invasions creating a distinct 
sense of the other.  A person with an illness such as cancer is defined by this false rhetoric.  
                                                 
500
 Power, M. (1994b) p33 
501
 Slaughter, S & Leslie, L., (1997) 
502
 Marmot, M., (2004)   
503
 Sontag, S.,  (1990)     
504
 Sontag, S., (1990) p43 
505
 Sontag, S., (1990) 64-65  
216 
I contend that the language and discourse of organisational change draws on these 
metaphors by speaking of overcoming difficulties, of having to face adversity head on and 
voicing feelings of betrayal and abandonment.  There is also a sense of open isolation: 
organisational isolation is experienced on an individual level.   
 
Sentiments such as these were voiced frequently during the restructuring. Walking 
through the building at any one time, one heard discussions using the following language.  
“We don’t stand a chance”, “Everything is against us”, “When is it going to end?”, “We 
have been abandoned”, “You have to face it head on”, “It is an uphill struggle”, “We have 
come this far…”, “I have been through this before, I can do it again”, “I have been through 
this before but I don’t know that I will come through this”, “You think it can’t get worse 
but then it does”, “We have to hope for the best”, “Oh well it is going to happen, you just 
have to be prepared”, “They will catch you unawares”, “You have to make yourself 
known, it is about reputation”, “We can’t fall at the last hurdle”, “It is crumbling all 
around us”, “We are cast adrift”.  These brief extracts are a small sample of how staff 
spoke, providing a clear sense of the separation people felt. The language was a reflection 
of inner turmoil, mirroring the disorder, confusion and uncertainty facing the organisation.  
Moreover, this language of conflict and despondency was echoed during the 
implementation of a national, standardised, pay structure for NHS staff. 
 
Over a period of two years, achieving one HR target had become central to PCT success.  
Its implementation was to be a source of much conflict and resentment.  In October 2004 
Agenda for Change (A4C) was introduced into the NHS.  A4C is a national framework on 
which pay is decided, consisting of several bands ranging from 1 to 9.  Its purpose was to 
ensure that all NHS staff were paid equally for the work they did. As discussed in Chapter 
Three, Scott identified that, where the State has neither the knowledge nor the capacity to 
understand local conditions, it creates new rationalising systems.  A4C, while not only 
stigmatising certain job roles, was one of the clearest examples of this type of rationalising 
behaviour.  The A4C programme includes: “a job evaluation-based process that 
harmonizes reward mechanisms and improved structures for learning, knowledge, and 
skills framework, continuing professional development; a common pay spine, rather than 
separate pay arrangements for different staff groups, rewards for increased knowledge and 
skills rather than time served; real incentives for staff and managers to change existing 
patterns of working and embrace new ones.”506  This new pay system excluded directors, 
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doctors and dentists; its focus was on non-medical staff.  The system was seen by Human 
Resources departments as effective for clinical staff, but less so for non-clinical jobs.  Jobs 
like those of Head of Performance and Information and similar performance roles went 
through the A4C process.   
 
The process of introducing Agenda for Change was a perfect demonstration of statecraft 
as described by Scott, in Chapter Three, the process by which the state sees the workings 
of an organisation by imposing its own order.  The rationalising processes introduced job 
profiles involving measures comparing and contrasting types of staff, including and 
excluding specific tasks, as well as differentiating and homogenising all actors and 
actants.  An example of how this affected a performance manager is illustrated below.  
Like Scott’s examples detailed previously, the New Labour government imposed practices 
and job profiles based on a centralised rigid structure which led to certain functions, skills 
and qualities being seen in a negative light.  Specific staff were suddenly stigmatised 
through having attributes that were deemed deeply discrediting;
507
 this was a source of 
anxiety, bitterness and conflict amongst individuals.  Practical, site-specific, local 
knowledge and expertise were replaced or often just cast aside.  This process resulted in 
loss of context, organisational memory, and the abandonment of previously established 
practices.  Hence decision-making during the transitionary period at ground level was 
ineffective, awkward and generally burdensome.  Although the introduction of 
rationalisation processes made claims to greater efficiency, the new system decreased 
overall efficiency while increasing State intervention, surveillance and, more importantly, 
control over the type of workforce employed by the NHS.       
 
A performance manager reveals how stressful day to day work became, on a personal 
level, for staff affected by the introduction and implementation of Agenda for Change, 
then a new grading and pay system. 
 
“The main reason for not wanting to come back to work today was due to the 
fact that I had a meeting with the HR director and my manager (the Director of 
Finance) about A4C.  Jobs like mine fare particularly badly under the review 
as it is a hybrid of several roles.  I am going through a process of appeal as I 
sit on the top of a band, and can’t progress any further.  I believe that work 
expected of me is at a higher level than that which I am currently on.  I feel 
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compelled to go through this process because I know the level I am expected 
to work.  Plus, I am aware through discussions with other Heads of 
Performance and Information in the SHA that they have all been banded one 
level higher than me.  NHS management should not be a snow-capped 
mountain.
508
 A couple of years ago I read an article that said women don’t 
often discuss pay because it makes them feel uncomfortable and that this is the 
start of the inequality pay gap between the sexes.  Well, it is embarrassing and 
it does make me feel wretched, frustrated and angry.  I am fighting a system 
where it is assumed I can’t win but I don’t see why I should be disadvantaged 
by an arbitrary system.”509  
 
It was said, of the A4C review, by a variety of local PCT HR directors, that the 
government were keen to be seen paying nursing staff an adequate salary as they were 
delivering the frontline services.  Those who worked within management and did not have 
direct contact with patients felt that this was being done at their expense.  Within the PCT, 
staff viewed A4C as trying to cost-cut at all levels as the organisation went into a merger, 
(as part of the Commissioning a Patient-led NHS).  The A4C process excluded the PCT 
Chief Executive and Directors.  For them adherence to the strict financial guidelines was 
paramount; they had most to lose because their jobs would be the first to be placed at 
placed at risk.  Several staff went through the appeals process but were sceptical about its 
validity.  This was not a process that staff could master easily; those who did well knew 
the intricacies of the language and how it could be used effectively to gain points.  
Foucault’s idea of governmentality, previously discussed in Chapter Three, is clearly 
applicable here as what is seen is the subtle entrenching of the governing modes of 
thought.  To an outsider, the process and the decisions that were made appeared 
completely arbitrary.  Moreover, there was little support from the HR directorate who 
were overwhelmed by the entire process, including the number of appeals.  Nonetheless, 
A4C implementation became a central DH performance measure, and NHS organisations 
rushed to meet the set timetable as their Chief Execs were aware the assessment led to a 
poor standing nationally.  It also became one of the main points of discontent both within 
the PCT and nationally throughout the NHS.   
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Ethnographic evidence as detailed above illustrates that organisational change, undertaken 
by New Labour, within the NHS was invariably about rationalisation, whether this was 
mergers or standardising pay structures.  Staff affected used the language of warfare and 
conflict to both articulate and empower themselves, mitigating against the sense of stigma 
and rejection felt.  
 
3. Communication 
Communication is one of the key pillars of a successful organisation.  The way in which 
messages are received and transmitted between staff and how an organisation 
communicates its purpose and vision tells an observer a significant amount about the state 
of the organisation itself.    Throughout my ethnographic work and interviews, this was a 
theme mentioned by staff on numerous occasions in various contexts.  
 
The statement below from a SHA Performance Manager highlights the role 
communication plays, and underscores the central role it plays in a performance 
manager’s work.  
 
PM: Communication is a key thing to the success. Everybody working 
together, knowing who to work with, who to contact for anything. Being based 
on one site, as opposed to being on multiple sites, and being able to speak 
face-to-face with people rather than telephone calls, emails; because they’re all 
quite impersonal. Perhaps telephone calls not quite as much.  Having the 
ability to ask questions, challenge where it’s appropriate, and where you’re not 
quite sure of the detail, to admit you don’t know, and have the detail explained 
to you so you get a better understanding. There are too many people who say 
yes, yes, yes but don’t know what the real issue is. It’s easier when there are 
fewer organisations to try and work between, with the partnerships. To 
understand the relationship between all the organisations that you have to deal 
with, like the Councils, and PCTs, the SHAs. So you actually make your own 
organisation more effective.
510
  
            
The interviewee sees open communication lines between all staff as central to a successful 
organisation. Being based in a single site is seen as more conducive to performance work 
as the interviewee is able to challenge individuals on what is being said without having to 
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use email and telephone exchanges.  Personal exchange not only makes questioning given 
responses less antagonistic and confrontational, but may also highlight a performance 
manager’s own lack of knowledge and expertise in specialist areas.  This becomes more 
apparent to the interviewee when talking with multiple agencies. When organisation is 
located across multiple sites, the chief executive is one of the few people who has 
knowledge of what is happening across all of them.         
 
The loss of the principal figure in an organisation, in this case the Chief Executive of the 
PCT, had a hugely detrimental impact on the effectiveness of communication.  Within the 
SHA, performance managers are aware of how great the loss of a chief executive can be to 
an organisation’s productivity and effectiveness; I witnessed this first hand when working 
in the PCT. While communication to all staff was not perfect when this post was filled, the 
departure of the Chief Executive became apparent almost immediately with previously 
weekly updates about the organisation via email less timely and relevant, fortnightly 
briefing bulletins scrapped and meetings, once monthly, reduced in frequency. This 
brought about a greater sense of uncertainty with staff unsure of how their own 
organisation was functioning; the left hand did not know what the right hand was doing; 
people were unaware of what corresponding departments were undertaking and therefore 
unnecessarily duplicated aspects of work.      
 
A PCT Governance Manager talks of feelings of pain, even though he has experienced 
reorganisation before, and of not knowing what is going on, of not fully understanding the 
direction and goal of the process.   
 
GM: The biggest problem is the fact that it’s been allowed to drag on and 
there’s not very good communication with people as to what’s happening; and 
deadlines have slipped and haven’t been performance managed at all.511 
            
Here the interviewee compares the implementation of organisational change to any other 
piece of work.  In this respect, he notes the lack of communication and the missing of 
deadlines as a failure in the project and comments on the ineffective performance 
management.         
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In a similar vein, a PCT Risk Manager speaks of experiencing change in his personal life 
and being unfazed by it; however this is unlike what he encounters in the NHS.    
  
RM: I don’t mind change. I’ve lived in different countries, I’ve moved house 
in different countries, I’ve worked with different nationalities and so my life 
has almost been a constant change, but it’s the change for the sake of change 
that is the most stressful of all.  One thing that the NHS is very poor at is 
communicating.
512
 
    
Poor communication is also touched upon by the interviewee, and this coming after his 
mentioning the stress of NHS changes, leaves me concluding that this led to further 
anxiety and contributed to the pressure and emotional tension.  
  
For NHS organisations the main role of leadership was to articulate the benefits of 
proposed government changes. Effective leadership was to recognise that a message, 
proclaimed once, was not necessarily embedded into the organisation and must be 
reiterated through different media to different groups of staff to become accepted.  
However, while embedded in both the PCT and SHA as an institutional ethnographer, I 
observed that, without a chief executive, communication acted in a void.   
 
A PCT Emergency Care Manager described how amongst the workforce the loss of 
leadership led to low morale. 
 
EC: Morale has been very low and people don’t perform well when their 
morale is low. There hasn’t been clear, decisive, leadership because we were 
without a leadership for six months; which in itself made it very difficult for 
new leaders to come in. We have been an organisation without leadership, and 
then when the new leaders came in it was difficult for them to be effective.
513
            
The interviewee noted the loss of leadership which lasted for a substantial period and had 
a knock-on effect of destabilising the new executive management.  This is similar to 
Goffman’s concept of stigma being transmitted through lineages, first described in 
Chapter Three.  It saw a previous, positive, group identity, being a member of senior 
management, become a significant source of stigma. 
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George Bernard Shaw said, “The single biggest problem in communication is the illusion 
that it has taken place”, a comment relevant to the sudden loss of leadership within the 
PCT.  A leader in the NHS must be able to demonstrate the value added, showing staff 
what contribution their work makes to both the PCT and wider society.  “Added value is 
the difference between the (comprehensively accounted) value of the firm’s output and the 
(comprehensively accounted) cost of the firm’s inputs.  In this specific sense, added value 
is both the proper motivation of corporate activity and the measure of its achievement.”514  
Without a leader, the main channel of communication dried up, leaving staff to speculate 
what was happening to the organisation.  The mood was sombre and during this period 
recourse to black humour was all too evident.   
 
The following remarks are those of a PCT Public Health Manager, speaking about the 
long-drawn-out restructuring process and the many rumours circulating before any official 
announcements were made.   
 
PH: It has been a series of rumours. As things begin to heat up and you are 
thinking, will I have a job or not, it is difficult to focus on your role and on 
keeping your current role spinning, because if your current role is not going to 
be there in the new structure, what is it worth now?  If it is not valued in the 
new one, do they value it now?  That has been quite hard.  There have been a 
lot of people changing. Everyone is very focused on their own worries.  We 
are quite dysfunctional as an organisation at the moment.
515
  
    
Here the interviewee worries not just about whether he will have a job in the future, but 
also the worth of his existing job.  What concerns him is not just job security, but the 
value of his current work.  While the previous interviewee talked about shared feelings of 
disengagement, here the interviewee notes that worry forces individuals to focus on their 
own concerns.  The behaviour identified by the interviewee substantiates Parson’s 
description of the sick role, discussed previously in Chapter Three.  Staff became exempt 
1) from performing their normal social roles and 2) from responsibility for their own state.  
However, sick people are simultaneously required to make a speedy recovery and this is 
seen in the PCT allowing individuals to concentrate on their own immediate concerns.   
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Ulrich Beck puts forward the notion of detraditionalization occurring in society; a 
breakdown of old, closed, fixed structures and relationships.  I would argue, based on the 
ethnographic evidence provided, that during organisational change the opposite occurred 
within the PCT.   As informal relationships were torn apart, staff found themselves falling 
back on traditional hierarchies, something they felt uncomfortable with because wider 
society has experienced detraditionalisation. Hence, the organisation they were working in 
was not reflecting their wider world.  Putnam describes a similar process which he refers 
to as the loss of social capital,
516
 the breakdown of ties and informal trust bonds.  Putnam 
uses the decline of social capital with relation to communities in society.  However, what  
my fieldwork uncovered was that NHS organization, where there are strong values, acted 
as a microcosm of wider society; hence, as I will illustrate, loss of social capital also 
occurs within an organisation experiencing a comprehensive restructuring.  The 
breakdown in communication is so apparent because it is one of the main features of 
conversation.  As an institutional ethnographer, I frequently heard comments such as: “It 
is the unknown,… it is the not knowing”, “Nobody tells us anything, we are being kept in 
the dark”, “No one tells us anything”, “We don’t know where we stand”, “It would be nice 
to know where we stood”, “We can’t make any plans”, “We will know soon enough…”, 
“Communication has broken down”. The usual sources of information dried up and this 
destabilised staff. Information is power; this is true in big organisations such as the NHS 
where formal communication is slow, but where informal networks work rapidly.  With 
these channels now closed off and no current information available, people began to feel 
powerless, as if they had no control over their work or future.    
 
According to Goffman, a sponsored publication by those affected by stigma gives voice to 
shared feelings,
517
 often including inspiring stories, personal experiences and ways of 
dealing with stigma.  The central communication document had been PCT Briefing.  As 
well as informing and updating staff on PCT matters, it had an equally important 
secondary function: it acted as a catalyst for more open discussion within the organisation. 
PCT Briefing gave individual reassurance that it was ‘acceptable’ to talk in public about 
contentious issues affecting the PCT. However, on news of the merger, PCT Briefing 
became less frequent, changing from a regular monthly to a bi-monthly document and 
taking on an overly positive outlook.  In some respects it became propaganda, adopting a 
revisionist role, something that had been missing from early editions. Furthermore, as the 
PCT experienced increasing financial difficulties, the publication was dropped.  Of the 
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many complaints I heard during the reorgansiation regarding the lack of communication, 
the most vocal related to the termination of PCT Briefing.     
 
In the following extract a PCT Public Health Manager complained of the positive spin that 
was placed on difficult issues, seeing it as patronising, as it dismissed the genuine 
concerns of staff.   
 
PH: Communication is going to be difficult in any organisation, but I wonder 
sometimes whether they underestimate us in that they come across that we are 
very upbeat, positive, we are doing all right, keep going, I know it’s difficult 
things.  It is very difficult to come across very genuinely and sometimes it 
would be nice to say, this is really awful, we are in a financial mess, it’s going 
to remain awful for a little while, but these are the things we are trying to do.  
It’s a bit more straightforward and people like to be treated as adults.  That is 
my perception.
518
  
            
The interviewee criticised an attitude which is patriarchal in nature; staff are deemed unfit, 
immature or emotionally unstable to deal with the difficult issues facing the organisation. 
The interviewee however understood the severe issues facing the organisation through 
informal communication channels and remarked that being kept in ignorance of these 
problems by the new executive team did not aid staff relationships.  
 
I have demonstrated how the lack of clear and transparent avenues for communication 
within the NHS during organisational change led to staff being stigmatised. By being kept 
ignorant of the significant aspects of the organisation for which they worked, they became 
outsiders; they were, as Goffman describes, outside the loop.  This was a factor that was 
detrimental to social interactions and staff were deemed, by those better informed, 
deficient when compared to the norm.  
 
4. Tribe/community 
My fieldwork revealed that during organisational change, there was a greater sense of 
community felt by staff with regard to the organisation which would soon no longer exist.  
 
                                                 
518
 Interview with a PCT Public Health Manager, p7 
225 
A PCT Risk Manager spoke of his skills not being fully recognised, of not knowing what 
was happening.  He felt demoralised and disengaged. 
 
RM: It’s been disappointing.  I wasn’t given an opportunity to demonstrate 
that I could do what I said I could do.  I’m now in this kind of limbo.  I’m not 
alone, and although it’s reassuring to know that you’re not alone, it’s still a 
limbo and it’s still demoralising and yes, our chief executive finally 
recognised that some of us are feeling disengaged.
519
     
           
He expressed a further sense of disenfranchisement, a feeling that he was separate to the 
process of change which he was experiencing.  And yet he felt a developing sense of 
community, an experience shared with other staff of not being alone and he gained 
reassurance from this newly-formed community. This sense was also expressed in other 
ways.  As an institutional ethnographer, I observed the frequency with which staff used 
the pronoun ‘we’ instead of ‘I’ to describe their situation.   
 
A PCT Governance Manager gives a short summation of the impact of organisational 
change on his working life. 
 
GM: Well, I’ve been through a couple of re-organisations, nothing as big as 
this though, this current one is probably the biggest and most painful.
520
 
    
As staff experience change, there appears to be an underlying sense of worry.  Fear and 
anxiety levels are high as they face the unknown. These feelings are felt irrespective of the 
number of reorganisations an individual has experienced in the past.  In fact experience of 
past reorganisations and familiarity of the process amplifies the sense of apprehension 
towards current structural changes, because there is an understanding of what will be lost 
in terms of people and practices.  Moreover, there is an awareness that good intentions 
regarding greater efficiency do not necessarily lead to correspondingly good outcomes as 
greater productivity is not guaranteed.      
 
This insecurity and pending doom was heightened by the professional closeness of the 
relationship between the ex-Chief Executive and the individual concerned.  NHS PCT 
organisational structures are predominantly pyramid-shaped.  I observed as an institutional 
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ethnographer that the person at the top of the organisation is the focus of the stigma, and 
that stigma then flows through the organisation.  The tighter the connection, the higher the 
level of stigma, the lesser the connection, the lower.  As previously, discussed in Chapter 
Three, this is known as ‘in group alignments’ and refers to “like-situated individuals, and 
this is only to be expected, since what an individual is or could be derives from the place 
of his kind in the social structure….the individual’s real group, then, is the aggregate of 
persons who are likely to have to suffer the same deprivations as he suffers because of 
having the same stigma; his real ‘group’ in fact, is the category which can serve as his 
discrediting.”521  My fieldwork revealed that in the PCT it was the departing Chief 
Executive who carried the stigma. This passed to his immediate directors (executive team) 
so that, even after he left, the stigma remained.  Middle managers tried to distance 
themselves from the stigmatised by the use of the organisational chart.  There was a sense 
of guilt by association; the hierarchical structure of an organisation base remained 
unaffected because the person at the top makes least impact.  Those lower down seem 
untouched by the stigma, just confused by the reorganisation. Moreover there was a sense 
that when a Chief Executive leaves, he is jumping ship, leaving those staying behind to 
face the battle alone. 
 
Even before the organisation was officially reorganised, staff were aware that change was 
on its way as so many senior executives were leaving.  However during this period staff 
tried to keep up the pretence that nothing was changing, carrying on as normal.  
Conversely as soon as it became official all pretence was pushed aside and staff became 
overly pessimistic about their future and the role they played within the PCT. While 
embedded as an institutional ethnographer, remarks I heard frequently were:  “We are on 
our own”, “Our efforts count for nothing”, “We have no support, the directors have 
jumped ship”, “Where has everyone gone? They have all deserted us”, “Make yourself 
seen, make yourself known”, “We are good, nothing has changed”, “We were good, we 
can be again”, “Where did it go wrong?”, “Where is it all going to end?”  Such words not 
only illustrate the feeling of abandonment but also how staff tried to reassure themselves, 
restore their confidence and re-establish their sense of purpose and belief that everything 
was fine.   
 
What staff say illustrates the concept of the organisation as ill, and further illustrates the 
idea of individuals acting as a group, with a collective conscience and an ailing mindset.  
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NHS organisations and staff have taken on the sick role,
522
 as described by Parsons; those 
identified as sick must be seen to be challenging their situation, actively looking to 
recover.  To have an illness means that sanctions or exclusions can be made against you.  
This can take the form of excluding people from talking or taking part in conversations 
and dialogue.  In contrast society may also deem that exceptions may be made or there 
may be exemptions made of particular behaviour due to illness.  Just as doctors often 
believe they know their patient’s illness better than the patient, the same happens to staff 
in merging organisations.  Outsiders, including external consultants and advisors, believe 
they are best placed to diagnose what is wrong with an organisation. Goffman states, “The 
stigmatised individual thus finds himself in an arena of the detailed argument and 
discussion concerning what he ought to think of himself, that is, his ego identity.  To his 
other troubles he must add that of being simultaneously pushed in several directions by 
professionals who tell him what he should do and feel about what he is and isn’t, and all 
purportedly in his own interests.”523  During my fieldwork I observed that, at an 
organisational level, private consultants and NHS recovery teams were dropped in, on an 
individual basis.  The PCT’s Human Resources promoted little else than CV sessions, 
counselling, and retraining to staff to counteract perceived inertia and stagnation.      
 
7.4 The discourse of Stigma and Policy Implementation  
Performance management not only shapes that which it is measuring, as seen in the 
example of 18 weeks in Chapter Six, but performance managers through their work and 
use of language have shaped how their actions are viewed.  Most importantly, by creating 
a new vocabulary within performance management, they are finding new ways of defining 
what they do. “The individual is a typified discursive construction: identities are 
constructed out of a process of interaction. To shift among interactions is to shift among 
definitions of self.
”524
  “Individual’s self concepts and personal identities are formed and 
modified in part by how they believe others view the organisation for which they work…. 
The close link between an individual’s character and an organisation’s image implies that 
individuals are personally motivated to preserve a positive organisational image and repair 
a negative one.” 525   This idea builds on Cooley’s theory of the looking glass self,526 
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where an individual’s identity and sense of self is shaped and formed from interactions 
with wider society. It is through the perceptions of others that the individual sees himself.   
 
The role of Performance Manager is varied; performance managers like chameleons 
change their outer personae to suit their circumstances. These shifting forms are as much 
about survival in an ever-changing organisation as they are about ensuring their continued 
dominance and success in gathering information. Within management hierarchies, 
information is not only knowledge but power and this is amplified in the role of 
performance management. This was exemplified in an interview:    
 
“You go around looking, watching, listening, asking, and I’ve been all around 
the houses for some stuff, but I’m quite able to voice my own needs. But the 
role isn’t meant to be where you’re a master of everything, because it’s not 
possible. It is much more macro, and we are the front person on performance, 
on key targets. The skills that we need are those of dealing with the people, of 
working with them, of giving the SHA frontline face, and all that 
communicating stuff, influencing, persuading, negotiating, all those things, 
because we’re trying to get stuff out of these people. They don’t much like the 
SHA, keep bothering them, but we know, and they know too, but they forget 
often, because they’re under so much pressure, aren’t they, and we do too, that 
it’s the next line up to the government, and the politics are rife, aren’t 
they?”527 
          
The interviewee states that knowledge is gained through observation as well as listening 
and questioning but getting the right information can be an arduous process.  However he 
sees that a performance manager cannot be an authority on all issues requiring his 
involvement.  Rather, the interviewee sees the performance management role as being the 
conduit for information as well as the portal through which the DH policy is channelled.  
As he says this involves “communicating stuff, influencing, persuading, negotiating” and 
this means that the SHA is not seen in a favourable light. The SHA appears to add to other 
NHS Trusts’ workload and also to be playing politics.      
 
A SHA Performance Manager talks about the operational experience adding to his overall 
authority.  He likens knowing what managers have to do to achieve targets to battle scars. 
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PM: I am able to add value, because I’ve been there, seen it, done it and I have 
an operational credibility.  We sometimes talk about clinical credibility, but 
there’s something about managers having operational credibility and having 
the scars to prove it. That you know what it’s like to have those daily 
meetings, to know the names of the long waiters and sort of trying to squeeze 
them in somehow.  Not sure that’s a uniform across the performance 
management function at the SHA.
528
      
     
The interviewee believes that hospital experience means that clinical managers are more 
receptive and responsive to what he has to say.  This experience is something he feels adds 
to his credibility as a performance manager, yet is not a characteristic of all performance 
managers.  Observations from my fieldwork underscore this sense of stigma attached to 
working solely in non-clinical environments. Performance managers, while holding a wide 
level of knowledge on a number of areas, often lack in-depth expertise. This was picked 
up by clinical managers as a sign of lacking a real understanding of the health systems 
within which they had to work.     
 
In the following extract, a SHA Performance Manager talked about the perception of 
performance managers.  He spoke at length on this topic, demonstrating both his anxiety 
and concern that performance management is seen negatively by hospital and PCT staff.  
Part of a performance manager’s role is to question, to interrogate assumptions and to 
ensure that there is enough detail and evidence for plans and decisions being made. The 
interviewee states that he feels like a ‘professional nag’ and is fears that he adding to the 
burden of work imposed on organisations.   
 
PM: Performance managers are a thorn in the side of trusts and PCTs. We’re 
seen as an irritant, and a nuisance. We’re the people who are always going in 
and doing the chasing on the detail, asking for this, asking for that. PCTs and 
trusts are extremely busy, under a lot of pressure, and in some respects we 
often add to that and some days I feel like a professional nag. I’m trying to 
performance manage when I don’t have any authority to do that, which is the 
difficult area for me, and I’m also trying to do it as a generalist, so even 
though I’ve worked in the NHS for well over 30 years, and worked at 
executive director level in PCTs, there are many areas that I don’t have 
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specialist knowledge in, and, for me, that’s the big area of difficulty in the way 
we work at the moment. Much of what I do is interpreting data that’s already 
been prepared, and applying a little bit of local knowledge to that, and I think 
that’s probably an area of duplication, and I’ll come on to the 18 weeks bit in a 
minute. Certainly, a lot of the data that comes out of decision support could 
form part of Board reports and performance reports, as it is – perhaps with a 
little more local tweaking by decision support. I find that working with my 
organisations, I’m most effective when it’s an area where I do have in-depth 
knowledge and some expertise, because I feel then that I’m adding value in 
those particular areas, and I’m helping them to improve. In other areas, I don’t 
feel I’m adding much value, to be honest with you, which takes me on to the 
whole business of the 18 week issue. To have much impact from a 
performance manager’s point of view, you do have to have considerable 
specialist knowledge in that area. You have to know how general hospitals 
work in detail. How patients flow through and are booked and seen by 
clinicians, and you have to understand something about continuous quality 
improvement – the lean work that’s going on. I think it’s quite a specialist 
area.
529
  
            
This interviewee conveys his insecurity regarding the value he adds as in many areas he 
lacks real in-depth knowledge.  He wonders if his work is of any value as his contribution 
to an issue is neither constructive nor informative.  This lack of expertise affects how he 
sees his role.  Where he makes a difference is when he speaks from experience or where 
he has a thorough grasp of the subject.  This lack of professionalism undermines his 
authority where clinicians are involved in discussions as they recognise gaps in his 
knowledge.  In the earlier chapter “Formation of the NHS,” I provided the ideal type 
contradictions between “managerialism” and “professionalism.”  The interviewee 
articulates the feeling that performance managers strive against, which is that they are 
simply complying with arbitrary rules set from above.  However, the sense that they are 
acting as the enforcers of the State, in this case the Department of Health, meant their 
legitimacy was further undermined.  Those who work in performance management regard 
themselves as true professionals even though they still adhere to the ideal type framework 
of managerialism.  Moreover, the expectation from other NHS staff, particularly 
clinicians, is that they work within a professional framework.  This disparity between 
                                                 
529
 Interview with SHA Performance Manager, p2 
231 
expectations and reality is a source of much inner struggle and contention in the work 
place.  Individuals try to rationalise their behaviour and ensure that their work meets the 
ideal type of professionalism. Unfortunately, this is beyond their remit and often 
impossible, given the nature of the performance management work.         
 
Frequently performance managers commented to me on the lack of public awareness 
about their work, and more importantly its value.  They feel their credibility is questioned, 
and their work not recognised.  Yet performance managers are often as sceptical as the 
public about the worth of their own work:   
 
“Performance means different things to different people and while the higher, 
if you like, Department of Health, NHS level, they might see performance as 
meeting various key performance indicators and set targets.  My view is that a 
lot of those targets mean absolutely squat to the general public.  The general 
public looks at targets in terms of their expectations, a clean bed, a clean 
hospital, people who listen, appropriate treatment at the right time and there is 
still a void in the middle between these key performance indicators and the 
wonderful reports that are given out every quarter or every year and the 
feelings of the general public. Whenever we have complaints, we cannot 
possibly be performing 100% because in the eyes of our patients, we’re still 
getting things wrong.  Wrong might be a minor point, but we’re still getting it 
wrong.”530 
 
Performance may be understood internally by the NHS and the DH but, to the public, 
targets and specifically the achievement of targets mean very little.  They hold no value as 
an achieved target may be at a higher standard than that of the target. One of the ways this 
discrepancy manifests itself is in complaints.  Complaints may rise as expectations rise 
and fail to be adequately met even though all indicators show otherwise.  Levels of 
success are set by politicians and regulators, not by the public. For these groups, success is 
defined in a range of what is both possible and achievable for the NHS.  However, success 
for the public is not necessarily moderated by either of these two factors:   
 
“I guess in terms of month on month improvements, the public aren’t 
informed, and I don’t even know that they would know what I was talking 
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about if I talked about an 18 week target. All the people in my family, for 
example, weren’t aware that this was a big target in the NHS, but when you 
tell them, they do say, oh yes, waiting times are much shorter, aren’t they?”531 
 
The belief being articulated here is that, though the public may not know specific targets, 
they understand the direction of travel being taken by the government, in this case that 
there is a focus on minimising waiting times for consultations and treatment.   
 
“The government can make the population believe that anything they do is 
what the public wants.  Any amount of spin can be put on this.  Clean 
hospitals or lack of cleanliness in hospitals has been an issue for several years 
now.  It never used to be an issue, but it is now.  Things like the overuse of 
antibiotics have now become an issue and that is felt to be part of the problem 
in infections like MRSA and c.diff.  But we shouldn’t be trying to cure the 
infection; we should be trying to prevent the infection.  My view is still that 
clean hospitals prevent infection and cleaner people prevent infection.  And 
therefore, the DH as any other government department, is very adept at putting 
its spin on a change in the NHS and it may well be what a few influential MPs 
as public representatives, campaigning bodies might like to see, but it may not 
be what the general public has actually said.”532 
 
The idea of measuring is that facts speak for themselves.  As described in Chapter Three, 
there is an objectivity that is inherent to reducing a problem to the minimum, hence 
numbers are prized.  Nevertheless, all figures are given to interpretation, all targets are 
translated and no data is provided without commentary.  The introduction of targets 
whether MRSA or c.diff allows a narrative to be told.  It is one area of improvement where 
progress in difficult circumstances is being made.  And yet, while this may meet the 
agendas of politicians and self-interest groups, it may not address the public’s original 
concern:   
 
“I don’t honestly think the public will have the first clue about, if you said to 
them about performance. They would think it sounds just like a theatre show 
or something on TV – I don’t think they’d understand the concept of 
performance as a word in relation to the NHS. What they probably understand 
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is media generated, is the performance or the issues in relation to the acute 
hospitals. What they understand is if you’ve got to wait for hours in A&E, or 
you’re waiting months and months for an operation, or you can’t get on a 
waiting list – that’s the way they view performance. They wouldn’t use that 
word, but that’s the way they view the NHS, some of that is generated 
politically and through the media. I don’t think they’d have any concept about 
PCT performance. They might think about their own GP practice and about 
whether they can see a doctor when they want to, and the right doctor.”533 
 
A PCT Public Health Manager thinks the public have a low regard for performance 
management. The language used highlights both the triviality - “bean counter” - and the 
apparent pointlessness - “moving bits of paper around” - to emphasise this point: 
 
“I would imagine they think there are lots of bean counters and the NHS is 
failing because there are too many managers moving bits of paper around.  I 
imagine the only things that impact on them are if they have waited eight 
hours in A&E themselves, if they are there themselves with their child, or 
whatever, they would think about that.  I shouldn’t think they even imagine the 
other things we count.  Most people do not even know there is a Primary Care 
Trust, let alone Performance Management.”534 
 
The interviewee, though implying that performance management is not a job the public 
would consider worthwhile, nevertheless goes on to state that this is because the public 
lack a clear idea of what the role entails. This view was one that I picked up as an 
institutional ethnographer in the PCT. Senior management thought public perception of 
performance management was low because it was based on the absorption of a media 
narrative, often negative in its portrayal of managers in general.     
 
A  SHA performance manager puts forward the view that targets in themselves have no 
value to the public.  Instead, targets are a means to an end, a process by which to ensure 
NHS services are easily accessible to patients and that those services provided are of a 
good quality.   
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“They realise there are targets and we have to achieve targets to ensure that the  
services are working, that there are quality services, that they are easily 
accessible, that the PCTs are working to the best of their ability and that 
taxpayers’ money is being used optimally. I don’t think that the public is just 
concerned with targets.  I think they are concerned with quality and access.”535 
 
The interviewee believes that targets are a tool by which the state can effectively ensure 
certain aspects of care are being delivered in a cost-effective manner.  As discussed in 
Chapters Three and Six, this perception of how the public view performance management 
is centred on how targets aid a system of rationalisation. What is equally important in this 
statement and evidenced throughout my fieldwork is what is not said, what in fact is 
missing.  There is no mention of employing performance management to reduce risk 
thereby driving up the quality of NHS services, nor does the response make reference to 
increased public accountability through the publication of target information.  This is 
significant as it illustrates how performance managers reconcile the state narrative with 
their reality.  Performance management therefore is not considered beneficial in reducing 
risk or increasing accountability as suggested in New Labour rhetoric, rather it engenders 
a principle of achieving more for less, with the promise of providing public value for 
money.  Yet targets in themselves do not necessarily encourage economic prudence or 
financial restraint; they can merely encourage economy of effort.  In some cases the 
achievement of a target may mean simply spending more money, rather than putting in 
more time and effort to overhaul a service for its long-term improvement, thereby 
guaranteeing its continued viability.               
 
A  SHA performance manager who has been in the NHS for several decades believes that 
the changes to NHS organisations over the years have meant they are less penetrable and 
pertinent to the public. 
 
“MN: The public generally don’t understand the structures of the NHS, they 
wouldn’t understand how performance management takes place. People 
understood what district health authorities were 20 years ago. From that point 
on, they lost the plot, and they don’t understand what a PCT is. They know 
what a hospital is, and they understand that that’s part of the NHS, but they 
don’t know what a PCT is or a Strategic Health Authority is.  
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IV: Why is it that they don’t know? 
MN: Because it changes so much and it’s not hugely rational, because in many 
ways the modern PCTs are exactly the same as the old district health 
authorities. They pretty much cover the same boundaries, they pretty much do 
the same thing, and people know that we’ve got a National Health Service; I 
don’t think they generally understand, and especially older people, that this is 
made up of a family of little different independent organisations – they don’t 
quite understand that. What does Primary Care Trust mean anyway, to the 
public? It’s not a self-explanatory term, is it, but people understand health 
authorities like they would understand a local authority.”536 
 
The interviewee describes how the language used creates a barrier between the general 
public and the health service.  He states the current organisations, PCTs and SHAs, have 
many of the same functions as the predecessors with the names that are not easy to 
understand, and do not, unlike hospitals and GPs, feature in the general vernacular. As an 
embedded institutional ethnographer I heard many concerns on this issue of perceived lack 
of public understanding, revealing a deeper sense of insecurity felt by those working in 
PCTs and SHAs, who believe the lack of immediate recognition is poor reflection on their 
work.  For them it highlights the value and worth given to those others who work in 
hospitals or GP practices.  This anxiety however could simply reflect the public’s greater 
awareness of professions which they contact and experience directly.             
 
A  SHA performance manager explained how the central directive to ensure patients were 
seen and treated within 18 weeks of being referred by a GP was a major policy initiative 
by New Labour.  The performance manager referred to the public understanding of 
general improvements to waiting times, while there appeared to be no similar recognition 
of the achievement of the specific target. 
 
“I don’t believe the patients do understand 18 weeks.  X are putting a lot of 
energy and effort into launching 18 weeks to their public and their patients, 
explaining what it’s about, what it means for them. They’re off on a campaign. 
They believed it should be a national initiative run by the government in trying 
to explain to people what that means. But there’s very little actually coming 
out, centrally. So, they’re undertaking it locally, to explain.  They have a lot of 
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patient and public involvement and links with partners, stakeholder bodies, to 
try and get that message out and, of course, with their own clinicians.”537   
 
The interviewee depicted the lack of clarity about performance messages being 
compounded by the fact that there was no national momentum in announcing the NHS had 
been successful in meeting a manifesto pledge.  Staff felt dissatisfied that their efforts in 
communication and marketing were not matched by the Department of Health.  It was 
seen as a huge blow to the government that the achievement of such a central target, one 
of their core commitments to the NHS, was not publicly acknowledged and therefore did 
not filter into mainstream consciousness.  
 
It was through the eyes of performance management that other NHS staff and the public 
viewed what was measured and counted. Under New Labour, performance management 
was not explicitly defined to the public; rather claims about what it would achieve were 
made.  Policy implementation saw performance managers take on multiple identities; they 
sought to lessen the ambiguity of their role which at times was stigmatising.  My 
interviews have drawn attention to how performance managers through language 
endeavoured to shape and establish how their own actions were seen and understood.  In 
creating a new lexicon, performance managers attempted to define and demarcate they 
work they did.    
 
7.5 The political imperative to policy 
A performance manager plays no direct role in policy formation, though performance-
generated information often influences policy development.  Performance managers are 
seen as enforcers by the State, the Department of Health, as they are involved in 
implementing policies irrespective of clinical reluctance or physical obstacles. A 
performance manager must ensure policy and its corresponding targets are achieved and 
adhered to; because of this responsibility, performance managers frequently find 
themselves having to defend the introduction of a policy.  A constant refrain heard in the 
PCT was “Why didn’t they (the government) introduce this change of policy earlier?”  A 
naïve answer would be to suggest that policymakers, decision makers and government had 
not thought of it earlier.  The more apparent answer is these same people did not consider 
NHS staff ready for the degree of change required.  This question arises so frequently 
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because policy is implemented in parts.  The thinking behind such a measure is to see how 
staff react to the new initiative, but more importantly for it to be embedded in the 
organisation.  However each constituent policy may not lend itself to the next policy, and 
so there is no linear progression.  The introduction of policy during this period was like a 
jigsaw puzzle.  Staff were introduced to policy in pieces, and prevented from knowing 
what the complete picture would be. Thus, it was necessary that each piece was 
recognisable individually, and should present a complete and coherent picture on its own 
right.   
 
When the pieces of policy do not fit together precisely, the interconnections become 
points of tension, manifesting themselves as policy conflicts.  At this point the question: 
“Why didn’t they (the government) introduce this change of policy earlier?” is voiced 
repeatedly.  I realised, while embedded as an institutional ethnographer, that staff were 
aware of the dominant trajectory with regards to policy; staff had a sense of what was on 
the horizon.  It was foolish, therefore, to assume they live in a political void, free from 
media or office speculation.   
 
 A SHA Performance manager detailed how the NHS was at the mercy of politicians’ 
whims and this did not necessarily improve the clinical care given to patients:    
  
“PM: But then the NHS is still within the auspices of the Department of 
Health, and, therefore, is still a political football. It’s all about winning points 
off the political opponents, either around what used to be the waiting-list size, 
then it became waiting times, now we’re getting down to 18 weeks.  What’s 
the next one going to be?  So we can do four-hour turn arounds in A and E, 
which show no clinical benefit at all.  Patients are sometimes required to stay 
longer than four hours in A and E, but actually their care could be 
compromised by pushing them forward into medical assessment units where 
they don’t have the appropriate care.”538 
 
The interviewee describes how targets appear arbitrary in terms of sound clinical 
justification.  There is no organisational control because management decision-making is 
dependent on political manoeuvrings. Observations made during my fieldwork 
corroborated this view that the lack of autonomy regarding decision-making and lack of 
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foresight to future policies was destabilising for those working in performance 
management. Moreover, as Goffman described, and I discussed in Chapter Three, stigma 
originates when individuals are deemed deficient compared to the norm, in this case other 
managers and clinical staff.  The waning of control over work created both a dependency 
culture on the State and a sense of insecurity amongst some performance managers. 
However, not all interviewees took this line. The contrasting view is given in the 
following quotation:    
 
“Quite often, your performance role changes quite quickly, because there are 
political imperatives around which become the most important things. It’s not 
necessarily a bad thing, given the amount of public funding there is, it’s 
reasonable for politicians suddenly to become interested in one thing or 
another. It does mean the direction of travel can suddenly change very quickly, 
which can be frustrating. It also makes medium-term planning probably more 
difficult than it needs to be.”539 
 
This extract illustrates the acceptance by the interviewee of the changing nature of the 
work undertaken, and the fact that, at different times, shifting political imperatives will 
force change in the areas of focus for performance management.  The rationalisation for 
the altering of priorities is that it reflects the will of the people, specifically taxpayers.  
This is an example of politicians being accountable to the electorate.  Nevertheless, though 
this SHA Performance manager is more positive than the previous interviewee, there is 
still recognition of the difficulties this style of priority setting generates. The two 
examples given draw attention to problems in medium-term planning and a sense of 
frustration as incomplete pieces of work are dropped in favour of the new.      
 
A SHA Performance manager set out his belief that the 18 weeks target was only an 
electorate pleaser, as all patients prefer shorter waiting times.    
 
“As a PR issue, I do think the government has implemented 18 weeks to make 
the Health Service look better. And probably, from a financial point of view, 
because of the savings. I’m not quite sure where the savings are going to be 
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made in a pathway, if I’m being totally honest. The Health Service obviously 
had to reduce its overspend and perhaps they saw 18 weeks as one of them.”540 
 
The interviewee acknowledges that, while publicly the 18 weeks target was about 
reducing waiting times, the latent agenda was about economy and financial savings.  The 
performance manager is not sure how monetary gains will be achieved, but there is no 
doubt in his mind that this is real purpose of the target. As an institutional ethnographer I 
observed how this mismatch between motivations influenced the way performance 
managers were perceived by other staff.  Clinical staff viewed them with an element of 
suspicion and distrust as they were unclear about the aims of performance managers.  
Again, this corroborates Goffman’s description of stigma as a quality which is profoundly 
discrediting to an individual or group.          
 
Here, a SHA performance manager recognises the importance to government of 18 weeks 
as a policy, having been a manifesto pledge.  The interviewee justifies the need for an 
additional layer of bureaucracy to measure the target effectively on grounds that shorter 
waiting times are better for patients.   
 
“My perspective is 18 weeks referral to treatment is to improve patient 
expectation outcomes and general view of the system.  It has to be better for 
patients, so I believe it’s a good initiative.  It was a manifesto pledge to cut 
waiting time, so people will deliver on that, which has got to be good.  But the 
benefit to the patient has got to outweigh any bureaucratic target-setting.  
There are, obviously, caveats within the rules to enable people to defer 
treatment for personal reasons and for clinical reasons.  Although people seem 
to be late off the starting blocks in implementing the 18 week initiative, it is a 
good initiative and will improve the outcomes for the patients. So, it has to be 
supported.”541 
 
The interviewee recognised that organisations, both PCTs and hospital Trusts, started to 
make real and significant progress towards the target only near the official introduction 
date.  As implementation had been left late in the day, large cash injections rather than 
service improvements and redesign led to the achievement of the target.  This was 
considered acceptable as the outcome for patients, irrespective of the method by which 
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this was accomplished, was shorter waiting times. Whether this is as easy to defend to 
taxpayers or the public in general is another matter. 
 
A PCT Elderly Care Manager believes that there is a gulf between policy and 
implementation.  He presents his belief that the State, in this case the Department of 
Health, does not allow enough flexibility for performance managers to use their own 
judgement on the most appropriate approach to implementing specific policies.        
 
“EC: There’s too big a gap between the DH and the people on the ground.  
The DH set targets and are fixed on them, they’re not prepared to listen to 
what people on the ground are saying about what the consequences are, and 
adapt and have something sensible. They need to let their senior managers 
manage, and manage to those targets and to that spirit, without having such 
targets fixed….If senior managers are responsible for targets, should be 
saying, no, that’s not what we mean, this is how we should be interpreting the 
targets. Now maybe they’re allowed to, but senior managers within the NHS 
are given that flexibility to say, look, this is the spirit, these are what our aims 
are, we are managing it in an appropriate way.”542 
 
The interviewee speaks of senior managers’ lack of autonomy to interpret targets to reflect 
the motivation behind the policy.  Instead, on an operational basis targets are rigidly 
adhered to, possibly thereby losing the original purpose.  This contrasts with idea of 
gaming, described in Chapter Five, where managers manipulated the rules of the measures 
that contributed to the target to ensure the best result.  Nevertheless, in both instances the 
original intention behind the policy was forgotten.  This has a stigmatising effect on those 
working in performance management, and furthermore it fits with Goffman’s description 
of stigma, previously set out in Chapter Three, as a deeply discrediting attribute.  The lack 
of professional autonomy means that often, as witnessed during my period as an 
institutional ethnographer, performance managers are seen simply as instruments of the 
State. They are considered by other NHS staff to be the mouth-piece of the Department of 
Health, with no ability to tackle policies that seem unreasonable or contradictory.     
These examples highlight how changing political imperatives fundamentally impact 
performance management.  Directional changes in policy meant that its implementation 
had become more dogmatic in order that outcomes were delivered as rapidly as possible, 
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leading to a lack of real professional autonomy, independence and control for performance 
managers who need time to deliberate on decision making and judgements.  As the 
following interviewee describes:   
 
“I wasn’t performance-managed by anybody else, I wasn’t told whether I was 
performing or late or anything like that.  In terms of knowing that we were 
going to hit the deadline we set some key objectives and a proper project plan, 
so, in a way we performance-managed ourselves to make sure that we were 
going to hit.  There wasn’t a budget or anything attached to it, it was more 
project management than performance management.”543 
 
The long-term NHS performance manager’s description illustrates how the role had 
changed over the years.  Previously, there had been less interference from the Department 
of Health, allowing a greater degree of personal autonomy.  An increase in regulation 
around processes has reduced genuine independence in how work is done.  Targets 
invariably alter not just the behaviours of that being monitored, but also the behaviour of 
those placed to undertake the monitoring.  Autonomy is important to managers, and more 
so to performance managers, as its loss corresponds to a loss of credibility with clinical 
staff.  Decreasing credibility is a characteristic which is stigmatising because clinicians are 
often judged to be those who have the patients’ best interests at heart; thus the balance in 
decision making is further skewed if clinicians believe they cannot trust the professional 
independence of the managers with whom they work.        
 
This section has dealt with the politics of policy creation, the lack of involvement of 
performance management in this process and the resulting stigmatising impact on them, as 
seen by a lack of professional autonomy and foresight about their work.  The next section 
will consider what happened when NHS staff, including performance managers, were 
consulted.  
    
7.6 The disenfranchisement of the consultative approach  
Within the NHS under New Labour there has been an increased focus on the consultative 
approach. Public consultations can occur at the local level, within the primary care 
community, the strategic level within health authority localities or at its widest remit at the 
national level as part of exercise undertaken by the Department of Health.  The 
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government’s motivation for using a consultative approach was to promote staff, patients 
and public participation, therefore engendering a stronger sense of local democracy.  
Much publicity was given to the increase in consultations, asking staff and patients for 
their views, as this was promoted to increase accountability, staff, patients and public all 
being active parts of the decision-making process.  The reality as experienced by staff was 
entirely different.  Staff commented frequently, during my fieldwork, about the NHS 
merely paying lip service to the idea as the organisation merely went through the motions. 
Goffman, as previously described in Chapter Three, asserts that stigma originates when 
individuals are deemed deficient when compared to the norm.  When staff views were 
sought only to be ignored, as with each reorganisation came a corresponding consultation, 
staff questioned their value and stated they were suffering from ‘consultation fatigue’.    
 
In the following extract, a PCT Risk Manager discussed what he believed was the purpose 
of consultations. He argued that the government drives through changes, claiming that this 
is at public behest, yet those working within performance are well aware that the public 
have little idea about the things done in their name.    
 
“If it was the government’s way of saving money, that’s fine, then the 
government should be very honest.  But they shouldn’t pull this veil over the 
whole thing that says this is what the public wants.  They probably looked at 
the public purse and the NHS finances and said, we’ve got to come up with a 
very good way of saving money.  The result is commissioning a patient-led 
NHS, which certainly won’t save money over the next years.”544 
 
The reason given by politicians as to why performance management exists is, according to 
this interviewee, false. Risk, while not stated by the interviewee, is being implicitly 
referred to, with the phrase “pull this veil”, and it is taken for granted that I as a fellow 
performance manager will understand this.  However, from my fieldwork I was able to 
ascertain the actual reason for performance management is for greater economy and 
efficiency, which as previously discussed are aspects of rationalisation.   
 
A PCT Commissioning Manager talked about his experience of consultations, including 
both large scale public consultations as well as smaller less significant ones.   
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“There was two pieces of work done with regard to, your NHS, your say, a 
huge national exercise to find out what patients wanted and what patients 
wanted was a choice.  Choice of provider, choice of clinician, all these issues 
around single sex wards, they wanted to be treated with dignity and seen 
quickly and that really was the NHS plan.  In a way, our customers, the 
patients were given the opportunity to say, to shape the direction and actually 
having a NHS plan has been bloody good, you know, for the first time we 
actually have a ten years strategy, and we seem to be doing quite well on that.  
Obviously, the world’s moved on since then. We don’t know if that is still 
what patients want, or what patients want is no MRSA or good clinical 
outcomes, it’s almost… you assume that’s what you’re going to get from the 
NHS.  There’s brand loyalty to the NHS.”545  
 
The interviewee picks up on the public consultations which occurred for both the 
publication of “The NHS Plan (2000)” and Your NHS, Your Say.546  He is of the opinion 
that public involvement provided greater transparency in these large-scale national 
initiatives.  The public, including charities, patient groups, clinical bodies, the Royal 
colleges, trade unions and NHS staff were involved in the development of these huge 
policy drives.  By incorporating and integrating these groups, the New Labour government 
ensured that introduction of their early health directives was implemented with minimum 
resistance.  However, the interviewee notes that patients and the wider public were 
excluded from minor consultations which happened because of changing circumstances.  
He believes that the public are unconcerned about their lack of input, possibly because of 
a deeply ingrained sense of loyalty to the NHS brand which continues irrespective of 
changes.  The value of consultations is in theory to help engage with the public to improve 
the effectiveness of new health policies and increase the efficiency of existing ones. 
However, consultations can and do occur within the NHS which comply with a set 
process: for example, regulations on large scale change mean that there must be a process 
of consultation with staff.  Unfortunately, my time spent as an institutional ethnographer 
highlighted that, in such cases, consultations can be demoralising and counterproductive 
as NHS staff are left feeling disenchanted when their views are ignored.  Once again, this 
lends weight to Goffman’s idea of stigma, as what we see is a devaluation and constriction 
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of personal identity, as the consultative approach appears as a mere formality to the 
introduction of a new policy.        
 
7.7 The language of stigma  
As discussed in Chapter Three, stigmatised groups use and apply concealing behaviours. 
This allows them to pass off actions that may otherwise be questioned in wider society, in 
this case the NHS.  Goffman says this can include the development of specific 
terminology, language and forums in which to communicate freely amongst each other.  
My time spent as an institutional ethnographer revealed the distinctive language within 
performance management.  The public have become more aware of this through political 
rhetoric such as performance, operationalize and delivery.  Other words have become a 
part of performance ‘work.’ They include:   
 
 Active monitoring - An organisation, which was previously achieving 
all targets, starts to underperform in certain areas. While this 
organisation is not failing in these targets, the appearance of poor 
performance across a number of areas leads to a more proactive 
scrutiny by the SHA.   
 Gaming - Individuals work to position their organisation in the best 
light. The term signals ways in which staff try to manipulate the system 
for the best possible result.      
 Horizon scanning - Performance managers attempt to determine what 
issues may lie ahead which may cause a problem in hitting the target.  
They are looking for difficulties and dilemmas that may affect the 
delivery of the target.  It is about eliminating perceived risks, 
identifying threats, and recognising trends that may be detrimental in 
the near future.      
 Target setting - This refers to the way in which local targets are set.  
The process is opaque; however, what it entails leads to a target, which 
organisations are more than likely to achieve.   
 KLOE - Key Lines of Enquiry (Pronounced Chloe) - detailed questions 
that inform audits. Used by auditors and inspection teams to aid both 
their assessments and judgements.  
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 Intelligence gathering - This refers to information, data, plans and 
people, all of whom have an impact on the attainment of a target.  In 
reality this often involves 
 Trajectory - This refers to a plan for the coming months’ activity 
usually plotted on a graph.  Any deviation from the trajectory is seen as 
a possible cause for concern.      
 Control and command - It is a top-down approach to management and 
describes the relationship between the SHA and PCTs; it is personified 
by SHA performance managers.  A performance manager’s role in this 
respect is focused on monitoring, surveillance and scrutiny of the 
actions of Trust staff.       
 
The above words now frame the way in which NHS policy is discussed.  However, this 
use of performance-related language is not solely directed to the NHS; other public 
services also use it, for example as seen in the education sector. In 2008, Professor 
Richard Pring referred to the use of performance language in education as Orwellian.
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By this he meant that language shapes how we see the world: in performance rhetoric 
reminiscent of the language of Big Brother, the voice of the State has a greater capacity to 
control how we think and act.  In the Nuffield review of ‘14-19 education and training 
Annual Report 2004-05’ “The Review noted the poverty of language….The language of 
inputs and outputs, of curriculum delivery and targets, or performance indicators and 
audits, is not the aims and values through which one explores the meaning of personal 
development and fulfilment.”548 The Review makes a strong argument against 
performance management language in education.  However, the role performance 
management language plays in the NHS, while still controversial, is more ambiguous.   
 
Language is a central part of the performance culture yet there is another language, 
internally focused and employed by NHS performance staff to a far greater degree than the 
general performance language.   This language centres around a new section of policy and 
in some respects is transitory, lasting only as long it takes the individual policy to become 
the norm within the healthcare setting.  To an outsider the vocabulary can appear 
ambiguous, but to participants involved in discussion there is a clearer message. My 
fieldwork revealed that it can hide behaviour such as gaming; moreover IT helped create a 
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stronger bond between those who are involved in performance work, providing a sense of 
community.  
 
An example of Goffman’s concept of concealment, as described in Chapter Three, is given 
by a SHA Performance Manager.  He explains the cautious way in which he tells other 
professionals what his job entails.  He is aware of the stigma and the negative 
connotations performance management holds and is therefore careful with the choice of 
words to explain his work:   
 
PM: I play tennis with GPs and dentists and was a bit nervous about telling 
them what I did. We were driving to a match and they said what do you do?  
And I thought about it and the way I described it, I said, I hold the NHS to 
account in X. My role was to ensure that the targets and directives were met 
and not just around access, but around clinical safety, around infection and 
really to be a sort of a sign post.  But, it didn’t help and they still thought I was 
a bit of a grey suit and part of the problem.  But if I was trying to explain to a 
member of the public that I am there to make sure that we’re getting the best 
possible service for you the taxpayer or patient, I can sleep at night with that 
role.
549
  
 
The interviewee negotiates around stereotypes of managers.  In the chapter “Formation of 
the NHS,” the ideal type contradictions between managerialism and professionalism were 
listed.  The interviewee is aware that doctors and dentists to whom he is speaking believe 
a distinction between managerialism and professionalism exists. They view him as 
somebody who is merely implementing the state’s agenda, Department of Health policy, 
which they see as often conflicting with patients’ interests.  I would argue, based on my 
ethnographic observations, that those working in performance employ language as a 
defence mechanism against the accusation that they as managers do not hold the patient’s 
interest as their primary concern.  This is an implicit accusation that all managers face 
from clinical staff, which was brought more sharply into focus by the target culture 
prevalent under New Labour.  The public perception is that performance managers are 
complicit in adding to the bureaucracy created by the state.  Performance management is 
regarded as part of the state machinery by which the state comes between clinicians and 
their patients. As discussed previously, performance management is a type of 
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disembedding mechanism: the state requires the public to place their trust in an abstract 
system and in so doing the state simultaneously removes trust and status from individual 
clinicians and practitioners. This is a move from an old form of trust relations to the new, 
from status to performance. Performance operationalises trust relations in that public 
confidence must be placed in structures and capacities rather than solely in clinicians’ 
knowledge, skills and expertise.  This leads to the tension of which the interviewee is 
aware and which he is trying to deflect.      
 
A SHA Performance Manager expressed his belief that the public perception of 
management in general was negative. 
 
PM: I think it’s kind of anti, there’s a kind of anti-management sort of vibe, 
isn’t there?  And this also stems from Casualty and Holby550 and stuff with 
these negative sort of management types and I think that they (the public) see 
that anything that’s removing money from the front line does not advance.  
That is the general perception of the management within the National Health 
Service.
551
    
        
The interviewee felt that the perception of management was negative because it was 
viewed as removing resources and funding from front line care. This perspective he 
thought was due in part to how management were presented in popular medical dramas.  
Performance management was viewed as hindering care and management as standing in 
the way of real progress in the NHS.            
    
The language of performance allows discussion about concealed practices such as gaming 
and in so doing shows an acceptance of, and a way in which to deal with dubious 
practices, thus a means by which to adapt and disassociate one’s self from the stigma. 
 
7.8 A dictionary of terms  
Language is a central part of the performance culture, playing a specific role; it allows 
those working within to describe hidden working practices in a more explicit fashion and 
acts as a form of concealment.  The work of Sontag illustrates how military language is 
used to describe the treatment of illness, and earlier I detailed how it could be applied to 
those experiencing organisational change.  Now, I want to take it further and illustrate 
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how it lies at the heart of policy implementation and is a part of daily dialogue.  While 
working as an institutional ethnographer, I uncovered words and phrases which are part of 
the 18 weeks vocabulary (see p278 Appendix F: Glossary of 18 weeks terms).       
 
As can be seen, the list is lengthy and comprehensive.  It covers all actions and behaviours 
relating to the 18 weeks policy.  As discussed in Chapters Two and Three, the NHS has 
sought to replicate science in its practices in order to enhance its authority.  While other 
professions within the NHS can call upon science for their credibility, this is not always 
appropriate in management.  Nevertheless, in an effort to gain greater authority and status, 
aspects of science are imitated.  Knorr Cetina argues that this is because there has been a 
move to a knowledge society; this is different from a capital, risk or information society.  
In a knowledge society, what holds currency and therefore value are knowledge and 
expertise; science as a form of knowledge production has a particular cache.
552
 The use of 
charts is one such tool (discussed in Chapter Five); another is the use of technical 
language.  Thus, terminology confers expertise on performance managers and validates 
their work.  Within performance management there is an internal conflict.  Managers are 
policing a norm, i.e. enforcing, regulating and promoting the best practice versus an 
enacting of the theatre of the absurd.  My fieldwork highlighted the pressure performance 
management asserts in encouraging others to fudge, massage and game while language 
acts as a way of normalising this behaviour.  More important, however, is its ability to 
empower performance managers.  Within this performance culture there is what Goffman 
refers to as a “sharing of a single set of normative expectations by all participants, the 
norms being sustained in part because of being incorporated, ….when a rule is broken 
restorative measure will occur; the damaging is terminated and the damage repaired, 
whether by control agencies or by the culprit himself.”553  What I witnessed as an 
institutional ethnographer was the language providing a safety net, hiding a performance 
manager’s fear of not knowing the subject in enough detail and thus lessening the 
likelihood of exposure.    
 
7. 9 Language applied: conversation decoded 
The following is an example of conversation within a performance meeting.  These 
meetings happened on a regular basis, the frequency of which was dependent on a Trust’s 
performance in the previous six weeks.  This particular extract took place between the lead 
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performance manager for 18 weeks and the Chief Executive of the hospital Trust. 
Towards the end of the conversation, the Director of Finance at the SHA joined in.  The 
conversation illustrated the pressure Trusts were under to realize the Further Faster 18 
weeks target, the methods they employed to achieve said target and how the Trust would 
break the news, to the public, that the target had been missed. It is of relevance as it 
highlights issues of gaming, transparency, governance and public accountability.        
 
SHA PM: Is the Trust gaming to get to 85? There is a concern that the trust 
looks like it is gaming?  
CE: What does that mean? 
SHA PM: Well the Trust hits the target short term but then falls back. 
CE: Well it [Farther Faster] is not a target  
SHA PM: Well there are handling issues. We just need to be clear about the 
story. 
CE: I don’t recognise gaming; I see the 85% target. 
SHA PM: We are worried about bounce back.  Sudden death is better than a 
slow prolonged death. 
CE: Are others going first?  
SHA PM: It is better to get the bad news out early. There is a story to 
understand, we need a credible position. 
CE: ‘Story’ has the implication of spin. 
SHA PM: What does your Board understand? Is it open?  
CE: They have known from last Tuesday. 
SHA PM: We need to agree soundbites. 
(chair of the meeting) FD to CE: That is the right reaction.  I like what I have 
heard, openly discussed.  Quickly, you (CE) do it, the more credible the story. 
It needs to pass the Daily Mail test. 
SHA PM: We need same words between the Board, SHA, PCT; one story  
 
First, I will deconstruct what was being said and what implied above.  The conversation 
starts with the PCT Chief Executive being asked by the SHA performance manager 
whether the hospital is manipulating the way in which patients are treated in order to 
achieve the target.  Though all those around the table including the chief executive 
understand what is being asked, he doesn’t like the implication that he would have 
knowledge of that sort of behaviour.  Therefore he asks what this means.  Not wanting to 
antagonise the situation, the SHA performance manager explains using conciliatory 
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language describing gaming as merely achieving the target but being unable to sustain this 
position.  As the target being referred to is a local SHA initiative to be achieved, rather 
than the national target, the Chief Executive is less concerned.  However, as the SHA have 
made Further Faster a regional priority, allocating additional recourses to achieving the 
target before its national deadline, there is concern within the SHA.  This is shown in the 
comment “we need to be clear about the story”, which means everyone, the PCT, the 
hospital Trust and the SHA should provide the same reason as why this local target, 
Further Faster, was missed.  The Chief Executive reiterates that he is unaware of gaming.  
The SHA performance manager, fearful that the Trust will now achieve the Further Faster 
target, worries that the hospital success, due to an increase in resources and capacity will 
be a one-off.  However, when this is removed, the number of patients being seen will drop 
dramatically and the graphical trajectory would show a sudden rise.  The SHA would 
rather see the target missed completely than have weeks of slowing performance, because 
a steady decline would bring greater scrutiny than if the target was missed outright.  The 
non-achievement of a target means that an organisation is still working towards it.  A 
target once achieved and in decline creates more enquires from the media.  The chief 
executive questions whether other Trusts in the same position, that of missing the local 
target, will make their position public before his own hospital.  The reply is that, the 
earlier the public can be informed that the local target has been missed, then the more time 
this gives the Trust and SHA to make a robust case that poor performance will not be long 
term and things are improving.  The chief executive, again worried lest he be seen to be 
manipulating the system, questions the use of the word ‘story’ to describe his approach.  
The SHA performance manager ignores the comments, well aware that meaning of what 
has been said is fully understood, but queries who else knows that failure is likely.  The 
response is the hospital Board are already aware. The conversation closes with an 
agreement that all parties, including the director of finance who has been listening intently 
up until this point, will have a set of words that explains the missing of the local target. 
There will be no gaps in the story, and patients’ care will be paramount and hence pass the 
‘Daily Mail’ test.       
     
Shapin,
554
 when describing the production of science compares laboratories to kitchens, 
and this is similar to Goffman’s ideas of frontstage and backstage, described in Chapter 
Three.  As was illustrated earlier, a performance manager’s perception that he or she lacks 
expertise on specific topics, leads to acting out a role, putting on a performance, with both 
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frontstage and backstage aspects. They take on the qualities they believe a performance 
manager should have.  However, this in itself brings its own pressure; the performance 
manager has to preserve this role.  Scambler, when discussing health-related stigma, 
asserts: “The maintenance of face requires individuals, like actors on a stage, to present 
and sustain positive images of the self…In the absence of an audience they can stop 
performing.”555  The above example of a conversation about 18 weeks illustrates how 
performance managers orientate themselves, both acting a role as well as acting outside 
the role.  As Goffman states: “similarly one finds that those who at the moment are 
routinely concealing their personal or occupational identity may take pleasure in tempting 
the devil, in bringing a conversation with unsuspecting normals around where the normals 
are unknowingly led to make fools of themselves by expressing notions which the 
presence of the passer quietly discredits.”556  To an outsider this may appear simply about 
performance managers asserting their status, creating a sense of superiority, and while this 
may play a part in the interaction this is not its primary purpose.  As an embedded 
institutional ethnographer I witnessed how knowing the language conferred both status 
and prestige; moreover, it was also an outward sign to newer performance managers of the 
community to which they now belong.  The language is a symbol and a conduit; it carries 
social information as well as having the capacity for knowledge sharing.  Furthermore, the 
dialogue shows that the language reaffirms the identity of what it means to be a 
performance manager; it shows how performance managers embody rules, articulate their 
roles, and what happens when there is a breach, a breaking of the role.  I would argue that 
individuals who form part of the same organisation or, more specifically, the same 
profession act in a similar fashion to a family, in that they will repair a breach.  Through 
my fieldwork I observed on numerous occasions that the process of repairing was done by 
ignoring, isolating or excluding the individual physically or as in this case their 
contribution to the conversation.   
 
In creating a performance language there was both a subconscious acknowledgement of 
the stigma and an acceptance that discussion of certain practices could not be spoken 
either openly or publicly.  Therefore, a process of normification and normalisation
557
 
occurred through which the performance managers created a vocabulary which acted as 
framework to their work.  The practical day-to-day implementation of policy was left 
unsupervised by the Department of Health; this was the work of NHS management, in 
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particular performance managers.  Politicians for the most part remain untouched by the 
detail of policy implementation and worked around a “don’t ask, don’t tell” rule. Where 
civil servants and politicians were in a position to know better, it substantiates Goffman’s 
statement “a phantom acceptance is thus allowed to provide the base for the phantom 
normalcy.”558 It was possible for a ‘normal,’ in this case someone outside performance 
management, to become ‘wise’, a courtesy member by their ability to spot ‘clues’, 
recognising the efforts of concealment made by the stigmatised.
559
  Owing to their close 
relationship with performance management, these people were primarily finance managers 
and Chief Executives within NHS Trusts. They had the ability to view their organisation 
through ever-increasing forms of figures which the target culture had created.  
Performance management was tasked with accomplishing the impossible. Where 
politicians could take pride in achieving the impossible, when you know how the 
impossible had been achieved, all sense of accomplishment was lost.  This was the art of 
performance management; the performance manager’s role was to ascertain what the best 
result was for an NHS Trust and how an organisation could achieve it.  Maximizing on 
targets may be in the Trust’s best interest, but whether this was in the interest of the 
patients and the NHS in the long term remains to be seen.  It was not personal trust, which 
was in doubt; rather it is institutional trust which appeared to be undermined by the 
implementation of policy through a target culture.  More current research in this area 
shows that during the New Labour period there were greater resources and funding 
available, higher levels of efficiency and more openness in the NHS than anything seen in 
the last three decades.
560,561
  If staff and the public do not trust reforms when they 
technically work, the reform will be unsustainable.  
 
7.10 Conclusion  
One way of describing stigma is to see it as sign of disgrace which sets a person apart 
from others and in this respect the performance culture under New Labour was 
stigmatising. Performance management stigmatised those working within in it; moreover, 
as the application of performance technologies led to organisational rationalisation this 
sense of stigma widened to affect greater numbers of NHS staff.  In this chapter I have 
focused on stigma, as both a cause and a symptom of rationalisation. I have examined the 
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discourse of stigma in relation to organisational change and policy implementation, 
looking at the political imperative to policy and the language of stigma. As illustrated 
throughout this chapter, the language of stigma contrasts sharply with the ‘risk’ discourse 
of the State described in detail in earlier chapters; it is one which is highly emotive 
compared to the dispassionate language of risk.  
 
Quantification, the use of dashboards and the application of tabularised information are 
the embodiment of rationality but the NHS and the patients it treats are complex. While 
modelling and generalizing can be helpful as conceptual tools, they cannot accurately 
portray societal relations.  Performance management during the New Labour years made 
no real headway in understanding local conditions.  The opinions of staff who had 
practical implicit knowledge gained through years and sometimes even decades of 
experience were disregarded. This knowledge, as described in detail in Chapter Three, 
Scott refers to as metis, is of the moment; it provides context to local issues.  It is difficult 
to write, describe and prove, as its non-explicit nature means it does not fit with the 
positivistic approach to science.  However, this wealth of knowledge is invaluable. The 
tendency to ignore it led to missed alerts and warnings about impending crises, leaving 
staff feeling disillusioned and discounted.    
 
What has become evident from both ethnographic work including the interviews, 18 
weeks case study and observations, is that stigma arises from the fact that performance 
managers are continuously mediating between two roles: representing the State to Trust 
staff and representing the Trust staff to the State.  The two roles have different purposes 
and functions, often mutually exclusive, and yet the State demanded total allegiance to its 
agenda.  There was a sense of cognitive dissonance as performance managers inhabited 
two worlds, had two masters and maintained two identities. This dual role created an 
apologetic character, one that was permanently trying to please the Trust for which it 
worked and also the Department of Health.  Furthermore, an uncomfortable tension for 
performance staff was brought about by their propensity to have conflicting opinions and 
thoughts about the means and methods undertaken to achieve targets.  They were aware of 
their organisations’ expectations but also keenly understood the public perception of 
misinformation, misrepresentation and gaming.  Interviews revealed not so much their 
inner turmoil but the way in which they rationalised and justified their actions.   
 
The performance manager is constantly managing a conflictual situation which explains 
the use of military metaphors, which draw on imagery of both battle and resolution.  In 
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this way, performance managers use language to convey not only the difficulty of the 
situation but also their readiness to overcome obstacles.  Furthermore, military metaphors 
express facets of rationalisation.  This was apparent in the mergers and streamlining 
during organisational change as well as the information gathering and surveillance aspects 
of the performance manager’s role.  Performance language is a subculture which allows 
those working in and around performance management to talk openly without being 
negatively judged or sanctioned.  Like all languages it allows communication to flow 
between peers and excludes those who are not versed in the vocabulary or the work.  
However, while this language is known to a few, the practices and practitioners that do the 
work of performance management will continue to be stigmatised.  It is only when the 
language moves out of the shadows and is understood by the majority of NHS staff that 
performance and the activities of the NHS will become more transparent, providing 
genuine accountability to the public.  
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Chapter 8 
 
Conclusion 
 
This research has focused on presenting a descriptive account of the work of a 
performance manager in order to dispel the myths around its functions.  It is only by 
understanding what is done, by acknowledging what was previously hidden, that we can 
evaluate the contribution and value of performance management to the NHS under New 
Labour.  Moreover, it is only with this knowledge that there can be any true discussion 
about the normative ideals of performance management.  I return to the questions stated in 
the introduction posed by Jeremy Dent and Mahmoud Ezzamel in relation to accounting, 
of which, as I have already stated, performance management is subset. These included: “1) 
how does accounting fit in the totality of an organisation’s activities? How do such 
observed abuses in accounting interact with other organisational mechanism? 2) What 
forces shape the accounting functions in organisations? Why do accounting practices 
evolve over time?  Such questions should, perhaps, be addressed before deriving 
normative accounting propositions.”562  The account I have given of the role of Head of 
Performance and Information expands on these questions, providing explanations and 
possible answers with reference to performance management.  The manifest function of 
performance, according to Blair, was to decrease risk by increasing quality, accountability, 
and transparency.  All of these have been achieved to a degree, though in the main this has 
been independent of the role performance managers played within organisations.  The 
results of my ethnography have shown that performance management has been largely 
unsuccessful in lessening the exposure to risk to which Trusts are subjected.   
 
Performance, a term that New Labour was quick to appropriate and which was originally 
taken up enthusiastically by the NHS, has come to cover a range of actions and behaviour. 
The reason in part was because the term lacked clarity and the resulting ambiguity allowed 
it to be applied to numerous activities.  The versatile nature of the word has allowed it to 
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be used in various situations in a variety of circumstances.  Britain as a Risk State uses 
performance monitoring in both the public sector and in private industry.  It is a way of 
strengthening modes of surveillance, reporting and tightening regulation.  Across all 
sections of society, economic rationality is replacing morality; we see a move from ethos 
to instrumental rationality, where relations are measured by transaction costs.  NHS 
performance management in this regard attempts to operationalise trust relations, which is 
evident in the establishment of performance indicators as a means of measuring and 
monitoring progress.  However, performance has also been reified; this is a new 
phenomenon.  Performance is no longer solely a process, a means to an end, a way of 
improving the NHS.  For the first time in the NHS Plan, we see ‘Performance’ as a goal in 
itself, it appears as a thing in itself.  Those who worked within Performance, including 
myself, were the visible aspect of this type of change within an institution; it was part of 
creating organisational transparency and reaching a wider audience.  Nevertheless, a 
process does not usually have physical representation so the final part of this research 
examined how complete that ‘representation’ was. We cannot go back to a time of 
secrecy, lack of external monitoring, and unconditional authority, but it was necessary to 
establish what happened since the introduction of performance and performance 
management.    
 
8.1 How this research advances our understanding of NHS performance 
management 
The nature of institutional ethnography is that it is specific to a time, a place and a set of 
actors.  Nevertheless, this research demonstrates the impact of experiences and events to 
be more general in terms of the interplay between the State and staff in the NHS.  This 
research has shown that it is not just labour that is undertaken within NHS organisations, 
but also ideological work.  As evidenced in Chapter Seven, as people worked, they 
reconciled their ideology with their action; this was not a static position, a one-off 
occurrence, but rather an ongoing process.  Performance managers did not embrace the 
risk rhetoric employed by politicians; they were gripped by the ideology of rationalisation 
in providing support, substance and value to their work.  The ethnographic work exposed 
the central latent function of performance management as rationalisation. As I have 
illustrated, performance managers were the tool by which state surveillance was carried 
out.  New Labour understood risk arose from not knowing what was being done.  Hence, 
New Labour governments, realising that there were whole areas of health care, among 
them services and procedures of which they had no knowledge, sought to remedy this 
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through surveillance, gathering information in the hope of minimising potential risks. 
Performance management was the means by which the government was able to extend and 
exert power over previously unexamined areas.  
 
I began this thesis with a famous dictum from Aneurin Bevan, the founder of the NHS and 
Minister of Health, 1945-51.  He said: “When a bedpan falls to the floor in Tredegar 
Hospital, its sound should echo in the Palace of Westminster.”  This is pertinent as it both 
set the scene for my research and sums up how performance management acts as the 
amplifier to actions made at a distance.  The NHS was and remains a significant issue for 
governments; decisions made in this area can sway election outcomes.  In 1997, after 
eighteen years out of office, New Labour could not afford to fail. This need for greater 
control was a symptom of wanting to be seen to be delivering on their election promises in 
this area.  As illustrated in Chapter Five, their authority via target setting and Star Ratings 
tables was felt throughout the NHS.  This appeared in the increased levels of monitoring, 
measuring and quantifying of information, most commonly in a tabularised format.   
 
Surveillance decreased levels of trust over a sustained period and had a detrimental knock-
on effect on quality and accountability both in the PCT and the wider NHS, the very areas 
it had hoped to improve.  In Chapter Seven, I revealed that the rationalising nature of 
performance management was in several respects felt most by the performance managers 
themselves.  A sense of stigma around the work done, demonstrated by a specific 
performance management language, was the way in which this manifested itself.  The 
surveillance culture led to a loss of professional autonomy, decision-making and trust.  I 
evidenced, in Chapter Six, how performance managers subjected processes, protocols and 
procedures to increased examination on behalf of the government. However, the technical 
competence and expertise in understanding the rules and regulations became a skill that 
needed to be hidden.  Proficiency brought greater unwanted external scrutiny and, as 
shown in Chapter Seven, the exclusive vocabulary, performance-speak, lessened 
transparency.  
 
During the same period, organisations within the NHS endured constant reorganisation, 
leading to a loss of organisational memory, history and archive. Organisations experienced 
trauma; staff felt increasingly undervalued, morale dropped and a strong sense of being 
under attack from the government as well as the public emerged.  Rationalisation of 
organisations resulted in staff feeling powerless as they lost control over the future 
direction of their working environments.  The reorganisations that the PCT experienced 
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were mirrored throughout the NHS, change was continuous and yet productivity did not 
rise in line with streamlining.  Many of New Labour’s own key markers of success in 
improving PCT productivity have remained virtually static from 2009 to 2010.
563
  The 
process of rationalisation promised increased efficiency and effectiveness for less financial 
input, but this was not always the outcome.  Instead, it appeared that organisations came to 
a standstill, paralysed by a lack of clear leadership.  Communication faltered and staff 
were stuck in limbo, uncertain of their position as well as the role and future of the 
organisation for which they worked.  It was only with the introduction of Foundation 
Trusts that power and control were devolved to a more local level, and even then there 
was an inability to release and relax centralised monitoring systems already in place. 
There needs to be a recognition by governments of all political persuasions that 
reorganisation in itself does not bring about reform and can weaken the very systems they 
are trying to strengthen.  
 
Under the Blair and Brown administrations, performance management became a form of 
bureaucratic administration and NHS staff undertook anonymous labour. Performance 
technologies effectively removed the individual, and in so doing removed both 
responsibility and lessened accountability. Staff working within performance, as well as 
those at the periphery who felt the impact of arbitrary targets, experienced a sense of 
alienation. Their autonomy was weakened as they were compelled to both distance 
themselves from the actual frontline events and to suspend their faculties of judgement 
and reason. The heuristic approach during New Labour’s years in office was one which 
focused on and gave premium to repositories of fragile facts and figures. There was an 
over-reliance on tabularised information, from which narratives had been removed from 
action. The testaments, descriptions and histories given by staff were overridden, side-
lined or omitted from official accounts. The absence of critical reflection, while not felt 
immediately, inevitably made its impact known in due course, as seen in Stoke Mandeville 
Hospital Trust’s thirty three deaths from Clostridium Difficile.  
 
This research makes a case for enabling each citizen, member of staff, patient and member 
of the public to exercise powers of agency, to develop capacities for judgement in order to 
reinvigorate the NHS and to prevent it from continued self-harm.  It is necessary to re-
establish within performance management bonds of trust. How is this to be achieved? To 
quote Arendt, “What I propose, therefore, is very simple: it is nothing more than to think 
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what we are doing.”564 Staff must be given time and space to think of the consequences of 
their actions and the purpose of their work, if the NHS is not to leap from one crisis to the 
next. They need to be empowered to question arbitrary targets and standards that have a 
negative impact on patient care and the quality of service provided or perhaps have no 
value at all. Data cannot be collected ad infinitum at huge financial cost with no 
discernible benefit to patients. Furthermore, the fact that data was used from performance 
management tools to prop up political posturing was unhelpful to the long-term authority 
of the staff who worked in this area.  Performance management will only regain 
legitimacy if the public can see the benefit of the work done, whether this is in an 
improvement in care or making the NHS more financially efficient.   
 
 
8.2 Performance management post-New Labour  
With the medical establishment reasserting its power, the public concerned about 
ineffective targets, the Coalition government seemingly uncertain about the role of 
performance, it has to be asked: “Has performance management become a costly ‘comfort 
blanket’?” Performance management was introduced to re-establish bonds of trust.  If this 
is once again being questioned, where does the future lie for performance management? 
“The audit society is only superficially a distrusting society.  Indeed, auditing is a practice 
which must be trusted and which is also itself, of necessity, trusting.” 565   Without trust in 
the information, performance management is little more than a time-consuming exercise 
in data collection. The Coalition government has already pledged to remove and reduce 
targets in recognition that Trusts are best placed to identify how to deliver healthcare to 
their local populations.  Secretary of State for Health, Andrew Lansley,
566
 when 
addressing parliament on the issue of transparency of outcomes and the future of the NHS 
stated, “Today marks the beginning of an important shift in focus for the NHS and public 
health, away from focusing on politically motivated process targets, and towards what 
matters most: improving quality and delivering health outcomes that are among the best in 
the world.”567  This assertion that attention should no longer be on process but rather 
health outcomes marked a shift in ideology from the previous government.  It remains to 
be seen how this will be implemented in practice and whether there will be a genuine shift 
in power from the central to the local.          
 
                                                 
564
 Arendt, H., (1998) p5 
565
 Power., M., (1997) p123 
566
 Andrew Lansley, Secretary of State for Health May 2010 – September 2012. 
567
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm101220/wmstext/101220m0001.htm#1
012204000573 
260 
The value of targets is being assessed by the Coalition government.  Some may remain 
will do so if there is sufficient evidence to justify their continued use in improving clinical 
standards.  However targets are just one part of performance management.  As I have 
shown, performance allows information to be amassed on all aspects of the NHS on behalf 
of the State, providing it with knowledge of areas that had previously remained unseen.  
The Coalition government has proposed far-reaching reform to the current structure of the 
NHS; this will have a significant impact on the way information is gathered.  The 
documents ‘Equity and excellence: Liberating the NHS’568 in July 2010 and an update in 
June 2011 proposed three key changes to the structure of the NHS.   At first, the 
Department of Health was to take on a more strategic role, but this was changed by the 
June 2011 amendment, which stated that the Secretary of State for Health would remain 
ultimately responsible for Health: a reinstating of the legal responsibility of the Health 
Secretary for the overall performance of the NHS.  The second structural change was with 
regard to SHA & PCTs.  The 10 SHAs and 151 PCTs which were accountable to the 
communities they serve are to be replaced by 500 consortiums of GPs. Former PCT 
responsibility for local health improvement will move to local authorities where a ring-
fenced budget is to be allocated to public health.  GP Consortia will take on the 
responsibility for much of how the NHS budget is spent.
569
  The final proposed structural 
change is that all hospitals should seek Foundation Trust status, being encouraged to move 
outside the NHS to become industries of social enterprise.
570
  The future will see a 
strengthening of the power of Health and Well-being Boards, which are being set up by 
councils, to oversee commissioning and give patients a greater role on them.  The 2011 
update suggested that these boards should retain a lead role for GPs in decision-making, 
but also boost the roles of other professionals e.g. hospital doctors and nurses.   
 
We are in a period of financial constraint.  Public spending is limited and there is no 
additional funding to support the changes to the NHS; funding is contracting in real terms 
rather than expanding.  The figures show there is room for improvement in all aspects of 
care and the NHS is expected to find £20 billion of efficiency savings by 2014.
571
  
Previously, when structures were rearranged in the NHS, it was given additional ‘hump’ 
funding to disentangle the existing structure and establish the new structure. Management 
restructuring will be an integral part of the structural reforms facing the NHS.  A level of 
expertise has developed within the current management, and, as old structures go and new 
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structures come into being, the focus for the Coalition government will be on retaining this 
expertise while promoting greater efficiency and effectiveness. Under the proposed 
reforms, patients will have more information and choice. This will be with regard to 
where, when and by whom they are seen.
572
  Patients are already becoming more 
demanding and this tendency is likely to continue as they seek the best clinical care.   
 
The structural changes proposed in The Health and Social Care Act 2012, plus an 
increasingly demanding public, mean that though specific targets may change, the 
importance of assessing performance against indicators is expected to remain.  Thus, 
while the future of performance management remains uncertain, its functions look likely 
to continue.  The planned radical reform to the current structure of the NHS and its 
possible implications for performance management therefore should be investigated 
further.  Since early 2013, a flurry of reports, each intended to have a major impact on 
NHS conduct, have added weight to my research claims. These are the Francis
573
, 
Keogh
574
 and Berwick
575
 reports.  Independently each of these reports are intended to 
make a considerable impression on how performance is implemented and, taken together, 
they argue for a wide scale re-visioning of performance management culture.  
 
8.2.1 Francis Inquiry 
On the 6th February 2013, Robert Francis QC published his final report into failings at 
Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust. It made for uncomfortable reading.  The 
Francis Report reflects on the loss of up to 1,200 patient lives between 2005-2008 at a cost 
to the public purse of £13,034,300.  It corroborates much of my research and vindicates 
my claim that performance management's sole focus on measuring is detrimental to all.  
This is a truth that for over a decade during the Labour years, was deeply unfashionable; 
even until recently it was unpalatable even to the Coalition government. The findings from 
the Public Inquiry initiated by the former Secretary of State for Health, Andrew Lansley, 
MP, form the basis for The Francis Report.  It took evidence from patients and families, 
hearing their accounts of appalling suffering.  The report describes a closed culture of 
secrecy and defensiveness.  It was endemic throughout the hospital Trust; moreover 
Francis concludes that the characteristics seen at Mid Staffs were likely to be replicated 
throughout the NHS.  In his letter to Jeremy Hunt, MP, Secretary of State for Health, 
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given in the first pages of his report, Francis states: “The extent of the failure of the 
system shown in this report suggests that a fundamental culture change is needed.”576 The 
Francis report blamed no single individual, seeing it instead as a whole-system failure.  
The checks and balances that should have been in place were ignored. This was in part 
because of the many reorganisations which unintentionally resulted in a diminution of care 
towards patients, although their overt aims were to improve the NHS and ensure that 
patients were treated with dignity and suffered no harm. The weighty 1,782 page report 
has 290 recommendations which have major implications for all levels of the health 
service across England.  
8.2.2 Francis recommends 
In his report, Robert Francis QC calls for a whole-service, patient-centred focus. His 
detailed recommendations do not call for a reorganisation of the system, but for a re-
emphasis on what is important, to ensure that this does not happen again. A reading of the 
Francis Report leads me to conclude that implementing 290 recommendations cannot be 
done cheaply if they are to succeed. The report's conclusion:  
“The first inquiry report stated that it should be patients – not numbers – which 
counted. That remains the view of this Inquiry. The demands for financial control, 
corporate governance, commissioning and regulatory systems are understandable 
and in many cases necessary, but it is not the system itself which will ensure that 
the patient is put first day in and day out. It is the people working in the health 
service and those charged with developing healthcare policy that need to ensure 
that is the case. 
The extent of the failure of the system shown in this Inquiry’s report suggests that 
fundamental culture change is needed. That does not require a root and branch 
reorganisation– the system has had many of those – but it requires changes which 
can largely be implemented within the system that has now been created by the 
new reforms. I hope that the recommendations in this report can contribute to that 
end and put patients where they are entitled to be – the first and foremost 
consideration of the system and everyone who works in it.” 577 
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The following themes were focused on: 
 a commitment to common values;  
 adherence to fundamental standards where non-compliance is unacceptable;  
 openness, transparency and candour in work;  
 care and compassion at the heart of nursing; 
 professionalism to include strong patient-centred  leadership;  
 information to be accurate, relevant and honest for transparency to flourish;  
 boards to publish accessible comparative information and noncompliance against 
standards aiding public accountability;  
 effective health service requires stability; impact assessments undertaken before 
structural reorganisations occur;  
 DH to have a greater understanding of patients’ needs and concerns.578   
Mid-Staffordshire Hospitals were pursuing Foundation status which meant their focus was 
to achieve key targets, including in finance. The evidence from the Inquiry shows this 
diverted the Board from the quality of patient care, thereby compromising patient 
experience and health outcomes.  Francis recognises that to some degree the problems 
seen in Mid-Staffordshire occur in most Trusts, though not to the same scale; my research 
corroborates these findings.  Finally, Francis made clear in his report that cultural change 
cannot be dependent on government alone and that staff throughout the NHS had a 
responsibility to change their approach to prevent Mid-Staffordshire-like incidents 
surfacing again.  
8.2.3 Keogh Review  
Professor Sir Bruce Keogh’s “Review into the quality of care and treatment provided by 
14 hospital trusts in England: overview report,”579 focused on 14 English hospitals with 
the worst mortality rates. The report was commissioned in the wake of the second Francis 
inquiry into Stafford hospital and launched in a period of political recriminations about the 
way the NHS was managed. On 6th February 2013, the Prime Minister David Cameron 
announced that he had asked Professor Sir Bruce Keogh, NHS Medical Director for 
England, to review the quality of care and treatment provided by those NHS trusts and 
NHS foundation trusts that are persistent outliers on mortality indicators. The report 
reflects the growing concern about the capacity of the NHS to deliver high quality, safe 
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and compassionate care. The anxiety arising from the findings of the Francis report was 
that there might be “more Mid-Staffs” which had gone below the radar of the regulator, 
that similar crises in care were happening across the country but remaining undetected. 
The report provided much ammunition for those seeking to gain political points and who 
sought to discredit the NHS, the regulators, the Coalition government and the previous 
Labour governments, under both Blair and Brown. Nevertheless, the review itself gave a 
balanced, thorough and thoughtful appraisal of the 14 hospitals concerned. Unlike the 
barrage of recommendations made by Francis, Keogh sets out what must happen in order 
to rectify the low standards of care at the hospital Trusts as well as providing lessons for 
the wider NHS in the form of eight ambitions.    
The report brought no real surprise for me.  Keogh showed that warning signs had been 
missed or in many cases dismissed, and observed that the performance culture was one 
that exacerbated a multitude of problems. He noted that from junior doctors right up 
through the NHS hospital hierarchy, there was a culture in which no-one-spoke, no-one 
asked and no-one heeded warnings.   
The lessons from the Keogh review must not be confined only to those hospitals that are 
currently the subject of special measures. All healthcare organisations, both NHS and non-
NHS, need to be alert to problems and concerns.  Both clinicians and managers need to be 
candid, curious and more importantly courageous in asking the awkward questions. 
Openness and transparency must become a central part of the NHS culture when risks to 
patients or to organisational governance are exposed, not alien to it.  Finding and funding 
the resources to support the appropriate intervention will be a major challenge in today’s 
financially-challenged economy, especially in the face of an ever-growing NHS budget 
deficit and an ageing population.  But standards of poor care must be addressed otherwise 
such scandals as those reported in the Francis and Keogh reports will continue.  
Questions initially posed to the Blair government following the scandals of Alder Hey, 
Bristol and Shipman, discussed in Chapter Two, raised two recurrent questions:  “How 
could this happen?” and “How could such happenings go unnoticed for so long?”  These 
continue to be the same questions that occupy the public.  They are perplexed as to why, 
given the investment in both information technology and performance monitoring better 
information is not available in order to provide an accurate reflection of how NHS bodies 
are performing.  Moreover, the evidence of poor performance is a source of much anger to 
the electorate.  Politicians of all persuasions know that they are being held responsible for 
the NHS’s failings.  The Keogh report recognises that the hospitals reviewed had suffered 
265 
well-documented problems over several years and opines that “these organisations have 
been trapped in mediocrity.” The implication of this statement is that all performance 
management systems, such as those discussed in Chapters Five and Six, had no significant 
benefit to the quality of care received by patients during that those years, thereby 
supporting my claim that these systems were ineffective in terms of risk reduction.  
8.2.4 Berwick Review 
Following the Francis Report into the failings of care at Mid-Staffordshire Hospitals, the 
Prime Minister David Cameron asked Professor Don Berwick to carry out a review into 
safety in the NHS, an area in which he is an expert.  His findings were published in ‘A 
promise to learn - a commitment to act: Improving the safety of patients in England’580 
(August 2013).  Unlike the Francis Review, it did not make hundreds of 
recommendations.  It was a less substantial document whose conclusion was that the focus 
of the NHS should be putting patient safety and experience at the very heart of the 
healthcare, meaning that it should be central to all aspects of commissioning and delivery 
of services.   
The report highlights the main problems affecting patient safety in the NHS and makes the 
following recommendations to address them. It says that the health system must: 
“• recognise with clarity and courage the need for wide systemic change 
• abandon blame as a tool 
• reassert the primacy of working with patients and carers to achieve health care 
goals 
• use quantitative targets with caution 
• recognise that transparency is essential and expect and insist on it at  all levels 
and with regard to all types of information 
• ensure that responsibility for functions related to safety and improvement are 
vested clearly and simply 
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• give the people of the NHS - top-to-bottom, career-long help to learn, master and 
apply modern methods for quality control, quality improvement and quality 
planning 
• make sure pride and joy in work, not fear, infuse the NHS”581 
Reviews such as those by Francis, Keogh and Berwick have been necessary because the 
performance systems which I have described in detail are no longer trusted.  The culture in 
place does not deal adequately with persisting poor performance. A key output of the 
Keogh review is to bequeath a framework and methodology to the NHS. As he says: “I 
was keen to provide an accurate diagnosis, write the prescription and, most importantly, 
identify what help and support they needed to assist their recovery or accelerate 
improvement.”582 The Keogh review calls for all the fragmented data about quality in 
hospitals, both quantitative and qualitative, to be brought together in a useable form, and 
for trusts to invest in the skills to interpret and use them.  It calls for real-time patient 
feedback and comment to become routine and “reach well beyond the Friends and Family 
test” that is part of the current assessment.  The Keogh report also calls for a 
comprehensive approach to reviewing Trusts’ performance, and one that relies on data and 
is transparent as well as multi-disciplinary.  The report’s investigation were a tough but 
fair process which uncovered things previously not revealed - for example, the disparity 
between reported and actual staffing levels on wards.  It was the very antithesis of the tick 
box, generic approach previously used by the CQC. 
The new Chief Inspector of Hospitals at the CQC, Sir Mike Richards, though only 
recently appointed to the post spoke almost immediately of his desire to see patients and 
the public being involved in inspections.  This reinforces suggestions made in the Keogh’s 
report that “involving patients and staff was the single most powerful aspect of the review 
process” and sets out an ambition that “patients, carers and members of the public will 
increasingly feel that they are being treated as vital and equal partners in the design and 
assessment of their local NHS”. It also tallies with my research; however, while all three 
reports state that endless and needless reorganisations were harmful as they moved 
management's focus away from patient care, this is not its main claim. The main thrust of 
the reports is to show that, in striving to meet national targets, patients were and continue 
to be seen as numbers, not people.  Layers of bureaucracy, procedures, process, plans do 
not give greater understanding of what is happening on the ground. Financial 
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rationalisation and increased standardisation increase risk of harm.  Quantification, in 
terms of achieving targets is not genuine public accountability. Finally, all NHS staff have 
been complicit in this culture. 
8.3 Future directions of this research 
This research has focused solely on performance under New Labour.  This is because, 
during this period, there was a proliferation of this type of management, in part as a means 
of ensuring manifesto pledges were delivered.  When I began my research, there were few 
studies that looked at the performance management in the NHS.  As this research comes to 
an end, this is beginning to change.
583, 584, 585, 586
  Nevertheless, performance management 
still needs the rigour of research brought to its activities. The three reports, Francis, Keogh 
and Berwick, discussed above, push for a new performance culture. Prime Minister David 
Cameron has called for a zero tolerance to patient harm
587
 while the Secretary of State for 
Health, Jeremy Hunt, has spoken in parliament about a culture of compassion
588
 being a 
key marker of NHS success.  Both have discussed the distorting impact of targets and the 
box-ticking performance ethos which led to serious failings of care in the NHS.  
Nevertheless, how this new performance management framework aids transparency and 
increases public accountability is yet to be assessed. What is clear is that performance 
management will need to develop and evolve rapidly, and how this impacts those that 
work in this area requires much consideration.    
 
This thesis has focused on how performance works in healthcare.  Its scope is specific, in 
that the ethnographic work was done within primary care and Strategic Health Authority 
settings.  Further research should focus on how performance management works in other 
areas.  In recent years, substantial literature on performance in other areas of the public 
sector has been published; this includes both education and social care.  However, it is 
performance as a process of delivery that needs to be considered. There are three key areas 
where widening the remit of the research would be beneficial.  Firstly, the question of why 
performance appears to be the preferred tool of choice for policy advisors should be 
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considered.  Ashmore et al sought the opinion of health economists
589
 while my research 
has focused on NHS staff.  However, policy advisors who are civil servants by training 
have a huge impact on the creation and implementation of policy, yet their judgements, 
opinions and reasoning with regard to the NHS are not widely pursued or understood.  
Hence the need for research in this area.   
 
A second key area of research would be to investigate how performance has developed in 
private healthcare.  New Labour introduced private providers to deliver not only auxiliary 
services, such as cleaning and IT, but also care, and the Coalition government are keen to 
extend this further.  There has been a greater degree of involvement in delivering NHS 
care through private companies. It is therefore necessary to understand how performance 
works in this environment.  
 
Thirdly, it is essential that the role of the healthcare regulator, the Care Quality 
Commission, (CQC), be examined in greater detail.  CQC’s role is to ensure that services 
are as safe as possible so that the best is experienced across the country rather than just in 
pockets.  Nevertheless, though there has been a national regulator throughout the 
introduction and embedding of performance targets, huge variation amongst providers and 
services still persists.  While targets remain, the Coalition has moved towards outcome 
measures with a focus on quality standards developed by NICE.  The future will see CQC 
reviewers continuing to note areas of both immediate concern and good practice.  
However, as the focus will continue to be on compliance with core measures and the role 
of the regulator is to remedy bad practice, the CQC will come under the greatest scrutiny 
from parliament, the public and press.  Compliance with standards in the NHS, as has 
already been seen, means that there will be those individuals and Trusts that seek the 
maximum return for minimum effort to the detriment of patients, and this is where the 
danger lies. One of the normative accounts of performance was it offered the means by 
which progress could be measured; the strength of the regulator will determine whether 
progress made is genuine, and thus there is the need for independent research.  
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Appendix A  
 
Roles of Staff identified and interviewed 
 
Formal semi-structured interviews were conducted with a total of 17 staff from the 
Primary Care Trust (PCT) and Strategic Health Authority (SHA). Informal discussions 
were also held with a number of staff as part of observations. 
 
 Clinical Governance Manager 
 Commissioning Manager 
 Elderly Care Manager 
 Emergency Care Manager 
 Finance Manager 
 Governance Manager 
 Primary Care Manager 
 Public Health Manager 
 Risk Manager 
 
 SHA Performance Manager  8 
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Appendix B 
UCL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY STUDIES 
 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
I (Shana Vijayan), a Graduate Student in the Department of Science and 
Technology Studies at University College London (UCL), and Head of 
Performance and Information with …. PCT, am conducting a social research 
study of Performance Management in the NHS.  This research is toward my 
doctoral thesis on this subject.  You have been selected to participate due to your 
role in performance and/or your ability to affect performance outcomes and I hope 
you will be able to assist me in my research. 
 
Why is this study important?  
The study will shed light on participants’ day to day experiences of life and work in 
and around performance management in today’s NHS.  The research aims to 
provide an account of performance management, which is important because no 
study or evaluation of performance management has taken place.  By asking 
those dealing directly with performance issues, this research intends to go some 
way to filling this gap. 
 
What will the study involve?   
Participation will involve an oral history interview, lasting approximately one hour, 
or period of time agreeable to you as the interview subject. There will also be an 
observational aspect to the study which will be gathered on a day to day basis.   
 
The interview will be audio- taped and transcribed. Your taped and transcribed 
responses may be quoted though your name will remain anonymous in 
publications resulting from this research.   
 
The data from the observational study and the interviews will be kept 5 years from 
the date of PhD completion after which time it will then be destroyed.  
 
The general conclusions of the study will be communicated to  ...PCT but this will 
not affect the anonymity of individuals involved.  All personal information will be 
treated confidentially. 
 
I am happy to answer any questions or research-related problems.  You may 
contact me, Ms Vijayan, on:  …………………….. 
 
You have two weeks in which to decide whether or not you wish to participate.  
Participation in this research is entirely voluntary.  You may refuse to participate at 
any time without penalty.  
 
 
What if I change my mind about being involved? 
You can decide not be a part of this research at any time without it affecting our 
professional relationship.  
 
What do I do now? 
Let me know whether you would like to take part and when you would like to 
undertake the interview.  If you have any further questions please do not hesitate 
to contact me on the above number. 
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Appendix C 
UCL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY STUDIES 
 
Consent Document 
 
Title of research: Performance management in the NHS 
Name of researcher: Shana Vijayan 
Position within … PCT: Head of Performance and Information   
 
               Please initial the box 
 
I have read and understood the information letter for participants.  
 
 
 
I have received enough information about what my role involves. 
 
 
I understand that my decision to consent is entirely voluntary and that I am  
free to withdraw from the study at any time without having to give a reason;  
and I know this will not affect me in the future. 
 
 
 
I consent to participate in the observational study.  
 
 
I consent to be interviewed on ………………………_____________________ 
 
 
I consent to the interview being audio- taped and transcribed and for the 
researcher keeping this data for up to 5 years following the completion  
of her PhD.  
 
 
I consent to the general findings of the study being communicated to the 
PCT but understand that this does not affect my anonymity since raw data  
will remain confidential.    
 
 
I have received a copy of this consent document to keep.   
 
 
……………………………_________________.................__________
 _________   
Participant’s Signature    Date 
 
 
____________________________ 
…………………………… 
Participant’s name in BLOCK LETTERS 
 
 
_ 
……………………………    …………… 
Researcher’s Signature    Date 
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Appendix D 
 
 
Balanced Scorecard - Indicator listings for Primary Care Trusts 
 
Key targets  
 Access to a GP   
 Access to a primary care professional (PCP)   
 Drug misusers accessing treatment   
 Elective patients waiting longer than standard   
 Financial management   
 Four-week smoking quitters   
 Outpatients waiting longer than standard   
 Total time in A&E: four hours or less   
 
Access to quality services  
 Ambulance category A calls meeting 8-minute target   
 Commissioning of assertive outreach services   
 Commissioning of new mental health workers and crisis resolution services   
 Delayed transfers of care   
 NHS dentistry   
 PCT patient survey: access and waiting   
 PCT patient survey: better information, more choice   
 PCT patient survey: building closer relationships   
 PCT patient survey: clean, comfortable, friendly place to be   
 PCT patient survey: safe, high quality, coordinated care   
 Sexual health   
 Six month inpatient waits   
 Thrombolysis - 60 minute call to needle time   
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Balanced Scorecard - Indicator listings for Primary Care Trusts continued  
Improving health  
 Cervical screening   
 Death rates from cancer, ages under 75 (change in rate)   
 Death rates from circulatory diseases, ages under 75 (change in rate)   
 Diabetic retinopathy screening   
 Flu vaccinations   
 Health equity audit   
 Immunisation: MMR   
 Infant health   
 Teenage pregnancy   
 
Service provision  
 CAMHS   
 Child protection   
 Community equipment   
 Data quality on ethnic group   
 Learning disability: identification in primary care and reducing long-term NHS 
residence   
 Risk management   
 Staff opinion survey: health, safety and incidents   
 Staff opinion survey: human resource management   
 Staff opinion survey: staff attitudes   
 Workforce indicator   
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Appendix F: Glossary of 18 weeks terms  
 
 Ambushed - Where the SHA is caught unaware by the DH.   
 Backlog - Patients, who are in the system, have passed 18 weeks 
treatment but not had treatment.   
 Bounce back - Organisations achieve the target at the expected date.  
However all resources have been employed in attaining the target.  The 
target is no longer as important, it is now yesterday’s news. 
Management become blasé, nonchalant in their attitude and expectations 
of clinicians ease. It is during this period that waiting times increase, 
hence the term bounce back.    
 Breach - The target has been exceeded and the patient waited more than 
the demarcated period.  All patients on entering the system are assigned 
have a breach date. If the waiting time should go beyond this date then 
they become a ‘breach.’          
 Camouflage - Where a small issue conceals a more complex problem.   
 Casualties - 18 weeks is a national priority as such other targets are 
pushed aside.  The achievement of 18 weeks takes precedence over less 
visible targets.    
 Clearance - Organisations should be achieving above the target on a 
weekly basis. This is due to two reasons.  Firstly, the thresholds and 
tolerance for achieving a target can change slightly; Trusts therefore do 
not want to fail because of one percentage point. Secondly, a Trust’s 
performance varies throughout the year and hence over-performance 
seeks to compensate for those periods of poor performance.      
 Clock start - An initial referral by a GP initiates a clock start; this leads 
to the start of first definitive treatment which is the clock stop.  
 Collateral damage - Targets that are considered minor which are 
allowed to be missed in order that the high profile targets may be 
achieved. A shift in priorities may mean that high profile illness get 
preference, whereas the Cinderella services suffer further cutbacks.  
This also can refer to staff dissatisfaction or the loss a senior member of 
clinical staff due to the change in priorities.    
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 Fit and ready/ fit for action - The clock (re-)starts from the date that it 
is deemed clinically appropriate for the patient to undergo a procedure. 
 Hollowing out - Where there has been a build-up of patients, a backlog 
develops.  At periodic intervals extra capacity is created on a temporary 
basis and resource is identified to reduce the numbers waiting to be 
treated.  When number of patients not treated in the appropriate 
timeframe has become significant, scrutiny from the DH or local media 
leads the executive team to implement remedial action.  This short term 
measure is referred to as hollowing out.      
 Legacy - Patients who are in the system yet not on an 18 weeks 
pathway.  This is because their treatment started before the introduction 
of the 18 weeks policy. 
 MIA - This is an actually a “did not attend”, DNA. Where a patient fails 
to attend an appointment/ admission without providing advanced notice 
to a hospital.  Blame for a failure to attend was originally placed with 
the patient; however on further investigation a batch of appointment 
letters may have gone missing, making it a hospital administrative error.         
 Near miss - Patients whose treatment fell close to the breach date 
because, they had fallen outside the system because of a lack of 
administrative focus on their pathway.  
 Rallying the troops - The SHA’s role is to motivate organisations to 
continually strive towards the target.  Organisations can feel 
disenchanted, because the target seems out of their reach or unrealistic.  
Long periods of poor performance can undermine an organisation’s 
confidence in its ability to achieve.  
 Regime change - A new chief executive appoints new directors for an 
organisation that had been labelled failing on key targets including 18 
weeks.   
 Run rate - The average time it takes for patients to be treated and go 
through the system. If the run rate is too high it can be unaffordable for 
the PCT and therefore unsustainable in the long term. On the other hand, 
if the run rate is too low, it can lead to increased backlog and a 
breaching of the target.    
 Smoothing - Where a graphical trajectory shows erratic performance, 
management suggest actions to prevent continued instability in the 
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system and provide a more sustainable approach.  An inconsistent 
trajectory suggests that staff are on the back foot when problems arise 
and are not resilience planning.  Hence there are no contingency plans in 
place for a higher volume of patients or an outbreak of illness amongst 
staff.        
 Sudden death - 1) This is when management suddenly become aware 
that a specific department is using the old method of measuring, stages 
of treatment rather than referral to treatment. Stages of Treatment is 
divided into the time it takes to get a diagnostic appointment, an 
outpatient appointment and an inpatient appointment.  You cannot add 
up the Stage of Treatment milestones and get a Referral to Treatment 
time. The total stages of treatment milestones exceed the RTT time. The 
volume of patients that would have to be seen and treated is too great. 
This leads to the sudden realisation that the achievement of 18 weeks 
target is completely out of reach.  2) It can also mean a complete 
missing of the target, rather than being near the target with the false 
expectation that you will be able to achieve that target shortly. Sudden 
death means that there are no unrealistic exceptions of what is feasible.   
 Surrender - Clinicians “capitulate” to management pressure and adopt 
new ways of working, having previously been vocal and resistant to 
suggested change.   
 Tolerance - The upper and lower limits of the target.  
 Watchful waiting - This is another term for active monitoring when a 
waiting time clock is stopped as it is clinically inappropriate to provide 
treatment to the patient.  It may necessary to understand how the illness 
progresses before ascertaining what would be the most appropriate 
treatment.    
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